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Abstract
In this thesis the author aims to make a contribution to our understanding o f mass attitudes 
towards European integration.
The initial theoretical backdrop is the field of regional integration, where mass attitudes are 
generally specified to play a minimal role in integrative developments. I criticise this 
viewpoint, and in particular the Permissive Consensus approach of Lindberg and Scheingold 
(1970), from an empirical and theoretical stance, arguing instead that public support for 
European integration is capable o f fulfilling an important legitimising function.
Amongst other researchers that view public opinion as worthy of study, the consensus is that 
mass support for integration is largely a function o f utilitarian calculations. My starting 
points are the large, unexplained differences in support by country that remain in many 
utilitarian studies. I hypothesise that explanations o f  mass support for integration are 
complemented by the inclusion o f variables that account for so-called ‘affective* attitudes. 
Specifically, I construct variables measuring national pride, European identity, nationalism 
and racism for European Union respondents surveyed in the International Social Survey 
Programme 1995 National Identity dataset. Here, as elsewhere in the thesis, I use commonly 
applied social sciences methodologies to test my hypotheses both at aggregate and country 
level. Essentially, I show that higher levels of pride and European identity are positively 
related to support, while nationalism and racism are negatively related.
A second empirical section to the thesis addresses how the four affective concepts interrelate 
with one another in the data. Although I do not formulate specific hypotheses in this case, I 
am, however, informed by the socio-psychological literature concerning social identity. In a 
final empirical section, I use Eurobarometer data to attempt an explanation o f non-attitudes 
towards European integration, shown to be ubiquitous in both surveys. Here, the explanatory 
focus is on education, knowledge and interest in politics rather than affective variables.
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INTRODUCTION
“The European idea is empty, it has neither the transcendence o f  Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of 
concrete patriotism. It was created by intellectuals, and that fact accounts at once for its genuine appeal to the 
mind and its feeble echo in the heart.” Raymond Aron (1954, p. 316).
The post-war fantasy o f a United States o f  Europe, and the subsequent reality of the European 
Communities was an undeniably elite-minded project. A vade mecum o f early participants 
might give prominence to visionary statesmen such as Winston Churchill, Aristide Briand or 
Count Coundenhove-Kalergi, or the contribution o f political entrepreneurs such as Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman. One would doubtless also be minded to stress the role of a 
wider class o f policy-makers, administrators and economic interests in the United States of 
America and the governments o f the "Original Six’, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, from a long list o f biographies, memoirs and 
histories one notable actor is absent: the general public, whether in the form o f  a pan- 
European consciousness, as a significant national or pan-national political party or movement 
calling for closer European integration, or even in a more radical, revolutionary guise1.
This initial pattern o f events is adopted in many of the International Relations-based theories 
o f European integration (see chapter one), where the main determinants o f the direction and 
pace of integration are policy-makers and institutional actors, so that only a limited role is 
assigned to the mass public. Writing in the neo-functionalist tradition, Lindberg and 
Scheingold (1970) notably characterise the public as providing a ‘permissive consensus* on 
European integration, allowing policy-makers to proceed unchecked. I strongly challenge the 
notion of a ‘permissive consensus* on both theoretical and empirical grounds; there is a 
strong case to be made that European publics have critically evaluated the Communities for at 
least three decades. Significantly, there has also been a shift among many theorists of 
European integration to allocate the public a more prominent role. Public displays of 
contrition from Ernst Haas (1975), a prominent neofunctionalist scholar who in early variants 
of this theory strongly criticised the use of public opinion surveys, and an increasing 
domestic politics element to many realist theories o f integration have been joined by later 
approaches such as multi-level governance, which take a more heterogeneous stance towards 
actors in the European Community decision-making process.
This recognition o f a role for the public in (theories of) European integration is the starting 
point for this thesis, and raises some basic questions that I set about trying to answer in the 
remainder o f the work. Principally, I focus on what role the public plays in integration, how 
this role performed and above all which factors allow us to understand public opinion 
towards European integration.
1 As ever in such matters, there are exceptions. However, ex-President of the Commission Hallstein may well be the 
exception that proves the rule when he writes "the decisions that have been taken [in the 1960s] lag far behind public opinion 
in Europe." (1972, p. 30; see also section 1.3.2.)
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In answer to the first o f these questions, I emphasis the legitimising role o f  the public. It i s  
clear that the European Union, despite its technocratic beginnings, has arrogated enough s ta te  
sovereignty to require public approbation o f its activities. Documenting how the p u b lic  
impacts upon integration, or the transmission mechanisms of public attitudes, reveals h o w  
this legitimising role is performed. Although theories o f integration are not particularly  
enlightening in this regard, one might regard referenda, elections, participation in m ass  
movements and organisations such as pressure groups, unions and parties and, of course , 
public opinion polls as channels o f mass attitudes. I choose to measure mass attitudes u s in g  
survey data, not least because the ability to draw broad conclusions from statistical findings is  
rather appropriate to a subject such as mass attitudes, while I take support for European 
integration as the chosen dependent variable. Anticipating somewhat the discussion below , 
support possesses the advantage o f being an open, neutral question that allows one to cap ture  
both utilitarian and affective dimensions to respondents’ attitudes, so that one can test a n d  
weight a variety of explanatory approaches. Secondly, support is a mild measure o f  
attachment to the EU perhaps consistent with the current legitimising function played b y  th e  
public: m any writers argue that the EU is not yet far enough advanced along the line o f  s ta te  
development to require a sense o f belonging or identity from its citizens. Indeed, writers su ch  
as Weiler (2000) warn that any attempt to impose a relation between nationality an d  
citizenship in, say, the style o f Carl Schmitt is to abandon the idea o f Europe as a m ulti­
national melting pot. Support, then, may be the most appropriate measure of the c iv ic  
republican type o f attachment that the European Union currently requires. Having covered 
these arguments, I present a detailed summary o f support for integration by question and o v e r  
time as measured in the Eurobarometer survey series (see chapter two).
These preliminary questions answered, the main corpus of the thesis concentrates o n  
understanding why people think the way that they do towards European integration; i f  th e y  
are in favour or opposed, why is that? Following the most prominent analyses, individual 
evaluations o f objects in a political system tend to elicit responses based on either narrow ly 
rational ‘utilitarian’ or more emotional, ‘affective’ considerations. I provide an overview o f  
utilitarian and affective measures o f support since the early 1970s using Eurobarometer d a ta  
(see ch ap te r three). This affective/utilitarian typology is then exported to a comprehensive 
literature review of attempts to explain support for integration, helping demonstrate th a t 
while utilitarian approaches predominate and indeed perform better than some o f th e ir 
‘affective’ counterparts such as Inglehart’s (1977) theory o f  a Silent Revolution, authors such  
as Gabel (1998) fail to account for sizeable and persistent national differences in support fo r  
integration.
The hunch o f this author is that utilitarian approaches to understanding the public’s role in  
conferring legitimacy assume a bygone, even mythical era in Community development. I 
contend that current EU institutional arrangements, even if  difficult to characterise, have  
clearly assumed proportions that require affective as well as utilitarian mass attachment. So , 
support for European integration can be at least partially explained with reference to th e  
presence or absence of affective loyalties towards the EU. More precisely, I set out to test th e  
effect o f national and European identity, national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia 
on support for integration. I extend the study to include xenophobia and racism out o f  
deference to the idea, most notably present in the work o f  Adorno et al. (1950), that attitudes 
of outgroup inferiority are the other side o f the coin to the ingroup superiority o f  nationalism. 
So, the aim  o f  this thesis is not so much to replace utilitarian approaches to explaining 
support for integration at the micro, individual level, but rather to complement them with the  
twin, overarching concepts of identity and tolerance.
xiv
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For the predicted impact o f selected independent variables on support for integration I turn to 
the discipline o f  social psychology, so that the hypotheses I test are informed largely by the 
social identity and self-categorisation branches o f this literature (see chap ter four). 
Essentially, nationalism and racism are predicted to impact negatively on support for 
integration on the basis that the European Union forms in some way the ‘out-group* in 
question for respondents holding these attitudes. By the same logic, any divergence between 
respondents who feel a sense of European identity and support for integration would be an 
indictment of the present European Union architecture. For national pride, I draw from the 
socio-psychological literature the idea that persons hold multiple identities, so that a sense o f 
mild attachment to one’s country does not necessarily preclude a positive or negative opinion 
on the European Union.
Lest some o f these hypotheses seem obvious enough, it is the strength of the relationship 
between pride, European identity, nationalism and racism with support, as well as the 
existence of any such relationship, that will be useful in determining the extent to which 
affective factors explain support for integration. Moreover, the fact is that very little work 
exists investigating the relationship between affective attitudes and support for integration - 
see just Hewstone (1986), Miiller-Peters (1998), Routh and Bourgoyne (1998), Charillon and 
Ivaldi (1996). Only one o f these four works relies upon internationally recognised, publicly 
available datasets. To investigate the determinants of attitudes towards integration I make 
use of International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey data. Although 
the more diffuse Eurobarometer survey series contains data on all fifteen EU member states, 
and over several decades up to the present, the ISSP dataset includes a superior range and 
quality o f variables for eight EU member state countries: Austria, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The results from the aggregate and 
country level logit regression model used suggests that all the hypotheses can be confirmed 
except for the expected neutral impact o f national pride, where in the ISSP data there is a 
positive link between higher levels o f national pride and support for integration (see chapter 
six). I speculate that this positive link reflects the degree of incorporation o f European 
identities in national identities, and thus subscribe to a constructivist view o f identity 
formation.
A particular advantage o f the approach taken here is that I manage to combine the 
measurement o f  several concepts at the same time, and over eight European Union member 
states. This allows for an analysis o f the interrelationships between European identity, pride, 
nationalism, racism and xenophobia (see chapter five). This is interesting not just from a 
wider sociological perspective, but also because o f the theoretical proximity o f the concepts 
in question. Amongst other findings, I demonstrate a cultural and political dimension to 
national pride.
In the final empirical section (see chapter seven) I tackle a topic that originally I had no 
intention o f addressing but the treatment of which became more and more pressing as the 
thesis progressed: non-attitudes towards European integration. It is clear that many 
respondents, rather than being hostile or favourable towards the European Union, simply do 
not have an opinion one way or the other. This can be distinguished from non-committed 
attitudes, generally people in the ‘don’t know’ response category that on the balance of 
evidence are unable to reach a conclusion on the subject in question. From chapter two, in 
some Eurobarometer questions respondents holding non-attitudes constitute the second 
highest response category. With these numbers not falling over time with the increased
xv
salience o f the Union, non-attitudes have become an important (non) response that, ir 
addition, have largely fallen by the theoretical wayside as the debate concerning attitude­
holding has progressed. I attempt to redress this balance with a statistical analysis of non­
attitudes based on the Eurobarometer survey series. Although continuity with the ISSP 
survey would obviously be preferable, Eurobarometer 42 (1994) is the most recent survey of 
the EU containing an appropriate measure o f non-attitudes and explanatory variables, where I 
draw on hypotheses concerning non-attitudes from the theoretical debate concerning public 
opinion towards United States foreign policy. The evidence confirms that the socio- 
demographic factors interest, knowledge and education are key explanatory variables. There 
is also a role for national pride and European identity, where it seems that prouder, more 
European respondents that we have seen are more likely to support further integration draw 
this extra support partially from non-attitudes as well as from ‘converting’ negative attitude 
holders.
The last chapter o f the thesis reviews the seven preceding chapters with the dual purpose o f  
providing a quick overview o f  all the results and interpretation contained in the thesis and 
speculating on some of the larger questions answered and raised by the thesis (see chap ter 
eight). So, for a more complete overview of the thesis findings, the reader is invited to turn 
straight to the conclusion.
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1. THE PUBLIC IN THEORIES OF INTEGRATION
1.1. Chapter Aim and Summary
The aim o f this chapter is to provide a theoretical context within which later results 
concerning public opinion towards European integration can be more fully appreciated. It is 
intended to specify, according to theorists, if, when, and how public opinion might be 
expected to play a role in the process o f European integration. Through this review of the 
role of the public in its wider context, one can also begin to provide an answer as to why one 
might wish to study public opinion at all. After all, were there convincing arguments to the 
effect that public opinion holds little sway over the European integrative process, one’s time 
might be more gainfully employed than in writing a thesis investigating the determinants of 
public support for integration. So, I define in section 1.1. what is meant by public opinion in 
this context and in section 1.2. I will undertake a literature review in order to assess the role 
o f the public in the most diffuse theoretical models of European integration.
In summary, the importance of public opinion for integration is mentioned or can be deduced 
implicitly from many of the main theories of integration. Functionalist, revisionist 
neofunctionalist and some multi-level governance theories go furthest in acknowledging a 
role for the public, while authors writing in the realist tradition have less to say regarding the 
public. In particular, theories o f integration that posit some role for the public tend to fall into 
two categories; in functionalist and neofunctionalist theories mass support for integration is 
harnessed through ‘payoff or utilitarian reasons, while scholars such as Checkel and 
Inglehart write o f social integration and value shifts, so that support derives from more 
affective, non-instrumental reasons. This payoff/non-payoff dichotomy reappears in chapter 
three when I categorise and assess the theories explaining public support for integration.
1
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1. The Public in Theories of Integration
On the other hand, the role o f the public is downplayed in probably the best-known piece o f 
theory devoted specifically to the role o f  the public in integration: the ‘permissive consensus’, 
an offshoot o f revised neofunctionalist theories o f integration. While not arguing that the 
public is insignificant, under the permissive consensus a reservoir of goodwill exists that 
means the public can effectively be ignored. This argument is criticised on theoretical 
grounds below and on a more empirical basis in section 2.4.
On the whole, and even for those theories that look relatively favourably on the role of the 
public, detailed arguments as to when and how the public acts to influence political decision­
making do not form part of the mainstream of regional integration theory. Coming from the 
point o f view that public legitimacy is increasingly required for the successful continuation of 
European integration, I argue that one o f key criticisms o f  the mainstream theoretical 
treatments of European integration is that many fall short o f current reality in evaluating the 
role o f the public. Even for those less well-known theories o f  integration such as Deutsch’s 
transactionalism, Liberal Constructivism and Inglehart’s Silent Revolution approach that do 
posit a strong role for the public, for the most part they fail to put this into an empirically 
testable theory.
L2. Public Opinion
Public opinion is a set of opinions that people hold about some issue that is politically 
relevant. Public opinion has:
• a direction: a majority o f the public may be in favour o f a certain issue or against it.
• a certain intensity: people do not feel equally strong about all issues.
• a certain degree of stability. Some opinions are very stable, and people do not change 
them often. Other opinions change frequently.
• Public opinion polls, whether by mail, phone, fax, Internet or face-to-face are all 
accepted ways to measure public opinion.
In any given situation, the public can be seen in opposition to private bodies and refers to 
those ‘non-assigned’ persons who in various situations cannot be defined as private
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individuals or as members of private groups (Barry, 1989, p.250). Thus for European policy­
making the public consists o f those persons affected by the actions of the members o f several 
private groups, including amongst others the relevant ministers, bureaucrats and lobbyists. 
The composition o f the public will vary from issue to issue and individuals will often find 
that they have an interest both as a member of the public and as a member of an interest 
group. Of course, in large-scale public opinion surveys it is rather hard to distinguish 
between the mass public and special interest groups, so that in practise we assume that all 
survey respondents constitute the public.
While a minimal definition o f public opinion would seem a necessary precursor to 
investigating its role in theories o f integration, there are many questions that are left 
unanswered here. For instance, are opinions plucked out o f the air and hence likely to very 
randomly or are they more stable, relating to an individual’s deep-seated values? These and 
other issues are embraced in section 2.2.2. and 7.2. with the aim of understanding the value 
and limitations o f opinion poll data.
1.3. L iterature Survey
I proceed by discussing the main theories o f European and regional integration, and they will 
be treated according to paradigm, and then on a chronological basis. So, as well as 
encapsulating current thoughts about the role of public opinion in integration, we will also be 
in a position to judge how public opinion was perceived to affect integration over time.
As a caveat, it should be mentioned that there is a huge array of approaches to European 
integration that cannot all be treated with justice here. The aim o f the literature review is not 
to exhaustively cover all theories of integration, but rather to bring out the role of the public 
in either those theories that do treat the issue explicitly or to highlight its absence in theories 
otherwise perceived as significant within the academic community. Furthermore, a reading 
of the political integration literature confirms that in many areas of the field a persistent 
debate remains between various intellectual schools of thought; for instance, as to whether 
the process of European integration is better explained using tools primarily from the
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discipline o f  International Relations or Comparative Politics. It will not be m y aim in th is  
chapter to attempt a resolution of such disputes.
Finally, the serious criticisms sustained by the main theories o f integration have led at least 
one commentator to suggest that integration theory will be consigned to “a rather long but n o t 
very prominent footnote in the intellectual history o f twentieth century social science” 
(Puchala quoted in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 11). Certainly it is true that over m any 
decades of research no empirically testable theory o f integration has been rigorously 
established1. Pentland’s remark that “events in Europe continue to outpace academic theory” 
rings just as true today as when it was made (1973, p. 146). Several theorists have suggested 
ways out o f this supposed impasse; Moravcsik, for instance, considers a broader definition o f  
European integration so that it encompasses four dimensions, each of which could be treated 
as a separate theory if necessary (1993, p. 479)* 2 3. Nevertheless, the intrinsic value o f  
integration theory lies not just in its success (or rather failure) to accurately predict the 
direction o f integration according to the rigorous standards o f empirical social science, but in  
its value as a model or tool to help break down developments that in reality may be far more 
complex. By way of analogy, economists continue to study models o f perfect competition 
not because they accurately depict the actual competitive state o f a particular sector o f an 
economy, but because such models a id  comprehension both by reducing economic activity to 
a few key variables and by providing a benchmark against which actual markets can be 
compared. This may not be enough or ideal for theorists seeking to predict or prescribe but 
for the purposes o f contextualising the role o f the public it is still of some value.
1.3.1. Functionalism
| The term ‘functionalism’ can be applied to the research o f a number of integration theorists, 
where M itrany’s The Progress o f International Government (1933) and A Working Peace
! In a now well-known analysis, Puchala makes an analogy between scholars attempting to explain the process o f
international integration and the story o f the blind men and the elephant; each blind man touches a different part of the 
animal, leading to different inferences as to its actual physical shape (1972),
3 The four dimensions mentioned by Moravcsik are (1) the geographical scope of the regime; (2) the range of issues on 
which policy is co-ordinated; (3) the institutions of joint decision-making and (4) the direction and magnitude of substantive 
domestic policy adjustment (1993, p. 479). By suggesting that it is unrealistic to expect one overarching theory to fully 
cover all aspects o f European integration, Moravcsik is diluting the power of integration theory. This approach is confirmed
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System (1943) are usually taken as the key works. At its heart, functionalism dichotomises 
social, economic and technical change with political change and illustrates a dynamic 
correctional mechanism to ensure that tensions between the two forces are peacefully 
resolved. Many functionalists see historical development as driven forward primarily by 
technology, as well as a tendency for political development to lag behind these advances. 
The result, at least in the extreme, can be war. Mitrany specifically attributes the ‘German 
aggression’ of the First World War to the malaise o f  the general world system (1943, p.38). 
This theory of war, based as it is on the objective conditions o f  society such as social injustice 
and economic insecurity rather than on, say, emotive factors such as nationalism has struck 
some commentators as Marxist in inspiration3. By tackling head on the issue of world peace, 
functionalism established itself as an ambitious theory, rather more so than its 
neofunctionalist successor. It was nevertheless a theory that fitted well with the 
internationalism o f the time, encapsulated in the League o f  Nations and writings of such 
intellectuals as H.G. Wells and Bertrand Russell4.
Mitrany’s brand o f functionalism was a subtle theory that foresaw peace not as a state but as a 
process; in Frederick Schuman’s words “peace by pieces” (quoted in Claude, 1971, p. 381)5. 
This aim was to be achieved through the rational organisation of administrative functions. 
Mitrany echoes Burke’s warning to the sheriffs of Bristol that “government is a practical 
thing” (1943, p. 20). The nature o f the technological and social challenges facing society 
means that the nation-state cannot always provide effective solutions, which should be 
tackled by a specially created bureaucratic body at the appropriate regional and jurisdictional 
level6. Mitrany believed that this method of ‘technical self-determination’ would prove to be 
adaptive, flexible and able to side-step traditional political jealousies and controversies.
in Moravcsik’s later work, where he self-consciously focuses on the process o f testing multiple hypothesis rather than a 
particular ‘grand theory’ towards integration (1998, p. 17).
* See, for example, Haas (1964, p. 20) and Claude (1971, p. 381).
4 Both Wells and Russell professed that only a world government could save the world from endemic war: Wells in his 
Anticipations (1901) and Russell in the Problems of Democracy lecture series in New York (see Coren (1993) and Ryan 
(1988) for more information on Wells and Russell respectively), Russell specifically called for a world university to train an 
administrative elite that would plan world society along utilitarian lines.
5 The view of peace as a process rather than simply an absence of hostilities has parallels in Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace 
(1795) where he argues that peace without the removal of present and future causes of hostility is simply a truce (Reiss ed., 
1991). Such pragmatic views can be seen in contrast to the more fantastic internationalism of H.G. Wells and Bertrand 
Russell, and Mitrany criticises their support for the creation of a world state as an invitation to Empire-builders (1933, p. 
135). In a similarly idealistic vein Woolf, writing in International Government (1916), simply proposes an end to conflict 
through the once-off creation of a supranational disputes arbitration mechanism with binding authority over its members.
6 Holland points out that this way of thinking has a parallel in the concept of subsidiarity introduced during the Maastricht 
negotiations (1993, p. 15). Article 5 of the post-Amsterdam consolidated Treaty states that political or administrative 
decisions are taken at the Community level “only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
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Mitrany, then, saw the future o f international society rather as his contemporary Le Corbusier 
saw the future o f architecture in Towards a New Architecture (1952): form was to fo llow  
function7. The vital interests that concern states are altered through the functional 
development of international organisations, as opposed to, say, trying to influence states’ 
behaviour directly. The desired result was that it would no longer be in states’ interests to  
risk w ar over a territorial dispute given, say, the economic disruption this might involve. 
This intermeshing of states is not an entirely redundant notion today: for instance, support fo r  
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation amongst a significant segment o f  US foreign 
policy-makers is arguably informed by the notion that prosperous countries will have le ss  
reason to argue with one another8.
Functionalists took their cue from the host o f international organisations and unions th a t 
sprung up from the middle o f the nineteenth century. Reinsch draws our attention to the 1850 
Austro-German Telegraphic Union, an administrative organisation regulating international 
telegraphic communication, as one o f  the first examples o f  its kind (1911, p. 15). Latter d ay  
examples o f institutions founded on supposedly functionalist lines might include the various 
specialist agencies o f the United Nations or the European Coal and Steel Community9.
The logical end-point of the functionalist endeavour was a topic that Mitrany approached in a  
pragmatic manner. In A Working Peace System, Mitrany argues that various functional 
agencies may require co-ordination, especially with international planning authorities (1943, 
p. 37). Mitrany denies that this implies any overarching political authority, yet seemingly as 
a way o f  recognising the powerful argument for such a body, concedes that some form o f  
representative body could meet periodically, if  only to ventilate opinion rather than formulate 
policy. Elsewhere, Mitrany refers to the creation o f  a world government through the gradual
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects o f the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community” (1997).
7 Arguably the term ‘function’ acquires a host of meanings in Mitrany’s writings including ‘need’, ‘purpose’ and ‘task’. See 
Haas (1964, p.7) for a fuller discussion o f this point.
8 The ‘commercial liberal’ tradition of international relations embodies some of this reasoning. Cobden states rather 
idealistically that “if we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust that trade will do that, a great impulse will from this 
time be given to social reforms” (quoted in Nye, 1988, p. 246). More recently, Rosecrance has points to the beneficial 
effects o f economic process in reshaping international relations (1986).
9 Many scholars o f regional integration have written monographs exploring the functionalist dimension of organisations such 
as the International Labour Organisation (Haas, 1964) and some o f the United Nations programs such as the International 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (Sewell, 1962).
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shift of functions and loyalties or “federalism by instalments” (quoted in Haas, 1964, p. 13). 
Yet it is also clear that to Mitrany, to create a supranational political body for its own sake 
was to miss the point of functionalism and simply to reproduce the tensions of nationalism on 
a large scale10 1. Indeed, in places Mitrany shows himself to be sensitive to cultural differences 
and the role of the state, and goes as far to suggest that cultural devolution could go hand in 
hand with functional integration of material activities (1933, p.137).
A contrast between Mitrany’s functionalism and early neofunctionalism in particular involves 
our main point o f concern here; the role o f the public in the process of integration. To reach 
the end point of, say, an international federation, a crucial psychological prerequisite for 
Mitrany is the transfer of mass allegiance to functional bodies. This process takes place in 
two stages as, firstly, those touched directly by co-operation change their attitudes (for 
example, international travellers and collaborating scientists) and, secondly, as this 
experience is diffused throughout society by education and the media, while at the same time 
the scope o f functional agencies increases so as to make it likely that every individual will 
experience some contact with one. By way of contrast, in section 1.3.2. we see that early 
neofunctionalism generally marks out public opinion as superfluous. Nevertheless, Mitrany’s 
view of the public is contradictory. Underlying the argument of a function-by-function 
transfer o f loyalties to a new socio-psychological community is the assumption that such 
loyalties can be transferred incrementally, and that there is no political loyalty that transcends 
the sum of functional loyalties (Pentland, 1973, p. 85). At once, man according to Mitrany is 
supposed to be rigorously utilitarian, in the spirit o f Mill, transferring allegiance on the basis 
o f perceived benefits. Yet in other contexts Mitrany deplores the supremacy o f  nationalist 
modes of thinking11. The argument is made in this thesis that instrumental reasons alone are 
not enough to explain national variations in support for integration and that we must defer to
10 Federalism is a panicular target for this criticism o f reformulating old lines of nationalist division. Federalists call for the 
creation of a single supranational state among a group of previous sovereign powers as a solution to conflict. For federalists, 
integration is generally a directly political phenomenon negotiated for swift implementation by political elites such as 
Schuman and de Gasperi imbued with ‘political will’, where economic integration tails political developments. Similarly, in 
the short term the public’s role in this process is solely reactive and by and large limited to the loose assumption that the 
people are ‘ready and eager to make the federalist plunge’ (Claude, 1971, p. 376). Ironically, writers in the federalist 
tradition tend to promote a strong role for democratic values and popular support once the federal state is established. 
Indeed, Pentland argues that some federalist movements have been so deeply populist in nature that gradualist moves to 
federal integration have been condemned as ‘collaborationalist’ with national governments (1973, p. 171).
11 One way to square this circle might be to argue that people are shaped by the institutions that govern them; under the rule 
of a nation-state people might be expected to be more relatively nationalist whereas with the rise o f international 
functionalist institutions people may display more internationalist sentiments. At no point, however, does Mitrany make this 
institutionalist argument.
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theories o f nationalism to more fully account for public opinion towards integration ( s e e  
chapters three and four).
Other key aspects of the functionalist model have been subject to criticism, and these h a v e  
been well documented12. Functionalist theories o f  international co-operation demand, fo r  
instance, that tasks can be separated into political and non-political categories, where n o n ­
political tasks do not present occasion for conflict. Yet this approach seems ra th e r 
unrealistic: it stands to reason that technical decisions can lead to disagreement, and th e re  
may well be a political dimension to an otherwise technical issue. Pentland gives th e  
example that the return of the Ruhr to Germany was a more important factor in gaining th e ir  
support for the ECSC Treaty than the economic arguments (1973, p.94). There would a lso  
seem little incentive for governments to co-operate in functionalist designs, despite th e  
wishes of their citizens, if  in the long term this means a loss o f status. Indeed, it is n o t  
immediately apparent why functional needs could not be accommodated within a n  
intergovernmental or even domestic framework; since 1900 the share o f state Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) accounted for by public spending has grown in industrial countries from  
single-digit figures to around 40%. In summary, we are presented with a theory of global 
integration according to broadly exogenous factors that, while it incorporates a role for th e  
public, is open to criticism on a number of fundamental issues regarding the mechanism o f  
integration.
1.3.2. Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism, which was first posited by scholars such as Haas and Lindberg in the la te  
1950s and early 1960s, applied a modified version of the dynamics o f  functionalism to a  
vision of an end-of-ideology, pluralist international political society. Written in a post 
Second World War environment, the focus of functionalist dynamics was no longer w orld 
peace through consensus building but rather determining the conditions under which a  
rudimentary regional grouping of states gradually acquires the capacity to make and execute
12 See, for example, Pentland (1973, p. 64-100).
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common decisions13. The typical modem political community, according to Haas, is a 
“multi-group competitive national society” where there is “agreement on the means of 
resolving internal conflicts by peaceful methods” (quoted in Pentland, 1973, p. 103)14. The 
focus then, is on the non-political, competitive process of integration rather than an end­
point15.
Instead o f arguing that international co-operation is achieved by objective functional need 
circumventing politics, neofunctionalists consider economic and political integration as 
intertwined. Integration proceeds, then, through the ‘expansive logic’ or self-sustaining 
processes o f spillover, of which there are three basic varieties identified by Tranholm- 
Mikkelson (1991, p. 4-7). Functional spillover is a mechanism arising from the economic 
interdependence o f Western Europe. Addressing policy issues in one area is assumed to be 
impossible without creating externalities in other sectors. Political spillover arises as political 
elites perceive that their interests are better served by seeking supranational solutions and so 
refocus their activities and eventually their loyalties to a new centre. Lindberg stressed the 
role of government elites in this connection. For example, bureaucratic interpenetration 
through the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) developed in the 
European Communities as governments found it increasingly difficult to function as 
gatekeepers. Cultivated spillover is a voluntaristic element in an otherwise deterministic and 
hence predictive theory. Here, central institutions such as the European Commission can 
themselves encourage integration by upgrading the lowest common denominator o f  interests 
through mediation16. Integration, then, is a ‘demand-driven* flow o f societal pressures 
(Schneider andCederman, 1994, p.641).
The result is
13 The focus originally was on the early integrative efforts of the European Community (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). Later 
this scope was widened to consider, in particular, Central and South America (see, for example, Schmitter and Haas, 1964).
14 Assuming a background o f liberal, ideological consensus allows interest groups to competitively pursue their own 
interests. This process implies a group of winners and losers (and hence opponents o f integration), although this is an issue 
not deeply explored by neofunctionalist writers. Corbey, however, suggests that stagnation may be a booster to integration 
in the medium term (1995). This competitive approach is in contrast to functionalism, where there is the assumption of a de 
facto common good, which more and more people come to recognise over time.
15 Pentland points out that the similarity between the neofunctionalist emphasis on process and Easton’s system’s theory, 
where the focus is on the set of interactions in a society rather than the institutions themselves (1965). As noted in the main 
text below, Lindberg and Scheingold later adopt this model formally in Europe’s Would-be Polity (1970).
16 Scholarly literature has produced several different varieties of spillover, most o f  them in the attempt to come to terms with 
criticism of neofunctionalism. Lindberg and Scheingold, for instance, look to ‘spillback’, ‘output failure’ (failure of 
spillover), ‘equilibrium’ and ‘systems transformation* (a new bargaining process transcends the old) to explain the ebbs and 
flows of European integration (1970, p. 134-9). Spillover, then, is downgraded to one mechanism amongst others.
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“the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are p e r s u a d e d  
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and la rger 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national 
states” (Haas, 1958, p.16).
Although Haas settles on the term supranationalism, many commentators have been quick to  
detect a federalist tinge to neofunctionalist writings in this area17 18. However, confusion o v e r  
the end product or ‘dependent variable’ has not aided neofunctionalist writers in their attem pt
1 o
to draw up an empirically testable theory .
The political actors mentioned in the above quote are governmental and industrial e lites, 
where the public is supposed to simply shift loyalties in a derivative manner, so that in 1958 
Haas argued that
“it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion 
and attitude surveys” (1958, p.17).
So, neofunctionalism resolves a prima facie contradiction thrown up by functionalism, 
squaring a theory that emphasises above all the role o f the technocrat in the mechanics o f  
integration with a role for the general populace in creating a socio-psychological community, 
by effectively removing the influence o f the populace19.
Initially, neofunctionalism appeared plausible. Early integration projects were very m uch 
elite-driven, and often self-consciously with the aim o f setting the ball rolling, so that th e  
issue area was less important than the degree of co-operation20. As for public opinion, former
17 See, for instance, Taylor (1983) and Pentland (1973). Pentland argues that federalism creeps into the writing o f both Haas 
and Lindberg through the joint decision-making political processes necessary for integration just as much as in any notion o f  
an end product (1973, p. 104).
18 See, for instance, Haas (1970). One o f the reasons that neofunctionalism was to come in for so much criticism was that it 
purported to be methodologically consistent and verifiable: to describe, explain and predict. This is in contrast to  
functionalism, which laid no claim as to over what time-period technical self-determination might work itself out. This lack 
of concern with verification or falsification lead Claude to argue that functionalism is an approach rather than a theory 
(quoted by Taylor in Mitrany, 1975, p. xix).
19 Thus a community consisting of common loyalties, values and kinship, or Gemeinschaft, was not viewed as the essential 
basis for sovereignty, although it was of course hoped that a community o f competing interests would follow from the 
transfer o f sovereignty.
20 “The common market for coal and steel by itself contributes decisively to the producers and consumers of coal and steel. 
But at the same time it offers the opportunity for stating and effectively solving the problems of creating an integrated 
European economy suitable to the modem world” (Haas, 1958, p.283). Despite the greater success of the Common Market, 
Monnet and other elite figures were keenest at first to promote Euratom, as this was seen as having a greater political future 
(Duchene, 1994, p. 292-9).
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President of the Commission Hallstein claimed simply of the 1960s ‘The decisions that have 
been taken lag far behind public opinion in Europe” (1972, p.30)21. Neofunctionalism has 
since been attacked repeatedly, so that the theory has undergone many reformulations and 
even recantation from one of its founding figures, Haas22.
In particular, interdependence theorists objected to the teleology and regional focus of 
neofunctionalism. On this view, interdependence between states is a global not regional 
phenomenon and the optimal area for co-operation between governments may extend outside 
any given regional structure. Interdependence also does not necessarily presuppose 
integration and could be consistent with a number of institutional outcomes. Most theorists 
in this tradition acknowledge a debt to Haas by arguing that the European Union exhibits a 
supranational style of decision-making in the sense that it is based on compromise and 
common interests23. However, while the notion o f spillover is retained, its automaticity is 
removed and instead made contingent on successful intergovernmental bargaining. If the 
importance of public opinion to this approach is not immediately apparent, Nye at least 
argues that the public influences the behaviour of elected political leaders by creating broad 
or narrow limits for integrative programs (Nye, 1971, p. 63). Moreover, Nye also points out 
that the concept o f integration must be disaggregated into its economic, social and political 
components, where the political component includes mass attitudes, so that integration 
without mass loyalty shift will only be ‘token’ (1971, p.73).
Other criticisms directed at neofunctionalism take issue with the theory’s disavowal of the 
importance of mass attitudes. Hoffmann’s article Obstinate or Obsolete? The fa te  o f the 
Nation State and the Case o f  Western Europe (1966) makes the case, amongst other
21 Insofar as it demonstrates a similar disregard for public opinion, this view coincides with that of Pascal Lamy, Delors’ 
one-time che f de cabinet and current Commissioner for Trade, who argued that in the 19S0s and 1990s the Commission had 
to lead the public:
"the people weren’t ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on without telling them too much about what 
was happening” (Ross, 1994, p. 194).
52 It seems that neofunctionalism has been attacked by generations of critics. See, for instance, George (1996, p.45-8); 
Hoffman (1966); Moravcsik (1987), Pentland (1973, p. 100-146). Functional spillover seems to emerge with the most 
credibility. How-evcr, the prospect of this leading into political spillover seems probabilistic, as Haas himself accepts (1975). 
In retrospect a seminal moment for both supranationalists such as Monnet and neofunctionalist theorists was De Gaulle’s 
reminder o f state authority through the 1965 empty chair crisis. Indeed, many criticisms stem from the notion that the role of 
government is understated; it was not w illing simply to be J.S. Mill’s ‘cash-register of interests’ (1861). Scholars who have 
argued for a reappraisal of neofunctionalism seem to have been far less bold than their predecessors by applying the theory 
to explain rather than predict (Tranholm-Mikkeisen, 1991,p.l8).
:i Keohane and Hoffmann argue that this style of supranational decision-making has been visible since at least the 
negotiations over the Single European Act (Wallace, 1990, p. 277-81).
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arguments, that the strength o f national interest in situations o f ‘high’ politics in particular 
will be enough for states to wish to stall integration. Yet Hoffmann also refers to the popular 
basis o f  elite action and to ‘national consciousness’ (Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 
1995, p. 17). Hoffmann’s emphasis on political parties, statesmen, national patriotism and 
pro-integration heads of executive integrating units all imply directly or indirectly a role fo r 
the public. Integration, then, is contingent at least to a certain degree on political culture o r 
public opinion24. Gellner too emphasises the role of political culture, arguing that successive 
waves o f  modernisation and industrialisation can just as likely result in pressures fo r 
secession as integration, depending on whether political cultures between territorial units are 
homogenous or heterogeneous (1964). For example, where two regions are impacted 
differentially by a wave of modernisation, so that one becomes more materially well-off than 
the other, Gellner argues that the potential for discord is present where the poorer region 
possesses a strong regional identity by virtue of say, different religious customs or skin 
pigmentation.
In response to these and other criticisms, many leading neofunctionalists did begin to posit a  
role, albeit limited, for public opinion in integration. Haas looked to widen the focus from 
elite to mass perceptions in the context o f loyalty shifting, and pointed to social learning 
effects, education and inter-group loyalties to justify this (Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnot,
1995, p. 19). Schmitter, too, modestly widens his participants in the integration process not so 
explicitly in terms of definition, but rather in operationalising population groups such as 
‘national participant political groups’, ‘participants or observers in regional processes* and 
‘relevant elites’. Some of these variables are operationalised with reference to survey and 
panel data measuring regional identity (Schmitter writing in Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971, 
P-252).
Lindberg and Scheingold’s mid-term report on neofunctionalism, Europe’s Would-Be Polity 
(1970) addresses some criticisms o f early approaches, and includes a detailed picture of the 
role of public opinion. Without sharing all o f his conclusions, Lindberg and Scheingold take 
one of their revisionist cues from Deutsch’s conception o f  a social community, which
24 This interpretation is put forward by Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnott (1995, p. 18) Sinnott attempts to extract the key 
variables affecting the survival or otherwise of the nation state and then looks at the impact of public opinion and culture 
upon each of them.
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evaluates integration by stressing a sense o f community between citizens developed though 
mutual, mainly cultural transactions rather than an institutional framework25. Lindberg and 
Scheingold then defer to the political theory of David Easton to make an explicit distinction 
between utilitarian and affective components of mass political attitudes and between 
identitive and systemic aspects o f interaction26. The identitive level of interaction refers to 
the links among the people of the Union, while systemic interaction refers to links between 
the public and the Union apparatus itself. Responses to questions of an either identitive or 
systemic nature are affective if  they represent some diffuse or emotional response and 
utilitarian if  the response is based on some perceived economic or political interest such as 
higher living standards. On the basis o f survey data, support for the Community is seen to 
invite a systemic response, where Lindberg and Scheingold claimed that the strongest basis of 
support for the Community was utilitarian. Evidence o f affective support was weaker, in the 
1960s most West Europeans referred to the US as their ‘most trusted ally’ (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970, p. 54). Lindberg and Scheingold interpreted their data as evidence of a 
‘permissive consensus’; policy-makers could most probably move in an integrative direction 
without encountering significant opposition, which in any case positive utilitarian attitudes 
would most likely smother. On the other hand, if persistent social cleavages were to arise, the 
opportunities to block integration would be greater but without necessarily determining the 
outcome (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 41). Public opinion is thus a passive tool of 
elites or counter-elites, and little impetus will come from it. Supranational bodies are still the 
main motors of integration, with the public in the background providing a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for integration. Indeed, public support was only one of three other 
integrative mechanisms, where other options include logrolling, functional spillover and actor 
socialisation. At the extreme, one could argue that this was not a theory to bring the public 
‘back in’, but rather an intellectual examination of why they should be kept out.
The permissive consensus of Lindberg and Scheingold has been an influential theory. Much 
scholarly output claims that until the 1990s the permissive consensus held as a research 
axiom for European public opinion studies (Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Franklin and 
Wlezien (1997); Gabel and Palmer (1995)). The implication is that studies on public opinion 
were not carried out because they were not thought necessary. Moreover, the emphasis in the
"  See section 1.3.3. for a more detailed examination of Deutsche work on regional integration.
:6 Section 2.2.2. explores the link betw een the work of Lindberg, Scheingold and Easton in more detail.
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permissive consensus on the utilitarian systemic foundations o f support for the Communities 
offers one explanation as to why those writers looking to explain support for integration have 
concentrated predominantly on economic or utilitarian motives (see section 3.2.1).
Nevertheless, I argue that theoretical assumptions o f the permissive consensus are no longer 
appropriate, so that there is a greater need to understand public opinion towards integration. 
To begin with, the status accorded to the permissive consensus is somewhat surprising as 
throughout their book Lindberg and Scheingold were highly reluctant to ascribe certainty to  
their findings. By looking at indicators of, say, affective attitudes their results were to a  
certain degree an exercise in inductive logic based around survey findings, which themselves 
mainly dated from the period 1954-63 for affective data and 1957-63 for utilitarian data. 
These findings may have been unrepresentative or opinions could have altered since the data 
they used was gathered. Moreover, even if the characterisation of the European Union as 
primarily utilitarian in character was ever true, today the Union’s broad ambitions make this a  
harder argument to sustain. The authors themselves suggest that the consensus might not 
withstand a major increase in the scope or capacity o f the community, although they did 
predict based on research detailing contemporary social trends that it would hold (1970, 
p.277). No mention at all is made o f the possible expansion o f the Communities to include 
member states generally more hostile to certain forms of integration. Moreover, Lindberg 
and Scheingold rather simplify the original permissive consensus argument put forward by  
Key, who states that one must also look at the quality as well as the quantity o f public 
attachment to a particular issue. A 90% approval for a particular issue may mask hard-core 
pockets o f  discontent or loose and undisciplined attachment (Key, 1967, p. 32). Aside from 
these theoretical criticisms, the empirical evidence suggests that both the more instrumental 
and affective dimensions of public opinion towards the European Union have fluctuated 
widely in recent years. Policy-makers are no longer necessarily able to rely on a strong 
reservoir o f  support for integration. The empirical evidence for the permissive consensus is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.4., in the light o f the presentation in chapter two of the 
aggregate levels o f support for integration amongst European Union member states.
1. The Public in Theories of Integration
1.3.3. Transactionalism and Postmaterialism
We have already seen that Deutsch’s transactionalism has influenced the work o f the 
neofunctionalist writers Lindberg and Scheingold. However, considering Deutsch’s work in 
its own right, this early statement of integration theory affords a relatively prominent role to 
political culture and public opinion.
Deutsch’s basic definition of integration involves the creation o f  a ‘security-community’; 
rather than favouring any type o f predetermined legal or institutional outcome the emphasis is 
on achieving a political state o f peace and security between countries. In turn, this involves 
the successful creation of
“a ‘sense o f community’ and o f  institutions and practices strong enough and 
widespread enough to assure, for a Tong’ time, dependable expectations o f peaceful 
change” (Deutsch quoted in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 12).
So, integration may be consistent with an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community, 
where the former option implies full political union and the latter does not imply any loss of 
state sovereignty27.
At heart, the sense o f community mentioned by Deutsch refers to the generation of social and 
political communications and transactions. This transactionalism is self-reinforcing as one 
level of transactions fuels trust and confidence that in turn leads to new levels of 
communication. The operationalisation o f this concept involves detecting for the presence of 
a number o f essential conditions: for instance, mobility o f persons, compatibility o f  values, 
mutual sympathies and loyalties, trust and a multiplicity o f communications and transactions 
links. It is clear, then, that cultural variables are crucial to Deutsch’s partially socio- 
psychological conception of integration. In France, Germany and the Western Alliance, 1
11 Deutsch was, however, aware that a pluralistic community might require fewer ‘essential conditions* to be satisfied and 
hence might be politically less costly to achieve (1957). An example might be the post-Marshall plan Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that promoted further cooperation such as proposals for a free trade area and payments union 
within Europe without compromising state sovereignty. In common with realism then, international integration is not 
contradictory w ith but rather complementary to the development of the nation-state. However, Deutsch seeks to move
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Deutsch makes use o f public opinion polls to argue that there was little support for a kind o f  
European unity against the concrete reality o f the nation-state (1967, p. 299).
Despite the focus on mass attitudes, there is good reason to believe that their influence is 
incorrectly specified. Haas makes the point that some o f the variables used to indicate a state 
of integration also define the process, making it difficult to isolate cause and effect (1964, p. 
27). One might challenge the path o f causality between variables and ask whether the public 
simply takes its cue from their leaders, rather than vice versa. On the other hand, the focus o f  
transactionalists on the behaviour o f states in the international environment risks ignoring 
solely domestic political or social discourses which could have an important role to play in 
integration. In this context mass attitudes gain a new relevance.
In more general terms, Deutsch’s model also suffers from a lack of consensus as to which 
common variables are most important in determining peace and security* 28. After all, one 
could make the case that the states of Europe that fought each other in two world wars in the 
twentieth century appeared remarkably uniform on a number o f economic, cultural, social 
and even political scales29. Inglehart, using in part data from France, Germany and the 
Western Alliance, has been able to argue a different conclusion to Deutsch; rather than 
implying a plateau o f integrative support, the general increase in social communications 
within Europe has served to instil stable attitudes in European youth which will be expressed 
as positive support for European integration in years to come (Pentland, 1973, p. 62). On the 
subject o f  generational change, then, I turn to consider Inglehart’s theories o f European 
integration.
Inglehart is one o f  the theorists who goes furthest in advocating role for the public. His 1970 
article goes straight to the point, asking
beyond resting sole responsibility for peace with the diplomats so disparaged by Mitrany, calling for a qualitative and 
quantitative shift in interactions and communications between states (Pentland, 1973, p. 51).
28 In the same way, further agreement could be seen as necessary on what constitutes integration: in the Might’ peace and 
security definition proposed by Deutsch, most of Europe could already be seen as integrated in that the prospects for conflict 
seem very slight.
29 One could argue that the role of social scientists in determining supposedly “objective’ conditions for peace is misplaced 
when it is the subjective opinions of policy-makers and others that can propel or limit the process of integration, whatever 
the supposed level of underlying congruence in social or other variables between countries.
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“To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set 
of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or 
diminish) regional integration?” (1970, p.764).
As Inglehart continues, this is really the question “Does the public have any influence on 
foreign policy decisions?” Inglehart then provides the reader with three factors that affect the 
relevance o f public opinion to decision-making: the structure o f the national decision-making 
process (pluralistic or monolithic), the distribution of political skills within a community and 
the degree o f intensity of opinions. With reference to this final point, a particular issue will 
only provoke a response if it relates to deep-seated values. Shephard interprets this to mean 
that ‘low politics’ issues of agricultural food prices will not evoke the same sentiments as 
debate over national sovereignty (1975, p.58). Inglehart’s feedback model that is introduced 
in the same article suggests interdependence between public and elite attitudes, so that the 
direction o f causality can reverse to allow elites the power to alter mass perceptions.
Inglehart’s later theorising builds heavily on the idea o f the distribution o f political skills 
amongst the citizenry. The theory of the Silent Revolution postulates that political changes in 
advanced industrial societies will be indirectly caused by individual political value- 
orientations and the level of political skills (1977). Persons with a postmaterialist value- 
orientation give less priority to materialist ends, and will be more directed towards personal 
realisation. Levels o f cognitive skills determine how able a person is to cope with and 
interpret the abstract content of political messages. Inglehart stipulates that the nation-state is 
too materialistic for postmaterialists, who are also concerned with a sense o f belonging to a 
wider, more cosmopolitan community. Those with higher cognitive skills are more able to 
comprehend the abstract content o f European integration. Postmaterialists and those with 
high cognitive skills will be more vociferous and supportive of European integration. 
Moreover, the role for the public will increase over time as skills increase and postmaterialist 
values are shared by more and more people. For example, Inglehart supposes that better 
educational systems and higher participation rates in education mean that post-war 
generations possess on average a higher level of cognitive skills and are more likely to be 
postmaterialists given the socio-economic changes in the post-war period.
Inglehart pursues a bottom-up ‘push’ approach to integration, as opposed to the elite ‘pull’ 
approach characterising many neofunctionalist and realist attitudes towards the public. This
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‘push’ approach provides us with a set o f value-based, more affective criteria to judge w hen 
the public are most likely to respond to an issue, in contrast to the generally instrumental 
approaches o f functionalism and neofunctionalism. Inglehart, however, prefers to make h is 
case for the public at some degree of generality; in the long-term, Inglehart writes, ‘m ass 
support will be a sine non qua for political unification* (1977b, p. 152)30. This point is then 
backed up by taking the examples of the 1970s referenda in Norway, Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom over whether to enter the European Communities. Ultimately, Inglehart 
is more concerned with the sociology o f  attitude formation than with political institutions. 
However, a more powerful critique o f  Inglehart is that, as we shall see in section 3.4., 
postmaterialism simply does not stand up very well on an empirical footing.
1.3.4. Realist Perspectives
Realism is an International Relations centred theory o f politics that when applied to the study 
of European integration serves to restore the autonomy o f  the state in the integrative process. 
Realists tend to posit that states are goal-oriented, rational and the principal, sovereign actors 
on an international stage delineable from domestic politics. Secondly, the lack of an 
international authority to make and enforce international law not only permits wars, but also 
renders co-operation problematic. This state o f anarchy may leave all concerned worse o f f  
than they could otherwise be were they to co-operate. Arguably, writings in the realist 
tradition go back as far as Thucydides, who presented a structural account as to the origins o f  
the Peloponnesian war (Nye, 1988, p. 235). In the discussion that follows, I recognise the 
plurality o f  realist designs and so consider several variants o f the theory, where the common 
thread is that international co-operation is best explained from the standpoint o f international 
state interactions rather than domestic politics and public opinion.
The realist perspective was first used in anger amongst scholars o f European integration by  
Hoffmann in his critique o f neofunctionalism. Hoffmann attacks the failure of functionalist 
or economic types o f  spillover to substantially alter the sovereign character o f  nation-states.
50 This rather general assumption that, in the long-term, public support is essential for successful political integration is in 
keeping with the long-term impact of the Silent Revolution argument and is also evidenced by the fact that Inglehart is quite 
prepared to accept that in the early stages of integration, most decisions were taken by elites in isolation from the public 
(1977b, p. 152).
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This criticism was especially pertinent in the light of the 1966 Luxembourg compromise as 
well as the evolution o f the European Council and Committee o f  Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). As mentioned in section 1.3.3., however, Hoffmann’s argument frequently 
refers to the popular basis of elite action and to ‘national consciousness’ (1966).
On the whole, realist theories are better at explaining interactions than interests. Writers such 
as Waltz, in the neorealist tradition, which is taken to refer to the restructuring o f realist 
thought around a more positivist framework, are most interested in explaining the behaviour 
of heterogeneous states through regime structures that may or may not serve to promote co­
operation. The result has been a parsimonious set o f theories that rely heavily on game- 
theoretic literature. Waltz only treats the domestic arena to analyse how its structure might 
influence the behaviour of political elites (1979, p. 81)31. Other writers do attempt to come to 
terms with the issue of legitimacy, yet generally only with reference to elite attitudes32. 
Sinnott elaborates on the writings o f Krasner and Puchala to argue that both writers employ 
the concept o f diffuse values to classify those conditions that determine the creation and 
persistence o f international regimes (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 26). It is, however, 
left to the reader to make the connection that the principles and norms adopted by elites are 
somehow related to mass attitudes.
Some reformulations and more recent statements in the realist tradition are prepared to 
acknowledge a role for the public in international affairs. Rosenau argues that, while mass 
publics may not be informed on the technical details o f a particular regime or issue, they can 
create indirect demands for regimes by demanding solutions to problems (Niedermayer and 
Sinnott, 1995, p. 28). Two-level game theory is a recent theoretical development in a more 
realist mould that explicitly incorporates public opinion in the domestic politics arena. The 
main protagonists in this field are Zysman and Sandholtz (1989) and Putnam (Evans, 
Jacobson and Putnam, 1993). The foreign and domestic arenas, despite the linkages between 
them, are neatly differentiated into two spheres, where only governments sit in on both 
‘games’. This implies, in keeping with Moravcsik’s theory that intergovernmental bargains
31 In fairness to Waltz and others, the role of public opinion in certain aspects of international relations is hardly immediately 
obvious. Sinnott points out that the mass public is unlikely to be familiar with The Law of the Sea or the International Food 
Regime (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 25).
32 Waltz too moves from the systemic to the unit level of analysis, but only to discuss learning and socialisation amongst 
political elites (1979, p. 74).
19
1. The Public in Theories of Integration
strengthen the state (1994), that states act as gatekeepers to international decision-making 
arenas, so that neofunctionalist assumptions of transnationalism must find new avenues o f  
influence, for example through supranational institutions. There is a hierarchy o f bargains, so 
that elite bargains are formed in response to changes in international conditions and in the 
domestic political context. However, Zysman and Sandholtz’s approach to domestic 
bargaining is hardly much of a progression on Moravcsik, the authors heavily emphasising 
the role o f  changing domestic coalitions in their analysis o f the Maastricht treaty. Putnam 
notes that the notion o f the strong state has dominated domestic-international theorising and 
argues that a more adequate account o f the domestic determinants of foreign policy must 
‘stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups.. .legislators, and even public opinion 
and elections’ (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993, p.435). Putnam identifies Level 1 and 
Level 2 bargaining, where Level 2 ‘ratification’ decisions may involve a number o f  
‘domestic’ influences that Putnam leaves open-ended. Putnam, then, does not commit 
himself to any exact model; rather, he specifies a broad framework that he hopes will be 
useful in stimulating further research (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993, p.437).
Spurred by  a core interest in liberty and limited government, writers in the liberal tradition o f  
international relations recognise that to say states act in their self-interest is tautological 
unless an account is rendered o f how such interests are formed. Such authors go on to argue 
that the role o f  elites is constrained from within rather than without the state. Similarly, 
neofunctionalists emphasise the political process of learning and redefining national interests, 
as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes. Keohane and Hoffmann attempt a 
synthesis o f  intergovemmentalist and neofunctionalist positions. With reference to the Single 
European Act, Keohane and Hoffmann argue that while pressures for spillover may have 
existed, its actualisation was at the discretion o f governments. Public opinion is seen as a 
factor constraining governmental decision-making, with the authors warning o f ‘domestic 
backlashes’ against the hardships that the Single Market could impose on particular sectors o f  
the economy. In addition, the authors see that in the longer run the transfer o f mass 
allegiances could well prove decisive, drawing our attention to the democratic deficit and the
“paradox o f  an elaborate process o f multinational bargaining coexisting with an 
obstinately ‘national’ process o f  political life and elections, the paradox of the 
emergence o f a European identity on the world scene coexisting with continuing 
national loyalties” (Wallace, 1990, p. 295).
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Moravcsik’s liberal intergovemmentalism is the approach in the realist tradition that has been 
most successfully applied to the analysis of European integration, where only an oblique role 
for the public is envisaged. In The Choice fo r  Europe, Moravcsik begins from a 
methodological criticism of integration theories as being incapable of explaining all the 
intricacies o f the process, and then employs a rationalist ‘framework’ to designate the set of 
assumptions he uses to break down integration into discrete chunks. Accordingly, the reader 
is presented with three stages to the integrative process: preferences are first aggregated at the 
national level, where appropriate states then bargain with one another to reach agreements, 
the institutional form o f which is decided only in the final stage. In determining national 
preferences, Moravcsik seems to display a liberal approach; national preferences are 
determined by domestic political competition, where states serve to aggregate these interests 
in their role as gatekeeper33. This places Moravcsik in an a priori neutral position as to the 
societal determinants o f domestic policy-making, and accordingly he accepts that amongst 
many other factors, public opinion may come to alter geopolitical reasons for co-operation 
(1998, p. 35). In practise, however, Moravcsik comes to accept that since the Treaty o f Rome 
the most compelling determinants o f national preferences have been political economic rather 
than geopolitical interests, with pressure correspondingly coming from special interest groups 
such as producer alliances34.
Moravcsik’s third stage, which analyses why governments choose institutional forms that 
pool, delegate or retain sovereignty, acknowledges some potential role for the public. The 
preferred explanation is the need to create credible commitments: a European Court o f Justice 
guarantees serves to guarantee states’ commitment to certain treaty obligations. 
Nevertheless, Moravcsik accepts that the quasi-constitutional character o f many European 
Union institutions cannot be fully explained without reference to Federalist ideals. To the 
extent that this is true, the liberal constructivist approach discussed above can then be used to,
33 This allows Moravcsik to argue that there is a unitary state position at the intergovernmental bargaining stage. In more 
complicated cases such as Germany, where the Bundesbank and the Chancellor have expressed contrary monetary policy 
positions, Moravcsik argues that the net national position may be stable and hence unitary (1998, p. 23). Ironically, 
Moravcsik may have managed to construct a weak state by postulating that governments simply calculate the relative 
pressures and act accordingly.
34 Moravcsik owes perhaps too much to Milward’s The European Rescue o f  the Nation-State (1992) in his analysis of the 
economic underpinnings of integration. Moravcsik suggests that Thatcher’s opposition to the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was primarily motivated by knowledge of the economic asymmetry 
built into the system rather than the loss o f sovereignty that this move might involve (1998, p. 427). Yet against the advice 
o f  Chancellor o f the Exchequer Lawson, Thatcher turned down the opportunity to join the ERM in 1985 at a far more 
reasonable exchange rate.
21
1. The
say, look at recent decisions in the Maastricht or Amsterdam treaties to increase the 
legislative powers o f the European Parliament. However, for Moravcsik, the third stage o f  
the integration process cannot be understood without reference to the second bargaining 
stage. In other words, where other European institutions and through them the public m ay  
exercise influence, this authority is knowingly delegated by member states35. M oracvsik 
gives several reasons why this might be the case, for example the Commission is able to  
promote the efficiency of interstate bargaining under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) b y
I
setting the policy agenda in the bargaining stage (1993).
We can see, then, that in varying degrees theories in the neorealist tradition have begun to  
‘unpack’ the state. Many such theories employ rational choice frameworks, so that norms 
and principles promoted by Non-Govemmental Organisations (NGOs) or nationally based 
interest groups enter the international policy-making process only by acting as constraints on  
elite behaviour. Liberal constructivists argue that the environment in which actors participate 
is social rather than methodologically individual; norms not only constrain actors but also 
reach m uch deeper as shared understandings or social constructions that constitute actor 
identities and interests. In this way, liberal constructivism marks an important shift in focus 
from interactions to interests.
If  liberal constructivism is analogous to functionalism in its emphasis on inputs to the policy­
making process, the process itself could only be compared to multi-level governance in its 
nebulous and multi-faceted nature (see section 1.3.5.). In practise there might be a myriad o f  
‘diffusion’ mechanisms that allow norms to permeate the international policy-making 
process, where Checkel identifies two stereotypical pathways (1997; 1998). In a relatively 
liberal society, transmission of norms may be bottom-up and societal. Here, non-state actors 
and policy networks are united in support o f certain values; they then mobilise and coerce 
policy-makers into changing state policy. The example is given o f the Clinton 
administration’s shift in support for a ban on child labour practises following pressure from 
organisations such as UNICEF and domestic consumer groups (Checkel, 1997, p. 479). If the
Public in Theories of Integration
3i The idea that member states delegate authority from a position of full legal and political sovereignty is criticised as 
unrealistic in section 4.5., where MacCormick is cited as arguing forcefully using legal theory that there are very few 
sovereign states left in the world, and certainly none in Europe (1993). Arguably, Moravcsik fosters the illusion of full state 
sovereignty by focusing in his accounts on the dynamics of EU summits and ‘grand bargains’ to the detriment o f decision­
making at, say, different levels or by European Union institutions.
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example here features special interest groups, it is nevertheless clear that public opinion could 
play a similar role. One might think, for example, of Tony Blair’s reticence to force the issue 
o f EURO membership against hostile public opinion36. Another pathway is top-down elite 
socialisation and learning, particularly appropriate to relatively state-centric political systems 
and institutions. Here, constructivists draw on social psychology literature to hypothesise 
how policy-makers may come to internalise new norms and values through constant 
exposure. A relevant example would be the engrenage or informal co-option of national 
officials who come to work at the European Commission (Michelmann, 1978). Although 
liberal constructivism does not necessarily preclude neorealist forms of integration, the focus 
on the social fostering o f values tackles head on issues o f legitimacy, the democratic deficit 
and European identity; all pertinent issues which appear to require some degree o f mass 
attitudinal input to be successfully resolved.
1.3.5. M ulti-actor Approaches
Many recent approaches by predominantly European scholars have depicted the EU as a 
complex and pluralistic structure, under relatively weak member-state control. The concern 
o f such scholars has often been less with advancing an overarching theory o f integration but 
rather with describing specific policy-areas that fall within the ambit of the EU. Moreover, 
for most theorists it follows that there is nothing inherently fixed in the current system, 
meaning that the EU has a far from a stable institutional structure.
Theories of multi-level governance (MLG) emphasise power sharing between different levels 
o f  government, where on one account there is
“no centre o f accumulated authority. Instead, variable combinations of governments 
on multiple layers of authority - European, national, and subnational - form policy 
networks for collaboration. The relations are characterized by mutual 
interdependence on each others’ resources, not by competition for scarce resources’’ 
(Hooghe, 1996, p. 18)
36 Checkel gives the example of wide public pressure, culminating with a mass campaign attracting over 1 million signatures, 
surrounding changes in the German citizenship law to allow people to hold dual citizenship (1997, p. 485).
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Multi-level governance, then, sets out not so much to challenge the rational choice 
foundations of neorealism but rather the liberal intergovemmentalist assumptions o f a state- 
centric integrative process where lowest common denominator bargains ensure that no 
government has to integrate more than it wishes. Fields o f integration are not neatly ‘nested’ 
so that states and state leaders can monopolise the interaction between the domestic and 
international arenas. The justification for this viewpoint is, in short, twofold. On the one 
hand, actors at different levels share decision-making competencies with states; in particular, 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court and even 
subnational regions all have independent influence that belies their intergovemmentalist role 
as merely bolstering the credibility o f interstate commitments37. Secondly, collective 
decision-making in the form of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers 
weakens the power o f  any single government. This pushes the question back as to why states 
would let this situation arise. Here multi-level governance theorists argue in rational choice 
terms: there may be intrinsic benefits having to do with shifting responsibility for unpopular 
decisions or insulating decision-makers from domestic pressures38. There may also be further 
political benefits to decisional reallocation outweighing the loss o f control: intrinsic benefits, 
such as insulation from domestic pressures on, say, a Central Bank or advantages associated 
with decreased transactions costs in formulating collective decisions with the costs in loss o f  
sovereignty, for example, lagged until a later parliamentary session. Furthermore, loss o f  
control may be involuntary39. As many o f  these points parallel arguments made by historical 
institutionalists, I now turn to this branch o f theory.
37 To take the example of the role of law in European integration, Dehousse and Weiler argue that its unintentional impact 
may be twofold (Wallace, 1990, p. 246-8). Firstly, the conservativism inherent in legal systems may make further evolution 
difficult. For example, Article 30 (6) as it was known when the SEA was signed is a success in the sense that it establishes 
cooperation in the field of economic aspects to security. On the other hand, further cooperation could be opposed on the 
grounds that it is not envisaged in this provision. Secondly, whether or not authority was willingly delegated to a 
supranational institution, where it is given the power to act reasonably autonomously, as is the case with the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in certain instances, member states cannot necessarily predict or influence outcomes. The examples are 
given of the creative role played by the ECJ with regard to the principle o f mutual recognition (the 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
ruling), the concepts of a customs union and o f a common commercial policy.
n  This follows Moravcsik’s argument that in certain instances state actors are able to use the EU to strengthen their 
executive power by “internationalising domestic politics" - loosening the constraints placed on them by domestic actors 
through the redistribution o f  decision-making to European Council or Council of Ministers level, where such decisions take 
place in secrecy and can be claimed to be binding (1994). This assumes, of course, that lowest-common-denominator 
bargaining prevails at the international level. Either way, the implications for the impact of public opinion are negative.
39 A final category of criticism of liberal intergovemmentalism concerns the disaggregation of some of its most basic 
concepts. It is seen as nonsensical to view the state as a monolithic whole, rather it is divided into institutions and actors, 
where the question is not ‘Why do states give up sovereignty in the process o f European integration?’ but ‘Why do particular 
actors change institutional rules?’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 348). In a similar vein, the concept of power is seen 
not just as the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would not otherwise do but also the ability to achieve desired 
outcomes. So, a successful ‘weak’ national government in a federal state might well have more control than a less successful 
‘strong’ national government in a confederal state (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 351).
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The central insight o f historical institutionalism is that the consequences of what originally 
may have been intergovernmental decisions are often unforeseen, unintended or undesired. 
To varying degrees, historical institutionalists argue that in certain circumstances and 
especially over the longer-term state control over the integrative process is limited. In the 
first instance, the partial autonomy of EU institutions may hamper state control. Information 
asymmetries may exist, especially given the highly specialised and pan-European nature of 
the work of the ECJ and the Commission. Institutions, then, are not simply the information- 
providers or facilitators of rational choice scholars but may have a deeper effect on actor 
strategies. In common with MLG theorists, the argument is made that the restricted time 
horizons of policy-makers and growing issue density leads to problems of overload and 
pressure to delegate (Pierson, 1996). Furthermore, sunk costs and the rising price of exit act 
as a strong deterrent to states leaving the EU40. Integration, then, may follow a ‘path 
dependent’ route producing a fragmented, multi-actor European polity.
So, the breakdown o f state control over the integrative process in both MLG and historical 
institutionalism suggests more leeway for the impact o f the public than liberal 
intergovemmentalism. Despite this, the first multi-level governance theorists were usually 
more interested in stressing the increased role of supranational actors than the public p er se 
(see Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). Moreover, the decision-making logic of multi-level 
governance theorists draws heavily on the rational choice structure o f neorealism rather than 
the more norm-based, societal approach o f  liberal constructivism. Nevertheless, insofar as 
the European Parliament is seen to play an increased role in policy-making in the multi-level 
mode, and is seen as representing the European public despite the arguments for the 
democratic deficit41, then there is a role for the public. In addition, the teleological ambiguity 
o f multi-level governance does not shut the door on a possible strong role for the public. 
However, in the final analysis both approaches arguably place more of an emphasis on 
supranational institutions than on mass attitudes42.
40 Scharpf argues that the cost of exit means that the pressure to reach agreement will be great. Yet these agreements will 
have a tendency to be sub-optimal given the frequent requirement for unanimous decision-making amongst fifteen states and 
the wish to avoid substantial loss of sovereignty (the ‘joint-decision trap’) (O’Neill, 1996, p. 274).
41 The typical response to this position is that, given the low and decreasing average voter turnout for European Parliament 
elections, increasing the powers of the Parliament increases the democratic deficit rather than resolves the situation.
42 See, for instance, Pierson’s analysis of European Social Policy where the author stresses the role of the ECJ and the 
Commission (1996, p. 14S-156).
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An additional area o f interest for MLG theorists has been the growing régionalisation o f  the 
EU. This perspective feeds into the literature on the Europeanisation of domestic structures 
and comparativist approaches to European integration. Benz and Eberlein argue that 
subnational regional units are becoming more involved in the EU policy-making process 
because o f the increasing role of the EU in regional development policies, principally through 
such vehicles as the European Regional Development Fund, the European Structural Funds 
and Cohesion Funds (1998, p. 2). One consequence o f such approaches has been that 
students o f domestic politics have begun to find that, without addressing the role of the EU, 
they cannot fully explain domestic processes and outcomes. The reverse side o f this is that 
without a fuller understanding of domestic processes, it may well be that European-level 
outcomes remain incompletely understood. Hence, to comparativists the study of domestic 
politics is seen as vital to understand why states choose to defend their interests at the 
international level, and because it is the basic political unit in the EU. Within each state, 
idiosyncratic policy-making styles based on different institutional structures and attitudes 
prevail43. The result is a renewed focus on domestic structures and attitudes: Hix looks, for 
instance, at pluralist, rational-choice, sociological and institutional domestic approaches. On 
Lipset and Rokkan’s sociological model of nation building, political systems are explained by 
a series o f cleavages created by ‘critical junctures’ in the historical development o f each 
system. Hix proposes that the EU is reflected in party-political conflict not so much in the 
traditional left-right politics cleavage but rather a ‘pro-supranational integration versus 
national independence’ cleavage that has arisen with the ‘politicisation’ of the EU (1994, p. 
21). Public opinion data can then be used to confirm the existence of such a cleavage in 
voting patterns, and indeed an attempt by Ray to do this is reviewed in section 3.2.344,
Writing from a multi-level governance standpoint and arguing on the basis o f the existing 
theoretical literature that the public does play a role in integration, Sinnott tentatively 
formalises when the public might be expected to play a legitimising role in internationalised
43 Ironically, in order to demonstrate the importance of the domestic politics approach, Bulmer argues that states arc the 
basic political units at the European level too, using such realist examples as de Gaulle’s boycott of the community in 1965 
(Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 149).
44 Even if  it is not made explicit in the literature, the domestic politics approach clearly implies an increased role for the 
public. For instance, one might imagine a situation where a government is constrained only by the need to build coalitions to 
remain in office. The maximum possible leverage that public opinion could exert is indirect: one can imagine a country 
approaching an election with several parties competing fiercely by making binding commitments.
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governance (1994). Sinnott argues that the role o f  the public is a function of the relationship 
between public perceptions and expectations o f  an issue on the one hand and the nature o f the 
problems being confronted and the claims o f  supranational institutions on the other. This 
relationship may vary by policy sector, country and over time. In a MLG system, the 
problem of allocating policy competences (especially in the light of the principle o f  
subsidiarity) is also an issue. Sinnott operationalises his model by considering seven 
scenarios, two o f which imply a strong role for the public. In the first of these cases, the 
nature o f the problem is international; however, the principle o f subsidiarity forges a link 
between the public and supranational organisations. Sinnott takes the cases of environmental 
policy, scientific research and development aid. The second example is where the public 
demands action at the international level, but where the issue itself is probably best tackled at 
the national level. Sinnott appears to use his own data collected for the European Science 
Foundation Project ‘Beliefs in Government’ to claim that in 1989 a majority of respondents 
felt that poverty should be tackled at the European level, despite the lack of institutional 
structures to deal with this issue (1994, p. 17). On the other hand, for some issues the public 
might not dispute the claim that it is mostly a matter for international cooperation and hence 
accept a correspondingly small role, the example being that of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) which began in 1970. This approach, then, tries to explain the current 
situation on a policy-by-policy, country-by-country basis with little claim to generality in the 
sense that, where one might hypothesis that the public will play a part in issues where there is 
an element of subsidiarity, the subjective interpretation of the issue that the public is free to 
place on it means that it might not recognise this particular issue as falling into the 
‘subsidiarity’ category. Clearly this is an approach that requires a lot o f empirical data with 
which to work, something that Sinnott willingly admits to not being able to provide in the 
same article. By way o f summary, then, multi-actor approaches do disaggregate the 
integration process, yet only Sinnott specifically includes the public as an active actor.
1.4. Conclusion
In the words of Stanley Hoffmann, “[t]he critical issue for every student of the world order is 
the fate of the nation-state” (Tranholm-Mikkelson, 1991, p. 1). Integration theory places this 
issue at its centre. On early theories o f integration, there was a fairly simplistic split between
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those theories such as functionalism, transactionalism and revisions of neofunctionalism that 
posited an instrumental role for the public in this matter, and more state-centred theories that 
denied the public a role.
However, as theories of integration converge over time, mass attitudes are being elevated in 
importance. After the disavowal of neofunctionalism by its leading theorist, Haas, the 
integrationalist debate has increasingly taken the form o f theories that attempt to disaggregate 
the state as an actor, such as multi-level governance, domestic politics approaches and liberal 
constructivism. Even theories that draw more directly on the realist tradition stressing state 
sovereignty over the integrative process, such as two-level game theory and liberal 
intergovemmentalism, posit more substantial roles for domestic politics inputs, often in the 
form o f bargains with ruling elites.
The significance o f  the inclusion o f  the mass public as an actor in several of these theories is 
enhanced by the feeling that, in the long run at least, mass attitudes will provide the 
legitimacy that the European Union needs to survive. The current debate over the democratic 
deficit within the EU and the numerous referenda on treaty and membership accessions 
would seem to bear witness to this impression. Exactly what legitimising function the public 
performs in the integrative process is addressed further in section 2.2.1., while the theoretical 
evidence o f  public involvement is backed up by empirical evidence in section 2.4., after a 
presentation o f  aggregate levels o f support for integration amongst European Union member 
states. This certainly marks a change from the original design o f the institutions o f the 
Communities, which consciously avoided democratic legitimacy and was instead marked by 
technocracy and elitism. As Spinelli remarked on the man whose name is most closely linked 
to the European project:
“Monnet has the great merit o f having built Europe and the great responsibility o f 
having built it badly” (Featherstone, 1994, p. 150).
Few authors, then, would argue that the EU is in institutional ‘equilibrium*.
With more and more theorists acknowledging some role for the public, the question then 
arises when and how the public can be expected to have an effect on policy outcomes. 
Putnam characterises public opinion research as either subscribing to a ‘bubble up’, leading
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indicator theory o f  the public role in integration, or a ‘trickle-down’, lagging indicator role, 
where the public essentially functions as a constraint (Putnam in Tsoukalis, 1983, p. 87). 
With perhaps the exception of Hallstein’s reflections of integration in the 1960s, the reality is, 
however, that most authors stress the role o f elites, possibly with mass attitudes playing the 
negative, constraining role first specified by Lindberg and Scheingold. As the salience o f 
integration increases, the public might be expected to voice their opinions more and more, but 
in an essentially reactive way. However, with the exception o f liberal constructivism and 
Sinnott’s tentative work there is little in the way of in-depth focus on the possible 
transmission mechanisms of public attitudes to policy-making, so that we are left to 
disentangle the relative significance o f public opinion amongst a morass of other factors. 
Moreover, few o f the theories mentioning public opinion address public impact at a 
supranational level, for instance through the European Parliament. There are two reasons 
suggested for this lack o f interest in the public; the influence of the permissive consensus 
thesis and the feeling until the later 1970s that public opinion was an unstable and irrational 
force.
In conclusion, the aim o f this chapter has principally been to demonstrate the role of the 
public in the various major theories o f integration as a justification or otherwise to study mass 
attitudes in more detail. The results suggest that, although the public is allotted some, often 
limited role in many theories, most theorists poorly define its exact nature. Moreover, there 
are grounds to believe that this limited role is understated. However, at this stage we will 
have to be satisfied with the premise that the public does have some relevance to the 
integration process, and move on to look more closely in the chapter that follows at the make­
up o f  mass attitudes in the European Union.
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2.1. Chapter Aim and Summary
In this chapter I principally aim to specify public attitudes in the various EU member states 
towards European integration over a set period of time. As a result, this chapter acts as a 
complement to those immediately preceding and following it.
A historical description and analysis o f trends in public opinion towards integration would 
appear a useful preface to the examination o f  various theories o f  mass support for integration 
in chapter three. Indeed, as we shall see in that chapter, several explanatory theories take as 
their starting point public opinion trends. However, as a necessary prelude to their 
description I elaborate on exactly what mass attitudes one should measure, a task that 
involves filling in some o f the blanks lift by theories of regional integration in' chapter one on 
the exact role o f the public in integration. I also address the relationship between 
respondents’ attitudes and survey questions. In this way I am better placed to understand the 
significance, meaning, and limitations in meaning of public opinions and attitudes, so going 
beyond the minimal definition of public opinion adopted in section 1.2. Finally, I take the 
opportunity to review the permissive consensus thesis introduced in chapter one using 
empirical data on support.
So, in section 2 .2 .1 .1 make the case that the public provides a necessary degree o f legitimacy 
to the European Union, as well as noting that the public might play this role in a variety o f 
ways, including through opinion polls. In section 2.2.2.1 set out to understand mass attitudes 
and opinions, the key insight being that attitudes towards European integration can be 
divided into ‘affective’ and ‘utilitarian’ components. In section 2.3. I set out to give a 
descriptive account o f public opinion trends. This goal raises a further set of methodological 
questions: the source(s) of our information concerning mass attitudes, what questions from
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these sources to take, how closely these questions approximate the utilitarian and affective 
facets of mass attitude support for integration identified in section 2.2.2., and also such issues 
as over what time period survey data is taken and which countries to include. At least here, I 
principally adopt Eurobarometer data collected under the supervision of Information, 
Communication, Culture and Audiovisual Media Directorate General of the European 
Commission, the only cross-national survey of mass opinion towards integration over a 
sustained time period. The support questions selected will try to cover opinion on both 
specific and more affective aspects o f further European integrative developments, generally 
over the greatest time period and including as many EU member states as possible. In certain 
instances, support will also be analysed by issue area.
The results show that questions addressing affective issues tend to gamer higher levels o f 
support than more specific questions. Another finding regards the high level of non-attitudes 
towards integration, although I wait until chapter seven to treat this subject in depth. 
Moreover, at the aggregate level there are a number of clear trends in public opinion since at 
least the 1970s. So, in section 2.4. I argue that insofar as the permissive consensus of 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) can be said to exist, it only does so only temporarily in 
certain specific countries or sets o f circumstances.
2.2. Methodology
In this section I mainly address the methodological issues behind the survey results presented 
in section 2.3. I work from the general to the specific: I argue that the significance of public 
opinion on European integration lies in its legitimising power, while a conceptualisation o f 
respondents’ modes o f orientation towards the European Union allows one to address in what 
ways public opinion survey questions tap attitudes. In the light o f  this I then consider the 
most appropriate data sources and questions to measure support for integration in its different 
facets. Finally the number o f countries to be included and the time period covered will also 
be addressed.
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2.2.1. Public opinion and system legitimacy
In chapter one we saw how the public has come to play an increasing, if  possibly underrated 
role in theories o f  European integration and, by extension, in the actual process o f integration 
itself. The precise transmission mechanisms of public influence into European Union policy­
making were also briefly discussed, even if  here too theory is rather imprecise. Although this 
may suffice to show that the public has a role to play in integration, we are left none the 
wiser as to what measure best captures this role. I argue that public ‘support’ for the EU, 
rather than, say, measures of European identity, most appropriately captures the public’s role 
on the basis that support is enough to fulfil an essential legitimising role in the integrative 
process.
At first sight, the question o f what role the public plays in  integration is answered with 
reference to the transmission mechanisms of public attitudes: in several European countries 
the public periodically passes or rejects referenda on negotiated EU treaties, while in all 
member states citizens may vote in national or supranational elections, patronise or organise 
popular manifestations or political organisations such as pressure groups, unions or parties or 
express their opinions in surveys, which might then be published in-house for political parties 
or in academic or journalistic media (see Gabel, 1998, p. 5). In addition, public opinion 
might be legitimising in its own right, or be associated with political behaviour such as 
voting (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995; Zaller, 1992). O f course, understanding the 
effectiveness o f these various transmission routes is a more involved question (for a thorough 
survey o f  research in this area, see M anza and Cook, 2001). Perhaps this is enough to 
warrant a study o f  public opinion; however, this description does not help us understand in a 
wider sense what purpose the public serves in voicing its opinion through these channels. I
I argue that public opinion is system legitimatory and to see w hy this might be so, I make the 
untesting assumptions that European Union member states are all governed by democratic 
institutions and that, given this, over a certain timeframe, probably measured in years or 
decades rather than months, these institutions must secure the acquiescence o f  a broad 
majority o f its citizens to continue in existence without reform of their governing 
arrangements. I f  we then consider Polsby’s four methods o f securing citizen acquiescence; 
coercion, indoctrination, loyalty and custom (in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264) we can
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assume that in a democracy, loyalty is at least the principal method of acquiring acquiescence 
or, rather, legitimacy. Analogously, the EU can be said to have evolved from a series of 
international treaties to such a degree that it too clearly requires a substantial degree of 
citizen loyalty. Borzel and Risse classify the EU as an ‘Emerging Federal System’: there is a 
directly elected parliament, a Court of Justice, supremacy of Community law over national 
law, and a series o f European treaties allocating jurisdiction and resources to European and 
national governments (in Jorges, Meny and Weiler, 2000, p. 53). Hence, I make the claim 
that the system has surely arrogated enough state sovereignty for us not to question the need 
for attendant citizen legitimacy.
The exact form and classification of the EU is contested, with resultant implications for the 
precise degree or type o f legitimacy needed; however, I contend that because the EU is not 
yet a ‘superstate’ it does not need loyalty based on collective identity but rather support. The 
basis of this argument is that, while the EU may well be an ‘Emerging Federal System’, it 
cannot be characterised as a domestic polity a la Hix (1994) but rather has member state 
power clearly entrenched at its base. Collective identity thus rendered unnecessary, 
Armingeon maintains that this will not change unless the EU begins to levy taxes and 
redistribute major resources (in Kriesi et a/., 1999, p. 236)'. The problem with identity as a 
source of system legitimacy in the EU context is further compounded by the fact that there is 
none: from figure 5.1. in section 5.2.2. we see that EU identity alone is surely too low to 
sustain a political regime. The transfer of allegiances as people become aware of the tangible 
benefits of integration, predicted by functionalists and neofunctionalists, has not happened. 
One might counter that low levels of identity are behind the numerous crises that have beset 
the EU in recent years; the rejection of several referenda, the fall of the Santer Commission, 
low turnout in supranational elections and the general impression of a democratic deficit. 
However, the EU is manifestly still with us and the scope of its ambitions shows no sign of 
slowing. I suggest that a milder form of attachment, exemplified by support, and coupled 
with behaviour such as voting in election and referenda, can instead account for the 
legitimacy (or otherwise) of the EU over the past decades. The key point is that while 
respondents with a strong sense of European identity may very likely also support the EU, 
supporters of integration may not share a sense of European identity and indeed they do not 1
1 Interestingly, the proposal to levy an ‘EU tax’ was put forward at the June 2001 Gbtenburg summit by German finance 
minister Hans Eichel (The Economist, 2001, p. 40).
33
2. Public Opinion Trends on European Integration
have to legitimise the EU. I thus challenge the exclusive focus of some scholarly research, 
such as the network on Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses 
(IDNET) on European identity.
The argument that a strong sense o f European identity amongst European publics is  
unnecessary to the development o f the European Union is pursued on a normative basis b y  
Weiler, who argues that a relation between nationality and citizenship in the style of C arl 
Schmitt is to abandon the idea of Europe as a multi-national melting-pot (Weiler in Gowan 
and Anderson, 1997, p. 286). Weiler reserves his harshest criticism for the members o f th e  
German Constitutional Court, who in the so-called 1993 ‘Maastricht decision’ ruled that th e  
European Court o f Justice did not have the sole power to review and annul Community 
measures on the grounds that no pre-existing European demos defined in organic national- 
cultural terms existed as a precondition for constitutional unification (Gowan and Anderson, 
1997, p. 276). The concerns o f Weiler appear valid to the extent that a European identity, 
especially one based on a Schmittian kind of völkischen homogeneity, might substitute 
national identities . However, from section 4 .3 .1 note that a European identity might sit side 
by side with national identities, so to the extent that Europe means different things to 
different peoples, a kind of unity in national diversity, this might check the emergence o f  a 
homogenous, overarching form o f European identity.
Accordingly I choose to measure and analyse mass attitudes towards the EU through survey 
questions tapping respondents’ support for European integration. In general support is a 
relatively neutral, non value-laden way to encompass a wide variety o f explanatory factors. 
So, there is no a priori assumption being made about which set o f factors are more valuable 
in explaining support3. Anticipating the discussion in section 2.2.2., evidence o f this neutral 
status can be seen in the fact that questions concerning support for integration are typically
1 Weiler calls for acquiescence to the EU in terms o f attachment to a civic, non-cultural polity (see also Schmitter, 2000, p. 
28). This is rather similar to the notion o f constitutional patriotism propounded by Habermas and reviewed in section 4.3. 
The problem with taking civic republicanism here instead of support is one o f measurement. Armingeon proposes using 
trust in the core institutions of democracy, along with pride in the system in question. However, this measure is fairly 
similar to the measure of utilitarian pride, or system legitimacy adopted in section 5.2.3. The second issue is that focusing 
on civic republicanism risks ignoring mild affective measures of pride (cultural pride) that may also be associated with EU 
support (see chapter five).
3 To see this point, consider the evaluation of EU legitimacy solely by measuring mass levels of European identity. This 
would imply that identity rather than, say, economic performance is the touchstone of EU legitimacy, and also suggests a 
particular view o f the EU, as a nation-state that requires its own identity. 1 do not wish to make such assumptions at this 
stage.
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capable of capturing both utilitarian and affective types of responses. The importance o f this 
becomes clear in subsequent chapters, where I go on to observe the relative explanatory 
power of utilitarian variables, and particularly rival affective variables, on mass attitudes 
towards European integration. This focus on support also draws our attention to 
understanding non-attitudes, or those respondents who hold neither a positive or negative 
attitude towards the EU. Can non-attitude holding be seen as a sign of withdrawal and hence 
disillusionment with the political system, or is it simply representative o f indifference and 
lack of knowledge concerning politics in general? I treat non-attitudes in chapter seven.
O f course, underlying the measurement o f  support is the application of quantitative methods 
to survey data. I do not intend to justify the use of quantitative methods and survey data as 
opposed to, say, discourse analysis to arrive at conclusions regarding mass attitudes, although 
I do briefly dwell on some of the problems associated with survey data in section 2.2.2. In 
this following section I also focus on understanding mass attitudes; in section 2.2.3. I select 
the most appropriate survey data, and in section 2.2.4.1 make a choice of dependent variable 
from the support questions available.
2.2.2. U nderstanding Mass Attitudes and Opinions
In this section I ask how one can conceptualise public modes o f orientation towards the 
European Union. The aim is to understand what sort o f responses survey questions 
addressing support for the European Union typically elicit from individuals. Here I follow 
Niedermayer and Westle, who make a key division between diffuse and specific evaluations 
o f an object. I then highlight some caveats to using survey data to tap respondents’ attitudes. 
This section, then, is the big brother to section 1.2. which offers only a minimal definition of 
public opinion. I
I adopt Niedermayer and Westle’s classification of orientations towards internationalised 
governance in order to better understand individual attitudes and opinions towards Europe. I 
make this choice because this relatively recent work draws heavily upon, and could even be 
seen as the culmination of, the efforts o f  earlier theorists Almond and Verba (1963; 1989), 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and Easton (1965). The basic components o f the
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Niedermayer and Westle model consist o f ‘modes o f  orientation’ and ‘objects’ (Niedermayer 
and Sinnott, 1995, p. 40). The former category encompasses anything a person might have in  
mind with respect to a particular object. In this thesis, the object in question is most likely a  
specific form o f internationalised governance such as the EU, or one o f its component 
aolicies. On Almond and Verba’s analysis, it is this distribution of patterns o f orientations 
:owards political objects amongst members o f a political community that constitutes political 
culture (1963, p. 14). The two-dimensional nature o f orientation modes and objects lends 
tself to further study by means of a simple grid (see table 2.1. below).
Table 2.1. Model of Respondents9 Modes of Orientations towards the EU
MODE
Psychological
Involvement Evaluations
Behavioural
Intentions
Specific Diffuse
X X
X X
X X
3*ali : ic , ns/ c 
outputs
Functional
Scope
able adapted from Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 50
ith regard to the objects in table 2.1., the political collectivity refers to those entities that 
rticipate in a common political structure and a common set o f political processes within a 
mmon territory. This political collectivity is in turn divided into ‘territorial’ and ‘personal’ 
mponents, recognising that both territories such as nation-states as well as people may be 
rnibers o f political collectivities at several levels of analysis, be it the international, 
tional or regional level. The political order refers to the organisation o f the political
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division o f labour within the collectivity, where this comprises its political philosophy and 
institutional structure (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 41). Political authorities are the 
occupants o f political roles at the international level. Policies are distinguished according to 
existent proposals or results and by functional scope; whether or not a particular policy is 
most appropriately dealt with at the supra-national level.
Modes of orientation are distinguished according to their behavioural relevance. 
Psychological involvement is the most passive form o f concern with an object, and aims to 
capture non-evaluative respondent interest in a particular object4. By contrast, an evaluation 
alludes to a normative response as to how an object should act or be and perceptions of how 
an object is or acts, whether over the short or long term5. Normative ideas that guide 
evaluations can be based on different criteria, and the resulting evaluations are subdivided 
into specific and diffuse categories. These subdivisions consciously draw on Easton’s 
selfsame concepts: the former is thought o f as being rational and political system output- 
related, and is based on concrete interests and cost-benefit calculations while the latter 
concept is more value-based, generalised and affective. Secondly, value-laden diffuse 
support as specified by Easton should not fluctuate greatly over time, unlike the more short­
term and volatile specific support. Support, then, is a multi-dimensional construct.
Clearly, Easton’s diffuse and specific concepts are close to Lindberg and Scheingold’s 
affective and utilitarian support discussed in section 1.3.2. Utilitarian support (‘based on 
some perceived or concrete interest’; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) is similar to 
Easton’s specific support, except that it is extended, and restricted to, political systems. 
Affective support (‘a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some o f the vague ideals 
embodied in the notion of European unity’; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) is nearly 
identical to Easton’s notion, except that it is restricted to orientations towards political 
systems. The objects of support are defined as systemic (the community and regimes, where 
political authorities are excluded for lack o f data) and identitive. Niedermayer and Westle 
argue that this identitive category refers to ‘underrated’ social rather than political
4 Niedermayer argues that the occasional Eurobarometer ‘Interest in Politics’ question is a measure of psychological 
involvement. In addition, the author shows that respondents with a higher interest in politics are more likely to go on to form 
specific and stable attitudes on political issues (1990, p. 3; see also section 7.4.).
5 Evaluations can be in the form of a positive or negative judgement about an object, or in the indirect form of a demand, 
where this is assumed to contain an implicit evaluation. In this way Niedermayer and Westle manage to combine Easton’s 
‘demand’ and ‘support’ inputs in his Systems Analysis o f  Political Life (1965).
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orientations between publics, where Easton includes political interactions between publics 
within his notion o f  a political community (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 39). I use the 
Niedermayer and Westle, and Lindberg and Scheingold terminology interchangeably in this 
thesis. Behavioural intentions constitute the final mode o f  orientation, and includes all 
actions that might be taken with different degrees o f subjective probability in regard to a 
particular object, such as voting or demonstrating. In table 2.1. I mark with an ‘X ’ those 
combinations o f  modes of orientation (‘evaluations’) and objects (‘Object as a whole’ and 
‘political collectivity’) that most occupy us here.
The adoption o f the concept of ‘evaluations’ has so far sidestepped the definition o f attitudes 
and opinions. Most commentators would agree that attitudes represent an enduring 
disposition to respond in a consistently positive or negative way towards a given object. 
Attitudes are only preceded by values, which might be thought o f  as enduring standards for 
what is desirable for an individual (Delli Carpini et al., 1996, p. 228). In our model attitudes 
would be manifested in evaluations and behavioural intent, but not psychological 
involvement. An attitude, then, is a hypothetical construct, demonstrated empirically only 
when the components of an attitude correlate with some consistency amongst each other or 
over time. In section 2.2.4.1 make an effort to identify the attitudes tapped by certain survey 
questions addressing European integration using exploratory factor analysis. Although an 
opinion m ay be the manifestation o f an attitude, it is something altogether more ephemeral. 
Following Hodder-Williams, an opinion is ‘an expression, either actual or potential, on a 
topic admitting o f  controversy’ (1970, p.5). While an opinion may well mirror an attitude or 
behavioural intent, this correspondence is unlikely ever to be perfect. There are many 
reasons why this might be so. In some instances, a well-designed and administered survey 
increases the correlation between attitudes and opinions. For example, one might focus on 
eliminating question wordings that introduce response bias. In other instances, respondents 
may willingly misrepresent themselves when asked for, say, their political preferences6. 
Whether a particular survey question evaluation represents a mere opinion or a more 
meaningful attitude is therefore an open question, and Niedermayer and Westle do not 
pronounce on the issue. As I deal with large-scale survey data in this thesis, I tend to assume 
that responses tap attitudes rather than opinions, subject to any caveats regarding question
6 Breen uses Latent Class Analysis to demonstrate that some extremist Northern Irish respondents deliberately misrepresent 
their true voting intentions in surveys (2000).
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wording and so forth. To increase the certainty with which one can say that this is the case, 
in section 2.2.4.1 scan survey questions for potential bias and other associated problems.
While there are many reasons why public opinion on an issue could be seen to vary, some 
authors have posited that public foreign and domestic policy attitudes are only partially 
consistent, inherently unstable or even random. If true, this would pose serious questions of 
the attempt in this thesis to explain mass attitudes towards integration. Converse, for 
instance, has argued that the mass public possesses a narrow belief system so that most 
people, for a lack of information about a particular controversy, offer meaningless opinions 
that vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time (Apter, 1964, p. 245). This 
work taps a general stream o f argument that devalues public opinion for its fickleness that 
stretches back two centuries. To take an example, the 19th century statesman Sir Robert Peel 
refers to:
“that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling,
obstinacy and newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion.” (Cited in
Hewstone, 1986, p. 14)
In recent years Converse’s approach has been criticised, so that many theorists now see the 
public as holding reasonably stable attitudes. Here, I simply draw attention to this important 
debate which is more fully discussed in section 7.2. I
I end this section by noting a further range o f  caveats to public opinion research that typically 
form part of larger debates, and I do no more than flag my awareness of them here. To 
begin, one might employ discourse analysis to criticise the foundations o f mass survey 
research. One o f the themes of this approach is an appraisal of the function of the written and 
spoken word. Following Chomsky, grammatical rules in particular are not merely part o f an 
economic form of description but representations of a person’s psychologically real cognitive 
structures. From this starting point, theorists have gone on to argue that most people use 
language to construct versions of the social world. Other theorists such as Austin have 
stressed the role played by social convention in language, so that much of what we say or 
write is context-dependent. The main implication for researchers using survey data is that 
responses may not be an accurate translation of individuals’ attitudes on any particular topic. 
In Discourse and Social Psychology the authors criticise a rather typical survey data analysis
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of attitudes towards ‘coloured immigrants* (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 44). For instance, 
the application o f  ‘restriction strategies’ by the survey designer leads in this case to responses 
being funnelled towards a series o f perhaps exaggerated or misleading categories. In this 
regard, I note that in section 2.2.4. some questions do not include and so prohibit a ‘don’t 
know’ response. Likewise, the context o f  the survey means that a certain attitude expressed 
on one occasion might not necessarily be expressed on another. The example is given o f a 
person who is sympathetic towards immigrants in general, yet reacts negatively to the idea o f 
immigrants in the context of welfare state ‘abuse’ by the same category o f persons (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987, p. 47). In practise, King, Keohane and Verba speak of ‘soaking and 
poking’, emphasising sound cultural familiarity with the country being studied so as to 
interpret data obtained in the correct fashion (1994, p.36; see also Putnam, 1994). For 
example, a  high proportion of neutral answers regarding support for integration could be used 
to support several hypotheses: lack o f  interest or knowledge, unwillingness to express an 
opinion on record and so on. It would appear, however, that such cultural familiarity is based 
more on, say, experience than following a specific methodology.
2.2.3. ISSP and Eurobarometer Data Sources
In this section I justify the selection o f the Eurobarometer (hereafter also EB) survey series 
and the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity (hereafter also ISSP) 
survey as the main sources of statistics on support for European integration. I also discuss 
the main strengths and drawbacks of each of these data sources. While the Eurobarometer 
surveys are better suited to providing descriptive statistics on support for integration and for 
testing non-attitudes towards European integration, the ISSP survey is more appropriate for 
testing the hypotheses I propound to explain support later in the thesis.
The Eurobarometer survey series is unmatched for general coverage of European affairs by 
country and over time. The surveys provide a ‘barometer’ o f  European Community public 
opinion on a wide range of issues usually directly or indirectly relevant to policy-makers. 
Since its original conception the Eurobarometer programme has expanded somewhat. Most 
of the standard surveys are accompanied by supplementary special surveys and a series of 
additional surveys such as the ‘Flash’ Eurobarometer polls, Europinion Continuous Tracking
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Survey (now discontinued) and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys have been 
launched.
The Commission o f the European Communities (Information, Communication, Culture and 
Audiovisual Media Directorate General), oversees the implementation of Eurobarometer 
surveys. The surveys are carried out by selected national institutes posing identical sets of 
closed questions to multi-stage, random samples of 1000 people per country aged fifteen and 
over7. Since 1975 (EB 3), a sample of 300 for Northern Ireland has been added to Great 
Britain to constitute the United Kingdom. Given the unification of Germany in 1990, an 
additional sample o f 1000 persons have been interviewed since EB 34, so that there are a 
total of 2000 interviews for this country. Since 1991 (EB 35) 500 interviews were conducted 
in Luxembourg, where before this date the number was only 300. Where results are displayed 
here for the Community as a whole, these are weighted on the basis of the adult population in 
each country8. Results are open to replication, and the data files are stored at the Cologne 
University Central Archive9.
Data has been collected over a relatively long time series, the first standard survey appearing 
in autumn 1973 (EB No. 1) with subsequent standard surveys being published biannually 
since this date10. Eurobarometer surveys have included Greece since autumn 1980 (EB 14), 
Portugal and Spain since autumn 1985 (EB 24), the former German Democratic Republic 
from autumn 1990 (EB 34), Finland since spring 1993 (EB 39) while Austria and Sweden arc 
included from winter 1994 (EB42).
So, the breadth of geographical coverage over time makes the Eurobarometer survey series 
particularly suitable for measuring trends public support for integration. There is no 
equivalent supranational statistical survey series to Eurobarometer in the world.
7 In multi-stage clustering a number of sampling points based on based on, say, city districts or households are drawn with a 
probability proportional to population size and density. From this a starting address is drawn randomly, using which other 
addresses are randomly selected. Generally speaking, cost considerations impose a trade-off betw een the number of clusters 
{i.e. city districts) sampled and the number of units within it subsequently chosen (De Vaus, 1995, p. 67).
8 It is not mentioned in the Eurobarometer surveys what age group this refers to, and w hether it is concomitant with the 15+ 
age group used for surveys.
9 The data files are, however, available from several sources. The data used in this thesis have all been downloaded from the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research website (http- ■ www icpsr umich cdu index html i.
10 Some surveys that were later included in the Eurobarometer reports were in fact first earned out in 1970 (European 
Community studies). Moreover, some of the ‘unification' questions that will be discussed below w ere asked in several 
public opinion surveys by the United States Information Agency between 1952 and 1967.
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Eurobarometer surveys have appeared in a host of articles and books broadly investigating 
variation in the levels of public support for European integration (for examples amongst 
recent literature see Eichengreen (1999), Gabel (1998; 1998b), Niedermayer and Sinnott 
(1995) and Ray (1995)).
The single time period and the limited number o f EU member states means that I do not make 
much use o f the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity for descriptive 
statistics on integration. The ISSP survey contains cross-national, individual level data 
loosely focused around the issues o f local, national and regional identity and belonging11. 
Data are available for a total o f 24 countries worldwide, although here only European Union 
member states are retained in the survey. The EU countries that the ISSP survey covers are 
as follows: Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden 
and Spain . For each of the countries there are approximately 1000 cases, except in the 
cases o f  Germany and the Netherlands, where the sample size is approximately 2000.
However, the ISSP survey is used in preference to Eurobarometer in chapters five and six 
because it contains a variable list far more capable o f testing the hypotheses explaining mass 
support for integration outlined in chapter four. Section 5.2.1. contains a more detailed 
comparison between the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys for the purposes o f explaining 
support. For chapter seven, the case for using Eurobarometer rather than ISSP data to 
measure non-attitudes towards integration is made in section 7.5.1.
Aside from the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys, there are few alternatives to the pan- 
European measurement of attitudes towards integration. A series o f World and European 
Values Surveys carried out sporadically over the period 1981-1997 under the auspices of the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) address feelings of 
regional identity and belonging1 23. These questions, however, do not come close enough to 
tapping evaluations o f support to be salient in this research. Two Reader’s Digest surveys
11 The data I use here was made available on CD-ROM from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (study no. 
2880) .
12 The data for the UK is split into Britain and then Northern Ireland. Here I only analyse the results for Great Britain. On 
the other hand, the East and West German territorial distinctions preserved in the ISSP data are amalgamated in my results, 
except where specifically stated to the contrary.
,J The World Values Surveys (WVS) grew out of a study launched by the European Values Survey group (EVS). In 1981, 
the EVS carried out surveys in ten West European societies; it evoked enough interest to be replicated in 14 additional
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conducted in seventeen western European countries in 1969 and 1990 pose a number o f 
questions enquiring into both utilitarian and affective satisfaction with the European 
Communities, support for various European-level policies such as agricultural support and 
even levels o f satisfaction with the number o f migrant workers. As these questions do little 
more than duplicate the efforts o f the Eurobarometer surveys I do not make use of them. A 
final option might be to stitch together country-based surveys o f  attitudes towards integration. 
However, the methodological problems associated with inter-country comparison and the 
limitations in the number o f included countries that would invariably result means that this 
would be very much a last resort.
2.2.4. Survey Questions
Having settled on the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys as sources o f questions measuring 
attitudes towards European integration, I now specify these questions and what facet o f 
support they measure. From section 2.2.2., we know that attitudes towards integration may 
contain utilitarian and affective dimensions, where a particular question might tap one or 
both dimensions. Using exploratory factor analysis, I identify two underlying factors in the 
questions examined below, which I interpret to measure affective and utilitarian facets o f 
support towards integration. In addition, I list a question that assesses support for specific, 
policy-oriented aspects o f the European Union.
To begin with general measures o f support for integration, I note that four questions dealing 
directly with attitudes towards the European Communities have appeared more or less 
regularly in Eurobarometer surveys. One o f these four questions also appears in the ISSP 
survey. A number o f other Eurobarometer questions are more recently or less frequently 
posed (5a to 9). The questions are listed immediately below, so that we can then move on 
interpret what type o f response they elicit from the interviewee.
(1) “In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If  for, are 
you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent
countries. From here the WVS expanded rapidly, so that for the 1995 wave the EVS group did not participate integrally. 
Nevertheless, the ICPSR carries combined EVS/WVS datasets for the 1981, 1990-1 and 1995*8 survey waves.
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against or very much against?’* (United States Information Agency surveys (USIA) conducted 
sporadically between 1952-67; European Community Study 1973; Eurobarometer No. 10 and 
many subsequent surveys. Question apparently discontinued from EB 44.2bis (1996))14.
(2) “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European 
Union is a  good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” (European Community Study 
1973; Eurobarometer No. 1 and many subsequent surveys)15.
(3) “If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be 
very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?” (European Community Studies 1970, 1971 and 
1973; Eurobarometer No. 1 and many subsequent surveys. Question apparently discontinued 
after EB 43.1, excepting an appearance in the 25th anniversary EB 50)16.
(4) “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance 
benefited or not from being a member o f  the European Community (Common Market)?” 
(Eurobarometer No. 19 and many subsequent surveys; 1995 International Social Science 
Program National Identity survey)17.
(5a) “In your opinion, how is the European Union, the European Unification advancing 
nowadays? Please look at these people. No. 1 is standing still. No. 7 is running as fast as 
possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion o f the European Union, 
European Unification.”
(5b) “And which corresponds best to what you would like?” (Eurobarometer No. 26, 28 and 
many subsequent surveys). This is the so-called ‘Eurodynamometer’.
14 For the USIA survey, the relevant question is the bipolar “Are you, in general, for or against efforts toward uniting 
Western Europe?’’. For surveys from ECS 1973 until EB 10, the question wording is “ All things considered, are you in 
favour of the unification o f  Europe, against it, or are you indifferent?” In EB 44.2bis, The word ‘Western’ is omitted from 
the question.
15 From EB 41.0 the phrase ‘European Union’ was placed alongside and eventually superseded ‘European Community’. In 
turn, the phrase ‘European Community’ relegated ‘Common Market’ to a position in brackets at the end of the question from 
EB 17 until it was finally removed in EB 35.
16 The wording ‘European Union’ begins to replace ‘European Community from EB 42. Concomitantly, ‘European 
Community’ relegates ‘Common Market’ to a position in brackets at the end of the question from EB 8 until it is finally 
removed in EB 35.
17 Until EB 35 ‘Common Market’ is included in brackets at the end of the question. For the International Social Science 
Program survey, the wording is very slightly different. “Generally speaking, would you say that (R’s nation) benefits or 
does not benefit from being a member of the European Union? (Benefits, Does not benefit, Never Heard of, Don’t know)”
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(6) “As for the future, do you think the movement towards the unification of Europe should 
be speeded up, slowed down or continued as it is at present (Speeded up, Continued as it is at 
present, Slowed down, No reply)?” (European Communities Study 1973; Eurobarometer 
No.s 4-7,10-12).
(7) “Would you be willing to make certain personal sacrifices for example, on the financial 
level, to accomplish European unification? Would you be completely willing, fairly willing, 
slightly willing, or not at all willing?” (European Communities Study 1970,1971 and 1973; 
Eurobarometer No. 3 and 4).
(8) “Some people talk o f  the idea o f forming a “United States of Europe”, putting together the 
member countries of the European Community. This means a kind of political union like 
there is between the fifty states of the U.S.A., or the ten provinces that form Canada. Does 
this idea of forming a United States o f Europe some day, including (your country), seem a 
good or bad idea to you?” (Eurobarometer No. 22,24)
(9) “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that in five years* time (your 
country) will be benefiting or not from being a member o f the European Union?** 
(Eurobarometer No. 39 and some subsequent surveys)
It would seem that we have an abundance of questions tapping attitudes towards the 
European Communities18. However, only the first five questions have been asked with any 
degree o f consistency over the lifespan of the Eurobarometer series. Concentrating on these 
five questions, then, it appears that they draw forth more affective or diffuse responses from 
respondents.
Question (1) appears the most diffuse measure of public sentiment on integration. The 
question wording does not refer explicitly to any form of supranational organisation or nation 
but rather to ‘efforts being made to unify Western Europe*. From section 2.2.2., we might
18 Indeed, there are many more Eurobarometer questions, especially in some o f  the earlier surveys, which purport to measure 
support for integration. Unfortunately most of these questions feature on only a few occasions. Other questions are similar 
to existing questions and so contribute little. In particular, questions (8) and (9) seem to have several similarly worded 
precursors in earlier surveys.
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therefore expect support for question (1) to be more stable than that for other questions. 
Additionally, I argue that because the question addresses European integration only in the 
abstract, and without the attendant problems conjured up by a specific representation o f  
integration, that it represents a theoretical maximum of underlying support for European 
integration19. Inglehart maintains that question (1) involves a ‘floating referent’: over time 
the degree o f  European integration has changed (1970, p. 168). Whereas in 1952 the question 
may have evoked the fairly modest European Coal and Steel Community in the backdrop o f  
the Second World War, in the new millennium the European Union agenda encompasses, for 
example, discussions on enlargement to admit former non-Westem European Warsaw Pact 
nations following the end o f the cold war. Because over time integration means different 
things one might make the argument that responses are not strictly comparable. One 
suspects, however, that there have always been some core values, such as the desire for peace 
in Europe, that have always been associated with the integrative process. It might thus be 
questions that measure less abstract aspects of integration than question (1) that are more 
prone to this problem of changing content. Yet even if the content of integration has altered, 
this cautions us to interpret survey responses within the context of the changing public 
discourse on European integration rather than necessarily discarding the question.
By asking respondents to evaluate their country’s membership of the European Union as a 
‘good* or ‘bad* thing, question (2) also seems to be tapping a diffuse evaluation o f support 
for integration. Handley argues that because no precise policy outputs are referred to, the 
referent is probably ambiguous for all but the most cognitively mobile respondents (1981, p. 
348). The counterfactual nature o f  question (3) would seem to imply that Handley’s 
argument could also be applied so that the question can be seen as a (diffuse) measure of 
enthusiasm for integration in general. In a logically consistent world, one might roughly 
expect the results o f question (2) and (3) to tally in an inverse sense as those who believe that 
their country should remain a member o f  the EU would not be relieved to see the EU 
scrapped. From figure 2.1. below, however, we can see that net support for question (3) is 
lower than that for question (2). This may be partially explicable by question-direction 
effects: some respondents tend to agree with questions fuelling a tendency towards ‘yea-
19 Eichengreen adopts a different tack, suggesting that there is a cosmopolitan/national distinction between question (1) and 
questions (2) and (4) in particular (1999, p. 19). Question (1), by speaking of ‘efforts to unify Western Europe’ evokes the 
elimination o f borders and sovereignty that are seen to be at the heart o f liberal, cosmopolitan arguments on integration, and 
there is no mention o f national perspectives unlike in other questions.
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saying’. Responses to questions worded in the same direction are thus more highly 
correlated with each other than with questions worded in the opposite direction (Heath, 
Taylor, Brook and Park, 1999, p. 159). I return to the differences in questions (2) and (3) in 
section 7.3., where both questions are candidates as a measure o f  non-attitudes. Question (4) 
is more utilitarian in the sense that it asks respondents to evaluate membership o f the 
community according to the rather utilitarian wording ‘benefited or not benefited’. Question 
(5a/b) seems studiously ambiguous as to what responses might be elicited. The seven- 
category response scale is undoubtedly an improvement on earlier questions . So, questions 
(1) -  (3) seem to be indicators o f diffuse support, while question (4) taps utilitarian support. 
Question (5) would not seem to fit in either o f these categories.
I employ exploratory factor analysis to test the theoretical impressions o f what responses 
these questions might elicit. I use Eurobarometer 42 (2nd half 1994), the most recent survey 
to include questions (1) to (5). The results for the factors with the highest two eigenvalues 
are presented in table 2.2. below. 20
Table 2.2. Affective and Utilitarian factors in EB 42 (1994) data
Factor Analysis Affective support Utilitarian support
Unify Western Europe? (Qu. 1) 0.67 0.19
EU membership (Qu. 2) 0.70 0.30
EU dissolution (Qu. 3) 0.60 0.25
EU country benefit (Qu. 4) 0.27 0.96
Unification speed (Qu. 5) -0.15 0.00
Eigenvalue 2.38 .98
Percentage of Explained Variance 47.68 19.51
Cronbach’s alpha for factor 0.73 N/a
Chi-squared Goodness o f Fit (df) 4.97(1)
Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax
20 Questions (1) to (4) are all to various degrees closed; that is, they only allow respondents to choose between selected 
categories rather than frame their own responses. This inevitably eliminates a great deal of repetitious and irrelevant 
material. However, there is a danger that choices will be forced so creating false opinions if there is an incomplete range of 
alternatives from which to choose. Referring to question (1), the original USIA survey only offered one positive and one 
negative response, the EC studies two positive and negative categories and a neutral category while the EB surveys follow 
this last pattern except that they do not offer an ‘indifferent’ category. With a neutral category only offered for four points 
in time one can expect responses to be to a certain degree biased. In addition to question (1), question (4) also does not offer 
a neutral category. Questions (2) and (3) only offer a single positive or negative category.
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Given the eigenvalue figure o f  0.98 for the second factor, I make the decision to relax the 
usual guideline o f  1 so that two factors are extracted. The results show that while questions 
(l)-(3 ) load more heavily onto the first factor, question (4) loads most heavily onto the 
second factor. As noted above, the wording for questions (l)-(3) is diffuse in character, so 
that I label factor 1 ‘affective support*. On the other hand, I have noted that the wording for 
question (4) seems to evoke a utilitarian response, and factor 2 is labelled ‘utilitarian 
support*. As expected, question (5) does not seem to belong with either factor.
In a slightly less satisfactorily manner, Gabel too manages to distinguish between affective 
and utilitarian support using EB 24 data (1998, p.22). In the affective category Gabel 
includes question (1), and a series o f further questions on European identity and solidarity, as 
evidenced by the willingness o f the respondent to pay higher taxes to ameliorate economic 
conditions in another EC country. Gabel takes question (2) as well as question (4) to be a 
measure o f  utilitarian attitudes towards integration. Any measure of support more specific 
than question (1), then, Gabel classifies as utilitarian21. I would argue that the question 
wordings, the results in section 2.3. and the above factor analysis would show this position to 
be overly sensitive. In any case, repeating Gabel’s analysis on EB 24, using exploratory not 
confirmatory factor analysis, I am only able to extract one factor.
In a separate, proprietary survey relying on many more question items, Hewstone manages to 
distinguish between utilitarian and affective dimensions to support for European integration 
in West Germany, Italy, France and the UK using factor analysis (1986, p. 165). Hewstone 
also alerts us to the fact that measures o f utilitarian and affective are highly correlated; this is 
also the case for the questions in EB 4222. Similarly, Wober carried out a public opinion poll 
of 816 U K  residents using a sixteen-item attitude questionnaire (1981). Factor analysis 
revealed three factors underlying British attitudes towards Europe, which the author named 
‘political’, ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ (Wober, 1981, p. 181). There are precedents, then, for 
attitudes towards Europe being multi-dimensional.
By contrast in Gabel and Palmer, the authors write that questions (1) and (2) form part of the same, uni-factorial 
dimension o f support (1995, p. 18). On this basis the authors construct a single support index from the two questions in an 
attempt to arrive at more consistent measurements of support. Gabel does not continue this standardised support measure in 
his later work (1998, p. 50).
“  The correlation between question (4) and question (1) is 0.37** (2-tailed test). Between question (4) and (2), (3) and (5) it 
is 0.48**, 0.4** and—0.07** respectively.
48
2. Public Opinion Trends on European Integration
Finally, as well as looking at support for integration on an aggregate basis, we can break 
down support into policy areas to gain more focus. As Sinnott rightly points out, preferences 
at what level a policy issue is to be decided are the very stuff o f legitimacy and support 
(Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, p. 65). Question (10) addresses policy issues directly 
by taking a series of issues areas and asking whether Europe is the most appropriate decision­
making level. Again, there are a number o f questions that go some way to breaking down 
support for integration into discrete areas although none put the question o f bounded 
legitimacy so directly as (10).
(10) “Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the 
(NATIONALITY) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within 
the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided 
by the (NATIONALITY) government, and which should be decided jointly within the 
European Union?” (Defence, Protection o f the environment, Currency, Humanitarian aid, 
Health and social welfare, Basic rules for broadcasting and the press, Fight against 
poverty/social exclusion, Immigration policy, The fight against unemployment, Agriculture 
and fishing policy, Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties, 
Education, Scientific and technological research, Information about the European Union, its 
policies and institutions, Foreign Policy towards countries outside the European Union, 
Cultural policy, Rules for political asylum, The fight against drugs) (Eurobarometer No. 32 
and some subsequent surveys) .
In summary, the affective/utilitarian dimensions of supported advanced in section 2.2.2. can 
be tentatively said to exist in the data. O f the affective questions, I argue that question (1) 
represents a theoretical maximum to support for integration. ‘Yea-saying* effects may 
account for the relatively low levels of support for question (3). In the sections that follow I 
choose not to draw on question (5) because it does not fit into the utilitarian/affective schema 
outlined.
:3 For earlier EB surveys such as EB32 which will be used later in the text below a slightly different set of issues is taken: 
Security and defence; Protection o f the environment; Currency; Cooperation w ith developing countries, Third World; Health 
and social welfare; Education; Basic rules for broadcasting and press; Scientific and technological research; Rates of V.A.T.; 
Foreign policy towards countries outside the EC; Participation of workers’ representatives on company boards; Protection of 
computer-based information on individuals.
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2.2.5. Country Inclusion and Time Period
The approach taken here will be to include as many EU countries in our descriptive analysis 
consistent with EB survey data. The Eurobarometer surveys begin in 1973, although some 
data goes back before EB surveys to incorporate European Community studies and 
occasionally United States Information Agency findings. New accessions are generally 
included in the surveys either before or swiftly after joining the Communities. However, 
EU 10/12 country sets are often used instead o f EU12/15 groupings, as often only a small 
number o f observations over time are available for the new member states.
2.3. Public Opinion Trends
In the following subsections I detail public support towards the EU as it is expressed 
principally in the EB survey questions selected and discussed above. The principal 
distinction I make is by diffuse and specific support. I also look at support for some o f the 
specific issues comprising part o f the integrative project. W ithin each of these categories I 
provide a snapshot o f support, before identifying differences by question, over time and at 
the aggregate and country level. I finish with an analysis of the permissive consensus in the 
light of the trends in support identified in the preceding sections.
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23.1. Diffuse Support
Figure 2.1. Diffuse Net Support Indicators among EU 10 and EU 15 Countries (EB 
1973-2000)
Figure 2.1. provides a general overview o f ‘net support’ for integration over time as 
measured by diffuse indictors (1), (2) and (3). Net support is calculated by subtracting 
negative response category results from positive result category findings. ‘Don’t know’ or 
neutral response categories are hence not considered. For the period 1973-1993 the data 
covers the first ten European Community entrants (EU 10). From 1995-2000 EU 15 data is 
included for question (2)24. Country-level graphs for questions (1), (2) and (3) are presented 
in section A.l. o f the Appendix.
Although one would be hard-pressed today to agree with Slater’s view that that there is a 
‘vast reservoir o f  public support’ for integration, positive net support is clearly very high 
(Slater writing in Tsoukalis, 1983, p.74). Between questions, however, support varies 
considerably. I interpret these differences as supporting the remarks made in section 2.2.4.
24 For question (3) there is no EU 15 data for the period 1995-2000, while for question (1) there are only three data points so 
that I exclude this data here. All the aggregate level EU data are weighted by population in the Eurobarometer surveys. 
These weightings are adjusted over time to account for population changes.
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that the most diffuse, positively-worded questions achieve the highest support levels25. From 
figure 2.1. we see that Question (1) has the highest net support results, providing evidence for 
the view that it represents a theoretical maximum of support for integration. Question (1) 
also appears to show notably less volatility than the other diffuse support questions. Then 
follows question (2), more specific insofar as it names the European Union as the instrument 
of regional unification. Question (3) has the lowest net support results, which come from a 
higher proportion o f respondents answering that they would be ‘relieved’ if the EU was 
scrapped than answer that they believe membership is a good thing. This suggests a possible 
‘yea-saying’ effect from respondents. Then, from figure 2.6. in section 2.3.2. net support for 
the ‘utilitarian’ question (4) is, as expected, lower than net support for question (3). While 
the affective/utilitarian split forms a useful conceptual device, we should nevertheless be 
wary o f  overattributing differences in support to this divide. For instance, the difference in 
support between diffuse questions (1) and (3) -  24 percentage points in 1990 -  is greater than 
that between questions (3) and (4) -  10 percentage points.
Turning again to figure 2 . 1 there are a number of trends in support over time broadly echoed 
in all the survey questions. Niedermayer and Sinnott propose a useful schema to fully 
illuminate the significance o f changes in support (1991, p. 57). Here, ‘Europeanisation’ o f 
public opinion occurs if  net support is increasing and ‘nationalisation’ denotes a decline in 
net support. To avoid any confusion o f  ‘nationalisation’ with nationalism and the theories o f 
support that I introduce later in the thesis, I use the term ‘anti-Europeanisation’ instead. The 
authors note that Europeanisation can occur due to a shift from indifference (where the EB 
question gives this response category) or negative evaluations into positive categories. 
However, net support can also increase if  positive support is unchanged, and negative support 
is transformed into indifference, or even if positive support declines and negative support 
declines further. Anti-Europeanisation can be explained by a combination o f the opposite set 
of mechanisms.
The first o f  these trends is an anti-Europeanisation shift that reaches a trough with the three 
diffuse indicators in around 1981. This picture is confirmed by looking at plates (1), (2) and
25 This ties in with Hurwitz and Peffley’s notion that the more value-laden the question matter the higher and more stable the 
findings (1987; see also section 7.2.).
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(3) in section A .l. o f the appendix26. Figure 2.2. below shows all question (2) response 
categories for the EU 10, so that the decrease in net support can be attributed to a shift out of 
positive evaluations primarily into the negative category27. It is interesting to note that there 
is some degree o f congruence between public opinion and the ‘eurosclerosis’ theory of 
integration, which posits that the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of integrative 
stagnation and dissatisfaction with the European Communities (Nelson and Stubb, 1998, p. 
237).
Figure 2.2. Question (2) -  EU 10 (EB 1973-1993)
............ Good Bad -----Neither
— N o Reply -  -  .N e t Support
In contrast with the preceding period, the 1980s is a time o f swelling support, rising to a peak 
in around 1990 or 1991, depending on the indicator used. According to question (2), the 
indicator showing most variation, net support fell 39% from a peak in the second half of 1975 
to the first ha lf o f 1981. However, from 1981 to the first half o f 1991 net support increased 
by 91%. By the first half of 1991 there is only a 3 percentage point gap (66%-63%) between
Country plates (1) and (3) in section A.l. o f the appendix uses European Community and United States Information 
Agency studies to provide pre-1973 data for questions (1) and (3) in the case of the earliest six members of the European 
Community. The chief findings are that while German public opinion was more favourable towards unification in the 1950s 
and 1960s than in the late 70s, the French and Italian publics were originally far less ‘European’. This gap progressively 
narrowed so that by 1975 support levels of all three countries were fairly similar; Italy even being more positive than 
Germany by 1975 on question (3) data. Inglehart explains the narrowing phenomenon by arguing that Communist 
supporters in France and Italy, initially hostile to unification efforts, were won over with the 1954 failure of the European 
Defence Community and the increasingly manifest benefits to workers (1970, p.l6$).
11 Support decreased ten percentage points from the 2nd half of 1978 to the first half o f 1981. Seven of these percentage 
points were redistributed to the negative category and the remaining three to the neutral category.
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question (1) and (2), implying that this was the period in which support for the Community 
came closest to its theoretical maximum.
Plates (1), (2) and (3) show that the picture for individual countries is more varied and indeed 
imply that the strong trends visible can be explained by some sets of countries rather than 
others. There appears a distinction in the data between countries where support jumps 
rapidly over the 1980s (Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal), countries where 
support increases reasonably (France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy) and 
countries in which support is level or even decreases slightly (Germany)28. Clearly, the last 
two sets of countries comprise the original six member states o f  the European Communities.
As the obverse to the decrease in the 1970s and early 1980s, both indifferent and net support 
categories increase with the decrease in negative opinions. Interestingly, indifferent 
responses also begin to decrease from the mid-1980s while net support continues to rise 
upwards. This suggests that over this extended ‘boom’ in support, many respondents at first 
hostile to the EU become indifferent as an intermediate stage to being supportive, in this way 
sustaining the increase in net support.
The third distinct trend in support visible in figure 2.1. is a spell o f anti-Europeanisation that 
begins around 1990 and bottoms out in 1997. The low-point is slightly lower than for the 
previous low at the beginning o f the 1980s. At the country-level there is an almost across- 
the-board reduction in net support. The exceptions are Ireland, where net support continues 
relentless upwards and Luxembourg, where support remains reasonably constant over the 
period. Probably the most controversial episode over this period with relevance to public 
opinion was the June 1992 negative Danish referendum result on accession to the Maastricht 
Treaty. According to questions (2) and (3), Danish net support for integration reached a peak 
in the second half o f 1992 before then declining. This suggests that the referendum result 
cannot be agglomerated with the downward trend in support over this period. Franklin,
:s Further intra-question analysis reveals that there was such a ‘boom’ in net support during some periods of the 19S0s that 
for Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands question (2) outpaced question (1). On the view that question (1) is 
a theoretical ceiling for underlying support, it could be argued question (2) net support figures represent, in stock-market 
parlance, 'irrational exuberance'. In other words, question (2) net support is partially explicable in terms of short-temi 
factors that do not coincide with underlying attitudes. Indeed, question (2) net support quickly returns below question (1) 
levels for these countries in the 1990s. So, there is also evidence of the expectation in section 2.2.4. that question (1) should 
display less variation than more specific measures o f  support.
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Marsh and McLaren attempt to explain the Danish referendum result largely within a 
domestic politics framework, and rationalise this by adapting the ‘second-order election’ 
thesis of Reif and Schmitt to referenda (1994). On this approach, it may be that political 
parties can more easily make capital out o f inter-national transfers than out of intra-national 
flows, while voters may take the opportunity to express a general protest against the 
government.
The latest visible pattern in aggregate net support is for a small, unsustained recovery from 
the 1997 low. The various country-level permutations to this picture means that there 
appears no overriding trend in support either positively or negatively. On the basis o f April- 
May 2000 (EB 53) data, one might roughly distinguish three country groups: high-support 
countries comprising Belgium (52%), Greece (53%), Spain (61%), Ireland (69%), Italy 
(51%), Luxembourg (69%), Netherlands (67%), Portugal (59%), mid-support countries 
including Denmark (29%), Germany (26%) and Finland (18%) and the low-support countries 
UK (1%), Austria (8%), Sweden (-4%). So, we can see that Sweden and not the UK as 
popularly supposed is the most negative EU member state. Indeed, all the 1995 Union 
entrants are not particularly enthusiastic members of the Union. I also note that for all the 
noisy hostility surrounding the Maastricht referendum, on the whole the Danish are more 
favourable towards the EU than the Germans.
We have seen above that support for integration varies not just over time and by country, but 
also between earlier and later entrants to the EU. This becomes clearer if we look at the 
figures below that display levels o f net support by question, and then by date o f accession to 
the EU.
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Figure 2.3. Question (1) -  Net Support EU 6/10/12/15 (EB 1978-1997)
EU 6 ----------EU 10----------- EU 1 2 ---------- EU 15
Figure 2.4. Question (2) -  Net Support EU 6/10/12/15 (EB 1978-2000)
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Figure 2.5. Question (3) -  Net Support EU 6/10/12 (EB1971-1995)
One can see a difference between the higher levels of net support for EU 6 countries and 
lower net support for EU 10/12 countries. Relatively large in the 1970s, the support ‘boom* 
of the 1980s meant that the gap between the psychological ‘core’ of early entrants and the 
‘periphery’ of later entrants dwindled to almost nothing by the early 1990s29. O f course, 
divisions in support by country still exist: beginning in chapter three I review' the many 
theories that purport to explain inter-country support variations.
29 If one removes the EU 6 from the EU 10/12 indicators, net support levels are marginally higher for the (EU 10/12 -  EU 6) 
countries by the early 1990s.
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2.3.2. Utilitarian Support
Figure 2.6. Question (4) -  Net Support EU 10/12/15 (EB 1983-2000)
Figure 2.6. displays net support for integration for question (4) by EU 10, EU12 and EU 15 
member states. Although the time series commences later than the diffuse net support 
indicators, we can pick out the same post-1983 trends visible in figure 2.1. Some of the 
country-level findings also mirror those reported in section 2.3.1. Over the course of the 
1980s, several o f  the newer Union members, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal have 
enjoyed a strong growth in positive evaluations, often surpassing their own net support levels 
for question (1) or the net support o f  other EU 6 countries for question (4). Net support for 
question (4) in Denmark also exceeds net support for questions (1) -  (3).
As anticipated in section 2.2.4. question (4) mean net support levels are the lowest o f all the 
questions. Eight o f the fifteen EU member states have reported negative net support figures 
at some time over the 1990s. From a casual look at plate (4) in section A .l. of the appendix, 
it seems that m any o f those countries with high net support levels are outlying states that 
have benefited from monetary transfers at the expense of some o f the bigger members such 
as Germany, where net support is correspondingly weaker. Continuing this speculative line 
of argument, it may well be that while inter-country transfers do not provoke upset,
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integration has not yet reached that point where inter-member state transfers are 
uncontentious (see Slater, 1983, p. 75; section 2.3.3.). So, the low levels of support for 
question (4) in some countries could be seen as an international manifestation of a familiar 
domestic politics problem; while people may be prepared to express high levels o f support 
for the ideals behind European integration, when it comes to making personal sacrifices to 
support these ideals support evaporates. Utilitarian explanations of support are discussed at 
length in sections 3.2. and 3.3,
2.3.3. Support by Issue
In this section I provide an overview of levels of support by issue. To do this, I use question 
(10) data from EB32 (1989) and EB49 (1998) to examine respondents’ opinions on whether a 
particular issue should be tackled at the European or National level.
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Table 2.3. Degree of Europeanisation towards Specific Policy Issues
C ategoris in g  Issu es by  popularity
E B 39 E B 49
N et S upport N e t Support
High E uropean isa tion (for E C ) H ig h  E uropeanisation ( fo r  EU)
Science/T ech C o-op 61 H um an itarian  A id 55
H um anitarian  Aid 61 A n ti-d ru g  fight 49
Foreign P o licy 42 F o re ig n  po licy 49
E nvironm ent 38 S cience /T ech  C o-op 45
C u rren cy 37
M oderate E uropeanisa tion R eg iona l redistribution 33
E nv ironm en t 30
Currency 22
V.A.T. ru les 15 M o d era te  E uropeanisation
B roadcasting/press ru les 4
Defence 1 Im m igration  policy 20
P o litic a l A sylum  rules 19
A n ti-E uropeanisation In fo . O n  EU 13
U nem ploym en t Policy 12
Data p ro tection -7 A gricu ltu re  and fishing 8
W orker’s represen tation -1 6 D efen ce 6
Health an d  Social W elfare -1 9
E ducation -28 A nti-E uropeanisa tion
F ig h t again st poverty -8
H ealth  and  Social W elfare -25
In table 2 .3 .1 present levels o f net support for a series o f policies. Following Sinnott, I make 
a rudimentary attempt to divide support into three categories: high Europeanisation (>30 net 
support) , moderate Europeanisation (>0, <30 net support) and anti-Europeanisation (<0 net 
support) (1999). Between the two surveys one can see a fair degree of consistency, only 
currency moves from moderate Europeanisation to high Europeanisation, and regulation of 
the media and press moves from moderate Europeanisation to anti-Europeanisation.
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Table 2.4. Changes Over Time in Issue Europeanisation
How has su pport ch an ged  for  issues over  tim e?
1989
(EB 32) 1998 (EB49)
Issue N e t Support N et Support
f o r  E C f o r  E U
Defence 1 6
Environment 38 30
Currency 22 37
Humanitarian A id 61 55
Health and Social W elfare -1 9 -25
Education -28 -24
Broadcasting/press rules 4 -12
Science/Tech C o-op 61 45
Foreign Policy 42 49
A verage 20.2 17.9
Table 2.4. offers a clearer insight into how opinions on the nine issues in common between 
the surveys have changed. Average support for the nine issues is down between the surveys, 
and there are sizeable drops in support for Broadcasting and Media, Environmental, 
Humanitarian Aid and Science and Technology co-operation policies. On the other hand, 
‘Europeanised’ Foreign policy and Currency programs have seen a good deal more support. 
I note that the content of these issues has doubtless changed over time, so that strictly 
speaking the surveys do not compare like with like. For instance, in 1989 the context for the 
Currency issue was the loose shackles o f the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM); nowadays 
twelve of fifteen states are participating in complete monetary union.
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Figure 2.7. EB 49 (1998) Net S upport for Europeanised Defence
Before we adjudge that there is strong EU support for a certain policy, it is as wise to bear in 
mind national differences. Figure 2.7. shows the respective position for each member state 
vis-à-vis Defence using EB 49 data. Moreover, despite the specific nature o f this question 
there is a suspiciously low 6% rate o f  ‘Don’t Know’ responses (see also Sinnott, 1999, p. 
11) . There is also some inconsistency between responses. Table 2.3. shows that there is a 
clear support for helping out regions in difficulty, yet only moderate support for a 
Europeanised approach to unemployment policy. It is hard to believe that this disparity is 
accounted for by  the publics’ preference for macroeconomic regional aid over 
microeconomic individual level aid. The implication is that many positive or negative 
responses may actually reflect non-attitudes. I go on to investigate non-attitudes in the 
European Union at length in section 7.3.
2.4. Evaluating the  Permissive Consensus
Introduced by Lindberg and Scheingold in Europe’s Would-Be Polity, the permissive 
consensus is a term  designed to explain the ability o f “national and [European] Community 
decision-makers...to operate relatively freely without encountering significant opposition” 30
30 The full question wording is “The European Union should have a common defence and security policy”.
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(1970, p. 121). With the theoretical deficiencies of the permissive consensus already touched 
upon in section 1.3.2., I am now in a position to evaluate the empirical evidence for its 
existence both currently or over the past few decades.
Before testing the permissive consensus empirically we must first operationalise it. In fact, 
Lindberg and Scheingold’s statement quoted in the paragraph above is no more than an 
interpretation of descriptive empirical evidence. The authors used a raft of indicators to show 
that systemic support for the Community apparatus was broadly greater than for identitive 
support amongst both masses and elite figures. Secondly, the basis of Community support 
was more strongly utilitarian than affective. In this section I focus on the more important 
systemic measures o f support, not least because Eurobarometer questions (1) -  (4) appear to 
fall under this definition. Of the affective indicators, Lindberg and Scheingold use question 
(1) data from 1957 and 1962 to show that affective support for systemic integration in 
France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain was at least 50-60%, while dissatisfaction was only 
around 5-10% (1970, p. 59). To measure utilitarian support the authors take a 1957 and 1962 
survey question asking whether the respondent approves or disapproves o f  the Common 
Market idea: for France, Germany and Italy support ranged between 60-85% while for Great 
Britain support was limited around the 40% mark (1970, p. 56). So, high affective and 
higher utilitarian systemic support for the Community forms the mainstay o f  the permissive 
consensus. Because Lindberg and Scheingold only use two data points, it may not have 
occurred to them to add that for a permissive consensus to exist, support must surely be 
relatively stable over time, with no sharp downturns. One might also speculate that the 
notion of a permissive consensus implies if  not indifference then lukewarm support towards 
the Community; respondents are surely not supposed to care too much.
With reference to the affective basis o f the permissive consensus, taking evidence from 
question (1) shows that the theory would seem to hold, although I argue that this rather leads 
one to question the suitability of the question. From figure 2.1. we can see that net support, 
which subtracts negative from positive responses, hovers around 60% for most o f the lifetime 
o f  the question. Meanwhile, from plate (1) we can see that if  not for Germany and Great 
Britain, for the other members o f the original six (except Belgium), the Iberian countries, 
Ireland and Greece net support was even higher than 60% in the mid-1990s. However, 
question (1) is not an ideal measure of support for further integration of the EU. In the first
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instance, from section 2.3.4. we know that question (1) contains no indifferent or undecided 
response category, possibly exaggerating the number o f positive responses. More 
pertinently, support for the idea of unifying Western Europe is clearly vaguer than support o f 
the European Communities. In figure 2.1. we see that support for question (2), that specifies 
the EU as the motor o f integration, is far lower than that for question (1).
The net support levels for questions (4) sit rather uneasily with the central piece o f evidence 
in Lindberg and Scheingold’s argument; that utilitarian support for the Common market was 
even higher than affective support (1970, p. 56). Despite a reference to the Common Market 
in the question wording, it is clear from figure 2.6. that net support levels are far lower than 
the reference figures o f Lindberg and Scheingold. This fits the pattern of the findings in this 
chapter, that utilitarian support for integration enjoys less popularity than affective support 
(see also Shepherd, 1975, p. 93-125 and Hewstone, 1986, p. 138). I note that we are not 
entirely comparing like with like: Question (4) asks i f  respondents have ‘benefited* from the 
EC and the Common Market, while the question used by Lindberg and Scheingold merely 
asks if  the respondent is in favour of the Common Market ‘idea*. Yet the former question is 
surely a more appropriate measure o f utilitarian support. Moreover, although the term 
‘Common Market* is dropped entirely from question (4) from EB 35 (1991), by this time the 
Common Market was subsumed within a bigger whole, no more a measure o f  utilitarian 
support for the EU overall than support for the EURO today31.
Evidence from aggregate level trends also does much to dent the permissive consensus theory 
from the 1970s onwards. Even if  we are not yet able to make a judgement on the motivations 
behind these trends, the various ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘anti-Europeanisation* shifts in public 
opinion demonstrate that European publics have evaluated integration responsively from at 
least the 1970s. Even in 1981, the downturn in net support from the peak o f  1975 exceeded 
20% for question (2), for the 1980s and 1990s the downturn from peak to trough was over 
30%. This rather goes against the findings o f Lindberg and Scheingold that even during 
crises in the integrative process, such as de Gaulle’s vetoes o f British entry and the empty 
chair crisis, public support for the Community failed to weaken and even strengthened on
31 Feld and Wildgen analyse public opinion on particular policy areas to determine whether, and to what extent a permissive 
consensus exists (1976). They find, as I do in table 2.3., that some policies carry more consensus than others. I would argue, 
however, that this approach is no substitute for taking an overall opinion on Europe, rather than of its parts.
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occasion (1970, p. 254)32. In addition, throughout the 1970s a series of (often contentious) 
national referenda lead to Denmark, the UK and Ireland joining and Norway rejecting 
membership o f the European Communities.
So, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that the permissive consensus never 
existed. There are, however, some country-level exceptions to this rule. The best example is 
Ireland, where support has not only been rather high, but grown even during the 1990s. 
Similarly, support has been very high and stable in Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands 
for many decades. Moreover, there have been trend periods in aggregate support, such as in 
the 1980s, where to all intents and purposes support was high enough to speak of a temporary 
permissive consensus. Dating the end o f this period o f permissive consensus has in this way 
become a matter open to considerable interpretation. Many commentators only speak o f a 
definitive end to the permissive consensus after the Maastricht treaty, with the subsequent 
referenda in Ireland, France and Denmark and absence of a return to the support levels o f the 
1980s33. Reif believes that there was a consensus, but that it began to erode before the 
signing o f the Maastricht treaty, and as early as 1987/8 in Italy and France (lecture given at 
the University o f California, Berkeley, 03/05/2000). Finally, Gabel unequivocally states that 
the permissive consensus was an erroneous construct relying on inflated survey measures of 
support (1998, p. 112). I argue that the evidence from this section can be used to confirm 
Gabel’s interpretation that there has been no consensus, albeit with the exception of 
particular countries. The closest one comes to evidence of a permissive consensus in this 
thesis is the suggestion from section 2.3.3. that non-attitudes towards integration have, and 
occasionally still do, allow governments, as Lindberg and Scheingold speculated, to operate 
freely towards Europe without public interference (see section 7.2. for a theoretical 
discussion o f non-attitudes). In this case the ‘permissive’ consensus is surely a misnomer, as 
it hardly befits non-attitude holders to give their permission to integrative advances.
32 Franklin and WIezien argue that these trend movements can be explained by public preferences towards EU policy levels 
(1997; see also section 3.2.). The authors demonstrate that, since 1981, as lines of EU legislation increase as measured in the 
Official Journal, relative preferences for policy decreases. Relative preferences for policy are measured by question (2). The 
idea that the public respond to the volume of legislation seems intuitively unappealing. Setting aside statistical issues, 
problems of ignorance concerning the number of lines of legislation arise, and the issue of quality as opposed to quantity of 
legislation is not dealt with. Nevertheless, such a theory is in firm contrast to any permissive consensus.
33 As Franklin, Marsh and McLaren argue, “Maastricht pushed the ‘permissive consensus’ regarding Europe beyond its 
limits” (1994, 458-9). Ancillary to this viewpoint is the belief that the 1992 Single European Market forced firms to 
compete and hence brought the issue of jobs and wages right down to the level of the public.
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2.5. Conclusion
I am mainly concerned in this chapter with charting aggregate and country-level trends in 
public opinion on European integration since the 1970s. I show that there have been three 
distinct trend periods in net support. Although in recent years support has not regained the 
heights o f the 1980s, it must be remembered that the scope o f integration has expanded 
hugely, so that the Union itself is a very different creature. For much of the period surveyed 
there was a significant difference in support between EU 6 countries and newer entrants. The 
social learning effect implied is a useful corollary to explanations of support that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
This chapter also tackles many other topics. The significance o f non-attitudes is broached, 
although a full treatment of this topic must wait until chapter seven. The combined evidence 
of non-attitudes and trends in support leads me to the conclusion that while the permissive 
consensus as defined by Lindberg and Scheingold has not held since at least the mid-1970s, 
there are segments o f the population in every country who prefer to let national leaders get on 
European Union issues unhindered. I also argue that survey data on public support for 
integration provides an appropriate measure of the legitimacy role performed by the public. 
To understand public support I adopt Niedermayer and W estle’s model o f respondents* 
orientations towards objects to single out an affective and utilitarian dimension to evaluations 
of support for integration. This division is re-employed in the subsequent chapter as a means 
of characterising various explanations o f support.
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3. REVIEW O F LITERATURE TACKLING ATTITUDES TOW ARDS  
INTEGRATION
3.1. Chapter Aim and  Summary
In this chapter I review the most pertinent attempts to explain attitudes towards integration 
using survey data. On the back of this review I then look to identify any gaps in the 
literature, so that in the following chapter I can turn my hunches into empirically testable 
hypotheses. The literature review is also invaluable in drawing attention to control variables 
to be included in future empirical analyses of support.
There are two dimensions used to inform the structure o f this chapter. The first is based on 
the affective/utilitarian split defined in section 2.2.2. and present throughout the thesis. 
Secondly, I dichotomise between explanations that potentially affect all members o f  the 
public in or between particular nations and those concerned more with private groupings of 
individuals either within or across countries. Essentially, this is an analogous division to that 
between public and private opinion marked out in section 1.2. So, while all EURO-zone 
citizens are potentially affected by European Central Bank decisions on the level of interest 
rates, only certain, private groups of fanners would be directly affected by changes to the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). These two dimensions to 
support can be used to construct a matrix, visible in table 3.1. below. For utilitarian 
explanations of support, public and private divisions are labelled respectively as ‘general* 
(cost-benefit issues impacting upon all members of the public) or ‘specific* (cost-benefit 
issues having an effect on only certain groups of people). For the affective dimension, public 
explanations of support might include such factors as national identity, while private 
explanations would look to invoke societal cleavages or special interests. I proceed below to 
cover explanations for integration in a systematic way based on this graphic.
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Table 3.1. Square Matrix o f Support for Integration
Utilitarian Affective
Public General factors 
(section 3.2.)
National 
Traditions 
(section 3.5)
Private Specific factors 
(section 3.3.)
Social Forces 
(section 3,4.)
By way of a caveat, this table is simply a tool to give structure to the multifarious 
explanations o f support. It is emphatically not designed or even able to neatly categorise 
every conceivable explanation o f support; indeed, one could conceive o f  many points o f 
dispute. In the first instance, some explanations of attitudes towards integration do not fit 
neatly into the two-way matrix outlined. This holds true for non-attitudes, o f which I reserve 
treatment until chapter seven. Secondly, it may not be clear into which category a particular 
variable belongs. The analysis o f gender in section 3.4. reveals that while men’s attitudes are 
at least partially determined by ‘traditional role’ values, for women evaluations o f economic 
benefits are more important.
In summary, it is incontrovertible that many of the instrumental and affective approaches 
discussed below have some merit, despite the specific failings of certain variables or 
methods. It is not the aim o f this thesis to discredit existent research into explanations of 
support or indeed to provide an exhaustive summary o f the evidence available for each and 
every possible hypothesis. Nevertheless, I do make the point that existent theories o f support, 
not least theories adopting a utilitarian approach, cannot explain all variation in support. 
Solely as an example of this failure, I draw attention in section 3.5. to persistent inter-country 
differences in support that remain in the data. I then attempt to complement previous micro­
level research by drawing attention to national identity and tolerance as hitherto underrated
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and understudied sources of affective attitudes towards integration. Specifically, I focus on 
European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism.
3.2. National Economies
In this section we are concerned with the public, utilitarian area o f table 3.1. I focus on 
explanations of support located at the international and then national level, principally EU 
budget dispensations, the level o f intra-EU trade and national macroeconomic performance. 
Some of the more sophisticated empirical research shows net EU budget receipts and 
especially EU trade to be significant in explaining support (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 
1997, 2000; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998). However, both factors fail to 
explain the fall in support in the early 1990s or to take much account o f respondents’ 
perceptions, preferring instead to rely on objective measures of budget and trade levels 
unlikely to trip off the tongue. Macroeconomic variables are able to explain cyclical changes 
in support, although it is unclear whether this is due to a domestic ‘feelgood’ factor affecting 
support for integration or a more rational evaluation o f the EU based on its role as guarantor 
of price stability.
From 2.2.2., utilitarian explanations o f support suppose a response based on some perceived 
economic or political interest such as higher living standards. We can seek to refine this 
definition by including the concept of a payoff, where this invokes the idea that an agent will 
change his or her behaviour in the expectation of future returns. In the context of support for 
integration, then, theorists in the utilitarian tradition expect citizens to evaluate the European 
Union and integration process on the basis of certain tangible costs and benefits and 
expectations thereof, where to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs citizens are willing 
to support integration.
Moving on to investigate international explanations o f support, I begin with the EU budget. 
On the most straightforward account, Bosch and Newton hypothesise that aggregate support 
is higher in countries that receive direct support in the form o f  a net surplus from the EU 
budget. Bosch and Newton use Ardy’s (1988) calculations o f average net budget receipts for 
the EC 10 countries from 1982-4, and contrast these figures with question (2) support figures.
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With Ireland and Greece coming sixth and seventh respectively in terms o f  levels o f support, 
but receiving by far the highest net payments, there is little obvious pattern in the results 
(Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 80). The authors, however, appear to be labouring under 
the misapprehension that the EU does not publish net budget figures and instead have to be 
calculated painstakingly. Since at least 1982 figures for net contributions and receipts have 
been presented in the Court o f Auditors annual report. In fact, despite a number o f 
anomalies, there would appear to be a basic, positive association between support and budget 
receipts. In figure 3.1. I plot mean net support (question (4)) for EB 49 and 50 against 
absolute net receipts (€ bn) from the 1998 EU budget1.
Figure 3.1.1998 EB Net Support (Question (4)) vs. Net Balance (€bn)
Vc can consider a number o f  modifications to the basic Bosch and Newton hypothesis, 
erry Wynn MEP proposes a change to the formula for calculating net contributions. Here, 
gricultural levies and customs duties collected by states are removed from net contribution 
gures on the grounds that they are really part of the Community’s own resources. This 
/oids the ‘Rotterdam effect’ whereby the vast volume of EU imports passing through the 
Dit unfairly bolsters the Netherlands budget contribution (European Voice, 1998). Figure 
2. shows that recalculating net receipts to remove own resources does not significantly alter 
e broadly positive association between support and receipts demonstrated in figure 3.1. *
Question (4), which I argue in section 3.2.3. draws on more utilitarian attitudes, is used then in preference to question (2). 
s surprising that Bosch and Newton use question (2) data as the basis for their comparison with net budget figures, given 
it they too accept that question (4) “comes closest to asking about specific support” (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 
).
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Figure 3.2.1998 EB Net Support (Question (4)) vs. Wynn-Adjusted Net Balance (€bn)
The original hypothesis for net receipts makes no allowance for how much individual 
countries are willing and able to pay. Clearly, Germany, while the largest net ‘loser’ from the 
EU budget, is more able to afford large contributions than many other countries. Taking net 
receipts as a percentage of national income could resolve this, and indeed this definition is 
used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 1997; 2000), and Anderson and Reichert (1996) in 
their articles examined below. Secondly, the net benefits figures available from the Court of 
Auditors only take account of direct payments from community funds to individuals of a 
particular member state. No mention is made in these calculations o f the indirect benefits of 
EU membership, more complex to calculate but generally more sizeable. The Cecchini 
report estimated the benefits of the removal o f ‘static’ non-tariff barriers to trade by the SEA 
at approximately 4.5% o f Community GDP. This figure is, however, potentially dwarfed by 
the dynamic benefits arising from economies o f scale and competitive pressures over the 
longer term (Cecchini, 1998, p. 97). On this methodology, Smith and Wanke estimate the 
real beneficiaries o f the Single Market to be the northern states and in particular Germany, 
precisely those countries that at present shoulder a greater burden o f the EU budget (1992, p. 
551). Without greater consideration of the distributional consequences of dynamic economic 
benefits, EU budget analysis is heavily biased.
Plotting support against net budget receipts is also no substitute for more rigorous statistical 
analysis: the positive association shown to exist in figure 3.1. could possibly be accounted for
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by a third, missing variable. Moreover, the reverse hypothesis may be true; more pro- 
European nations might be willing to make larger budget contributions. The evidence from 
researchers using more statistically advanced methods is mixed. Eichenberg and Dalton 
conceptualise net support as the result o f  a number o f economic and political variables, each 
operating either at the national or international level (1993, p.520)2. The authors take the first 
nine EC member states (minus Luxembourg) and pooled time series data from 1976-89 
Eurobarometer surveys and estimate an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model for 
an average net support dependent variable constructed from question (2). Their ‘EC budget 
return’ factor fails to achieve statistical significance in any o f the models they test. Anderson 
and Reichert construct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression models using 
question (2) data from three separate EB surveys at different points in time (1982, 1986 and 
1990). As well as a Budget Return variable constructed from the relevant Court o f Auditors 
reports, their model includes variables for age, gender, farmers, income, education, 
postmaterialism and EC-trade, o f  which more later. Their results show that for the 1982 and 
1990 time-periods the EC budget return did significantly affect support (Anderson and 
Reichert, 1996, p. 241). The impact o f  the EC budget return, however, is small (coefficient 
0.1 (1982), t-ratio 9.6). Even a EU budget surplus amounting to the relatively large figure o f 
2% of GDP would only be associated with an increase in support o f 0.2 on the response scale 
o f 0 (membership a ‘bad thing’) to 2 (a ‘good thing’).
For the final word in this discussion, however, I note that the EU budget effect is unable to 
explain cyclical variations in net support, while net receipt figures are an attempt to deal 
objectively with what is in many ways a subjective issue. As is, the net receipts hypothesis 
assumes that some critical proportion o f citizens is aware either of the figures or the direct 
effects o f  the EU budget. However, i f  it supposedly requires calculations to be made on the 
basis o f a Court o f  Auditors report to arrive at the net figures it seems absurd to argue that the 
public is aware o f  this issue. In this light it seems rather tongue-in-cheek o f Eichenberg and 
Dalton to suggest that factors such as the ‘Thatcher effect’ o f publicising the budget debate 
mean that citizens throughout the EU are aware of the intricacies of this issue (1995, p.524).
: The model constructed includes inflation, unemployment and GDP (national economic factors); intra-EC exports, EC 
budget return (international economic factors); a measure of Soviet-US conflict (East-West conflict), variables to measure 
the impact o f the UK referendum, the Danish and Irish Single European Act (SEA) referendum and the 1979 European 
Parliament direct elections (international political factors); finally there are variables included attempting to capture ‘national 
traditions’ o f support in the UK, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy and France. The RA2 for the model is 0.72.
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Ultimately, we are really grappling with subjective perceptions or expectations towards 
budget returns; not so far an issue covered in public opinion surveys. Secondly, while the EU 
budget effect may be able to explain relative, inter-country support it is not suited to 
predicting absolute levels o f support for integration. Without a contraction in the budget it is 
unclear, for example, on what basis there was a downturn in support over the 1990s (see 
figure 2.1. in section 2.3.1.).
The empirical strength o f  the relationship between inter-country trade and support is probably 
the strongest in the payoff literature. Eichenberg and Dalton include in their regression 
equation a variable that measures the level of intra-EC exports as a proportion o f total 
exports, where the hypothesis is that a growth in the proportion o f  EC exports is a stimulus to 
pro-European sentiment. With the overall share of intra-EC exports growing from 34% of 
total EC exports in 1960 to 60% in 1988, and taking a coefficient value of 0.38 (t-ratio 3.5) 
this translates into an almost 10% increase in the dependent variable, average net support for 
question (2) (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, p. 523). The same model, applied to the original 
six member states (minus Luxembourg) and the three newer members (Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK) demonstrates a greater effect for the latter group o f countries (coefficient 1.15; t- 
ratio 10.34). Eichenberg and Dalton speculate that this is down to the Teaming curve’ effect 
o f Community membership (1993, p. 527; see also section 3.5.). In a later paper aimed an 
extending their earlier findings to include the years 1973-1996, the authors find the same 
positive effect of EC trade on support and differential between the Original 6 and the later 
three entrants, albeit with reduced coefficients in both cases (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1997). 
Similarly, Anderson and Reichert include a variable measuring the percentage o f a country’s 
total external trade (imports plus exports) that is conducted with other member states. This 
trade variable achieves significance in two out of the three years tested in their model (1986 
and 1990). The impact of trade in this model, however, is relatively small (coefficient 0.002 
(1986), t-ratio 5.2). If a country’s trade with the EU increased from 0% to 60% of its total 
trade, the impact on support would have been 0.12 on a question (2) response scale ranging 
from 0 to 2.
In a separate approach, Gabel bases his explanations for EU support on the premise that 
judgement is made by citizens only in terms of the policies that the EU has enacted (the 
‘policy appraisal’ model). This approach, then, credits respondents with more sophistication
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than “merely checking the economic thermometer and adjusting their opinions o f integration 
accordingly” (Gabel, 1998, p. 38). Gabel uses pooled cross-sectional EB question data from 
1975-1992, combined with OECD economic datasets where appropriate, to arrive at an OLS 
regression equation modelling variations in support. For ease o f  interpretation the dependent 
variable, EU support, is a normalised version o f question (2), to give a (non-continuous) 
index o f  support running from 0 to 100. Gabel tests several individual-level utilitarian 
explanations o f support (see section 3.3.), however he also tries to explain support through 
the impact of integration on national economies. Specifically, Gabel tests for the effects o f 
EU trade dependence (the ratio o f a nation’s intra-EU import and exports to GDP), where as 
this ratio grows, the benefits for the national economy grow and hence the propensity to 
support integration grows. Gabel also hypothesises that for nations whose industries are 
uncompetitive internationally, benefits and support will be correspondingly lower. This is 
operationalised by looking at a nation’s intra-EU trade balance divided by population, where 
support is positively related to this variable. The same regression equation includes a number 
of country dummies and two further variables. The first variable is ‘war deaths’, measured 
by the number o f civil and military casualties per 1000 population on 1939 population data 
from World War II, along with an interaction term to estimate the impact o f time on the 
relevance o f security concerns in EU citizens’ utilitarian evaluations o f integration. This tests 
the hypothesis that support is a function o f the threat of national destruction a war would 
entail (the security hypothesis). The second hypothesis makes the case that for citizens who 
support a democratic capitalist political system, the EU has benefited the stability of this 
system (the political stability hypothesis). This is measured by creating a pro-stability 
dummy variable from a measure of political allegiance, and so dividing respondents into 
“opponents” or “supporters” o f democratic capitalism. An interaction term consists o f the 
pro-stability variable multiplied by the level o f electoral opposition to democratic capitalism 
as measured by averaging the percentage support won by anti-system parties over the last two 
elections relative to the year the respondent was surveyed. Gabel’s results confirm all the 
hypotheses except that relating to political stability. Nevertheless, the effects o f  the trade 
hypotheses on support are not major; a single standard deviation increase in a nation’s intra- 
EU trade dependence (25.9% o f  GDP) is associated with a 2.85 average increase in his 
support index. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in a nation’s intra-EU trade 
balance ($51.29 per capita) is associated with a 2.97 average increase in support (Gabel, 
1998, p. 85). Despite these and other studies pointing to the significance o f  intra-EU trade as
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an explanatory factor in support (see also Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; 
Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000), the fairly minor coefficient and absence of any contractions or 
marked slowdowns in intra-EU trade levels suggest that this group of hypotheses is unable to 
account for the sharp mid-1990s downturn in support.
We now move to consider a series of hypotheses deriving from national macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, unemployment and inflation figures. This approach at least has the 
advantage o f taking indicators about which citizens are surely more aware than EU net 
budget receipts and trade figures. To begin, Bosch and Newton put forward two h>potheses 
based on this approach; that “wealthier countries with stronger economies will be able to 
compete more effectively in a larger market and more open market" so promoting higher 
levels of support, and that “poorer countries think that they will gain most, in the long run, 
from the modernising effects o f the EU” and they too will show higher levels of support 
(Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.82). There are two points here, ‘wealthier countries with 
stronger economies’ is an incomplete idea. Stronger economies may well fare better under 
increased competition, but it is not clear on this account what a ‘strong’ economy is, and 
there is no reason presented for association of this concept with the wealthier countries of 
Europe. France is a relatively wealthy country, although whether its economy is ‘strong’ is 
debatable. It is also assumed, in the first hypothesis in particular, that further integration will 
be concomitant with some form of increased economic liberalisation. This is explicitly 
conceived as occurring in the first hypothesis through a ‘larger market’, so implying an 
increase in competition through 1992-style single market measures. The majority of such 
measures have already been enacted, so that many of the supposed economic benefits of 
future years, save a larger market through enlargement, will have to rest on alternative 
foundations. Economic arrangements such as a single currency may well have economic 
implications deleterious or advantageous to countries on a separate schema, unrelated to 
whether a country is wealthy or possesses a ‘strong’ economy. Finally, if both poorer and 
wealthier countries are supposed to gain from integration, it is hard to see where this leaves 
any explanatory principle. Either support increases because a nation is rich or because it is 
poor!3 The two co-existing hypotheses are meant to show' that membership of the community
3 One could argue that the poorer and wealthier countries, those countries at the extremes, are more likely to gam. Thus 
plotting countries on an x-axis from the poorest to the richest against support on the y-axis, would give a U-shape. However, 
it would be difficult to demonstrate such a relationship w ith the small sample of countries available. One might also argue 
that the effects on stronger and weaker economies would be felt over different time periods.
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is not a zero-sum game in national economic terms; however it has been shown that in their 
present form testing one hypothesis demands that the other be ignored. Perhaps fortunately, 
Bosch and Newton announce that EC Question (2) support figures versus GDP per capita 
over the years 1975, 1980 and 1985 show only a random relationship (Niedermayer and 
Siimott, 1995, p.82)4. 1
Other authors have greater success in demonstrating a link between macroeconomic measures 
of economic well-being and support. From section 2.4. Franklin and WIezien argue that as 
lines o f EU legislation increase relative preferences for policy decrease. Relative preferences 
for policy are measured by question (2). This is seen as a good proxy for relative preferences 
because as economic well being increases, a higher level o f  public expenditure is sanctioned. 
Question (2) for the EU from 1971-94 is plotted against a so-called ‘misery index*, the sum 
of EU unemployment and inflation rates, averaged across countries and weighted by 
population (1997, p. 354). From 1977-94, the two measures are in step to a remarkable 
degree (a correlation of 0.92) so that a high level o f  misery is associated with a low level of 
support. Given that question (2) is, after all, a measure o f  support for integration, it seems 
more likely that the link between macroeconomic variables and support is evidence that the 
public appraise integration according to national economic performance. Inglehait and 
Rabier demonstrate a correlation between national indices o f industrial production and 
consumer prices and support for integration in the mid-1970s (1978, p. 74). In their study 
outlined above, Eichenberg and Dalton show that between 1976-88 a 1% increase in the 
inflation rate produces a decrease in net support across the community of almost 2% 
(coefficient-1 .8 , t-ratio -3.2) (1993, p.522). Unemployment and GDP figures fail to achieve 
statistical significance (see also Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000). In their Generalised Least 
Squares analysis of EB data from 1973-93, Anderson and Kaltenthaler show that inflation 
and unemployment affected support significantly, and as predicted, using question (2) data 
(1996, p. 189; see also Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett, 1996). Only Gabel pours cold water on 
any link between national macroeconomic conditions and support. On his 1975-1992 
Eurobarometer model, GDP, unemployment and inflation are all significant, but they act in
4 In the light of the ‘feelgood’ effect introduced below, it is regrettable that Bosch and Newton did not extend their 
macroeconomic variables to include, say, house prices. Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis splits consumer 
income into permanent and temporary categories, where consumption is mainly a function of the former more reliable source 
of income (Mankiw, 1992, p.410). An increase in house prices would serve to increase permanent income in a more direct 
way than, for instance, lower inflation or an increase in real GDP. This more concentrated effect could then be contrasted 
with support for the EU.
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the opposite direction predicted. That it, as GDP rises, and inflation and unemployment fall, 
utilitarian support decreases (Gabel, 1998, p. 105). However, Anderson, who addresses 
subjective impressions o f personal and national economic conditions rather than objective 
financial indicators, successfully manages to demonstrate a link between subjective economic 
conditions and support for integration in Eurobarometer 34.0 (1990) data.
It may be that the findings of Franklin and Wlezien and others can be taken as evidence that 
the EU benefits from a ‘feelgood’ effect based on the business cycle that spills over into the 
domain of EU support. In the domestic sphere it has long been contended by commentators, 
politicians and academics alike that strong national economic performance is associated with 
increased support for the government o f the day5. This approach benefits from not requiring 
that people have any particular knowledge of, or hold the EU responsible for specific 
policies. Indeed, as the evidence below suggests, people might well consider the EU 
ancillary to national governments in the policy-making process. In common with the 
European Union’s second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), could it be that support is 
second-order too?
For an alternative ‘policy appraisal’ perspective, citizens do not simply respond to national 
economic factors but are more sophisticated, instead judging the EU on the success o f  its 
many initiatives to maintain price stability. Indeed, the use o f price stability as a measure to 
control adverse currency movements has been a highly visible feature of European policy­
making since the 1972 ‘Snake’. In keeping with this view, many of the macroeconomic 
empirical findings reviewed above single out inflation as the macroeconomic variable most 
commonly linked with support. In addition, this approach allows us to make sense o f the 
seemingly new ‘Post-Maastricht’ relationship between support and inflation of the 1990s: 
that is, as inflation decreased, so did support. This is a result o f  inflation control coming to 
be associated with unpopular domestic policies required to ensure adhesion to strict entry 
requirements to the third stage of EMU (Eichenberg, 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000)6.
5 For a quantitative approach to relationship between economic conditions and evaluations of national governments see 
Lewis-Beck (1988). As an example, between 1960-84, the annual growth rate o f real GDP correlates 0.63 with the 
percentage of the popular vote going to the party currently in the White House (Lewis-Beck, 1988, p. 10).
6 Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett argue that the post-Maastricht fall in support amongst the original EU6 countries can be 
explained by the switch from the unanimity rule bom out o f the Luxembourg Compromise to the majoritarianism introduced 
by the SEA and especially Maastricht (1996). The argument goes that these institutional changes have lessened the 
probability that integration will be in these core countries interests. As we have seen in chapter two, however, there does not 
appear to be a valid distinction between post-Maastricht ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ decreases in support.
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The survey data is unclear as to whether respondents perceive the EU as responsible for price 
stability and are hence inclined to evaluate support according to the ‘objective* reality o f the 
situation, or i f  respondents evaluate the EU on the basis o f  ‘feelgood* spillover effects or 
simply subjective perceptions o f economic performance7. Gabel and Dalton draw our 
attention to Q. 134, Eurobarometer 22 (1984) which asks
(11) “Which one o f  the following do you think is the most important cause o f  the current 
economic problems in (your country)?** One answer only from worldwide recession, 
developments within (your country), American economic policies, Japanese economic 
policies, EEC economic policies, low cost imports from the less developed countries.
Only around 12% o f respondents blamed the EEC for their current woes, compared to about 
23% who look to internal developments, while 39% blamed adverse worldwide conditions 
and 16% the U S8. It seems unlikely therefore that the European publics hold the EU 
primarily responsible for their nation’s economic well-being. (Gabel and Dalton, 1995, p. 5). 
On the other hand, Niedermayer and Sinnot refer to Q. 271, Eurobarometer No. 27 (1987) 
which asks
(12) “What things, in your opinion, bring the countries o f  the European Community together 
most? Could you tell me by choosing from this list those which appear to be the most 
important ones” (the economic links that they have developed with one other; the efforts 
these countries make for peace in the world; the wish to form a counter-balance faced with 
domination by the superpowers; the democratic and humanitarian values they share; the need 
to unite their efforts in order to master the technologies o f the future; their culture and their 
ways o f life; the need to defend themselves against outside threats; other)
7 Subjective perceptions of economic performance affect both the ‘feelgood’ and ‘policy appraisal’ models. Respondents 
might quibble over the level of inflation they feel exists, but they may also fail to associate the EU with, say, price stability 
(see Gabel and Whitten, 1997).
8 Strictly speaking, respondents might see the EU as playing a larger role in positive economic developments than negative 
ones. This would mean that more people might be prepared to support the EU than express contrary attitudes towards it 
during times o f good economic performance and hence we run the risk o f underestimating the role o f the EU in economic 
developments. However, I take the attitude here that the conclusions drawn in the main text from this question would most 
likely not be changed radically by this knowledge.
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This data shows that most people (approximately 40% in both cases) answered in terms o f 
‘the economy’ or ‘world peace* or both (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 77). On the 
limited and rather out-of-date evidence we have, then, it would seem that the EU is perceived 
as co-responsible, or perhaps as a lesser partner in economic policy-making. Although this 
evidence might be sufficient to argue that the public is unlikely to associate the EU with its 
lesser-known policies or effects, I would argue that this evidence is inconclusive in deciding 
between ‘feelgood’ effects, subjective perceptions or more rational evaluations of national 
macroeconomic conditions.
In summary, evidence o f utilitarian impact on support at the general level is present, although 
muddied. The more sophisticated analyses o f the EU trade and budget hypotheses suggest 
that these variables do have explanatory power. Nevertheless, they ignore subjective 
perceptions and cannot explain well cyclical variations in support, in particular the 1990s. 
National macroeconomic variables also seem to play an explanatory role, although here there 
is controversy over whether this represents subjective perceptions, a ‘feelgood’ reaction or a 
more reasoned response to EU attempts at price stability. Given the previous evidence o f 
non-attitudes that would imply citizens lack the information to make rational economic 
calculations concerning the EU, let alone towards specific EU economic policies, I would 
argue that the role for expectations and perceptions rather than objective data appears 
underdeveloped.
3.3. Individual-level Payoffs
The utilitarian approach characterised as ‘individual payoffs* in table 3.1. involves the 
examination o f payoff support for integration amongst focused interest groups rather than 
whole nations. I maintain an open mind as to whether specific groups operate at the intra- 
national or trans-national level, although only the former option is specifically catered for 
under table 3.1. This section looks primarily at farmers* attitudes towards integration, where 
support is expected to vary over time and by nationality.
On the basis that the grouping that has most to gain (and lose) from the EU budget is farmers, 
their attitudes towards the EU are taken as a litmus test o f the specific-utilitarian approach.
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In 1998 the CAP swallowed 48.1% (ECU 38,810m) o f the EU budget, far and away the 
largest budget allocation to any single policy (Official Journal o f the European Communities 
C 349, 1999, p. xiv). That this money is often dispensed for reasons as simple as leaving 
fields idle would lend strong weight to the supposition that farmers display relatively greater 
support ceteris paribus towards the EU than other occupational groups.
However, there are problems with hypothesising that fanners will automatically translate 
their appreciation for subsidies into support for the EU. Although the CAP has for many 
years been one o f the cornerstones o f integration, European policy-maker attitudes have 
hardened towards it in recent years. A series o f reforms have succeeded in cutting 
agricultural support as a percentage o f EU GDP from circa 2.8% (1986-88) to approximately 
1.6% (1999 estimates) (The Economist, 24th June 2000, p. 145). So, when looking at survey 
data, we might tentatively expect that farmers are relatively more supportive than other 
occupational groups either before the beginning of the substantive reform process in the mid- 
1980s or the more biting 1992 MacSharry reforms. One might further point out that the 
levels o f subsidies maintained by individual nations such as Germany before the CAP were 
even higher as a percentage o f GDP, so that certain national groupings might not be 
distressed at the thought of a return to national farm policies. Certainly, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland all maintain more generous regimes than the CAP (The Economist, 24th June 
2000, p. 145). Nevertheless, it would be to go against all the evidence to suggest that 
farmer’s groups were pressing for an end to the CAP in the aim o f reaping more generous 
national subsidies. Less tenuously, the impact o f the CAP is not homogenous, meaning that 
certain groupings o f farmers are far more likely support it than others. Broadly, the CAP has 
favoured efficient northern producers over smaller southern farms, with arable crop support 
alone accounting for around 43% of European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) expenditure, the vehicle by which most CAP spending is funded. By contrast, 
typically southern and Mediterranean crops such as Olive oil (6.6%) and Tobacco (2.2 %) are 
not so heavily prioritised in the EAGGF (Official Journal o f the European Communities C 
349, 1999, p. xii). Hence, it may well be reasonable to differentiate support for the CAP by 
country.
Bosch and Newton first attempt to assess the impact o f farmers upon support by comparing 
the balance o f support for EU membership between farmers o f  the EU12 and other employed
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people (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 97-99)9. Taking Eurobarometer data from 
between 1973 and 1992/3, fanners as a whole were marginally more supportive o f EU 
membership than those in the non-agricultural sector until 1981. After this date their support 
was not statistically significantly different from others outside their sector. Inter-country 
differences were more marked, generally between farmers in France, Germany and Italy who 
were relatively less supportive than other people in employment, and between farmers in the 
smaller countries such as Denmark and Ireland who were more positive. These results would 
not seem to provide the clear evidence we are looking for regarding the impact of specific 
economic considerations on support.
Bosch and Newton then turn to regression analysis to assess specific explanations of support. 
Analysis is made using question (2) as the dependent variable and is on a country-by-country 
basis for the EU 12. Because some questions used in their analysis are posed only at 
irregular intervals, a maximum of seven separate years are taken for data analysis between 
1973 and 1990 depending on the country. Included in the analysis are variables testing for 
farmers and fishermen taken together, social class, employment and family income10. Results 
are moderate, with individual variables generally explaining up to 30% of the proportion o f 
variance in support and often far less (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.95-96). The results 
for farmers and fishermen combined are mostly significant at the 0.05 level, although 
directionally surprising; farmers and fishermen are associated with less support in France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and German and positive support only in Denmark and Ireland. 
Other economic variables do not perform particularly well; indeed, non-economic control 
variables, class in particular, are often more powerful and with more frequent statistically 
significant observations (see section 3.4.). If the effects of nationality on support are 
surprising, support by farmers over time behaves a little more as predicted. Andersen and
9 The authors subtract the proportion of non-farmers supporting EC membership (question (2)) from the proportion among 
farmers and their dependent spouses. In fact, the occupational category of farmers is shared not just with their spouses but 
also with fishermen. Bosch and Newton, however, rightly claim that Eurobarometer samples only a minimal number of 
fishermen, as evidenced by data in Eurobarometer No. 33 where for once farmers and fishermen were coded separately 
(Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 98). Only two fishermen are sampled across the whole survey, as compared to 204 
fanners. Britain is excluded from the analysis due to lack of data, while the Benelux countries are taken as a w hole.
10 The model also includes variables measuring subjective economic expectations and attitudes including expectations of 
more/less strikes next year, whether respondents believe governments should play a greater role in reducing income 
inequality, or favour more government intervention in economic affairs and expansion of public ownership. Seven non­
economic control variables are also included; age, gender, age the respondent left school, overall life satisfaction, 
satisfaction with democracy, optimism and pessimism about the next year and left-right party’ support. We are warned in the 
main text that these variables may be measured using slightly different survey questions between surveys.
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Reichert, in an aggregate OLS model described at greater length in section 3.2. test for the 
effect o f  fanners for the years 1982, 1986 and 1990. Only for the two earlier time periods the 
results are statistically significant (coefficient 0.15 (1982); coefficient 0.11 (1986) -  both 
results significant to at least the 0.01 level).
In a regression model in a similar format to that presented in section 3.2., Gabel focuses on 
the distributional consequences o f economic integration. Occupational categories and 
measures o f educational attainment are included on the basis that EU labour market 
liberalisation affects citizens differently according to level o f education and occupational 
skills, where human capital is an indicator o f a citizen’s ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances. This effect will be compounded by citizen assessments of capital market 
liberalisation and moves towards EMU, which will allow the more wealthy to exploit greater 
investment opportunities provided by more open financial markets. On the other hand, 
people on low incomes will find welfare spending constrained by capital mobility and EMU 
and mobile capital making it more difficult to bargain for higher wage settlements11. Finally, 
Gabel includes fanners in the model, w ho are again hypothesised to benefit from CAP, while 
Gabel argues uniquely for distance from  a border as a determinant of support, on the basis 
that border residents are best placed to gain from the benefits o f  freer cross-border traffic.
Gabel’s results confirm all his hypotheses. Between 1975-92 a fanner was associated with an 
average increase o f 4.81 points in utilitarian support on Gabel’s normalised scale running 
from 0 to 100, while the wealthiest EU respondents expressed on average 6.51 points more 
utilitarian support than the poorest respondents. Higher levels of education are also 
associated with higher support for integration1 2 and border residents average a 1.42 increase 
in support. The adjusted RA2 o f the model is 0.13 (Gabel, 1998, p. 53).
In summary, scholars have at best shown that economic explanations constitute a partial and 
weakening explanation of support. Evidence solely from 1990s Eurobarometer data suggests 
that in the post-Maastricht era coefficients o f inflation, trade and GDP have decreased and
11 For an alternative view, Wood uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model to show that wage equalisation may occur when relatively 
unskilled labour-abundant countries open up to international trade with more skilled labour-abundant countries (1994, p. 28).
12 Respondents completing their education before 15 were labelled Mow', those finishing between the ages of 14 and 20 were 
labelled ‘low-mid’, respondents completing at ages 20 or 21 were coded as ‘high-mid’ and those finishing their education 
after 21 were coded as ‘high’ (Gabel, 1998, p.53). This fails to account for national differences in education. For example, 
it would be highly unusual to complete a degree in Germany by 21 years o f  age, whereas this is fairly common in the UK.
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even changed in direction, where Eichenberg argues that respondents now evaluate the EU 
less according to objective economic performance and more on the success o f redistribution 
policies (2000). A broader criticism of the economic hypotheses is that they overlook the 
cmcial fact that the economic consequences of integration are typically achieved through 
political means, a process that in all its complexity is often anything but utilitarian in 
character. Indeed, evidence from section 3.2. shows citizens as viewing the EU as only 
partially as an economic vehicle. Bosch and Newton confirm this finding by examining 
support in Spain and Portugal, two countries that are prime net beneficiaries from the EU 
budget. Using a 1985 EB survey, measures o f association between responses to the expected 
economic, political and diplomatic benefits o f EU membership are all closely linked (r = 0.8,
0.73 and 0.91 respectively for Spain and 0.87, 0.84 and 0.87 respectively for Portugal). 
Those who expect their country to benefit economically also expect political and diplomatic 
benefits (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.100). It appears that we also must evaluate the 
EU on a non-payoff basis.
3.4. Individual Non-Economic Explanations
This section examines individual social forces as a counterpart to individual utilitarian 
explanations o f support, and is represented by the ‘social forces* area in table 3.1. The 
starting point for the analysis is a schema elaborated by Leonard Ray (1996) that explains 
support drawing on the social cleavages model established by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in 
order to explain the nature of party systems. Divisions are made along similar lines; centre v. 
periphery, church v. state, urban v. rural, owner v. worker. The urban v. rural distinction is 
not examined here, on the basis that this cleavage in large part reflects the tension between 
those individuals employed in agriculture and other primary sector activities and those 
dependent on commerce, services and manufacturing. As such this cleavage is tested for in 
the previous section using data on support amongst farmers. In addition, Ray adds a cleavage 
postulated since Lipset and Rokkan*s work; postmaterialism v. materialism. I also consider 
the impact of political orientation (the left v. right cleavage) and trust in national and 
supranational institutions on support, and finally a host of socio-economic variables; age, sex, 
education, income and occupation. While some of these variables, such as income, might 
equally qualify for another category this reminds us that the categories distinguished in table
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3.1. are not watertight. In summary, class, income and education offer the most reliable 
associations with support for integration.
The centre/periphery cleavage is understood as a geographical and cultural concept, 
separating those who possess political, economic and cultural power from those who do not. 
Testing an inter-country variant of this thesis warrants an examination of social deprivation 
or exclusion. Taking unemployment and education as indicators of exclusion, Ray finds that 
a significant relationship with support exists only for the latter variable (1996, p. 14)u . This 
is not especially convincing, as we see below that education is often used as an independent 
variable in its own right. One might then consider the core/periphery cleavage from an EU 
viewpoint. In the first instance, we have seen in section 2.3. that so-called EU periphery 
states such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, whether defined geographically or by date o f 
entry, tend to have recorded faster increases in support over the 1980s. Secondly, we can 
look at intra/trans-national periphery nations or regions. Intergovemmentalists would argue 
that the EU is another tool by which national governments are able to maintain control over 
domestic groups and the policy-making process (see Moravcsik (1994) and section 1.3.4.). 
On the other hand, other authors see the EU as a ‘multi-level’ polity in which regional actors 
can take advantage o f resources independently o f the state (section 1.3.5.). Certainly, there is 
evidence to suggest that regions may be more pro-European than the member states o f which 
they form part. Data from the 1997 Scottish Election Study demonstrates that Scots are less 
Eurosceptic than the English and Welsh. Only 22.7% of Scots versus 31.4% o f  the Welsh 
and English surveyed would leave the EU, while 13.2% of Scottish respondents fell into the 
highest category o f positive feeling towards the EU, against 9.2% in England and Wales 
(Keating, 2001, p. 5). The suspicion is that for the Scots, European Union membership is 
associated with devolution and increased self-determination (see also sections 4.5. and
6.4.2.).
The church/state cleavage offers little new insight into support for integration. O f the little 
evidence available, Ray computes correlation coefficients between Catholic and Protestant 
denominations and support, and finds that only in Northern Ireland does support significantly 
alter by denomination, while throughout the EU a few predominantly Catholic countries are 13
13 Ray constructs the dependent variable by combining EB questions {1 ) and (2) and uses data from EB surveys 37 and 38.
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associated weakly with positive EU support. Other minority religions are not considered 
(Ray, 1996, p. 7).
Analysis of a left-right political cleavage provides a useful insight into support, especially 
where the issue is broadened to encompass extremist viewpoints and top-down political 
influences on individuals. However, because the content of the left-right cleavage is so 
country-specific, it is difficult to generalise about aggregate effects. Historically, it may not 
be unreasonable to dichotomise between more pro-European, free trade centre-rightists and 
the economic concerns of anti-European leftists (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998; 
Shepherd, 1975). In recent years, however, Hix claims to have identified a specific pro and 
anti-European cleavage that cuts across traditional party lines (1994). In this way it has 
become more difficult to generalise between countries about differences in support by 
political orientation. Certainly, in the more eurosceptic United Kingdom differences of 
opinion over European integration have at times been genuinely cross party. In Scandinavia, 
however, opposition has come specifically from new left and agrarian centre parties and the 
left wings of social democratic parties (Nelsen and Guth, 2000, p. 274). At the present time, 
the distinction may be more clear-cut between support for mainstream and extremist parties, 
from the right or left end of the political spectrum. As we have seen in section 3.2., Gabel 
successfully demonstrates a negative link between support for integration and electoral 
support for anti-system political parties.
Notwithstanding Hix’s cleavage, there is a branch of literature in which the view is taken that 
citizens adopt attitudes towards integration that reflect the position of opinion leaders, 
whether they be the political party they support, the government o f the day or the media. 
D eutsch’s ‘cascade’ model is an example o f  theory in this area. On this view there are five 
different levels o f communication: at the top are socio-economic elites, followed by political 
elites. Then there are opinions as represented by the mass media, a ‘net’ of opinion leaders 
and finally ordinary citizens (seen as 60-90% o f the adult population). Elite opinion guides 
m ass opinion through a trickle-down effect (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 138)14.
14 Even Inglehart subscribes to a version of the ‘pull’ argument to a degree (1970). An output from the political system first 
has to be perceived by the mass public before the feedback from public to elites is effective.
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There is a fair amount o f empirical evidence to support the view that citizens adopt attitudes 
towards integration that reflect the position of the party they support (Feld and Wildgren, 
1976; Inglehart and Reif, 1991; Anderson, 1998). Carey, for instance, shows using EB data 
from 1976-1994 that as one’s attachment to a pro-EU centre/centre-right party increases, 
individuals are more likely to support the EU (1999). A  variety of macroeconomic and 
socio-economic controls are included. Wessels makes the further point that parties are more 
likely to be successful in reducing, than in increasing support (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 
1995, p.158)15.
A slightly different line of research suggests that citizens project the evaluations o f the party 
(or person) o f the national leader onto integration. Rasmussen tests this top-down approach 
by studying the effect of the Conservative Party and Lady Thatcher, a long-in-office 
conviction politician, upon public opinion. Despite Mrs Thatcher’s sniping against Brussels 
and strong stance over budgetary contributions, absolute support levels increased and 
volatility was lowered from the early to mid-1980s16. This lends weight to Rasmussen’s 
analysis: by regressing net EC approval against voting preferences and net satisfaction with 
Thatcher and the Conservative government Rasmussen shows that the stance of the 
Conservative party, generally pro-European, may have had more impact on citizens (1997, p. 
113). So, we can expect political" extremists to be more anti-integration than other 
respondents, and respondents themselves to be influenced in a ‘top-down’ way by opinion 
leaders such as politicians coming from parties they vote for. The problem with this latter 
approach, however, is that it can say very little a priori concerning in what direction 
respondents will be influenced or the motives of those elites in positions o f influence.
As well as demonstrating the positive impact of establishment parties on mass attitudes 
towards integration, Anderson uses Eurobarometer 34.0 (1990) data to show that satisfaction 
with democratic institutions as a whole translates into higher levels o f support for European 
integration (1998, p. 590). Ranged against Anderson, Sanchez-Cuenca propounds an 
institutional hypothesis: all other things being equal, the better the opinion citizens have of
15 There are a number of other approaches modelling the flow of opinion from elite to mass levels e.g. Rosenau’s four-step 
foreign policy model. Reviewing this and other evidence, however, Wessels argues that research based on these competing 
models is rare (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 139).
16 Rasmussen assumes that people perceived Mrs Thatcher as anti-European. While attacking Europe on repeated occasions 
one could take the view that fundamentally she accepted the EU; Thatcher signed the 1986 Single European Act, which 
handed sovereignty in several key areas over to the Brussels decision-making mechanism.
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the relative performance o f European institutions, the stronger their support for integration. 
Sanchez-Cuenca shows convincingly that in countries with high levels of corruption or low 
levels of welfare spending, citizens are more inclined to support the EU (2000). If the impact 
of welfare spending on support seems reminiscent of Gabel’s model o f the distributional 
consequences o f integration (see section 3.3.), this is because Sanchez-Cuenca is openly 
attempting to introduce a political dimension to the international political economy approach 
of Gabel, even if  this new approach is still very much in the payoff tradition. The author then 
uses Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995) data to show that lower levels of trust in national 
governments are related to higher levels o f  support for the EU. This allows Sanchez-Cuenca 
to make the claim that a European demos is not needed for European democracy, just an 
efficient European system of institutions, or correspondingly inefficient national alternatives. 
Part of the problem at hinting at a vision o f  European civic republicanism founded on nation 
state incompetence is that the popular perception of European institutions is little better. 
Moreover, precisely the reverse hypothesis may be hue: the stronger the support for national 
government and satisfaction with national democracy, the greater the support for integration. 
In section 3.2. we have seen how the EU may benefit from ‘spillover’ effects as regards 
national economic performance, while in chapter six I show that pride in one’s nation is 
linked to higher support for integration17. I would argue, then, that the need for a European 
demos can be bypassed not by satisfaction with European institutions but rather with support 
for, rather than identity with, the European Union. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the work 
o f theorists such as Anderson and Sanchez-Cuenca suggests that domestic politics matter in 
explaining support for European integration.
Class divisions as a basis of support for integration offer a promising insight into support. 
We have already seen that Bosch and Newton’s results in section 3.3. view class as an 
explanatory factor. This is backed up by Ray, where class correlations with support are 
statistically significant for eight o f twelve EU nations for the two 1992 EB surveys18. The
17 Of course, it may be that trust in national institutions is negatively related to support for the EU, while national pride is 
positively related to support for the EU. The problem for Sanchez-Cuenca is that he defines satisfaction with national 
governments in broad terms (2000, p. 152). Unfortunately, by 2001 no ISSP or Eurobarometcr survey exists including both 
national pride and trust in institutions questions to test this impression,
18 For EB surveys, which all the research here draws on, class is measured as subjective social class.
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direction of the correlations indicates that individuals from higher social classes are 
associated with more favourable attitudes towards integration than those from lower classes.
The social cleavage to which most space in the literature has been devoted undoubtedly 
relates to Inglehart’s theory o f a Silent Revolution (see section 1.3.3.), although empirical 
evidence from a number o f studies is not particularly favourable towards the theory. 
According to this theory, two independent variables can be distinguished: political value- 
orientations and the level o f political skills. Any attitude towards integration is at least 
partially a function of these two characteristics. Inglehart distinguishes between two different 
value-orientations: materialists and postmaterialists, where the former give priority to 
material things such as economic factors and physical security, whilst the latter are more 
directed by the need for intellectual fulfilment. Inglehart argues that European integration 
fulfils the needs o f postmaterialists, and justifies this by stating that integration appeals to 
intellectual needs, where materialists are more parochial and less cosmopolitan than 
postmaterialists. Secondly, postmaterialists are more eager to fulfil a need for belonging, and 
are more able to fulfil this with the EU, where the nation-state is seen as too materialist. So, 
in the aggregate, the more post-materialist the value-climate the higher Inglehart expects 
public support for integration to be. W ith regard to the level o f political skills, these are 
meant to determine how able a person is to cope with and interpret the abstract content of 
political messages, where distance from the source is taken as the best indicator o f  the level 
of abstraction. The higher the level o f  this cognitive mobilisation then, the higher we can 
expect support for the EU to be. Furthermore, Inglehart supposes that pre and post-war 
generations differ in an especially notable way towards the two independent variables, 
because both are related to different youth experiences. Skills are, he postulates, related to 
education and values result from levels o f  affluence, where both these variables are supposed 
to have increased over time. In summary, then, we have several postulates that we can test 
empirically.
Both Inglehart’s two main variables are open to criticism. The exact reasons why individuals 
who are preoccupied with intellectual concerns should support the EU are never clearly set 
out (Ray, 1997, p .l 1). The EU owes many of its origins and its current policies to economic 
ideas, and as we have seen above many people evaluate the EU on utilitarian lines. The EU 
may represent an alternative to nationalism and offer some improvements over national
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legislation, but only in an environment of secrecy and remoteness. Moreover, it would also 
seem strange to relate abstractness in cognitive skills to physical distances. The affairs of 
many national governments can surely be just as complex in detail so as to make the 
abstractness o f  the issue irrelevant. Indeed it could be argued that Italians are positive 
towards the EU because it offers a more effective, clearer form of governance. Inglehart’s 
age argument may also work against him. Whilst it seems reasonable to assume that those 
cohorts who received their basic socialisation in the aftermath of World War II were living in 
a period in which nationalism was discredited, the further away from the formative 
experience of the Second World War presumably the less powerful this effect will be19. 
These theoretical criticisms make it more difficult to construct a working hypothesis within 
which to look empirically at postmaterialism, and if taken to the extreme one might argue 
that the EU was just as likely to exhibit materialist as postmaterialist tendencies.
The empirical evidence concerning the theory of the Silent Revolution is at best inconclusive, 
and hampered by methodological issues. While EB surveys show that, since the early 1970s, 
the quantity o f postmaterialists has risen and the number of materialists has decreased, Clarke 
and Dutt argue that the four-item question battery in EB data used to measure 
postmaterialism is sensitive to short-term fluctuations in economic conditions, in particular 
unemployment rates (1991). Specifically, as unemployment rises, postmaterialism can be 
expected to rise spuriously as the unemployed increasingly select the supposedly post­
materialist question response ‘give people more say in government’ as to their top issue 
priority.
Using the EB postmaterialism measure we can see that Inglehart’s faith in the inter- 
generational, socialisation impact of postmaterialism may be questioned. Partially no doubt 
because the theory ‘birth-date’ of 1970 is hardly a good baseline in itself to measure long­
term changes in attitudes, Inglehart has demonstrated that post-war generations are more 
positive about a ‘United States of Europe’ than are pre-war generations (1970). However, 
Janssen demonstrates that the effect of age varies according to the dependent variable; that is, 
splitting question (1) data between 1973-88 into pre-1931 and post-1946 year-of-birth groups
19 This implication is present in Inglehart’s own writing when he declares that generations that received their basic 
socialisation in the aftermath of WW2 would more readily abandon their reservations about political integration (1970, 
p.768).
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yields no substantial differences in support, while the same methodology applied to question 
(2) does confirm Inglehart’s hypothesis (1991, p. 461). Both authors fail to control for 
several alternative explanations such as higher levels o f income and education amongst 
young people. Or could it instead be that older generations, more traumatised by war, are 
more willing to co-operate? Gabel successfully shows that support for integration is partially 
conditioned by the number o f war deaths suffered by a country in World War II, the 
implication being that those older generations, most closely affected are more prepared to 
countenance international cooperation (1998, p. 81). Other authors demonstrate an 
association between increased age and increased support in respondents surveyed by 
Eurobarometer before 1986, but rarely after (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Anderson and 
Reichert, 1996).
Direct tests o f  the EB postmaterialism variable with support for integration do not give more 
encouraging findings. Janssen shows that the distinction between materialists and 
postmaterialists seems to be irrelevant for attitudes towards European integration. Janssen 
constructs two pooled data sets using 1973-88 EB data showing the proportions o f net 
support for question (1) and then question (2) grouped by both values and cognitive skills. 
Although in both instances postmaterialists with higher cognitive skills are slightly more 
supportive o f integration than materialists with lower cognitive skills, when one controls for 
skills, the relationship disappears. That is, while a higher level of cognitive skills is 
associated with higher support for integration, postmaterialists are no more supportive of 
integration than materialists (1991, p. 458). Thirdly, looking at Inglehart’s theory from the 
aggregate position, there are a number o f anomalies. Most strikingly, 1988 data on Italy 
show us that a relatively materialist country, and with relatively low cognitive skills is very 
supportive o f integration (Janssen, 1991, p465). Given these results, methodological 
criticism o f Janssen’s study could even be seen as a hopeful sign for Inglehart’s theory, and 
Gabel duly laments the limited, four-country approach o f Janssen comprising West Germany, 
Britain, Italy and France, as well as the absence of controls for other factors such as income 
that are potentially related to both support for integration and cognitive skills (1997, p.5).
Several other studies also test the relationship between postmaterialism and support for 
integration using EB data, and again the evidence is not encouraging. In brief, Deflem and 
Pampel find weak support for postmaterialism, with many o f their regression results for this
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variable failing to achieve significance (1996, p. 132)20. For Ray, regression results are in 
mixed directions (1996, p. 13; see also Mathew, 1980), while for Anderson and Reichert the 
hypothesis held for citizens in the original six member states but not in newer members 
(1996, p. 243). Gabel also finds that materialists are more likely to be supportive o f 
integration (1998, p. 98).
Socio-economic variables income, education and occupation are treated together here for the 
reason that they perform similarly. Simply, as levels of income and education increase, and 
individuals hold white-collar jobs as opposed to manual jobs or being unemployed, support 
for integration increases by most accounts (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998; 
Anderson and Reichert, 1996). Only on Bosch and Newton’s regression analysis are the 
effects more ambiguous (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 95).
The evidence o f gender support for integration tends to suggest that males are more 
supportive of integration than females. Ray shows using 1992 EB data that women are most 
opposed to the EU in seven of twelve states, and most strongly in Britain and Denmark 
(1996, p. 11). Nelsen and Guth show that women in many o f the northern European states 
tend to be less favourable towards integration than men, while women comprised most o f the 
no votes in the 1994 series of Nordic referenda (2000, p. 270; see also Borresen, 1997). In 
the same paper, the authors argue that this gender gap is partially explained by economic 
evaluations: certain women do not appear confident that benefits enjoyed under the welfare 
state will be maintained in the face o f EU-induced economic change (Nelsen and Guth, 2000, 
p. 286; see also Ray, 1996, p. 13). This is contrary to many standard approaches, which view 
female attitudes as more a function o f lower levels o f knowledge or interest, or more 
conservative political orientations. Another innovative approach is taken by Liebert, who 
explains the gender gap in support for integration using a psychological ‘relative deprivation’ 
approach, whereby there is a discrepancy between a person’s current position and that which 
is expected (1997). Thus the author critically re-examines the process o f European 
integration from the perspective of, for instance, EU measures to promote equal opportunities 
or the social policy dimension to integration.
30 The authors measure the dependent variable by taking questions (1), (2) and (3), performing factor analysis to reveal one 
underlying factor which is represented by a scale, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation o f 1 (Deflem and Pampel, 1996,
p. 128).
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At first sight it would seem that class, in conjunction with income and education, offers the 
most promising line of specific social explanations for support. Inglehart’s Silent Revolution 
theory, perhaps the main theory in opposition to payoff explanations o f  support performs 
poorly. In the final analysis, however, there is a high level o f  methodological uncertainly at 
play that limits the strength o f  the conclusions drawn. Studies are not usually comparable, 
despite typically drawing on the same EB data, because o f  differences in survey years, 
calculation o f  the dependent variable, inclusion o f different controls and choice o f analytical 
tools. Moreover, the undoubtedly complex interplay of variables on one another is rarely 
disentangled in the work above.
3.5. National Traditions
The impact o f  national non-economic factors on support for integration is the last category I 
consider in table 3.1. Even theorists from a payoff background have noted the force of 
national traditions o f support. However, it seems that this has not lead to much attendant 
speculation regarding the role o f  national non-economic factors in explaining support at the 
micro-level. In this section I aim to remedy this, making the suggestion that explanations of 
support for European integration can be improved by taking account o f some specific 
components o f  the concepts o f  identity and tolerance: European identity, national pride, 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism.
I take the starting point for an analysis o f national non-economic factors as the inclusion of 
dummy variables controlling for the impact o f inter-country differences in support in some 
‘utilitarian* public opinion analyses. Eichenberg and Dalton include dummy variables in 
their regression analysis for those countries whose patterns o f  support, in the words of the 
authors, depart significantly from the general model (Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Italy and France as the control variable). The effects o f these so-called ‘national traditions’ 
dwarf the impact o f economic variables. For instance, just by virtue of being from the United 
Kingdom, support is reduced by almost 45% (coefficient 44.9, t-ratio 8.1)21. Eichenberg and
21 The authors do not specifically mentioned the omitted category in the country dummy analysis. However, Eichenberg and 
Dalton look at support for the EU 9 (minus Luxembourg), and include as dummies in their regression analysis the UK,
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Dalton’s analysis gives statistically significant coefficients o f  12.3 -41.0 and 22.4 for the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Italy respectively for the period 1973-88 (1993, p. 522; see also 
Gabel and Palmer, 1995, p. 10).
The selfsame authors who produce evidence o f these inter-country differences generally 
decline to investigate this area much further. Gabel does at least take measures of external 
and internal stability to explain inter-country differences. From section 3.2., external stability 
is measured by World War deaths per capita and decay in stability concerns over time, while 
internal stability concerns the percentage o f  the vote received by anti-system parties. Despite 
this, all the five country dummies introduced into a model measuring external and internal 
stability were significant (Gabel, 1998, p. 134). In a direct comparison made by Eichenberg, 
inclusion of the external and internal stability indicators in a regression equation explaining 
support barely altered the coefficients o f the country dummies (2000, p.32). Eichenberg and 
Dalton rather limply suggest that the dummy variables represent the residue of historical 
foreign-policy traditions that erode only slowly. Indeed, the interesting question is whether 
“controlling for these national effects, there are additional factors that move opinion above or 
below its traditional baseline o f support” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000, p. 13). I contest this 
presumption o f inter-country differences as the somewhat irrelevant legacy of past foreign- 
policy traditions. Despite the label ‘National tradition* a correct interpretation o f 
Eichenberg’s results is national differences due to any factor at all, where tradition implies 
country differences founded on, for instance, cultural heritage.
While noting the force o f national traditions in support, I explicitly do not intend in this thesis 
to account for unexplained cross-national variation in support, where the correct way to 
proceed in this case would be to employ multi-level statistical models (see section 5.3.). 
Rather, I wish to use these national differences as a starting point to explore new micro-level 
variables explaining support, thereby relying on more standard fixed effect statistical models. 
O f course, even if all factors that accounted for national differences could be modelled at the 
aggregate level, national differences might still persist, perhaps either because o f a different 
qualitative impact of a variable on support at the country level (size, direction and 
significance of the coefficient) or by a different quantitative sociological makeup. In this
Netherlands, Denmark Italy and Ireland. Therefore Germany and Belgium would appear to form the missing category. 
Given the omitted category, the results for Ireland (coefficient -19, t-ratio -5.7) appear curiously low.
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latter case, for example, there is a smaller proportion o f  farmers in Britain than on the 
continent, and to the extent that fanners are successfully shown to be more pro-European 
than the typical citizen equally across member states this would have the effect of meaning 
support across the UK is, ceteris paribus, lower than the EU average. However, my point is 
that with a little lateral thinking, national differences in support highlight the degree to which 
affective factors have been neglected in existing analyses: the emphasis is on ‘national’ as 
much as ‘differences’.
One national non-economic explanation o f support has already come to light in chapter two. 
However, the evidence suggests that this ‘social learning’ hypothesis is only so useful in 
explaining support. On the social learning approach, membership o f  the Union is a 
socialisation process; over time citizens become more familiarised with the workings of the 
institutions and the benefits o f  integration. Niedermayer and Sinnott provide evidence for a 
form o f  the social learning thesis by using trend data in an attempt to show that support for 
integration grows slowly but consistently over time (1995, p. 91). As it stands this appears an 
inadequate argument; it may just be that the most Europhile countries joined the Union first. 
Indeed, the principle that earlier Community entrants are more positive towards integration is 
successfully tested in the ‘timing of entry’ variable included in the regression models of some 
authors (see Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, p. 187; Mathew, 1980).
However, there is clear evidence of social learning effects in figure 2.4. from section 2.3.1. 
We can see that there is a yawning gap o f around 20 percentage points in question (2) net 
support between the EU original 6 and the EU 10 until the mid-1980s, when the gap closed 
sharply. Moreover, if  the narrowing o f  inter-country differences over the last decade means 
that it is more difficult to demonstrate significant differences in levels of support between the 
EU6 and other countries simply by looking at graphs o f net support, a distinction can still be 
made by  calculating the volatility, or standard deviation, o f support.
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Figure 3.3. Average Net Support vs. Volatility (EB 1973-2000)
Figure 3.3. presents the question (2) mean net support scores by country for the EU 15 from 
1973-2000 and the counterpart volatility figure in diminishing order, the standard deviations 
o f the biannual net support findings for question (2) from 1973-2000. It can be seen that 
there is a mild association between higher levels of average volatility of support and lower 
levels of average net support. Once support is relatively high, then, it tends to stay there: 
lower drawdowns in net support are experienced. We can then demonstrate that the countries 
with higher volatility readings tend to be the later EU entrants. With reference to the country 
markings above each pair of volatility and support readings in figure 3.3., we can sec that the 
later entrants tend to dominate the bottom of the table, with higher volatility and lower net 
support scores, while the more established members tend to be at the top o f the table. 
Denmark and the UK are very much exceptions to this rule22. In the literature, Eichcnbcrg 
(2000), Gabel (1998) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) find length of membership to be 
a significant variable in regression equations explaining support for integration. 
Nevertheless, from the same authors it is clear that significant national difference in support 
still exist in spite of controlling for social learning effects.
I make the suggestion here that two hitherto underrated and understudied dimensions o f 
support are respondents’ sense of identity and tolerance. The reasons behind this interest in
=: Eichenberg takes a different approach and measures the pooled standard deviation of net support for question (2) over 
time. The results show that intra-Community volatility has indeed declined from 2S.0 119~6-S0* to 22 6 (1996-99) 
(Eichenberg, 2000a, p. 16).
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different forms o f identity come from the content and tone o f  the popular debate around 
integration in many EU countries, which emphasises loss o f sovereignty. Risse, Marcussen, 
Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, for example, document the British concern with 
transferring sovereignty to the EU (1999). As for tolerance, we shall see in chapter four that 
xenophobic and racists attitudes can be viewed as affective influences on support that 
highlight outgroup inferiority, as against nationalism which focuses on ingroup superiority. 
In particular, Adorno et ah view racism, xenophobia and nationalism as forming part of the 
concept o f ethnocentrism (see section 4.5.).
Secondly, I contend that scholars who promote a view o f public support as based on 
utilitarian preoccupations tend to assume a model o f the EU’s institutional architecture that 
no longer exists, or indeed may never have existed. To see this, I take as given from section
2.2.1. that the EU makes considerable claims on state sovereignty, so that it has been labelled 
an ‘Emerging Federal System* by Borzel and Risse (in Jorges, Meny and Weiler, 2000, p. 
53). I f  we then consider Polsby’s four methods of securing citizen acquiescence; coercion, 
indoctrination, loyalty and custom (in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264) I argue that in a 
democracy, loyalty is at least the principal method o f acquiring acquiescence or, rather, 
legitimacy. In the domestic politics arena, loyalty might be tested in survey data by a 
combination of factors: it is a minor slight o f  hand to replace loyalty to the system with pride 
in national social institutions and certainly Almond and Verba point to national pride as 
necessary for system legitimacy (1989, p. 68; see also section 4.4.). Moreover, national pride 
is in itself an expression of attachment to one’s national identity, which could then be tested 
directly (see section 4.4.). Although in section 2 .2 .1 .1 make the case that loyalty based on a 
fully-fledged European identity is not necessary for EU legitimacy, it certainly does no harm 
to track its impact through support. Moreover, we shall see in chapter four that for many of 
the affective factors, including national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, the 
identity component has a ‘negative*, national side potentially impeding support for 
integration rather than generating legitimacy for the European Union. In any case, the point 
is that utilitarian measures of support do not tap affective factors, so that to maintain that the 
principal basis o f EU support is utilitarian implies, consciously or otherwise, a model o f the 
EU that does not require identitative, legitimacy-inducing attachment.
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Specifically, then, I advocate testing how attitudes o f  European and national identity, 
national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism relate to support for integration. Overall, 
there is very little research into the effect o f these five factors individually on support (see 
just Charillon and Ivaldi, 1996; Hewstone, 1986; Müller-Peters, 1998; Routh and Burgoyne, 
1998 - all reviewed in chapters five and six). Certainly, to the best o f this author’s 
knowledge it is the first time that the whole gamut of factors has been tested together, and 
across so many counties. The strategy will be to define these concepts and hypothesise how 
they might affect support for integration in the next chapter. I then move on to determine the 
makeup of these factors, before considering how they affect support for integration.
3.6. Conclusion
So, the outcome of this chapter has been a decision to investigate further the effect on support 
o f a set of variables relating to identity and tolerance; European and national identity, 
national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism. This hunch has been sparked by 
criticism of the assumption underlying utilitarian accounts o f support that the Union does not 
require much public legitimacy, coupled with the sizeable impact of country dummy 
variables on support in many regression models explaining support for integration. I propose 
here that a respondent’s sense of identity provides the underlying theoretical unity between 
the five concepts, so enhancing the legitimacy of treating them together. This is discussed at 
greater length in section 4.2. where I review the most current social psychological theories of 
identity.
The survey o f the literature has also revealed a number o f control variables to be included in 
subsequent analyses. Amongst those variables having the clearest effect are macroeconomic 
indicators, EU trade figures, socio-economic variables such as class, income, education and 
occupation, and political orientation. It has, however, been a feature of this literature review 
that comparison between results, and results themselves have been clouded by 
methodological problems and differences. Hence the theories o f  postmaterialism and the 
impact of other economic variables such as fanner support also deserve appraisal where 
possible.
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Finally, while we have deliberated over what variables might explain support, we only touch 
on ‘non-support’ or non-attitudes. We have seen that to the extent that citizens are not very 
well informed about European Union politics, perhaps comparable to the lack o f information 
citizens have been shown to display concerning foreign policy in general, it seems likely that 
they make recourse to domestic proxies such as subjective economic conditions or the views 
o f their chosen political parties (Anderson, 1998). Given the clear significance o f  non­
attitudes shown in section 2.4. this short treatment is an omission, and one that will be 
rectified in chapter seven.
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HYPOTHESES
4.1. Chapter Aim and Summary
The principal aim o f  this chapter is, with the aid of the existing theoretical literature, to build 
on the insights of section 3.5. in order to arrive at firm hypotheses that purport to explain 
support for integration. The actual empirical operationalisation o f the concepts defined 
herein is left to later chapters. I also speculate on the interrelationships between each o f the 
concepts, in view of the empirical analysis conducted in chapter five.
Because identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and racism, the concepts taken to 
investigate support for integration, are complex and often multifarious in meaning, I attempt 
to single out as far as is practicable one particular interpretation. I will thus steer clear o f a 
general review o f these concepts, to which it would be hard to add profitably to the already 
voluminous literature.
Placing the aforementioned concepts on a firm theoretical footing before hypothesising about 
them  is, I would argue, a highly valuable exercise. I note a tendency in the more empirical 
social science literature to minimise the treatment of contested theoretical concepts such as 
nationalism and instead rely on hypotheses derived from well-worn quotations or common 
understandings, which may be more or less appropriate to the issue under scrutiny1. While 
this approach may be to some extent excusable in a journal article o r essay, this is less so in a 
thesis. *
Elsewhere in the thesis I argue that the authors of a couple o f articles that do not devote a large amount of space to defining 
their terms confuse nationalism with national pride (see McCrone and Surridge (1998) in section 5.2.4. and Charillon and 
Ivaldi (1996) in section 6.2.1.). Other authors define nationalism using short quotes from established scholars such as 
Gellner (see, for example, Heath, Taylor, Brook and Park, 1999). While in themselves not erroneous, such definitions fail to 
do justice to, say, the wide variety of nationalist thought and the attendant implications for hypotheses on the topic.
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I begin with an overview of the principal social psychological theories o f  identity in section
4.2. The reason for this focus on social identity theory and self-categorisation theory is that 
the clear definition o f ingroup identity, and in particular o f  national identity, they afford 
brings an underlying theoretical unity to the concepts under consideration here. Moreover, 
the processes o f  individual categorisation, depersonalisation and ingroup/outgroup relations 
form a consistent and powerful explanatory tool for theorising about the effects o f  our often 
multi-faceted chosen concepts on support for integration. W ith this in mind, the more a 
respondent has a sense of European identity the more likely, ceteris paribus, I expect them to 
be in favour o f  European integration. I understand national pride to measure utilitarian or 
affective attachment towards the nation as an ingroup, with few implications for support for 
integration. On the other hand, nationalist sentiment is characterised by a feeling that the 
nation should wield ultimate state political power, so that I assume that any infringement of 
state sovereignty by the European Union would be rejected. Similarly, I understand racists 
and xenophobes to be hostile towards the EU, for facilitating or failing to halt the cross- 
border movement o f non-nationals and extra-communitarians. Lest these hypotheses come as 
little surprise to the reader, one should note that the strength o f  the relationship with support, 
as well as the existence o f any relationship, will be useful in determining whether affective 
factors really can explain any o f  the inter-country differences in support identified in section
3.5.
4.2. Social Psychological Theories of Identity
In this section I briefly review the main tenets o f social identity theory and self-categorisation 
theory, the most current social psychological theories o f identity. The justification for this 
diversion lies in the fact that nationalism, national pride, xenophobia, racism and o f course 
identity can all be profitably understood employing the ingroup/outgroup language o f group 
identity. So, a study o f social psychological theories o f  identity reveals a consistent set of 
rules within which these often more political concepts operate. This review, albeit far too 
brief to do justice to this rich topic, provides a more profound insight into, and an underlying 
theoretical unity between, the concepts under consideration, and goes some way to justifying 
their treatment together in the thesis.
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Social identity theory refers to a body of social psychological research into intergroup 
relations. The key insight provided by this theory is that the act o f social categorisation by 
itself, seemingly a purely cognitive division of persons into groups, is often sufficient to 
produce discriminatory behaviour in favour of the ‘ingroup* over the ‘outgroup*. An 
individual applies this categorisation process in social interaction for similar purposes as in 
basic perceptual activity, namely as a
“system o f orientation for self-reference, creating and defining the individual’s place 
in society. [It is] Individuals’ ‘self-definition in a social context...” (Oakes, Haslam 
and Turner, 1994, p. 81).
There are many different forms o f ingroup to which an individual might belong or identify 
with, including nations, religions and races. For many of these groups, individual members 
may never know, meet or hear o f their fellow members. Nowhere is this more true than for 
the nation, famously described by Anderson as an ‘imagined community’ (1983, p. 15)2. The 
actual content of an ‘imagined national community’ or national identity might include a 
number of components: common ethnic background, common cultural traditions and 
common experience. The emphasis accorded to each factor varies considerably, so that while 
some authors focus on a shared linguistic heritage, others such as Weber stress a commitment 
to a political project (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 15). There is a further split between 
primordialists and constructivists over whether these national identities are created, or are 
somehow natural (see section 4.5.) Writers in the constructivist tradition might point out that 
identities have changed in conception over time, so that the religious communities o f  the 
Middle Ages were imagined in very different terms from the modem nation (Billig, 1995, p. 
68). Today, we might expect national identities to contain visions of social and political 
orders, and perhaps federalist or more intergovemmentalist notions concerning the European 
Union. Turning to consider national outgroups, this appears roughly analogous to the 
concept of the ‘Other’ current in some continental philosophy and International Relations 
writings. Neumann and Welsh write that the Other reminds us that “a thing is perceived as 
much in terms o f what it is not as in terms of what it is” (1991, p. 331). Europe’s Others are, 
for instance, frequently constructed as territorially defined entities (America; Russia; Turkey;
2 It should be noted that some theorists treat the nation only as a ‘quasi-group’, on the basis that national identity only 
becomes important in times of war (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 703).
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Asia), but also as the continent’s own past o f wars and nationalist rivalries (Risse, 1998, p.
12).
Social identity theory assumes that the commonness between group members is accentuated 
by a sense of difference with regard to other communities. Individuals are postulated as 
having a need to view the group with which they identify in a more positive way than the 
outgroup. The main tool for group members to establish ‘positive distinctiveness’ is the 
stereotype. A stereotype can be seen as a collection o f attributes believed to characterise the 
members of a particular social group. This process o f characterisation in itself does not 
imply any deliberate positive or negative bias in content towards an object. In essence, 
stereotyping is a cognitive short cut designed to help the receiver cope with information 
overload. Indeed, it is argued not only that stereotypes can be context-dependent and 
flexible, but also that they are quite often appropriate. Oakes, Haslam and Turner invite us to 
consider the case o f  a poll tax demonstrator in London, 1990 faced with a policeman. Rather 
than consider the policeman as an individual, the authors suggest that the more contextually 
important features would instead be considered; as a policemen, he has the power to arrest 
you, is in possession of a truncheon, and has a presumed antipathy towards demonstrators 
(Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 127). Nevertheless, most authors accept that 
stereotyping does inevitably lead to some distortion of perception and accentuation of 
perceived intergroup differences. As we shall see with regard to nationalism, xenophobia and 
racism, stereotypes can also serve political and ideological functions.
Self-categorisation theory builds on social identity theory by looking at the processes 
underlying self-categorisation in greater detail than social identity theory, although in reality 
the theory attempts more than this and there is a good deal o f overlap between the two 
approaches. Self-categorisation approaches suggest that categorisation is a dynamic, context- 
dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context (Oakes, 
Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 95). The theoretical artifice employed to give life to this 
proposition is the principle o f meta-contrast. This states that a given set o f items is more 
likely to be categorised as a single entity to the degree that (inter-group or in-group) 
differences within that set of items are less than the differences between that set and others 
(intra-groups or out-groups) within the comparative context. For example, a group of 
Europeans might perceive themselves as fellow Europeans when dealing with Americans,
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while emphasising national differences when interacting mainly with each other. In this way, 
the meta-contrast principle incorporates the intuition that group identities are both multiple 
and relative.
To the extent that an individual categorises oneself with a particular group, the greater the 
degree of depersonalisation of the self, and accentuation of differences with the outgroup, 
that occurs. The principle o f meta-contrast can be used to calculate the ‘prototypical* ingroup 
member, or the person who is simultaneously most different to the outgroup and least 
different to the ingroup. The prototype thus exemplifies what ingroup members share and 
what they do not share with the outgroup. As far as group members are prototypical, 
personal identity depends on social identity, so that the individual’s self-perception is 
depersonalised. This inverse relationship between self-perception as a unique individual and 
as an ingroup member is at the heart of group behaviour.
A further result from self-categorisation theory is that extremists tend to make more polarised 
judgements due to their relative intergroup positioning. Let us imagine that an ingroup 
comprised o f Scottish nationals becomes more extreme in the intergroup context, as the 
outgroup switches from English to Russian nationals. In this situation, the ingroup’s more 
extreme members gain in prototypicality over more moderate ones. Extremists tend to 
display greater assimilation of certain stimuli and greater contrast o f others (relative to their 
own position) than people whose own position is moderate and hence the group as a whole 
ends making more polarised judgements. The point here is that people with moderate views 
are bound by the same psychological processes as racists or other extremists. This context- 
bound view o f extremism contrasts with the work of personality theorists such as Adorno, 
who argued that only persons with distinct psychological profiles are inclined to hold and use 
stereotypes (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 129).
In summary, this brief overview o f social identity and self-categorisation theory has outlined 
the principal rules o f intergroup behaviour to which the concepts that we investigate below 
adhere. After all, nationalist, xenophobic and racist attitudes are clearly explicable in terms 
o f stereotypical relations between in-groups and out-groups, while national pride can be 
viewed as the degree o f attachment to the national ingroup. Secondly, self-categorisation 
theory teaches us that the process of stereotyping is psychologically valid, in that it is
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efficient, adaptive and useful. That is to say, more tolerant persons apply many o f  the same 
psychological process as racists. This is in contrast to what might be socially and politically 
valid, from the point of view o f  the accuracy o f the content o f  a particular stereotype. The 
emphasis in explaining racist or nationalist behaviour, then, moves to the individual level and 
enhances the validity of the sociological analysis of the concepts considered in chapter five. 
Finally, the social psychology literature provides an underlying theoretical unity between the 
five concepts under consideration that helps to justify their selection and treatment together.
4.3. European and  national identity
The clearest and most direct application o f  the socio-psychology literature can be made to 
discussions of national and European identity, leaving aside for now world, regional and local 
identity foci. I argue that respondents who see their identity in purely national terms are less 
likely to be supportive of European integration than respondents who hold a more European 
sense o f identity. The caveat here is that i f  national identities themselves adapt to contain a 
European facet, this relationship may not hold.
I choose to focus on the interrelationship between European and national identities, rather 
than one or the other in isolation, because this more readily captures the multiple identities 
that people hold. As we will see in figure 5.1., only a tiny minority of people report to 
feeling exclusively European. However, many more people claim to feel European and 
national loyalties. So, the insight o f  multiple identities from the socio-psychological 
literature means that I am not expecting people to choose between Europe and the nation, and 
in turn this means that I concentrate on people’s relative attachments to Europe vis-à-vis the 
nation rather than any absolute sense o f belonging.
The definition o f European and national identity themselves follows directly from section
4.2. That is, both identities constitute types o f ingroup belonging, and ‘imagined 
communities* as specified by Anderson (1983)3. As discussed above, the content of
3 I note that identity may contain utilitarian and affective dimensions; however, because I am unable to capture these 
subtleties in the 1SSP survey questions used for identity (see section 5.2.1.), I delay discussion of this facet of identity until 
section 4.4. on national pride.
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European and national identities may vary by country and, for constructivists, over time. I do 
not propose here to detail the content of individual national identities, although there is no 
shortage o f authors that do (see, for instance, Michalski and Tallberg, 1999; Risse et a i, 
1999). I note, however, that an analysis of national identities does play a role in interpreting 
the empirical results in chapters five and six. With regard to European identity, however, 
some o f the theoretical works on the topic have important implications for hypothesising 
about European identity that I try to cover briefly here.
To begin, ‘What is Europe?’ is a contested concept; to some authors Europe lacks a strong 
common linguistic, ethnic and historical heritage to compete with entrenched national 
equivalents (Smith, 1992). Indeed, insofar as European nations might be said to share a 
common set o f values such as respect for human rights and democracy, one might question 
the extent to which they are specific to Europe and so provide the basis for a European, rather 
than, say, universal identity. In short, while experiences working for EU institutions might 
engender a more cosmopolitan outlook amongst policy-making elites (Laffan, 2001), a mass 
European identity is unlikely to develop. Other authors point to the fact that Europe’s leaders 
have instead focused on Europe’s potential future together, rather than the divisiveness o f the 
last century. In the words of Helmut Kohl:
“Germany is my Fatherland, Europe is my future” (quoted in Howe, 1995, p. 32).
One could interpret this vision as a calling for the creation o f a European identity, sitting 
alongside national identities. On these two approaches, it would seem reasonable to suppose 
that respondents with a more European sense o f identity will be more supportive of 
integration than those who retain a purely national orientation. However, one might also see 
this vision as an invitation for nations to reorientate themselves towards a European vision, 
however hazy it might be. This would imply that national identities would increasingly 
contain a European element, possibly varying from country to country as different pros and 
cons are selected4. Risse et al. (1999) adopt this constructivist approach, and expect the 
emergence of a common European identity in addition to and strongly related with nation­
4 Haller lists five understandings of Europe circulating amongst its member states and past applicants. For some countries, 
Europe is a prop or crutch to overcome domestic difficulties (Mediterranean countries and Ireland) , to others it is a 
necessary evil (UK and Scandinavia) or a bureaucraticised superstate to be avoided (Norway and Switzerland), while it is 
also seen as a vehicle for the realisation of economic and political interests (Original Six members) or as a substitute for a 
weak sense o f national identity (Germany) (Haller in Kriesi et ai., 1999, p. 273).
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state and regional identities. In this situation, there is no real trade-off to be made between 
European and national identities and, certainly, figure 5.1. shows that the modal respondent is 
as close to Europe as the nation. So, on this understanding of European identity, national and 
European identities might both be related to support for integration. To continue the focus on 
the effect o f  Europeanisation on a person’s identity structure, I sidestep this problem by 
looking at relative European identity. That is, despite Risse’s point, one might expect 
respondents who are more attached to Europe to be more pro-integration than those who are 
less attached. So we have
HI: the more European a respondent feels, ceteris paribus, the more likely he or she is to 
support the European Union. Similarly, the more national a respondent feels, the less likely 
he or she is to support the Union.
Of course, this assumes that respondents link the idea o f Europe with the specifics of the 
European Union. Lest this link appear obvious, it would certainly be a revealing reflection on 
the state o f the Union if European identity and support were shown not to be linked. 
Secondly, the strength o f any relationship is useful appraising different affective explanations 
of support.
Turning to the relationship between identity and other concepts, one would be very surprised 
if pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism did not relate to identity to some degree. It is, 
after all, unlikely that a nationalist or a racist would not consider themselves close to their 
nation. However, this relationship is less likely to be reciprocal; while a nationalist is very 
likely to feel, say, English, it does not follow that all English are nationalists.
4.4. National Pride
In this section I define national pride as an affective or utilitarian expression of belonging to 
the nation. Thus national pride is a theoretically distinct concept to nationalism, as it has no 
ideological content. Because these two types o f attachment imply no necessary contradiction 
with sympathies towards Europe, and have no political content that conflict a priori with
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European integration, I do not foresee any relationship between national pride and support for 
European integration.
National pride can be defined as evoking a positive sense o f attachment based on belonging 
to the nation, so that at one level the term is effectively synonymous in all but degree of 
attachment with patriotism, or love o f country. In socio-psychological terms, we can think of 
national pride as representing a fairly positive level o f attachment to the nation as an ingroup, 
or as a favourable comment on a respondent’s national identity. In other words, a question 
asking a respondent about his or her national pride presumes a belonging to the ingroup in 
question. To illustrate this point, it would be nonsensical to ask someone who considers 
themselves Dutch whether they are proud of Germany’s macroeconomic policy-making 
record. While one must be in possession o f something before being proud o f it, the reverse is 
not necessarily true; a German may well not feel proud o f  his or her country’s sporting 
achievements. Hence the interest in measuring levels o f national pride.
Earlier questions from section 2.2.4. also ask respondents to evaluate the European Union 
broadly in terms o f ‘membership* (such as question (4) which is used as the dependent 
variable in chapter six ). We learn from section 2.2.2. that such questions elicit both 
utilitarian and diffuse evaluations from respondents and, although in the case o f pride 
attachment is based on belonging not membership, there seems no reason why this same 
schema cannot be applied here. Indeed, backing for this approach can be found in the work 
of several authors in the field o f national identity. Cinnirella (in Breakwell and Lyons, 1996) 
questions the simplistic model of the self within the social identity paradigm outlined in 
section 4.2., where the motivation for social identity is self-esteem maintenance. For 
Cinnirella, individuals might come to customise their social identities according to the type of 
attachment they adopt (Breakwell and Lyons, 1996, p. 267). The author essentially endorses 
the schema put forward by Kelman (in Rosenau, 1969). That is, attachment to the nation can 
have a utilitarian or affective basis. In turn, this approach appears to derive from the work of 
scholars such as Almond and Verba (1963) and Easton (1965) discussed in section 2.2.2., so 
that this sub-stream o f thought seems rather duplicative. Nevertheless, Kelman does propose 
three specific forms of sentimental and instrumental attachment to the nation; the normative 
(either a commitment to the ‘sacredness’ o f the state or to law and order), ideological (either 
a commitment to specific social institutions or to cultural values) and the role-participant
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(either the respondent identifies with the role of a national or is committed to his or her social 
role) (see also Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989).
The first o f  three main implications o f this work is that there are likely to be two dimensions 
to national pride, so that a single question asking respondents about their levels o f ‘national 
pride’ appears undesirable. Secondly, both dimensions o f national pride might be thought of 
as sources o f system legitimacy, or the right to exercise authority in the distributive and 
procedural aspects o f  social justice (see Tyler in Hewstone and Manstead, 1995). This is 
especially the case for instrumental national pride; it is a minor slight of hand to replace pride 
in national social institutions with loyalty to the system. One should not, however, push this 
point. If instrumental national pride in particular is a good proxy for system legitimacy, there 
are many other forms of obtaining citizen acquiescence including coercion, indoctrination 
and custom (Polsby in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264). Moreover, questions mentioning 
pride in the nation, even at an instrumental level, introduce an unmistakeable identity 
dimension that may cloud other issues5.
The third implication of Cinnirella’s work is the potentially differential impact of any 
instrumental and affective dimensions to national pride on support for European integration. 
Routh and Burgoyne suggest that one feature o f affective, cultural attachment is a backward­
looking and regressive desire to avoid change in one’s national identity. On the other hand, 
the instrumental attachment is more open to changes on the basis of the perceived benefits. 
(Routh and Burgoyne, 1998, p. 4). This analysis suggests that cultural pride holders are 
likely to be unfavourable towards integration, with instrumental pride holders being 
ambivalent or perhaps even positive. Underlying this approach is the social identity 
viewpoint that if  the outgroup, or for that matter the ingroup, o f  national identity and hence 
national pride turns out to be Europe it is no longer realistic to assume that pride and support 
are unrelated. In turn, the constructivist view o f the nation as an artificial creation discussed 
in section 4.3. provides a particularly clear path for such identity development. On this view, 
any relationship between national pride and support for the EU is due to the alteration of 
national identity either to an contain an anti-European element or, likewise, national identity 
may actually come to incorporate some aspects o f a European identity. However,
5 To see this, consider the difference between the question “Are you satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the 
country where you live?” and “Are you proud of Britain’s unique parliamentary democracy?”
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constructivist explanations o f the relationship between national pride and European 
integration focus on detailed study o f the content of national identity, something that cannot 
be accomplished here. Instead, I argue that findings regarding the relationship between 
national pride and support can be used as supporting evidence for constructivist theses, and I 
return to this point in section 6.4.1.
Despite the claims o f constructivism and Routh and Burgoyne’s attributes o f instrumental 
and affective pride, I argue that the contrast between nationalism and national pride 
demonstrates that there is unlikely to be a strong relationship between national pride and 
European integration; unlike nationalism, national pride has no attendant anti-European 
ideology or political content and is non-exclusive in character. Thus there is a clear 
theoretical difference between national pride, as a specific type o f attachment to an ingroup, 
and nationalism, which complements ingroup attachment with, minimally, the political theory 
that any given nation should be constituted as a state, and that a state should be founded in a 
nation. This distinction has been recognised by several theorists of nationalism and 
patriotism: in one o f the most influential works, Adorno et al. sees the genuine patriot as 
“free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power” while 
‘pseudopatriots’ possess “blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical 
conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection o f  other nations as outgroups” 
(Adomo et al., 1950, p. 107)6. Kosterman and Feshbach use factor analysis techniques to 
empirically demonstrate that respondents distinguish between patriotism and nationalism 
(1989). However, one might expect nationalists and possibly xenophobes and racists to hold 
attitudes o f  national pride. Indeed, for Smith and Jaarko, national pride is a “prerequisite” for 
nationalism (1998, p.l). On the other hand, while patriots may hold some hostility towards 
national outgroups, to the extent that all categorisation involves stereotyping, there is no 
expected link between affective attachment to the nation and ideological hostility towards 
outgroups; for instance, one would not expect to see strong evaluations o f racial or national 
superiority from such respondents. Indeed, from section 4.2. it follows that (national) 
identities, and pride therein are non-exclusive, so that a respondent might feel, say, both 
French and European.
6 From section 4.5. we know that Adomo et al. consider that only nationalists or pseudopatriots engage in stereotyping, and 
that genuine patriots do not. Given that in section 4.2. social identity theory teaches us that al) individuals stereotype to a 
certain extent, this may lead to an unnecessarily polarised distinction between patriotism and pseudopatriotism in the work 
of Adomo.
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As a further point o f contrast between national pride and nationalism, the former concept is 
often seen as a constructive social force, while nationalism tends to be viewed as an affliction 
on society. Almond and Verba suggest that a certain level o f national pride may actually be 
necessary for the legitimacy and stability o f a political system (1989, p. 68). Taylor, who 
equates a strong sense of identity with the polity as a measure o f commitment to it, echoes 
this point (Taylor in Beiner, 1999, p. 228)7. Against this view of national pride and 
patriotism as a healthy national self-concept, nationalism has historically been viewed as 
morally shabby, and as the jingoistic cause o f wars (see section 4.5.; Kosterman and 
Feshbach, 1989, p. 258). As a result, some authors have proposed patriotism as a beneficent 
alternative to nationalism (see Viroli, 1995).
Thus national pride as defined here is a very different beast to nationalism. I define national 
pride as a measure o f belonging, multidimensional and non-exclusive in nature. Because of 
its non-exclusivity, there would appear to be little conflict between supporting the EU and 
one’s own nation; indeed, one might hold a series of multiple identities. Hence we have
H2: pride in a particular nation is not linked, ceteris paribus, with levels o f  support fo r  the 
European Union amongst its citizens.
4.5. Nationalism
I begin this section with a brief, general classification o f  the different dimensions to 
nationalism. Evidently focusing here on nationalist sentiment rather than behaviour or ideas, 
I review literature both from the contested political theory of nationalism and more 
straightforwardly extremist psychological perspectives on nationalist sentiment. This allows 
the construction o f  a hypothesis proposing a negative relationship between nationalist 
attitudes in respondents and support for integration. As a caveat, this picture may not hold
7 There is an interesting contrast, however, between national pride as something socially beneficial or useful, as implied in 
the text above, and pride as an absolute moral ‘good’. Christian theology has long railed against pride, and Thomas Aquinas 
states representatively that “inordinate love o f self is the cause of every sin” (1978, p. 144).
1 1 0
4. A Definition o f  Concepts and Formalisation of Hypotheses
for stateless nations, where nationalists from such areas tend to display ambivalent or even 
pro-European sentiments.
Smith identifies five separate actual uses of the term nationalism (Beiner, 1999, p. 55).
1. the process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states.
2. a consciousness o f belonging to or identity with the nation amongst the mass public or 
political elites, together with sentiments for its security and prosperity.
3. a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’ and its role. (Political Rhetoric)
4. an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and national will and prescriptions for 
the realisation of national aspirations and national will.
5. a social-political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realise its national will.
Each of these five practical uses is further reducible to at least one of the core, more abstract 
components of ideas, sentiments or political actions. In the first sense nationalism is 
understood primarily as the work o f intellectuals. Sentiments can be taken to refer to 
attitudes, values or the ‘consciousness* that characterises a particular culture, while in the 
third sense nationalism is understood as an organisation or movement which purports to 
promote the national interest in some way. Evidently, the most relevant nationalist 
component in a thesis concerning public opinion is sentiment, or point 2 on Smith’s schema. I
I proceed to hypothesise a negative link between nationalist sentiment and support for 
integration. From social psychology it is evident that, in common with patriots or persons 
with sentiments o f  national pride, nationalists identify very strongly with the nation o f which 
they are members. However, only from political theory do we learn the content o f nationalist 
ideology shared by nationalists. The core nationalist belief is that the national unit provides 
state legitimacy, so that nations should also be constituted as states and vice versa. To many 
authors nationalism thus conceived constitutes a benign recognition of cultural differences, 
while other writers see nationalism as more often than not descending into a bigoted and 
outmoded ideology. Arguably, for either of these two characterisations o f nationalism the 
impact on support for integration could be seen to be negative. In the end, I test a relatively 
extreme version o f nationalism, not least because Adorno’s psychological conception of 
nationalism takes a similarly negative view, while in section 5.2.4. we see that the
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International Social Science Program (ISSP) survey questions used to measure nationalism 
seem to tap a more extremist viewpoint.
From section 4.1. we can assume that nationalists, like patriots, identify strongly with the 
‘imagined community’ of the nation to which they belong. Moreover, the presence o f an 
outgroup illustrates the point that nationalism is not inward-looking but sees the nation in 
reference towards other nations or non-nationals. However, it is the specifically nationalist 
ideas regarding the distribution o f  political power that separates nationalism from patriotism. 
To begin with a definition, Gellner highlights that for all persuasions o f  nationalist the 
legitimacy o f the state is provided by the cultural unit, that is, the nation. He writes
“Nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the 
basic social bond. Whatever principles o f authority m ay exist between people depend 
for their legitimacy on the fact that the members o f  the group concerned are o f  the 
same culture... In its extreme version, similarity o f  culture becomes both the 
necessary and the sufficient condition of legitimate membership: only members o f the 
appropriate culture may join the unit in question and all o f  them must do so.” (1997, 
p. 4)
We can make do here by defining the state as that agency within society that possesses a 
monopoly of legitimate political power. The definition o f  a nation is altogether more 
problematic. For some writers, a nation is a historically constituted community o f people that 
possesses a combination of certain characteristics, such as a common language, territory, 
economic life and psychological make-up (Stalin in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 20). 
Other contributors stress the contingent nature o f nations, arguing that its members must 
mutually recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. For Renan, the nation is an 
“everyday plebiscite” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 17). These two approaches hint at the 
division in the literature between conservatives, who see the nation as primordial and natural, 
sidestepping political institutions and actors altogether, and constructivists, who tend to 
believe that
“the unmitigated link between the cultural raw material and political identities is 
broken by an active process o f identity-formation entailing manipulation o f cultural 
symbols. ..It is up to the political activist to select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilised 
or suppressed.” (Cederman, 1996, p. 3).
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On any account, the nation is a cultural concept, set aside the more legal and political 
character o f  the state. This conception clearly has immediate application for a state such as 
the United Kingdom, where people share a common legal citizenship but may have differing 
notions of whether they belong to a Scottish, Irish, Welsh or English nation.
While it follows from Gellner’s definition that state power must be apportioned on national 
lines, within the EU context this does not imply absolute legal and political sovereignty. 
MacCormick disputes from a legal perspective the intergovemmentalist understanding of 
integration (see section 1.3.4.), arguing that it is mistaken to apply an Austinian analysis to 
European integration, whereby parliaments delegate rather than transfer power to the EU’s 
law-making organs, making the commands they issue binding on citizens in virtue o f their 
pre-adoption by the sovereign body (1993, p. 3). Instead, MacCormick asserts the primacy of 
an evolutionary interpretation o f  Hartian theory of law, whereby legal systems have at their 
apex a rule o f recognition for law based on deliberative practise and emergent custom. As an 
example o f this approach, the Factortame case saw the UK government accept the striking 
down of certain parts of the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act by the European Court o f Justice 
because the rules and norms o f European Community law came to constitute a new criterion 
o f validity for UK law. Taken to its conclusion, this view o f  law that allows different legal 
systems to overlap and interact on potentially equal terms, leads to a divorce o f statehood 
from legal sovereignty. Only in this way, MacCormick argues, can one allow for 
international law, canon law and what is sometimes called the ‘living law’ o f social 
institutions like universities, firms or families (1993, p. 14). The implication for the study of 
nationalism is that calls for full political and legal state sovereignty are unrealistic. Arguably, 
the force o f these arguments is recognised by many nationalist movements and in the 
accompanying literature. Catalan nationalists are seen to adopt a ‘post-sovereign’ stance, 
stressing a historic tradition o f shared sovereignty, while on the other hand Basque 
nationalists arguably reject this discourse and continue to demand full independence 
(Keating, 2001). This opens the door for post-sovereign nationalists to potentially be pro- 
European integration, and this point is discussed below. The question, then, of what degree 
o f sovereignty is required for statehood might be thought o f as varying by nation, and indeed 
we can see in section 6.4.1. how different minority nationals react to the idea of 
independence within the ambit o f the EU.
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Whatever the requisite amount of state sovereignty demanded, Hobsbawm makes the point 
that for extremists nationalism is able to function as a ‘trump’ card that can subordinate other 
interests to its achievement.
“ [The relationship between nationalism and, for instance, the choice between 
capitalism and socialism] is o f  no significance to nationalists, who do not care what 
this relationship is, so long as Ruritanians (or whoever) acquire sovereign statehood 
as a nation, or indeed what happens thereafter” (Hobsbawn quoted in Beiner, 1999, p. 
13)
From section 4.2. we learn that extremists hold more polarised opinions regarding outgroups 
than more moderate ingroup members. In the context o f nationalism, extremists often 
construct a self-righteousness morality justifying their claims to state power on the basis o f 
biased assessments o f superiority over national outgroups, either other nations internal to the 
state in question or in the international domain. At its most intense, Dunn points out that this 
is no less than ethical relativism, a doctrine that gives an agent no good reason to deny 
themselves anything that they desire and are able to appropriate (Dunn writing in Beiner, 
1999, p. 30-2). As a particularly poignant example, many nationalist ideologies are exclusive 
in character, and the worst historical instances have laid claim to spurious racial advantages 
that serve to differentiate a particular nation. The results have invariably been bloody, and in 
Gellner’s words “many people had to be either assimilated, or expelled or killed” (1994, p. 
116). Unsurprisingly then, for many people nationalism has an air of moral shabbiness, a 
challenge to the universalist morality that pervades Western societies, whether in the form of 
Christianity or legal arrangements that see humans as possessing identical rights.
On the other hand, the view that human values are in some sense specific to particular 
cultures, together with the understanding that this implies a geographical limit to ethical 
competence, has lead to some o f the most benign nationalist thinking. Following Plamenatz, 
western nationalism has more often than not served as a vehicle for the celebration o f culture 
idiosyncrasy, exemplified by the historicist thought of writers such as Herder and Mazzini. 
Isaiah Berlin has insisted that Herder took the view that cultural nationalism was necessarily 
opposed to any hegemonic infliction o f  its own cultural proclivities, as this would be 
hypocritical (Beiner, 1999, p. 42).
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More recently, some theorists have tried to show that there is no inconsistency in fusing 
nationalist elements to liberalism, or in bringing a liberal face to nationalism. Civic 
nationalism attempts to find a role for collective identity alongside liberal conceptions of 
citizenship. On such accounts, it is recognised that the liberal ideal o f universalistic 
citizenship can never be realised in a pluralistic world o f  nation-states. Nevertheless, 
citizenship can be based on accidental territorial coexistence (Jus soli) rather than according 
to, say, bloodlines (jus sanguinis). So, in non-exclusive states such as the United States, 
Canada, Britain or Sweden there is supposedly equal access to the cultural goods o f  and in 
the civic nation. Amongst many criticisms, however, Kymlicka argues forcefully that civic 
nationalism is necessarily based on a cultural component, even where it is something as 
innocent as promoting a common language (Beiner, 1999, p. 133)8. Kymlicka explains the 
violence in Turkey against the Kurd minority not because Turkey refuses to accept Kurds as 
Turkish citizens, but because it refuses to accept that Kurds are a separate national group. So 
civic nationalism too often falls back into exclusivity and a negative form o f nationalism.
Advocates of Liberal nationalism typically call for intra-state cultural and national 
differences to be taken account, so weakening the idea of a homogenous national state. For 
Tamir, the “ideal o f  the nation-state should...be abandoned” although national identities 
should have the opportunity to be displayed in a “public space” (Tamir quoted in Beiner, 
1999, p. 8). This means that the feature o f nationalism as a ‘trump’ is diluted. For many 
authors, however, Tamir’s position is simply a form of liberalism that is not indifferent to 
concerns about national identity; liberal nationalism itself being quite possibly an oxymoron 
(Levison, 1995). The concern is, that when it comes to the crunch, liberal nationalists will be 
forced to drop either the liberalism or the nationalism elements. According to Beiner, this 
irreconcilability derives from a basic problem, “how to privilege the majority cultural identity 
in defining civic membership without consigning cultural minorities to second-class 
citizenship” (1999, p. 9). That is, while it would seem unlikely that any real nationalist
8 Civic nationalism reappears in the work of Habermas as ‘constitutional patriotism’ or the political loyalty of citizens to 
universal values and the free polity that they share (1989). However, as Canovan shows, advocates o f this ‘new patriotism’ 
leave many vital questions unanswered, such as where the state draws its power. For many, the answer to this question is the 
nation (Canovan, 2000, p. 423).
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would agree to abandon the idea of a nation-state, it is hardly liberal to favour any one group 
of people over another within the boundaries of a shared civic life9.
Nationalism in the psychological literature is understood in more extremist terms, with 
attendant implications for the link between nationalist sentiment and support. In The 
Authoritarian Personality Adomo et aL see nationalism as a  species of ethnocentrism, which 
is characterised by anti-Semitism, hostility towards other minorities, and a narrow, aggressive 
loyalty to the national ingroup (“patriotism”) (1950)10. Indeed, xenophobia and racism also 
form part o f this broad concept of ethnocentrism, with the implication that we can expect 
nationalist, racist and xenophobic attitudes to be positively associated with one another. On 
the other hand, viewing identity and pride as the necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
nationalism, racism and xenophobia means that the relationship here is likely only to be one­
way: nationalism, racism and xenophobia should not expected to determine their logical 
antecedents, identity and pride.
Ethnocentrism itself is a concept associated with a certain psychological type, the 
authoritarian. The authoritarian is known for his or her ‘conventionalism’ or rigid adherence 
to convention based on the fear of being different, which in turn implies a susceptibility to 
fascism or other outside moral guidance. The Berkeley group o f  Adomo arid his co-authors 
build on the work o f Freud to explain this occurrence as an externalisation o f the conscience 
or superego, the result of a failure to internalise the moral rules o f the conscience within the 
self or ego. W hile an authoritarian individual wishes to satisfy his or her id, or primitive 
emotional needs, conflict with the superego prevents this. In a strangely Marxist twist, the 
authors posit that this conflict is the result o f sexual repression, itself a by-product of 
bourgeois capitalist society. The result o f these unconsciously repressed and unsatisfied 
desires is a compensatory exaggerated emphasis on convention for its own sake 
(‘conventionalism’), a vengeful authoritarian aggressivity as well as destructiveness and 
cynicism; in short, anti-democratic behaviour. So, authoritarian attitudes such as the
9 Nationalism and Liberalism can, arguably, be more successfully linked with regard to national self-determination. 
Liberalism, when taken to mean the right of a community to self-defence and freedom from oppression (emancipation), has 
formed part o f many early nationalist movements (see also Loth, 2000, p. 22).
10 Ironically, Adomo et at. take patriotism to refer to ‘pseudopatriotism’, or blind attachment to national cultural values and 
rejection of other nations as outgroups (Forbes, 1985, p. 55). This pseudopatriotism can be distinguished from genuine 
patriotism, or love o f country.
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predisposition to think in rigid stereotypes and aggression towards those who violate 
conventional values are at the root of nationalism. The nationalist, then, is an all-round bigot; 
suspicious o f  foreigners, he or she is also inclined to find fault with his or her own 
countrymen, particularly minorities (Forbes, 1985, p. 54).
As a caveat, in section 4.2. we learn that all individuals who engage in self-categorization 
also engage in stereotyping and ingroup promotion over outgroups. On the other hand, 
Adorno et a l.’s approach suggests that only authoritarian personality types engage in 
stereotyping. The danger is that Adorno redefines all nationalist stereotype holders as 
ethnocentrists, or extreme nationalists. In this way, Adorno’s definition of nationalism could 
be too extreme and polarised, perhaps artificially distinguishing it to too great a degree from 
national pride.
In summary, I have (somewhat artificially) characterised nationalism into more moderate and 
extremist variants. It seems possible, however, that both types o f  nationalist sentiment can be 
associated with anti-EU evaluations. For extremists, then, nationalism may be little more 
than a doctrine o f ethical relativism and ethnic superiority, so that we can without great 
difficulty imagine extremist nationalism sentiment to oppose the creation of a regional 
organisation aiming to bind its members into patterns o f co-operation. Moreover, although 
this is not the place to definitively judge how successfully some theorists have fused 
nationalism and liberalism, it is evident that even more benign takes on nationalism struggle 
to avoid envisaging a single, hegemonic national culture as providing state legitimacy. One 
might also expect, then, liberal and civic nationalists to resist EU encroachments on national 
sovereignty. However, this dogmatic rejection o f sovereignty encroachments may be 
exaggerated in the case of moderate nationalists, as it makes no allowances for differences 
between ‘high’ politics sovereignty issues, such as foreign policy cooperation, and the more 
mundane Tow’ politics of, say, international waterway management. Nevertheless, the 
expected attitudinal similarities between the two variants of nationalism towards the 
European Union mean that I am agnostic about which variant to test. I hypothesise 
nationalist attitudes to be concomitant with negative evaluations of European integration. 
This is based on the interpretation that nationalist attitudes derive from a self-righteous 
morality that generally maintains that state power must be in the hands o f legitimate national 
representatives. In turn, the nation is, at the very least, primus inter pares in the international
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system. As supporting evidence, Laffan points to the revival in fortunes o f  nationalist 
popular parties in some EU countries as a reaction against growing the growing 
cosmopolitanism fostered by the EU (1996, p. 89). So we have •
H3: nationalist sentiment in a particular state is linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels o f 
support fo r  the European Union amongst its citizens.
While the relationship between nationalism as defined above and support might seem rather 
self-evident, we are still interested in the strength o f  any relationship. Moreover, it is clear 
from the operationalisation o f nationalism using pre-existing survey questions in section
5.2.4. that it is difficult to capture the extreme version o f nationalism defined above. 
Especially in the light of this, the relationship between nationalism and support is more 
controversial than it might seem at first. Although the Treaties establishing and building the 
European Communities and the Union have doubtless involving the signing away of 
sovereignty, some theorists have argued that this has strengthened the nation-state. Recalling 
section 1.3.4., Milward et al. (1992) argue that the purpose o f  European Community policies 
was not to supersede but to reinforce the nation-state, while Moravcsik (1994) makes the 
claim that opaque central bargaining amongst member-states has enhanced their control of 
the domestic policy arena. Both these hypotheses are, however, somewhat counter-intuitive 
and controversial. I incline to the view that for a proposition to affect the mass public 
consciousness it must be, as with a Hollywood movie plot, kept very simple.
As a further caveat, I begin by noting the distinction between nationalist sentiment and the 
state in the hypothesis above. For many countries, a single, unchallenged national grouping 
is in control o f or privileged by the organs of the state, so that this distinction is of little 
import. However, there are a smaller number of countries that contain recognised, stateless 
nations within their confines. In the European Union, Belgium, Spain and the United 
Kingdom would seem to be the clearest examples o f states with minority nations in their 
midst. In the most straightforward case, the European Union may be seen as an ally in 
achieving statehood for ‘post-sovereignty* nationalists from certain minority nations, either 
because the EU functions as a prop for nation-states (see Milward et al., 1992) or for the 
quite opposite reason that European integration has contributed to the demise of centralised 
nation-states (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). Keating argues that in the case of Scotland, the former
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view has strengthened support for the ‘post-sovereignty’ position within the Scottish National 
Party, as it allows one to claim that Scotland could quite feasibly become an independent 
state within the orbit o f the European Union, rather like the Netherlands, by acceding to the 
acquis communautaire (2001, p. 2). As we have seen in section 3.4., opinion poll data 
suggests that the Scots as a whole are less Eurosceptic than the English. On the other hand, 
the continuing widespread support for classical statehood means that I treat Scottish 
nationalists’ evaluations of the EU as an open question. For Catalonia, the data is slightly 
more clear-cut, indicating that Catalan residents are more likely to feel European the more 
than they feel Catalan rather than Spanish (Keating, 2001, p. 10). Other stateless nations may 
be more ambivalent towards the EU, possibly the result o f historic traditions emphasising 
pactism, accommodation and shared authority. Amongst Welsh nationalists, where support 
for independence is weaker than in Scotland, nationalist discourse appears on the whole more 
focused on a Europe o f the regions rather than an independent Wales within Europe (see 
Lynch, 1996). Keating argues that Welsh nationalists are
“more concerned with maximizing the degree o f  autonomy and influence open to the 
nation than with the trappings o f sovereignty, and are usually ambivalent as to their 
ultimate aims, preferring to see how the world evolves before they commit 
themselves.” (Keating, 2001, p. 3)
I treat Welsh nationalist attitudes towards integration as likely to be ambivalent. A third 
option is that minority nationalism and European integration are incompatible, on the grounds 
that European institutions undermine state sovereignty. The most likely candidate for this 
category is the Basque country, where Keating sets out data showing this to be the Spanish 
region with least identification with Europe (Keating, 2001, p. 11). In section 5.2.4.1 analyse 
minority nation results based on this three-way typology rather than any specific country-by­
country hypotheses.
Within the confines of this section I have attempted a broad outline of the range of nationalist 
thought. I use a simple one-dimensional scale, with extremists and moderates at either end, 
to characterise these different approaches. For both practical and theoretical reasons, I 
hypothesise a negative relationship with support for the EU. This hypothesis, however, is 
shown to be theoretically coherent only for those nations that have achieved statehood, so 
that nationalists in stateless nations such as the Basque country m ay well evaluate the EU in a 
very different light. The potential acquiescence o f some minority nations within the EU
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project highlights the fact that full political and legal state sovereignty is rather unrealistic 
project, only pursued by a few nationalist movements. Finally, nationalism is seen by 
Adomo et al. as positively related to xenophobia and racism, but, while most nationalists are 
proud o f and identify with their home nation, the reverse is unlikely to be true.
4.6. X enophobia and Racism
The similarities between the two concepts o f xenophobia and racism mean that they are 
investigated together here. Socio-psychological approaches to xenophobia and racism 
highlight common, ethnocentric origins with nationalism, including a presumed antipathy 
towards European integration. A  number o f other individual and group-level approaches to 
xenophobia and racism are also briefly discussed, although they do not alter substantially the 
hypotheses towards integration.
Rather than viewing xenophobia and racism as irrational, inscrutable psychological 
dispositions, both concepts can be clearly located in the socio-psychological framework 
outlined above. Put simply, xenophobes hold prejudicial attitudes towards foreigners and 
strangers, which one might think o f here as an outgroup defined by non-nationals. Racists 
are predisposed towards certain ‘races’ while at the same time consigning other such 
groupings to outgroup status. There are, o f course, differences between the two concepts. 
One might see the strict meaning o f xenophobia as fear o f the other, where there has been a 
subtle shift from ‘separation’ to ‘adversity’ towards the outgroup. For this reason, some 
writers have seen xenophobia as intimately related to nationalism. For instance, the 
following witticism is labelled by Karl Deutsch as a European saying
“A nation is a group o f persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a 
common dislike of their neighbours” (1969, p. 3).
On the other hand, racism retains a more explicit sense o f hatred for particular ‘races’. As 
discussed in the following paragraph, racism can be at least partially understood in terms of 
cultural and ideology theories o f  biological superiority; that is, many historical forms of 
racism made their way into the open under the guise o f science.
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Here, I understand ‘race’ to denote a class of people related by common descent, the 
supposed signs of which are skin colour and physiognomy. This is in spite o f the fact that 
scientific and pseudo-scientific attempts to divide humanity into separate subspecies or 
‘races’ have been thoroughly discredited. The so-called ‘father’ of modem racism, 
Gobineau, recognised three races, the white, the yellow and the black, in descending order of 
superiority and argued that all races achieve their characteristic greatness when unmixed 
(Scruton, 1982, p. 189). Modem genetics has definitively shown that characteristics such as 
skin colour are genetically superficial, while it is generally recognised that ‘interbreeding’ 
among humans has taken place continuously throughout history. However, to the extent that 
people may exhibit prejudice based upon perceived racial grounds, the phenomenon is still o f 
interest here.
This lack o f  an objective base to distinguish between races often leads ‘practitioners’ 
themselves into confusing xenophobia and racism. A European Commission DGV report 
‘Racism and Xenophobia in Europe* compiled on the basis o f  Eurobarometer 47.1 remarks 
that many people who openly declared themselves racist in the opinion survey were in fact 
xenophobic, “as the ‘minorities’ who were the target o f hostile feelings in each country, 
varied according to its colonial and migratory history and the recent arrival of refugees” 
(1997, p.l). Because of this confusion, it may not be possible in the general sense to say 
whether a particular set of survey questions measures xenophobia or racism, it may depend 
very much on the particular circumstances of the country in question. On the other hand, 
Eurobarometer figures for 1992 show that more of the foreign resident population in EU 
countries came from outside the EU (an average of 2.8% as against 1.5% from inside the EU) 
(Melich, 1995, p. 11). So, the confusion surrounding racism means that it is probably best 
that treated theoretically in conjunction with xenophobia.
From section 4.5. we know that one o f the more common ways to understand the phenomena 
o f xenophobia and racism is, in common with nationalism, using Adomo et a V s umbrella 
concept of ethnocentrism. In this instance, an ethnocentrist is someone who judges foreign 
groups by domestic standards, and so is to be contrasted with cosmopolitanism and cultural 
relativism (Forbes, 1985, p. 22). For Adomo et al., the driving force underlying this crude 
political ideology, ethnocentrism, was an ‘authoritarian’ personality type, itself principally a 
product of early sexual inhibition common in bourgeois capitalist society. So, one might
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expect a positive statistical association between nationalist, xenophobic and racist sentiment 
(see section 5.4.). Certainly, for many right wing movements and political parties in Europe, 
nationalism and racism go hand in hand. Consider, for example, the French ‘Front National’, 
the Austrian ‘Freedom party’ and the Belgian ‘Vlaams Blok’11.
Although social-psychological theories may adequately describe the actual process of 
stereotyping and prejudice, a number o f different approaches compete to explain the causal 
factors behind racism and xenophobia. Amongst the individual-level theories o f prejudice, 
the most straightforward approach takes individual correlates of racial and xenophobia 
prejudice in attitude surveys. Self-interest theories postulate that individuals develop 
negative stereotypes towards those with whom they are in competition and conflict (Quillian, 
1995, p. 587). Other theories investigate prejudice at the group-level, where the phenomenon 
is typically explained by threats to the dominant group’s interests or privileges by a 
subordinate group. Quillian distinguishes between theorists such as Bobo that stress threats 
to a group’s subjective perception o f their own interests and the work o f authors such as 
Blumer, who posit that groups respond to threats against their real interests. Interesting as 
these diverse threads of thought are, the limitations o f the survey data used in this thesis, as 
well as its scope, mean that I only attempt to locate the causes of racist and xenophobic 
attitudes at the individual level and from a predominantly sociological standpoint.
Theorising about the relationship between xenophobia, racism and European integration, I 
take the view that xenophobes and racists will associate a closer European Union with an 
influx into local communities o f members of the out-groups that they are hostile towards. 
Certainly with respect to xenophobia, the free movement of persons forms a key part of the 
1985 Schengen Agreement, incorporated into the EU framework from May 1999 as a 
protocol to the 1997 Treaty o f Amsterdam, and the 1986 Single European Act’s focus on an 
internal market. Similarly, the EU may well be associated with an influx o f non-Caucasian 
‘races’ in the minds of racists. This may be thanks to a series of initiatives such as the 
Schengen Agreement’s joint Visa policy, which allows legal extra-communitarians to travel 
freely within 13 o f  the 15 EU countries. More fundamentally, a cosmopolitan value system 
underpins the whole EU project: Article O of the Treaty o f the European Union states that 1
11 It is worth noting that racist politicians such as Le Pen and Haider have occasionally expressed racist and pro-European 
sentiments, regarding their own racial group as Europeans.
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any European state may apply to become a member o f the Union. This definition might 
include states as ‘undesirable’ as the ex-Warsaw pact countries and even Turkey.
H4: xenophobic sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels 
o f support fo r  the European Union amongst its citizens.
H5: racist sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels o f  
support fo r the European Union amongst its citizens.
Socio-psychological approaches suggest that xenophobia and racism are theoretically rather 
similar concepts, and the subjective nature o f racism acts to reinforce this notion. I predict 
that both concepts react negatively to the reality of integration and the cosmopolitan thinking 
that forms part of the EU’s guiding principles.
4.7. Conclusion
In the introduction to this chapter I made the argument that definitions are too often neglected 
in the empirical social science literature. This argument forms a key motivational force 
behind this chapter, even if the space is not available for a completely fluent treatment of the 
concepts under consideration.
I show in section 4.2. that social psychological theories o f identity can provide the building 
blocks for a thorough understanding of identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and 
racism. Not only does this aid in our understanding o f these concepts, in particular the multi­
faceted nationalism, but also acts to justify the treatment here o f  the five concepts together.
In section 4.5. I argue that one can, very crudely, distinguish historically and theoretically 
between moderate and extremist variants of nationalist ideology. I argue that nationalists of 
both types are generally hostile towards the European Union. Even so, the negative link 
between nationalist sentiment and the EU is placed into question for stateless nations. In 
section 4 .5 .1 also introduce Adorno’s psychological explanation o f nationalism, xenophobia 
and racism. Despite a number o f caveats, I expect nationalism, xenophobia and racism to be
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positively associated with one another in the chapter five results. On the other hand, I expect 
to see no causal link run from national pride to nationalism, xenophobia and racism (although 
vice versa I posit a link), nor even between national pride and the EU, as the former concept 
is a measure o f  attachment to the nation rather than an ideology. I posit a negative link 
between the closely related attitudes o f  xenophobia and racism and the EU, which both in 
actions and underlying philosophy has shown itself to be a cosmopolitan organisation. 
Finally, I propose that the more European someone feels, the more likely they are to support 
integration. National identity in particular might be a necessary condition for attitudes of 
national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, although the opposite is rather unlikely 
to be true. Even if  some of these hypotheses appear uncontroversial, from section 3.5. we 
know that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate this. Moreover, we are also 
interested in the strength of any prospective relationship.
So, having defined identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and racism and 
hypothesised how such attitude holders might view European integration, I proceed in 
chapter five to operationalise the concepts and empirically analyse their make-up, including 
their relationships to each other. In chapter six I test the hypotheses established here against 
support for integration.
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EUROPEAN IDENTITY, NATIONALISM  AND RACISM USING ISSP  
DATA
5.1. Chapter Aim and Summary
The main aim o f this chapter is to demonstrate empirically using International Social Science 
Program survey data some of the principal determinants, at least from a political sociology 
perspective, o f European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and 
racism, concepts that are theoretically defined in chapter four.
The motives to investigate the determinants of what will serve as independent variables in 
later chapters are threefold. From section 4.4., one might expect a positive link running from 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism to national pride and European identity, but not vice 
versa. Similarly, the theories o f Adorno et al. discussed in section 4.5. suggest that 
xenophobic, racist and nationalist attitudes are positively associated with each other and 
indeed stem from an underlying psychological disposition. So, the research herein can serve 
to (in)validate earlier theoretical definitions. Moreover, the relative theoretical proximity of 
the five concepts taken makes it useful to show their distinctiveness in the data, as well as on 
what basis they do relate to each other. Thirdly, from a wider sociological perspective, this 
research stands to shed light on the basis o f several relatively common attitudes in society at 
large. There is also an interesting contrast that can be highlighted here between the 
components o f European identity and national pride, generally seen as benign attitudes, and 
the determinants o f nationalism and racism, which are typically viewed in more negative 
terms.
The building blocks for the construction o f the necessary statistical models are presented in 
the opening section 5.2. of this chapter. Here I introduce and explain the selection o f the
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ISSP data, operationalise, with the exception of xenophobia due to lack o f data, all the 
concepts defined in the previous chapter and also bring in a number o f relevant control 
variables. In section 5.3. I describe the series o f models and the Weighted Least Squares 
regression technique used to investigate the determinants o f national pride, European identity, 
nationalism and racism before presenting the results at the aggregate and country level. 
These results are interpreted in section 5.4.
The key aggregate level findings modify the earlier predictions. As expected, I show initially 
that there is a cultural and political dimension to national pride. In fact, there are two key 
factors underlying the survey data; political and cultural pride and nationalism load onto one 
factor, while racism loads predominantly onto a second. Although the first factor appears 
similar to Adorno’s concept o f  ethnocentrism, the weak loading o f racism and the positive 
relationship between national pride and support exposed in chapter six suggests that this is 
not the case, and I instead treat it as a measure of affective, cultural support for the nation. 
The grouping together of national pride and nationalism also places into doubt the chapter 
four hypothesis that national pride is unrelated to support for integration. The second factor 
seems a more straightforward measure o f racism.
5.2. C onstructing the Model
In this section I begin by giving an overview of the ISSP National Identity survey data. I 
then operationalise one-by-one the concepts outlined in chapter four. I also state how 
common each concept is in the survey data selected. After all, setting aside statistical issues, 
i f  only a small handful o f respondents are, say, nationalist then the effort devoted to 
explaining both their attitudes towards integration and their determining factors would seem 
misplaced. Finally, the control variables are considered, so that in the sections that follow I 
can present the statistical models used, the results and the interpretation thereof.
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5.2.1. The ISSP Survey
I decide to use the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey in 
preference to the Eurobarometer survey series in both in chapter five and six because it 
contains a variable list capable of measuring our central concepts over a broad, representative 
sample of European Union member states.
The ISSP survey contains cross-national, individual level data collected over a single time 
period (1995)1. Data are available for a total of 24 countries worldwide, although here only 
European Union member states are retained in the survey. The EU countries that the ISSP 
survey covers are as follows: Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden and Spain1 2. For each o f the countries there are approximately 1000 cases, 
except in the cases o f Germany and the Netherlands, where the sample size is approximately 
2000. Rather than allow sample size by itself to influence the aggregate level findings, I 
weight the data by population, which allows one to draw EU-wide conclusions from the eight 
countries in question. The 1995 population figures are expressed in millions and, in brackets, 
as a percentage of the total population of the eight countries: Germany -  81.9 (30%), UK 
58.5 minus 1.6 for Northern Ireland (21%) (see 1998 Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of 
Statistics), A ustria- 8.1 (3%), Italy 57.2 (21%), Ireland -  3.6 (1%), Netherlands -  15,5 (6%), 
Spain -  39.2 (14%) and Sweden -  8.8 (3%) (World Bank, 1997). Clearly, while Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy and Spain are weighted up, the impact of the smaller countries such as 
Austria and Ireland on the aggregate results will be very small.
I choose the ISSP survey data over the Eurobarometer surveys on the basis of the variable list 
present in each o f the surveys. While the strengths of the ISSP survey variables are evaluated 
in the sections below, I note here that the Eurobarometer surveys are not particularly
1 The data I use here was made available on CD-ROM from the Zentralarchiv fur Empinsche Sozialforschung (study no. 
28S0). All the results based on this data are available in digital format on request from the author.
2 The data for the UK is split into Britain and then Northern Ireland, Here I only analyse the results for Great Bntam. On 
the other hand, the East and West German territorial distinctions preserved in the ISSP data are amalgamated in my results, 
except where specifically stated to the contrary.
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successful at measuring national pride, nationalism, racism or xenophobia. Racism and 
xenophobia receive the best coverage; several slightly erratic question series are 
supplemented by two special Eurobarometer reports (No. 30.0 and 47.1.). The report 
‘Racism and Xenophobia in Europe* (1997), drawn from Eurobarometer 47.1., is examined 
briefly in sections 4.5., 5.2.5. and 6.2.5. Unfortunately, the coverage for national pride and 
nationalism is poor. There are several questions concerning citizens* fears over the potential 
loss o f  sovereignty or identity that the EU might bring about, and over where the dividing 
line over public policy is between national governments and European institutions3. 
However, it would appear difficult to argue that these types o f questions elicit responses 
based overwhelmingly on nationalist considerations. A question is posed on national pride; 
however, this question is put infrequently, and not necessarily in combination with any other 
items o f interest. This lack o f coverage is unfortunate; Eurobarometer surveys typically 
include all current EU member states at the time o f issue and are also available over an 
unmatched time period (see section 2.2.3.). So, the use o f the Eurobarometer surveys is 
restricted to explaining non-attitudes (see section 7.5.1.) and evaluating the meaning o f 
various types o f  dependent variables and provide measures o f  absolute levels o f  support for 
integration (see chapter two).
5.2.2. E uropean  and National Identity
Identity is operationalised here using the only two suitable questions in the ISSP survey:
“How close do you feel to ...?  (Very close, close, not very close, not close at all, can*t 
choose/don*t know)’*
(13) Your country
(14) Europe
3 In lieu o f listing all such questions, the interested reader is directed towards the search engines run by the German Social 
Science Infrastructure Service (http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/search/index.htm) and the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (http://www.nsd. uib.no/atle/eurob/eurosok.cfin). These engines greatly facilitate question 
searches amongst the large number of Eurobarometer surveys.
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From these two variables, I construct a measure that compares national and European 
attachment by subtracting responses to these two questions. I do this by coding the ‘can’t 
choose/don’t know’ category as missing, and coding question (13) from 1 to 4, where 4 refers 
to ‘very close’ feelings towards one’s country. Question (14) is coded from -1 to -4 , where -  
4 refers to ‘very close’ feelings towards Europe. In this way, a single scale is constructed 
from 3 to -3, where -3  captures greater attachment to the nation than Europe, and 0 implies 
equal attachment to Europe and the nation (see figure 5.1. below).
Figure 5.1. Levels of European and National Identity (1995 ISSP)
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This scale is almost identical to that constructed by Citrin and Sides using Eurobarometer 
data (2001, p. 11). The advantage o f combining the two questions is that it allows 
respondents to express attachment to multiple territorial foci (see section 4.2.). So, this is 
neither a measure o f European or national identity, but rather o f both, and in relation to one 
another. As such, it is a ‘strong’ measure o f identity attachment; that is, while one might well 
feel a certain level of Europeanness, feeling more European than national is a tougher hurdle. 
So, this measure captures the extremes of European or nationalist sentiment. As for 
disadvantages, this measure cannot tell us about the strength and direction of the relationships 
between absolute levels of national and European identity and the dependent variables. 
Moreover, one would have to accept that the term ‘closeness’ appears vague and 
indistinctive, not quite synonymous with the ‘membership’ necessary for identity of a group. 
Certainly, it does seem surprising that the modal respondent is as close to Europe as to his or
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her nation. However, these finding do not differ substantially from the following 
Eurobarometer question
(15) “In the near future do you see yourself as...(nationality) only, (nationality) and 
European, European and (nationality), European only?”
Here, over the last decade between 80-90% of respondents consistently see themselves as 
belonging to only their nation, or their nation and then Europe (Citrin and Sides, 2001, p. 20). 
As can be seen from figure 5.1., the vast majority o f  valid responses fall between 0 and -3, 
implying a similar pattern (Mean = -0.65; Variance = 0.80). The real problem may be that 
respondents who are equally opposed to the nation and Europe fall under the 0 category. 
Again, the best way to interpret this scale is as a relative not absolute measure o f identity.
In figure 5.2. I present a graph giving an overview o f  relative mean European identity by 
country, where respondents in countries with scores closer to zero are more European.
Figure 5.2. Relative European Identity (1995 ISSP)
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As a caveat to the operationalisation o f identity herein, other theorists have noted that identity 
is a multi-dimensional construct, something that we are unable to capture here. From section 
4.4., Cinnirella argues that identity possesses both utilitarian and affective dimensions (in
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Breakwell and Lyons, 1996). Bruter goes some way towards operationalising what he labels 
‘Civic’ and ‘Cultural’ dimensions o f  national identity, revealed by employing factor analysis 
on a ten-item proprietary survey o f  210 university students from the UK, France and the 
Netherlands (2001). From the broader perspective of collective self-esteem, Lilli and Diehl 
find evidence from 200 German university students o f four dimensions to national identity: 
an individual’s self worth as a group member (Membership), an individual’s view o f the 
ingroup’s value (Private), the views o f others towards this group (Public) and the contribution 
o f ingroup membership to the person’s self-conception (Identity) (1999). So, the measure of 
national and European identity proposed here is necessarily more simplistic than that 
proposed in some o f the social psychological approaches to identity and which is successfully 
applied to national pride in the section below.
5.2.3. National Pride
National pride is operationalised in the ISSP survey by taking the following questions4, 
which roughly correspond to a set battery o f questions concerning national pride stretching 
back at last as far as the work o f Almond and Verba (1963, p. 64; see also Müller-Peters, 
1998 and below). The same set o f  questions is taken to measure national pride by Smith and 
Jarkko, who also use the ISSP National Identity survey to investigate national pride (1998)5.
“How proud are you o f (R’s country) in each of the following?” (Very proud, somewhat 
proud, not very proud, not proud at all, can’t choose/don’t know)
(16) the way democracy works.
(17) its political influence in the world.
4 I choose not to include the variable that asks: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When 
my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a citizen of (Respondent’s Country).” (Agree strongly, 
Agree, Neither agree or disagree, Disagree, Disagree strongly). Unsurprisingly, this variable correlates highly with question 
(21) (r=0.588; significant at the 0.01 level for a two-tailed significance test). I prefer question (21) as the response 
categories for the question elaborated here differ slightly to those for the rest o f the pride questions.
5 On the other hand, Dogan uses national pride questions in the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey data as an indicator 
o f nationalism (1994). Dogan does at least take national pride as one in a battery o f five indicators o f nationalism, which 
also comprises level of confidence in one’s army, willingness to fight for one’s country, trust in neighbouring countries and 
support for European integration. However, it should be clear that all o f these questions, and of course the last one in 
particular, could quite easily be thought of tapping a variety of attitudes rather than just nationalism. Because the World 
Values Surv ey is not used in this thesis (see section 2.2.3.) and the questions it contains are not all available in the ISSP data, 
I refrain from detailed criticism of this approach.
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(18) its economic achievements.
(19) its social security system.
(20) its scientific and technological achievements.
(21) its achievements in sports.
(22) its achievements in the arts and literature.
(23) its armed forces.
(24) its history.
(25) its fair and equal treatment o f  all groups in society .
The responses to the three questions are coded from 1 through 4, where 4 signifies the most 
proud response (‘agree strongly*). The ‘can’t choose/don’t know* responses are dropped, as 
they are not fully integrated with the other national pride response categories, appearing 
rather as an addendum in the question wording above. In keeping with this, categories 2 and 
3 in the national pride questions, supposedly sitting either side o f an indifferent response, 
typically receive a far higher percentage o f  responses than the indifference category. For 
instance, while 43% of all respondents were somewhat proud o f their country’s economic 
achievements, and 25% were not very proud, only 7% couldn’t choose. On the other hand, 
indifferent responses for the nationalist variables above vary between 20-30%.
To test the idea from section 4.4. that there are both instrumental and affective dimensions to 
national pride I employ factor analysis on questions (16) to (25). I use the maximum 
likelihood method to extract factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. In the interests of 
clarity, I assume an orthogonal design between factors, and rotate to a final solution using the 
Varimax method. The final, rotated solution is shown in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of National Pride (1995 ISSP)
Are you proud of...? Political Pride Cultural Pride
Way democracy works .73 .11
Political influence in the world ¿5 .30
Economic achievements .« 4 ,19
Social security system .68 .04
Scientific achievements .36 .42
Sports achievements .17 .63
Arts achievements .08 .62
Armed forces .24 .56
History .09 .6 2
Fair treatment of groups .55 .26
Eigenvalue
Percentage of Explained Variance 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)
3.77
37.70
0.77
1430.11 (26)
1.58
15.81
0.71
Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Vanmax
We can indeed see that two quite distinct factors rather than one are extracted. My initial 
interpretation is that the first group o f factors highlighted in bold (questions (15)-(18)) all 
refer to a more instrumental or political dimension to national pride while the second 
highlighted group (questions (21)-(24)) refer to a more affective, cultural element. Because 
questions (20) and (25) load to a sizeable extent on both factors I do not attempt to allocate 
either o f these two variables to one or the other latent factor. I go on to construct variables in 
the ISSP data from these two extracted factors, the former named ‘Political Pride’ and the 
latter ‘Cultural Pride’. Interestingly, Müller-Peters administers a pan-European survey with a 
very similar battery o f  questions measuring national pride to that appearing in the ISSP 
survey, and also extracts two factors using principal component analysis (1998, p. 709)6. The
6 This survey takes 15,088 respondents from all fifteen EU member states. The nine questions ask whether respondents are 
proud o f  their country’s economic power, political influence in the world, welfare system, public safety, currency, head of 
state, cultural traditions and customs, national language and finally history (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 9). The italicised
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factors are labelled ‘Economic-Political pride* and ‘Cultural-historical pride’ by the author. 
Almond and Verba too distinguish between political and non-political pride on very similar 
lines using a very similar battery o f questions (1963, p. 65). From section 4.4. I note that 
instrumental pride in particular can be seen as a possible proxy for system legitimacy. To the 
caveats mentioned before concerning other potential sources o f citizen acquiescence and the 
overriding role o f  national identity, I add here that questions (16)-(19) are worded in a 
relatively vague way that invites identity rather than instrumental considerations to come to 
the fore. Additionally, for models B, C discussed in section 5.3. below I include a control for 
system legitimacy in the form o f  a variable measuring political allegiance. From section 3.2., 
we have seen how Gabel has measured system support by creating a pro-stability dummy 
variable from a similar measure o f political allegiance, and so dividing respondents into 
‘opponents’ or ‘supporters’ of democratic capitalism.
A potential criticism of the use of questions (16)-(25) to measure national pride is that they 
only elicit responses from selective groups o f people, those who are in themselves only 
interested in science, sport, history and so on. I would argue that national identity necessarily 
takes as its content individual dimensions o f national pride, so that there is a national identity 
or pride component to discrete activities, institutions, symbols and traditions. Nevertheless, 
one can test for the possibility o f selective responses by performing a logit regression on two 
dummy variables created from political pride (question (16)) and cultural pride (questions 
(21)), where ‘don’t know’ and ‘can’t choose’ responses are coded 1, and all other responses 
are coded 0. In both cases, women are significantly more likely to hold non-attitudes. For 
question (16), women are supplemented by younger and less educated voters, while for 
question (21) nationalists and racists are significantly less likely to hold an attitude. Hence, 
for national pride attitude-holders, the opposite selective response tendencies are visible. 
However, before reading too much into these findings it must be bom in mind that response 
rates are very high overall; the lowest figure for all the national pride questions is 89%. It is 
also not clear that these ‘selective’ responses cannot instead be explained by response trends 
amongst non-attitude holders. Against this, we have already noted that ‘don’t know’
questions form part o f economic-political pride while the underscored questions constitute cultural-historical pride. The two 
other questions were seen to fall between the two categories. The eigenvalues constitute a further similarity between the two 
sets of extracted factors; both political prides have an associated eigenvalue of greater than 3, while for both cultural prides 
the figure was approximately 1.5. Regrettably, on request this survey data was not made available by the author.
134
5. An Empirical Examination o f National Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism
using ISSP data
responses in this specific instance may not tap non-attitudes. A discussion o f when survey 
responses measure non-attitudes is delayed until section 7.2.
Table 5.2. Factor Analysis of National Pride by Country (1995 ISSP)
Austria GB Ita ly
Are you proud of...? pot. pride cui. pride poi. pnde cui. pride poi. pride cui. pride
Way democracy works 0.79 0.05 0.66 0.27 0.61 0.16
Political influence in the world 0.61 0.42 0.74 0.27 0.62 0.20
Economic achievements 0.53 0.40 0.64 0.32 0.61 0.26
Social security system 0.56 0.25 0.59 0.11 0.75 0.10
Scientific achievements 0.1 s 0.67 0.37 0.45 0 .2 ) 0.58
Sports achievements 0.12 0.63 0.19 0.60 0.12 035
Arts achievements 0.21 0.49 0.25 0.45 0.08 030
Armed forces 0.31 0.47 0 .1S 0.74 0 JJ 0.29
History 0.25 0.47 0.23 0.66 0.15 0.42
Fair treatment of groups 0.53 0.26 0.45 0.42 0.66 0.14
Eigenvalue 3.99 1.25 4.26 1.25 3.51 1.41
%age Explained Variance 39.86 12.45 42.64 12.48 35.06 14.12
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.76 0.63 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.50
Chi-squared (df) 111.289 (26) 151.38 (26) 155.25 (26)
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Bold indicates question foirns part of a single factor; italics indicates question loads onto the factors highlighted. 
Note: Cronbach’s alpha is measured for the aggregate level two factor structure
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Table 5.2. Factor Analysis of N ational Pride by C ountry continued
Germany Netherlands Sweden
Are you proud of...? poi. pride cui. pride poi. pride cui. pride poi. pride cui. pride
Way democracy works 0.78 0.17 0.71 0.13 0.68 0.16
Political influence in the world 0.53 0.48 0.36 0.44 0.54 0.33
Economic achievements 0.50 0.54 0.48 0.36 038 0.09
Social security system 0.62 0.16 0.54 0 .16 0.65 0.04
Scientific achievements 0.29 0.65 0.32 0.47 0.24 0.43
Sports achievements 0.16 0.70 0.09 0.62 0.16 030
Arts achievements 0.12 0.61 0.23 0.54 0.03 035
Armed forces 0.35 0.50 0.10 036 0.11 0.46
History 0.29 0.48 0.18 0.45 0.04 038
Fair treatment of groups 0.57 0.31 0.51 0.14 039 0.12
Eigenvalue 1.19 4.45 1.28 3.41 3.09 1.61
%age Explained Variance 11.91 44.49 12.81 34.09 30.89 16-06
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.75 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.74 0.59
Chi-squared (df) 330.97 (26) 198.36(26) 107.28(26)
Ireland Spain
Are you proud of...? poi. pride cui. pride 3rd factor ; poi. pride cui. pride
Way democracy works 0.60 0.03 0.21 ; 0.63 0 .2 5
Political influence in the world 0.69 0.18 0.07 0.80 0.17
Economic achievements 039 0.28 0.11 0.79 0.16
Social security system 0.36 0.14 0.30 : 0.60 0.22
Scientific achievements 0.40 0.35 0.13 ! o.4i 0.53
Sports achievements 0.15 0.66 0.12 0.16 0.73
Arts achievements 0.13 0.62 0.06 0.17 0.74
Armed forces 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.46 0.42
History 0.09 0.31 0.39 0.21 038
Fair treatment of groups 0.21 0.06 030 1 0.47 0.33
Eigenvalue 3.25 1.23 1.08 4 .4 4 1.38
%age Explained Variance 32.54 12.30 10.82 44.44 13.75
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.68 0.60 I 0.81 0 .7 4
Chi-squared (df) 71.324(18) ! 82.50(26)
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Bold indicates question forms part of a single factor; italics indicates question loads onto the factors highlighted. 
Note: Cronbach’s alpha is measured for the aggregate level two factor structure
We can see in table 5.2. that at the country level the two-factor model is subject to a number 
of country-specific fluctuations. However, the differences are not so fundamental as to 
necessitate abandoning the clarity and consistency o f the two-factor model at the country 
level. While a two-factor solution is repeated for all countries except Ireland, only for Great
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Britain does the solution involve exactly the same combination of variable loadings as at 
aggregate level. The most common difference is that question (25) involving the fair 
treatment of groups loads more heavily on political pride for five countries, whereas at the 
aggregate level this variable appears to load equally on both factors. For Germany and the 
Netherlands, questions (17) and (18) load more or less equally on both cultural and political 
pride at the country level, rather than more heavily on the political pride factor as at 
aggregate level. In the case of just these two countries, cultural pride explains more variance 
in the observed variables than political pride . On the other hand, for Italy and Spain, both 
countries with former fascist governments, pride in the armed forces loads slightly more onto 
political more than cultural pride, although the loading o f this question on either factor is not 
exceedingly heavy. However, for Germany pride in the armed forces and its history appear 
to load predominantly on cultural pride as predicted, while together with Sweden and Italy, 
pride in their scientific achievements loads onto cultural pride rather an assuming its usual, 
‘neutral* status. For Ireland, there is a three-factor solution; while political and cultural pride 
are typical in make-up, a third factor is formed from question (25) concerning the fair 
treatment of groups. By concentrating on political and cultural pride, I do not capture a third 
dimension to pride in Ireland. Despite these four sets o f exceptions, I take the decision to 
maintain the aggregate two-factor solution.
We can see that national pride is quite prevalent in the survey data and, by inference, in the 
population. Overall, 63% of all respondents from the EU member states in the ISSP survey 
declare themselves to be proud or very proud of the way democracy works in their country 
(Qu. (16) - a component of political pride). 81% of all respondents declare themselves to be 
proud or very proud o f their nation’s achievements in the field of arts (Qu. (22) - a 
component o f cultural pride)8. Figures 5.3. and 5.4. break down these high mean levels of 
political pride and cultural pride by country using the saved factor scores derived from factor 
analysis, where I include all variables not just those shown in bold in the tables above
7 I continue to use the aggregate level factor scores for both Germany and the Netherlands, because the correlations between 
the aggregate level and country-specific factor scores are very high. For Germany, the aggregate and country level political 
pride correlation is 0.96, while in the Netherlands the same correlation gives a figure o f 0.96. The aggregate and country 
level cultural pride correlation is 0.95 in Germany, and 0.97 in the Netherlands. All results are significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed test).
8 For both these questions, it was possible to generalise from the sample to the population: the mean scores o f 2.7 
(democracy) and 3.0 (arts) out of a possible 4 points passed a 2-tailed one-sample T-test at the 0.001 level of probability.
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(aggregate mean = 0.00; variance = 0.78 (political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range = 4.77 
(PP), 4.88 (CP) where the higher the positive score, the higher the level o f national pride). 
We can see that Italy displays markedly less political pride than the other countries surveyed, 
a finding seemingly unchanged since Almond and Verba’s 1960 survey findings on the same 
subject (1963, p. 64). Interestingly, W est Germany shows relatively positive levels of 
political pride, where for a long time it was assumed that 20th century events had rendered 
national pride in the political sphere unacceptable (see Hewstone, 1986, p. 155). We can now 
concur with Topf, Mohler and Heath, who use 1988 survey data to show that pride in the 
political sphere has caught up to broadly similar levels to that expressed in Britain (1989, p. 
125; see also Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 64)9. Rather, both East and West Germany display 
very low levels o f cultural pride, where two questions address history and the role of the 
armed forces. It would seem that if  the Germans have not put their past wholly behind them, 
then at least it is confined to certain demarcated spheres rather than tainting the whole 
political system.
Figure 5.3. Mean Levels of Political Pride by Country (1995 ISSP)
6<-
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Country
9 The political pride chart would suggest that Britain has lower levels of political pride than Germany, so that one could 
argue that since 1988 Germany has gained even more self-confidence. This conclusion is right for the wrong reasons. 
Political pride as measured here combines indicators of both economic and political pride, where in the Topf, Mohler and 
Heath and ISSP data Germany strongly outscores Britain on levels o f economic pride. In fact, the ISSP data show's that 
Britain and (West) Germany have very similar levels o f pride in the way democracy works. Back in 198S, however, Britons 
were more proud o f its monarchy than Germans of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law).
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Figure 5.4. Mean Levels of Cultural Pride by Country' (1995 ISSP)
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5.2.4. Nationalism
I operationalise nationalism in the ISSP survey by taking the following three questions:
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Agree strongly, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)”
(26) “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like 
the people in (R ’s country).”
(27) “Generally, (R’s country) is a better country than most other countries.”
(28) “People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.”
All three questions appear a valid measure o f the moral self-righteousness dimension of 
nationalist sentiment, with an emphasis on international rather than domestic sovereignty 
concerns. McCrone and Surridge use questions (26) to (28) above, along with questions 
(16)-(25) in section 5.2.3., to measure national pride rather than nationalism (1998, p. 7). In 
view of the definitions o f national pride and nationalism put forth in chapter four, as well as 
the existence o f alternative questions (16)-(25) in the ISSP data set that could be said to better
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measure national pride, I would argue that using questions (26) and (28) for this purpose is 
simply mistaken. By contrast, McCrone and Surridge do not justify, empirically or 
theoretically, their choice o f indicators for national pride10 1.
The focus in the questions above on the international dimension to nationalism means that 
respondents are grouped not by nations but states, so that the ‘Respondent’s country’ 
parameter in the question above only offers a list o f states. So, if  the state is in national 
hands, and that state contains just one nation, then the questions appear to tap the pejorative 
view o f nationalism focused on in section 4.5. While this may hold for most of the states 
under consideration in the ISSP survey, this is conspicuously not the case for Spain and the 
United Kingdom. One might attempt to account for ‘minority nations’ by creating interaction 
variables between the nationalism variable above and respondents from Scotland, Wales, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country11. However, if  we accept that minority nationalists will 
score poorly on the nationalist variable, because they are hostile to the nation-states referred 
to in questions (26) and (27), then they will be grouped with respondents from minority 
nations who identify with the nation-state but are simply not nationalists. In this way, 
respondents in favour of Scottish independence might be indistinguishable from Scots who 
see themselves as non-nationalist but British, clearly an undesirable outcome. I note that 
attempts use party allegiance as an indicator of minority nationalism are thwarted by lack of 
data on minority nationalist parties, and in any case might exclude nationalist respondents not 
intending to vote for a designated nationalist party. I settle on the following measure of 
minority nationalism from the ISSP survey
(29) “Which o f  the two statements comes closer to your own view?
1. It is essential that (R’s country) remains one (nation/state/country).
10 The empirical evidence suggests that the nationalism and national pride questions tap distinct factors. Performing a factor 
analysis (maximum likelihood estimators, varimax rotation) on the questions (26)-(28) and (16)-(25), we can see that three 
factors are extracted (eiginvalues of 4.2, 1.7 and 1.3). The factors with the two highest eigenvalues, it is suggested in the 
section below, tap different dimensions o f national pride, while questions (26)-(28) form part o f a third factor, presumably 
nationalism. A goodness-of-fit test indicates that the results are significant at the 0.001 level (chi-squared 1430; d f 42).
11 Choosing which sub-state nations to include here is not without controversy. For instance, the Galician Nationalist 
Coalition presses for the independence o f  Galicia from Spain. By only looking at Catalonia, the Basque Country, Wales and 
Scotland, I follow Keating’s (2001) evaluation o f  the most significant independence movements in the EU countries 
considered by the ISSP survey.
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2. Parts o f (R’s country) should be allowed to become fully separate i f  they 
choose to.”
So, I include question (29) in the regression models below, and additionally create interaction 
variables for respondents that choose response (2) to this variable and reside in Wales, 
Scotland, Catalonia or the Basque country respectively. Question (29) is not asked in Ireland, 
possibly because there is little cause to investigate separatism within the Republic. To allow 
the inclusion o f this variable in the aggregate level data, I replace Irish missing cases with the 
average score (1.07 or a little over 6% o f respondents) o f the two other countries in the ISSP 
survey, Austria and the Netherlands, with no separatist movements to speak of. The variables 
created in this way should allow us to control for minority nationalists in the main 
nationalism variable, as well as to observe directly how minority nationalists view the 
European Union. On the basis o f the analyses made in section 4.5., I expect Catalan 
nationalists to be pro-European, while Basque nationalists are more likely to be anti-EU. For 
Welsh and Scottish nationalists, I note that there is some ambiguity as to their likely 
relationship with the EU.
As a caveat, question (29) is unable to measure the impact of regional identity on support for 
the European Union. For instance, it would undoubtedly be interesting to observe the 
relationship between respondents inhabiting the Lega Nord-labelled region o f ‘Padania’ and 
the European Union, where at the time o f the ISSP survey the Lega Nord was in favour of 
independence, although perhaps without adhering to values of, say, multiculturalism that 
underpin the European Union. In any case, the focus o f this thesis is not at the sub-national 
level.
The responses to the three nationalism questions are coded from 1 through 5, where 5 
signifies the most nationalist response (“agree strongly”). One can estimate the internal 
reliability of the three questions by taking Cronbach’s Alpha, which gives a reasonable score 
o f  0.68. I also perform this calculation on a coimtry-by-country basis; results are broadly 
similar, although for Ireland I note here that the figure is a slightly lower 0.5112. The three
12 The country level results are as follows: Germany (0.71), Great Britain (0.70), Austria (0.70), Italy (0.60), Ireland (0.51), 
the Netherlands (0.65), Sweden (0.64), Spain (0.72).
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questions are then used to construct a balanced Likert Scale, where each o f  the five response 
code items is added to the other so that the overall scale runs from 3 to 15, high scores 
indicating higher levels of nationalist sentiment (mean -  2.55; variance = 1.14). In the 
analysis o f nationalist sentiment featured below, I transform this Likert scale into more easily 
inteipretable quartiles13. In the ISSP data sample the mean level of nationalism as measured 
by the Likert scale is 8.69, with a standard deviation o f  2.58. Thus many people are 
ambivalent or mildly nationalist, while the top quartile of respondents are nationalist; that is 
to say, they score between 11-15 points on the Likert scale. Performing a one-sample T-test 
confirms that the mean overall score in the ISSP sample can be generalised to the population, 
with a 0.001 probability o f error for the 2-tailed test. To get a further feel for the distribution 
o f the data, figure 5.5. below shows the mean scores by country on the Likert scale, where the 
overall mean level o f nationalism is also marked. It is readily apparent that Ireland, Great 
Britain, Spain and Austria score higher than the mean level, while both East and West 
Germany score furthest below the mean.
Figure 5.5. Mean Levels of Nationalism by Country (1995 ISSP)
13 The quartiles are recoded from the Likert scale as follows: 1 = (3-6); 2 “  (7-8); 3 13 (9-10); 4 = (11-14).
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5.2.5. Racism and Xenophobia
The ISSP survey offers a number of questions broadly covering xenophobic and racist 
attitudes, without it being entirely clear which of the two concepts is being tapped, or both. 
However, by examining the likely composition of the outgroups mentioned in the questions 
listed below, I would argue that racist attitudes are most probably being elicited. We have:
(30) “Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups 
maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt 
and blend into larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?
1. It is better for society if  groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.
2. It is better if  groups adapt and blend into the larger society.”
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” (Agree strongly, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)
(31) “Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their 
customs and traditions.”
(32) “Immigrants increase crime rates.”
(33) “Immigrants are generally good for (R’s country’s) economy?”
(34) “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were bom  in (R’s country).”
(35) “Immigrants make (R’s country) more open to new ideas and cultures.”
(36) “Refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be 
allowed to stay in (R’s country)?”
(37) “Do you think the number o f immigrants to (R’s country) nowadays should be...?” 
(Increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot)14.
14 All the question responses are coded from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the highest level o f racist response. The exception is 
question (30), where there are only two responses that are coded in the main text above.
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For the eight questions listed above the outgroups mentioned are ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees* and 
simply ‘groups’. All three o f these term s could apply to many categories o f  non-nationals. I 
argue that racist attitudes are most likely being tested, on the basis that the most likely 
composition o f these outgroups are people from outside the European Union. Specifically, in 
every one of the EU 12 except Belgium and Luxembourg the number of non-EU foreigners as 
a percentage o f  the total population w as greater than the number of EU foreigners as a 
percentage o f the population in 1992 (Melich, 1995, p. 11). Moreover, for Belgium the 
percentage of non-EU foreigners was a  highly visible 3.4% o f the population, the third 
highest figure in the EU 12 behind Germany and the Netherlands.
I perform a factor analysis on these questions using the Maximum Likelihood method o f 
extraction and Varimax rotation, with the results presented below. I
Table 5.3. Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of Xenophobia and Racism (1995 ISSP)
Question Racism Factor 2
Help m inorities to  p re se rv e  traditions .16 .84
M aintain traditions o r  ad ap t in  society .17 .39
Im m igrants increase c rim e .64 .12
Im m igrants good fo r  th e  econom y .56 .21
Im m igrants take jo b s  aw ay  from  people .60 .10
Im m igrants bring n e w  ideas/culture JS9 .19
Refugees should b e  a llo w ed  to  stay .4$ .22
N um ber o f  im m igrants shou ld  be increased .68 .25
E igenvalue
Percentage o f E xp la ined  V ariance 
C ronbach’s  alpha 
C hi-squared G oodness o f  F it (df)
3 .20
39.94
0.78
505.70  (13)
1.10
13.73
0.52
Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax
I assume that the first factor extracted is a measure of racism, so that I do not measure 
xenophobia in the ISSP data, while the other extracted factor is ignored in this research. So, 
from the saved factor score o f  the first latent variable extracted above I construct the racism 
variable, where all items and not just those highlighted in bold are included (mean = 0.00;
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variance = 0.75; range = 5.48). The second factor is ignored because of the extremely weak 
eigenvalue and the poor reliability o f the factor at the country and combined level, doubtless 
partially due to the poor factor loading o f question (30). It is easy to agree with McCrone and 
Suiridge, who also analyse the same ISSP data and conclude that people’s attitudes towards 
immigration is characterised by ‘complexity* and a lack o f predictability (1998, p. 14). 
Certainly, a complex series o f attitudinal relationships might be seen to exist where questions 
(35) concerning immigrants bringing new ideas and culture and question (31) asking whether 
respondents agree that minorities should preserve traditions do not to load onto the same 
factor, so implying that openness to new ideas is not closely related to support for 
maintaining their cultures and traditions. There is a clear reference to the economic benefits 
o f allowing immigrant communities into the respondent’s country in three questions for the 
first extracted factor. However, the other questions contained in the first factor suggest there 
are no grounds to distinguish an economic or ‘utilitarian* racist dimension in the ISSP data 
(see section 4.6. for ‘utilitarian* theories o f racism).
Table 5.4 Factor Analysis of Racism by Country (1995 ISSP)
Rotated Factor M atrix G e rm a n y G re a t  B r ita in A u s tr ia
R acism Factor 2 Racism F actor 2 Racism
Help m inorities to  p reserve traditions 0.13 0.80 0.31 0.68 0.49
M aintain trad itions o r ad ap t in society 0.25 0.49 0.09 0.49 0 3 9
Im m igrants increase crim e 0 .6 6 0.17 0.69 0.31 0.66
Im m igrants good  for the econom y 0.49 0.21 0.56 0.29 0.60
Im m igrants take jo b s  aw ay from  people 0 .76 0.09 0.75 0.08 0.65
Im m igrants b rin g  new  ideas/culture 0 .54 0.27 0.57 0.26 0.60
Refugees shou ld  be allow ed  to  stay 0 .43 0.33 0.53 0.27 0 3 5
N um ber o f  im m igrants shou ld  be increased 0 .64 0.29 0.64 0.37 0.72
Eigenvalue 3 .39 1.08 3.62 1.07 3.42
% age Explained V ariance 4 2 .4 0 13.49 45.22 13.44 42.77
C ronbach’s A lpha 0 .80 0.82 0 .80
C hi-squared (d f) 1 0 4 .0 4 (1 3 ) 4 2 .4 5 (1 3 ) 17 6 .8 4 (2 0 )
E xtraction M ethod: M axim um  Likelihood. R otation  M ethod : V arim ax with K aiser N orm alization .
B o ld  indicates question  form s part o f  a single fac to r; ita lics  ind icate  question loads onto the facto rs highlighted. 
N ote: C ronbach ’s alpha is m easured for the aggrega te  le v e l  tw o  factor structure
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Table 5.4 Factor Analysis of Racism by Country continued
Italy Ireland
Racism Factor 2 Factor 1 Racism Factor 3
Help minorities to preserve traditions 0.24 oso 0.06 0.24 0.32
Maintain traditions or adapt in society •0.08 0 .2 8 0.12 O.OS 0.16
Immigrants increase crime 0 .6 5 -0.10 0.37 0.17 0.19
Immigrants good for the economy 0 .5 7 0.12 0.22 0.62 0.12
Immigrants take jobs away from people 0 .6 0 -0.07 0 .8 9 0.13 0.12
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture 0 .6 3 0.20 0 .0 8 0.67 0 .24
Refugees should be allowed to stay 0 .4 7 0.03 0.10 0.10 0 .57
Number of immigrants should be increased 0 .7 3 0.01 0.24 0.33 0.44
Eigenvalue 2 .9 5 1 .15 2 .5 0 1.07 1.01
%age Explained Variance 3 6 .8 8 14 .3 4 31 .31 13.35 12.65
Cronbach's Alpha 0 .7 7 0 .6 8
Chi-squared (df> 37 .61  (13 )
Netherlands Sweden Spain
Racism Racism Factor 2 Racism Factor 2 ■'
Help minorities to preserve traditions 0 .5 3 0.30 0 .5 8 0.14 0.71
Maintain traditions or adapt in society 0 .51 0.12 0 .6 2 0.06 0 .28
Immigrants increase crime 0 .6 6 0 .5 4 0.41 0 .67 0.04
Immigrants good for the economy 0 .51 0 .6 5 0.32 0.41 0.18
Immigrants take jobs away from people 0 .6 2 0 .6 7 0.16 0 .70 0.09
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture 0 .6 4 0 .7 3 0.17 0 .34 0.20
Refugees should be allowed to Stay 0 .5 8 0 .6 7 0.30 0 3 0 0.08
Number of immigrants should be increased 0 .7 8 0 .6 0 0.49 0 .48 0.12
Eigenvalue 3 .5 6 4.01 1.02 2.39 1.13
%age Explained Variance 4 4 .5 3 5 0 .0 8 12 .75 29.91 14.13
Cronbach's Alpha 0 .8 0 0 .8 6 0 .66
Chi-squared (df) 2 0 3 .5 0  (20) 6 9 .9 8  (1 3 ) 3 6 .1 9 (1 3 )
Extraction M ethod: M aximum  L ikelihood. R o ta tio n  M e th o d : V arim ax  w ith  K a ise r N o rm aliza tio n .
B old  indicates question  forms part o f  a  sing le  fa c to r; i ta lic s  ind icate  q u e s tio n  lo ad s  o n to  th e  factors h ighlighted . 
N ote: C ronbach’s alpha is measured fo r  the  a g g re g a te  le v e l  tw o  factor s tru c tu re
At the country level results were roughly consistent w ith the factor analysis above, although 
with a notable exception. For all countries except Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands, the 
same two-factor solution with a very  high C ronbach’s Alpha figure was recorded. For 
Austria and the Netherlands, a one-factor solution was recorded, which presents our analysis 
with little difficulties given that the cause was the two variables in factor 2 loading more 
heavily on racism. For Ireland, however, the solution is messy. Three factors are extracted, 
with racism seemingly divided into factors according to which questions invite yea-saying
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anti-racist answers (questions (33) and (35)) or yea-saying racist answers (question (34)). A 
third factor measures attitudes towards refugees (question (36)). Of the three extracted 
factors, the second factor has the highest correlation (0.65**; two-tailed test significant at the 
0.01 level) with the aggregate level racism factor. Because this result is given for only one 
country, in the interests of consistency I use the aggregate factor solution at the country level, 
noting accordingly the position o f  Ireland.
According to the European Commission report ‘Racism and Xenophobia in Europe" levels of 
racism (or xenophobia) are quite high in European Union member states (1997). 9% of 
respondents openly declared themselves as ‘very racist". In Belgium and France this figure 
was 22% and 15% respectively. The cumulative percentage o f  those declaring themselves to 
be ‘quite" or ‘very’ racist is 33% for the European Union as a whole. Only 34% of 
respondents declared themselves ‘not at all" racist. For the ISSP data the results are no less 
startling. 41.7% of all respondents ‘agreed* or ‘agreed strongly* with the statement that 
immigrants take jobs away from people, while only 6% o f all respondents believed that 
immigrant numbers should be increased either ‘a little’ or *a lot*15. We can see how racist 
sentiment varies between countries in figure 5.6. Italy and East Germany contain the most 
racist respondents, while at the opposite end of the spectrum is Ireland. Lest this finding 
concerning Ireland come as a surprise, Ward and Greeley use World Values Survey data to 
show that the Irish appear to be the most tolerant people in the English-speaking world, and 
the most tolerant people in Europe, tied with the Dutch (1990). At first sight, one might 
deduce that the reason for this tolerance is simply a response to the exceedingly low number 
of non-EU foreigners in Ireland (estimated at 0.9% of the total population in 2000 according 
to Eurostat, 2000). Yet this is figure is not so different to that o f  Italy (estimated 1.9% of the 
total population (Eurostat, 2000)), a country whose high level o f racist attitudes is rather 
suiprising, insofar as being very pro-European does not seem to rule out racist attitudes 
amongst the population. A better explanation is the low perception o f  the number of 
foreigners in Ireland: 51% of Irish Eurobarometer respondents in 1994 thought that there 
were ‘not many* non-nationals in the country, against an EU12 average o f just 11% and a 
mere 8% in Italy, notwithstanding the low actual number o f foreigners in the aforementioned
15 For both these two questions, the mean response was statistically significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed test), strongly 
implying that one can generalise from the sample to the population.
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country. So, it would indeed appear that it is the tolerance o f the Irish influences the 
subjective perception of the number o f foreigners in the country.
Figure 5.6. Mean Levels of Racism by Country (1995 ISSP)
C o u n try
5.2.6. C ontrol V ariables
In this section I display the choice o f control variables used in both the analysis below and in 
later chapters, as well as summarising in what form such variables are included in the 
analyses so as to ease their later interpretation. I will also consider some o f  the problems of 
inclusion o f variables of interest that could not be used. In particular, I dwell on the 
distinction between fixed and random effects models.
For ease o f  reference the coding and exact description o f the control and indeed the other 
variables included in the models in this and the next chapter are summarised in table 5.5. 
below, as well as in  section A.2. o f the appendix. As can readily be seen, this list comprises 
mainly socio-economic control variables. For some countries, data is missing for one or 
more o f the control variables. The problems associated with some of the controls, and the 
attempt to include further variables, are now discussed.
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Table 5.5. Variable Coding (1995 ISSP)
VARIABLE D E SC R IPT IO N
D ependent/Independent variab les  
E uropean/N ational identity S cored  from  - 3  to  3. N egative score indicates m ore national a ttachm ent [M ean ■  -0 .65; variance 
-  0 .80]
National Pride F acto r analysis scale [mean ■ 0.00; variance =  0 .78  [political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range 
4 .77  (PP), 4 .88  (CP)]. Levels o f  p ride increase positive ly  w ith variable score
N ationalism V ariab le  sp lit  in to  quartiles derived from  L ikert scale  (scored from 3-15). Levels o f  nationalism  
increase p o sitive ly  w ith  variable score [m ean -  2 .5 5 ; variance “ 1.14]
M inority  N ationalism 1 “ Favours u n ita ry  position 2=Holds separatist a ttitudes. Data on Ireland initially m issing ; coded 
to  1.07. In terac tion  variables are created  fo r  Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and  the  Basque 
C o u n try  by  com bining  minority nationalism  response with regional origin o f  respondent as 
appropriate
R acism F acto r analysis scale [mean *  0.00; variance “  0 .7 5 , range ■ 5.48]. Levels o f  rac ism  increase 
positively  w ith  variable score
Support for E uropean Integration B ivariate sco rin g  - either pro/anti-integration o r  attitude/non-attitude holding. 1 “ Pro-European 
o r a ttitude h o ld e r  respectively
C ontro l variables
Sex 1 -M a lc , 0= F em ale
Age F ro m  14 to  9 6  years. Coded as cohorts (1 • -  30-39; 3 - 40-49; 4  -  50-59; 5 - 60+ )
Education C oded  from  1-7 (1 -  n o  education; 2  -  incom ple te  primary; 3 -  prim ary  com pleted; 4 -  
incom plete secondary ; 5- secondary com pleted ; 6  -  incom plete university/sem i-higher; 7- 
un iversity  com ple ted ). Some national variations apply*6.
Subjective Social Class C oded  from  1*7 (1 -  Lower class; 2 -  W orking  c la ss ; 3  -  Lower M iddle class; 4  -  D o n ’t  know; 5 
-  U pper m idd le class; 6 -  Upper class; 7 - M idd le  class). This variable is treated a s  categorical. 
M id d le  c la ss  is the  base category. N o data for G B  o r  the Netherlands.
Political A ffiliation C oded from  1-6 (1 -  Far left; 2 -  L eft, centre left; 3 - Right, conservative; 4 -  F a r  right; 5 -  
O ther, D on’t K now ; 6  - Centre, liberal). W e code  th is  variable so  that ‘N /A ’ (p rev iously  coded 
‘0 ’) and ‘an sw er-refused ’ (previously coded ‘9 ’) a re  coded system -m issing. 'N o  p a rty ’ ( ‘7 ’) and 
‘D o n ’t know ’ ( ‘8 ’) are coded along w ith ‘no  spec ific  party ’ ( ‘6 ’). T his variable is  treated as 
categorical; L e f t  being  the omitted category. N o  d a ta  for Italy.
Incom e C oded  from  1 -5 a s  quintiles in each country. H ence , th is is a  m easure o f  the re lative incom e o f  a 
respondent. H ig h er value equals g reater w ealth . Ita ly  data  m issing.
C ountry  dum m ies 
Religion
W ith  S p a in  a s  th e  om itted country.
C oded  from  1*3 (1 - Protestant and L utheran responden ts , 2 - R om an C atholic, 3 -  N o  religion 
professed). T aken  as categorical variable, w ith  no religion as the base category. ISHI coding
O ccupation fro m  16 to 90 . O ccupational status increases w ith  score. Data Trussing fo r  G B, Italy , Sw eden and 
the  N etherlands (coded  to  the mean o f  43.5).
O ccupation D um m y 
F an n ers
l= n o  occupation  da ta  available, O=occupation da ta  available 
1 “ A gricultural w orker; 0“ non-agriculturaJ w orker
16 The coding for Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Great Britain departs from this general model to take 
account of different national educational qualifications. These categories are broadly, however, the national equivalents of 
the qualifications set out in the general coding and are hence comparable.
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Although the ISSP survey does include a variable designed to measure respondent 
occupation, the lack of comparable data across counties hinders the attempt to measure the 
effect o f  occupation on support. The UK, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands adopt 
idiosyncratic national classification schemes that prove particularly resilient to attempts to 
translate them into a standardised scale17. O f the other countries only Ireland uses the most 
up-to-date 1988 International Standard Classification o f Occupations (ISCO) measure 
promoted by the International Labour Organisation, the rest o f the countries use ISCO 1968 
coding. Once these ISCO two scales have been standardised18, I apply a further 
transformation to the data with the aim o f  constructing a simple, continuous variable; by itself 
the ISCO scale itself is simply a list o f  occupations classified by tasks and skill levels. Of the 
three main varieties of occupational status scales; prestige measures, socio-economic scales 
and nominal class categories, the most widely-accepted class category, the Erikson- 
Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) scale can be ruled out on the basis that it requires two 
additional variables for self-employment status and supervisee numbers that the ISSP survey 
does not provide. Given that the model already includes a subjective measure of social 
standing in subjective social class, I chose Ganzeboom and Treiman’s International Socio- 
Economic Index (ISEI) of occupational status. These authors conceive of the ISEI as 
measuring the attributes of occupations that convert a person’s education into income. 
Accordingly, the ISEI index is generated by the optimal scaling o f occupation unit groups to 
maximize the indirect effect o f education on income through occupation and to minimize the 
direct effect o f  education on income, net o f occupation (with both effects net o f  age) and 
using the International Stratification and Mobility File (for more details see Ganzeboom, 
Treiman and De Graaf, 1992). The resulting set o f scores was rescaled to a range o f 16-90, 
with ‘Judges’ gaining the highest score. Two unit groups jointly hold the lowest score: 
‘Farm-hands and Labourers’ and ‘Helpers and Cleaners in Offices, Hotels and Other 
Establishments’.
17 The ISSP codebook does list the various national coding schemes. However, to the best knowledge of the author there are 
no tools available to convert from these four national coding schemes to the ISCO schemes. Particularly unfortunate is the 
case of the UK, where a  special 2-code version o f the easily convertible 3-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
is used.
'* Conversion between different ISCO and occupational status scales is relatively simple, thanks largely to a series of scripts 
written by Prof. Harry Ganzeboom and Prof. Donald Treiman and made available by the University of Utrecht 
(http://www. fss. uu. n 1/soc/hg/ismf)-
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This ISEI variable is included in the aggregate level models and in appropriate country level 
models. Because o f  the high number o f  missing cases I code all missing responses to the 
mean (43.5)19. A separate dummy variable is created to track the incidences o f these recoded 
missing responses. In this way, the number o f cases in the ISEI variable is increased, while 
the difference in support on integration between missing and regular responses can be 
studied.
For the four ISEI countries we can test a micro-economic explanation of support, namely the 
pro-integration behaviour of farmers, derived from their receipt o f EU subsidies (see section
3.3.). A dummy variable was created directly from the ISCO occupational indices, 
containing all the occupational categories contained under major group 6 (skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers) except that o f forestry workers, who presumably do not benefit from 
agricultural subsidies20. Only 182 respondents are characterised as farmers, working out at 
4.4% of the available 4122 cases, a fairly representative figure when one also considers that 
some 5% o f the EU labour force is employed in agriculture (Economist, 12th October 2000). 
Another potential problem circumvented is that the majority o f agricultural workers are 
coded as fanners or farm supervisors, people who one suspects would be highly aware o f the 
CAP, rather than casual farm labourers who might be less in tune with the issue of subsidies.
From sections 3.2, and 3.3. we know that explanations of support have often drawn upon 
general and specific economic explanations, from the positive effect of nation-state growth 
on support to the pro-integration impact o f farmers who benefit from subsidies. Even if  the 
hypotheses formulated in chapter four do not focus on utilitarian explanations of support, it 
seems desirable to include a series of economic controls in the analysis. Unfortunately, the 
ISSP National Identity survey does not include any appropriate variables. One possible 
response is to add to the survey data some key indicators of national economic performance
19 Of the 4122 cases available from the four countries taken here, over half were missing. The specific reasons for this, 
while not elaborated in the ISSP survey, might well just reflect labour force participation rates. Much of this missing data 
could be due then to respondents such as the elderly or the young, or the unemployed not covered in the ISCO classification 
scheme.
20 Section 6 in the ISCO indices is also shared with fisherman. While for ISCO-68 fisherman are placed in a separate 
category, in ISCO-88 some occupational categories are shared between farmers and fisherman section. Section 3.3. footnote 
9 reports a similar, but more serious problem in the Eurobarometer proprietary occupation index. Here the numbers are too 
small to trouble us. For ISCO-68 only one respondent was coded in group 6-4, denoting fishermen, hunters and related 
workers. For ISCO-88 no respondents were coded in the potentially contentious groups 61 or 62, denoting skilled 
agriculture/fishery workers and subsistence agriculture/fishery workers respectively.
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such as unemployment, GDP and inflation, taking data from, say, the OECD Economic 
Outlook report containing data for 1995 (OECD, 1997). However, efforts to include these 
variables directly in the model are stymied by perfect multicollinearity between the economic 
indicators and the country dummy variables for the aggregate level model. One might 
attempt to get round this problem by taking the most basic model formed in section 5.3. 
(model A) and substituting for the country dummies a new control variable composed of the 
country dummy coefficient for each case taken from model A in tables 5.6.-5.10., with a 
coefficient o f 0 for the omitted country. One then proceeds by measuring the impact o f the 
macroeconomic variables firstly with reference to the overall log likelihood or RA2 of the 
model, and secondly by the impact on the new control variable for the country dummies. In 
the model without the macroeconomic variables the coefficient for this variable should be 
one, where this refers to one unit o f  the original country dummy coefficient. If this 
coefficient falls below one, we can see that the addition o f the macroeconomic variables has 
in some way reduced the country effects on the dependent variable .
In the end, however, I do not test for the macroeconomic controls. The basic point is that as I 
explicitly state in section 3.5., I am interested in pursuing micro-level explanations o f 
support. This being the case, there is little justification in tagging on this rather ad hoc 
method o f estimating country-level variations in support to a fixed effects statistical model, 
where cross-national variation is best explained using multi-level statistical models. To 
explain this issue a little further, one can imagine a fixed effects model to be of the type
j
y * = bo + £  V s + u .c (U
where i subscripts individuals and c countries. One might expand bo to allow for a separate 
intercept per country: 21
21 These measures hardly constitute an ideal test o f the effects of macroeconomic indicators on support. It is unclear whether 
respondents look to relative or absolute levels o f these indicators, or both. For instance, unemployment in a particular 
country may be relatively low compared to other countries, but nevertheless at a historic high for the country in question. 
On the other hand, respondents might not be so worried about a relatively low growth rate in GDP if absolute incomes are 
quite high. In common with other authors, 1 could be criticised for taking just first differences for GDP and CPI, and only 
absolute rates of unemployment (see section 3.2.). In any case the macroeconomic variables can be shown to be almost 
wholly irrelevant in explaining country-level differences in pride, identity et ai.
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C -l
6o “  ¿0 +
c-l
(la) i :
where z - l  if  country-c  and there are C countries. Fitting a dummy variable for each country 
accounts for all the between-country variation that is not captured by contextual variation. 
Contextual effects are captured by Y h xv *n eQuat o^n (1)* Thus a comparison between
c - i
yic=da+ Y ldczc + wi, (2)
C - l
(where w is the error term in this case) and (l)+(la) would tell us how much of the gross 
differences between countries (captured by the dummy variable coefficients in (2)) is 
accounted for by the contextual effects. This model type is suitable for my purposes and is 
adopted in this chapter. However, if one wants to introduce specific country level variables 
like GDP that might explain cross-national variation the model is unable to handle them; as 
we see above the result is multicollinearity, The correct thing to do, in this case, is to tum to 
random effects or multi-level models. Again beginning with equation 1, the intercept is 
expanded differently
K
* « = a0 + Z a*zfc+ ec <lb)
Here the z variables (of which there are K) are now country characteristics, where there are 
now no country dummies and e is an error term, common to all individuals in the same 
country. Each individual’s error term has a unique component (u) and a component shared 
with fellow countrymen {e). The variance of u measures residual variation between 
individuals while the variance of e measures residual variance between countries, where the 
aim is to reduce u as much as possible through the use of both contextual and country level 
variables. So, using this two-level form of the multi-level model, where level 1 is individuals 
and level 2 is countries, one can observe cross-national differences in support and keep the
i
. w w W K i b t
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macroeconomic variables in the model (see also Goldstein, 1995). However, as this is not 
my aim I stick with the fixed effects models and sacrifice the macroeconomic variables.
5.3. The Results
In this section I present abridged results from regression models investigating the make-up of 
national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism, before reflecting upon their 
meaning in the following section. Results are provided for both at the aggregate and at the 
country level. At the aggregate level, missing data in some countries means that I adopt a 
strategy o f looking at particular subsets o f countries to maximise the use o f the available data. 
These arrangements are discussed here, as is the choice o f weighted least squares regression 
model.
Table 5.5. in section 5.2.6. makes it clear to us that data for certain independent variables are 
missing for particular countries. To avoid the missing cases for each particular variable 
unnecessarily invalidating the use o f  the remaining country data, I adopt a strategy o f 
analysing particular subsets of countries. Specifically, for all aggregate level results I include 
a first, ‘basic model’ which features all eight countries (Model A) through the exclusion of all 
variables that contain missing data for one or more country: Subjective Social Class (data 
missing for Great Britain and the Netherlands), Political Affiliation (no data for Italy) and 
Income (no data for Italy)22. Model B adds Political Affiliation and Income, so removing 
Italy from the analysis. Model C adds Subjective Social Class to the variables from model 2, 
so removing Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain from the analysis. So, in series o f tables 
below we have the results o f the European identity, nationalist, national pride and racism 
analysis at the aggregate level (models A-C) and country level. As already noted, the missing 
data for Ireland for the minority nationalism variable is ‘plugged’ by assuming a certain 
response for all the cases. Although this allows minority nationalism to be included in all the 
aggregate models, the variable is naturally excluded from the country level analysis for 
Ireland due to lack of variance.
22 For the occupation index data are missing for the UK, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. However, this issue is resolved 
in a different way, and as detailed in section 5.2.6.
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I employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with robust estimators on data 
weighted to equalise sample sizes, in order to minimise the risk of heteroscedasticity 
affecting the results. Heteroscedasticity does not destroy the unbiasedness property o f OLS 
estimators, but the estimators are no longer efficient. To counter heteroscedasticity, the robust 
model applies a transformation to the data before simply fitting the OLS model. The 
appropriate transformation often depends on the assumptions made about the error variance 
of the model. In this case, comparing the error variance of the OLS models against various x  
variables in the model results in a number o f possibly heteroscedastic disturbances. I thus 
employ White’s method o f obtaining robust estimators o f the variance. White shows that 
under very general conditions, appropriate variance estimates can be constructed without 
specifying the type o f heteroscedasticity (Greene, 1990, p. 403).
Because the resultant regression results are rather lengthy, I only present here an abridged 
version of the results, so that only the aggregate level findings for each concept are included 
here, and where the control variables in each o f these models are suppressed. Full versions of 
all the results, including the country level findings, are placed in section A.3. o f the appendix.
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Table 5.6. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Im pact on Political Pride of the Independent 
Variables (abridged)
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
* * *
Cultural Pride 0.21 * 0.18 * 0.20 •
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Identity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
* * *
Nationalism 0.20 * 0.19 * 0.18 *
( 0.01 )
*
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism -0.II * -0.11 * -0.14 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country 0.05 0.10 0.15
( 0.08 )
*
( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 )
Catalonia 0.17 * 0.10 0.10
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Scotland -0.04 -0.01 -
( 0.08 ) ( o . l l )
Wales 0.09 0.04 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0. 12)
* * *
Racism -0.22 * -0.20 * -0.19 *
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
* * *
Constant -4.15 * -4.17 * -3.18 *
( 0.32 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 0.32 )
Number o f Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.39 0.26 0.29
F stat. (DF) 127.54(24) 38.10(29) 28.2(31)
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0 .01 level (2-tailed test)
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
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Table 5.7. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on C ultural Pride of the Independent 
Variables (abridged)
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.18 0.18 *
*
0.20 •
( 0.02 ) ( 0 .0 2 ) ( 0.03 )
Identity -0.05 -0.07 • -0.05 *
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
*
Nationalism 0.12 0.13 * 0.17 *
( 0.01 ) c 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
*
Minority Nationalism -0.16 -0.19 * -0.18 •
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country -0.39 -0.26 * -0.27 *
( 0.07 ) ( 0 .1 2 ) ( 0.12 )
Catalonia -0.08 * -0.04 -0.05
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Scotland -0.16 -0.10 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.15 )
Wales 0.02 0.09 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.10 )
* * *
Racism 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.13 •
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Constant 1.11
+
*
*
1.09 *
m
0.81 *
( 0.29 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.31 )
Number o f Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.33 0.35 0.36
F stat. (DF) 115.76(24) 80.17(29) 60.6(31)
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
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Table 5.8 .1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Im pact on E uropean Identity o f the Independent 
Variables (abridged)
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) { 0.03 )
Cultural Pride -0.08 ** -0.10 ** -0.07 *
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
*
Nationalism -0.07 * * -0.06 * * -0.06 *
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism 0.22 ** 0.19 ** 0.16 *
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Basque Country 0.26 ** 0.09 0.10
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 )
*
Catalonia 0.36 ** 0.27 •* 0.28 *
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 )
Scotland 0.18 * 0.21 * -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 )
Wales 0.12 0.15 -
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.15 )
+
Racism -0.12 * * -0.14 * * -0.16 *
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
-0.62
(  0.38 ) (
-0.03 
0.46 ) (
0.04
0.39 )
'  .1 M i l l  O i  < i!
RA2
F stat. (DF)
5823 
0.14 
30.65 (24)
3892
0.14
16.42(29)
2672
0.12
13.15(31)
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
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Table 5.9. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Nationalism of tbe Independent 
Variables (abridged)
Model A Model B ModeIC
b  (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.30
*
♦ 0.30 *• 0.30
*
*
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Cultural Pride 0.21 * 0.21 *• 0.26 •
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
*
Identity -0.08 * -0.07 ** -0.07 *
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism -0.14 * -0.11 -0.02
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Basque Country -0.19 * -0.29 -0.29
( 0.09 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.17 )
Catalonia 0.04 0.06 0.03
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 )
Scotland 0.05 0.03 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.II )
Wales -0.21 -0.19 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.16 )
* *
Racism 0.28 * 0.35 ** 0.31 •
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
* *
Constant 3.95 * 3.53 •* 2.99 •
( 0.38 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.39 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.31 0.35 0.37
Fstat(DF) 118.27(24) 92.40(29) 55.71 (29)
Note: Entries are b  coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
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Table 5.10. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Racism  of the Independent Variables 
(abridged)
Model A Model B Model C
b  (s.e.) b  (s.e.) b  (s.e.)
Political Pride
*
-0.23 *
*
-0.21 *
*
-0.20 *
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.03 )
*
Cultural Pride 0.12 * 0.11 * 0.13 *
( 0.02 )
lit
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.03 )
Identity -0.09 * -0.10 * -0.12 *
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.02 )
*
( 0.02 )
*
Nationalism 0.20 * 0.23 * 0.20 *
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism 0.05 -0.07 -0.13 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country 0.11 0.20 0.19
( 0.07 ) ( 0.12) ( 0.12 )
Catalonia 0.06 0.14 * 0.14 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
Scotland -0.11 -0.12 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0.15)
Wales 0.05 0.12 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.14)
* * *
Constant -2.71 * -1.25 * -0.74 *
( 0.29 ) ( 0.36) ( 0.31 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.26 0.28 0.33
F stat. (DF) 79.31 (24) 41.51 (29) 32.60 (31)
ote: Entries are b  coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
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5.4. Interpretation of Results
I interpret the findings from section 5.3. by independent variable type and at both aggregate 
and country level. The relatively high degree of theoretical correspondence between the four 
concepts mean that I am interested here in the interrelationships between pride, European 
identity, nationalism and racism at the aggregate and country level. I then analyse the effect 
o f the remainder o f  the control variables by dependent variable at aggregate and country 
level, and with reference to other empirical studies. Because the ten regression models 
spawn a large amount of data, information on control variables and country level data, which 
is not included in the model summaries above, is presented in section A.3. of the appendix.
5.4.1. Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism at the Aggregate Level
In this section I summarise and interpret the aggregate level relationships visible in the tables 
above. For ease o f interpretation, I summarise the percentage changes in the expected value 
o f the dependent variable in tabular form. Beyond this, I show that attitudes towards pride, 
European identity, nationalism and racism are guided by two underlying factors; attachment 
in all its forms to the cultural side o f the nation and a second factor based on racism.
From tables 5.6.-5.10, we can see that the aggregate level relationships between the five 
central concepts are very strong. Where there is a relationship between any of the five 
concepts and minority nationalism, it is typically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) in 
models A-C. In figure 5.7. below I convey an overall sense o f the directional relationships 
between the concepts. We see that many o f  the variables positively predict one other so that 
it seems that they share some underlying factor in common. Exceptions are the relationships 
between political pride and racism, which is negative in both directions, and between 
European identity and political pride, where the relationship is not significant in either 
direction. This is despite the fact that by substituting question (14) for identity, thus 
measuring absolute rather than relative closeness to Europe, one can show a positive link
161
m ii BBPuwMjjuiiiii jujmju w wwmw wmuw
5. An Empirical Examination o f National Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism
using ISSP data
with political pride , suggesting that national identities are moving to incorporate a European 
element (see section 4.3.). So, being politically proud is consistent with a certain absolute 
level o f  European identity, although not necessarily with feeling more European than 
national, or vice versa. Furthermore, European identity is positively related only to minority 
nationalism and negatively related to cultural pride, nationalism and racism. It seems that 
relatively pro-European respondents are less likely to share in the same underlying factor that 
binds cultural pride, nationalism and racism.
Figure 5.7. Directional relationships between concepts
Political Pride
Nationalism
■
ir
Cultural Pncfe
Racism
Identity
v
bi-ci rectorial +ve relationship
-  -  a bi-diraciioriai *ve relationship
AH relationships significant 
(0.05 level or better)
Although I do not include minority nationalism in this graphic, this variable is negatively 
related to nationalism, cultural and political pride, and positively related to relative European 
identity. On the whole, then, minority nationalists are pro-European and anti-state. There is 
no statistically significant link between minority nationalists and racist attitudes: differences 23
23 Duchesne and Frognier find that national pride and European identity do not correlate in the Eurobarometer data (in 
Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 202). This is not altogether surprising given the age of the survey data (1982-88). 
Moreover, the Eurobarometer question does not distinguish between cultural and political pride. In lieu of this, the authors 
embark on a rather spurious attempt to distinguish more affective and utilitarian dimensions to pride by strength of response 
to the existent national pride question -  ‘very proud’ or ‘not proud at all’ being seen as more cultural responses and ‘rather 
proud’ and ‘not very proud’ being seen as closer to the measure of political pride adopted here.
162
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  l lbetween nation and state are not conceived along racial, but rather cultural lines. Minority j jj
nationalists from Catalonia and Scotland hold an even stronger pro-European identity then
the typical minority nationalist as, surprisingly, do the Basques to a certain extent. As
expected, Welsh minority nationalists are more ambivalent towards Europe. For the Basques,
however, there is a relatively strong negative relationship between Spanish cultural pride and
nationalism, suggesting that Basque nationalism is more firmly rooted in independence from j
Spain than Europe (see section 5.4.2.). Catalans too tend to be less likely to be culturally
j
proud than the typical minority nationalist, however, they are more likely to be politically j
proud; perhaps an indication that they view themselves as more European than anti- 1
Spanish24. !
i f ¡|
To arrive at a further understanding o f the results I assess the relative and absolute strength of j |
the various coefficients on support. For ease of interpretation I do not look at the regression ! |
coefficients but rather the percentage change in the expected values o f the dependent variable 
means by explanatory variable in table 5.11. below. !
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24 The effect on the dependent variable of being Basque, Catalan, Scottish and Welsh is equal to the sum of the minority j
nationalism coefficient plus the nation coefficient. The standard error for the nation+minority nationalism coefficient is 
equal to the square root of the two coefficient estimates plus twice their covariance. In the models above, all the combined : ■
variable coefficients are statistically significant. i !
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Table 5.11. Change in Dependent Variable Expected Value by One Standard Deviation 
Increase in the Independent Variable (1995 ISSP)
Dependent Var. Political Pride C ultural Pride Identity Nationalism Racism
Independent Var.
Political Pride 0.20 | -0 3 5 ( 13% ) 
(0. 12/0.29)  j (-0 .46/-0 .25) Not significant
2.71 (9 % ) 
(2 .45/2 .77)
-0.09 ( - 175% ) 
(-0 .22/0 .02)
Cultural Pride 0 .2 7 (35% ) | -0.40 
(0.15/0.38) | ( -0 .49/-0.32)
-0.87 ( - 1 3 % )
(-0 .96/-0 .80)
2 .7 3 ( 10 % )
(2 .67/2 .80)
0 . 1 9 (58% )
(0 .06/0.21)
Identity | -0.49 ( - 2 3 % ) 
Not significant j (-0 .60/-0 .38)
-0.77
(-0.85/-0.70)
2.37 ( -3 % ) 
(2 .31/2 .43)
0.07 (-4 2 % ) 
(-0 .06/0. 18)
Nationalism 0.44 (120%) 
(0 .32/0.56)
-0 . 19 (5 3 % )
(-0 .30/-0 .09)
-0.86 ( -8 % ) 
(-0 .95/-0 .80)
2.48
(2.45/ 2.51)
0.31 ( 158% ) 
(0 . 18/0.42)
Racism -0.03 ( - 115% )
(-0 . 14/0.08)
-0 .3 4 ( 15% )
(-0 .45/-0 .24)
-0.81 ( -5 % )  
(-0 .90/-0 .73)
2.68 (8 % ) 
(2 .62/2 .75)
0.12
(0.02/0.2)
Figures in bold are basic model results with all variables set to mean or standard response 
Numbers in brackets correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Percentage in brackets conveys percentage change between central explanatory variable result and original expected or 
predicted value.
All expected values displayed are significant to at least the 0.05 level.
Expected values of the dependent variable are arrived at using the simulation methodology of 
Cing et al. (1998). On this approach one approximates the mean of the dependent variable 
hrough drawing simulations o f the parameters of the model estimated from their asymptotic 
sampling distribution. The approximation becomes more accurate as we increase the number 
>f draws. In CLARIFY (1999), the Stata add-in which allows one to apply simulation 
echniques to data, the number of draws is set by default to 1000 and I use this number to 
rrive at all m y results in this chapter and elsewhere. One o f the principal advantages of 
hese simulation techniques is in the ease o f interpretation o f  results. Rather than interpret 
lodel coefficients, we can now interpret independent variable effects in terms of the 
xpected or predicted value o f the dependent variable, and with the additional benefit of a 
leasure o f  uncertainty around this mean result (King et al, 1998, p. 350).
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To measure the change in effect on the expected value o f the dependent variable for a change 
in an explanatory variable one needs to specify a reference model. I choose just such a model 
capturing the characteristics of an imaginary, average respondent. I begin by selecting model 
A on the grounds o f  its relative simplicity and because it includes all eight countries. The 
categorical nature o f  the countries considered as a whole makes selecting a modal value 
meaningless and I remove all country dummies from model A. I then set age, sex, education, 
religion and the ISEI occupation variables to their modal values, giving a 40-49 year old 
female, Roman Catholic respondent, with an incomplete secondary school education . As 
more or less continuous variables, I set political and cultural pride, European identity, 
nationalism, minority nationalism and racism to their means, while I assume that the average 
respondent is not Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh.
So, the bold numbers in table 5.11. above represent this basic reference model for each 
dependent variable. For the average respondent default expected value scores of about 0 
should result for pride and racism, 2.55 for nationalism and -0.65 for European identity, their 
mean values. We can see from table 5.11. that very roughly this is what we find, where 
deviation from 0 could result from the use of modal values for some variables in the 
simulation model or the omission of several key variables such as the country dummies. For 
each dependent variable I then vary by one standard deviation the main independent variables 
one-by-one and record the differences in expected outcomes in table 5.11. along with 95% 
confidence intervals25 6. The percentages visible in the table refer to the percentage change in 
the dependent variable brought about by the one standard deviation change in the relevant 
independent variable (or the first difference, the difference between two expected values, as a 
percentage o f the original expected value[d5]). As an example, we can see that for the modal 
respondent, a one standard deviation increase in cultural pride would lead to a 35% increase 
in political pride, plus or minus about 50%27.
25 For the principal ISEI occupation variable, the mean and the mode is 43.5 (see section 5.2.6.). The occupation coding is 
such that several jobs are numbered either 43 or 44, such as Firefighters, Bookkeepers, Foremen and Airline stewardesses 
(Ganzeboom, Treiman and De Graaf, 1992). So, in this instance, there is no single, ‘average’ job that can be imputed to the 
imaginary respondent in the reference model. As a secondary, related point, I assume that the farmer and ISEI dummies are 
set to 0.
26 The standard unit of increase for all variables is one standard deviation or from 0 to approximately 0.86 for racism, and 
cultural and political pride; nationalism is increased by 1.1 (from 2.55 to 3.6) and European identity changes by 0.9 (from -  
0.65 to 0.5).
r  The final interpretative hurdle involves relating the one standard deviation increases in the independent variables to actual 
survey question responses. For European identity, the simple, two question scale means that the standard deviation increase
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As already noted, the incompatibility between racism and political pride and the positive 
interrelationships between cultural pride, nationalism and racism lead one to speculate that 
underlying these concepts are two factors. One can test this idea through factor analysis on 
pride, European identity, nationalism and racism. I use the maximum likelihood method to 
extract factors having eigenvalues greater than 1. In order to allow for the possibility that the 
two pride factors can load onto the same factor, I assume an oblique (direct oblimin) design 
between factors, and rotate to a final solution using the Varimax method. The final, rotated 
solution is shown in table 5.12.
Table 5.12. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of Pride, European Identity, 
Nationalism and  Racism
Concept Nation Racism
Political Pride 306 -.261
Cultural P ride .471 .011
Identity -.240 -.034
N ationalism .738 .104
Racism .221 .975
E igenvalue 1.186 1.626
P ercen tage o f  E x p la in ed  Variance 23.7 32.5
C ronbach’s  alpha 0.43 WA
C hi-squared  G oodness o f  Fit (df) 3 3 .6 5 (1 )
E xtraction m ethod: M a x im u m  Likelihood; R otation  m eth o d : D irect O blim in (D elta: 0 )
in scores from -0.65 to 0.5 implies a small shift from a relatively national to a relatively European identity position. For 
nationalism, an increase in the variable score by one standard deviation to 3.6 implies that a respondent is just outside the top 
quartite of nationalist respondents. This roughly translates as 10 points on the nationalist likert scale, an increase of about 2 
points. So, from being rather neutral concerning the nationalist questions before, the typical respondent now tends to offer 
one nationalist response from the three questions he or she is confronted with. As far as political and cultural pride and 
racism can be translated back into ISSP question responses, we recall that the four political pride questions are coded from 1 
to 4, where 4 indicates a strongly positive feeling of national pride. It can be shown that a respondent from the 50-60% 
percentiles generally amasses around 10 response category points against 13 points for a respondent in the 80-90% 
percentiles. Typically, this might signify that the average respondent answers mildly positively to three questions and 
negatively concerning one other, while the positive respondent answers positively to all four questions. The difference 
between the two, imaginary respondents is in the response to one question. For cultural pride, the same interpretation 
applies, so that the difference between the average and positive respondent is about 3 points from four questions coded from 
1-4. For racism, the average respondent typically scores 18 points over 6 questions coded from 1-5. In one likely scenario, 
this means that the respondent returns neutral answers, with perhaps one mildly 'racist' response amongst the six. Those 
respondents with a high level of racism (84th percentile) typically score about 24 points, implying a mildly or strongly racist 
response to all survey questions.
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In keeping with the earlier prognosis, two factors are indeed extracted28. With political and 
cultural pride and nationalism principally loading onto the first factor, I treat this as a 
measure of national attachment (‘nation’). It seems unlikely that this factor is the underlying 
‘ethnocentric’ dimension advanced by Adomo as racism loads rather weakly. The linkage o f 
cultural and political pride with nationalism offers strong evidence against the hypothesis that 
national pride is unrelated to support for integration, although as we shall see in chapter six 
the directional effect is different to nationalism. The second factor appears a straight measure 
o f racism, so leaving relative European identity as something entirely separate. As a final 
remark, minority nationalism is, unsurprisingly, negatively linked to cultural and political 
pride and positively related to European identity. Some minority nations in particular may 
see Europe as a means to strengthen their sovereignty, and the data backs this up for 
Catalonia, Scotland and to a certain extent the Basques. On the other hand, the Basques are 
also relatively strongly anti-state, while the Catalans do not see themselves so much in 
opposition to the Spanish state.
5.4.2. Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism at the  Country Level
An overview o f the country level results unsurprisingly gives a broadly similar picture to that 
at the aggregate level. The focus here, then, is on pointing out and interpreting some o f  the 
country specific variations to the aggregate level picture. The main findings are that the main 
(negative) determinants of relative European identity are either racism or cultural pride, but
rarely both. Secondly, the country level data affords a series o f insights to minority 
nationalism. There is evidence to suggest that supporters of regional independence, as well 
as minority nationalists, tend to be relatively pro-European. The exception is Basque
28 The same factor analysis is performed at country level. For Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden the same 
factor structure and approximate loadings are maintained. For Germany, Great Britain and Ireland, a similar two-factor 
structure is derived, where political pride, cultural pride and nationalism (but not racism) load onto one factor, and racism, 
cultural pride and nationalism (but not political pride) load onto another. Relative European identity loads negatively onto 
both factors. My interpretation of the results from this second group of countries is that a conception of patriotism 
composed of political pride et al. exists separately from a ‘cultural’ variable comprising racism, nationalism and cultural 
pride. Racism, then, is more mainstream, not being associated with system legitimacy, while cultural pride and nationalism 
contain two dimensions.
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nationalism, which is less concerned about its position vis-à-vis Europe, and more concerned 
with distancing itself from Spain,
Because the country level results are rather voluminous, they are placed in tables 5.6b.-5.10b. 
in section A.3. of the appendix. Even if  the aggregate level findings are rarely mirrored 
exactly at the country level, the overall picture is of course very similar. Below, I tackle 
some o f  the most pertinent country level exceptions from the aggregate picture as well as 
taking interest in the performance o f  the minority nationalist states in Spain and Great 
Britain.
• Because minority nationalist sentiment in the Basque country is negatively linked to 
Spanish cultural pride, while being unrelated to relative European identity, one 
suspects that the Basques have an anti-Spanish, rather than a particularly strong pro or 
anti-EU conception o f their identity. Again reflecting the aggregate level findings, we 
see from table 5.8b. that Catalans are more likely to be pro-European than the typical 
Spanish respondent.
• While the minority nationalism variable is significant and negative in the Great 
Britain nationalism country level model, the findings for Scottish and Welsh minority 
nationalists are not significantly significant. •
• Minority nationalism has a more regional flavour in the Netherlands, Austria, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden. Without further analysis o f the ISSP data to determine 
the exact geographical provenance o f such respondents, the limitations o f question 
(29) means that it is not immediately evident what these local foci or identities might 
be. However, the absence o f sizeable national minorities and the relatively pro- 
European outlook of most of this group o f countries suggests that respondents are 
more likely to be pro-regional devolution rather than in favour o f national 
independence. For instance, Swedish minority ‘regionalist’ respondents might well 
see themselves as belonging to Scania, a self-declared bloc containing over one 
million people on the southern tip of Sweden who demands include official 
recognition of the historic Scanian language. Likewise, for Italy it may well be the
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case that this result refers to supporters of the Lega Nord, or perhaps the rather less 
numerous real national minorities in Italy, in Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d’Aosta and 
Fruili-Venezia-Giulia. In table 5.1 Ob. we can see than Italian minority nationalists are 
also more likely to be racist, certainly an accusation frequently (and justly) levelled at 
the Lega Nord. Less clear are the findings from Austria, where minority nationalists 
are less likely to be nationalists or politically proud, and the Netherlands, where such 
respondents are less likely to be culturally proud. Perhaps because minority 
‘nationalists’ in these countries are no more pro-European than other national 
respondents, one might interpret these findings as evidence o f  sub-regional 
discontent, or strong local identities that do not aspire to national or regional status. 
Ultimately, however, further analysis of the ISSP data is necessary to determine the 
exact geographical provenance o f  such respondents.
• From table 5.6b. we can see that racist attitudes do not impact significantly on 
political pride in Ireland. Similarly, table 5.10b. shows us that political pride is not 
significant in the model o f racism. At first sight this suggests that, unlike in other 
countries, there is no contradiction between being racist and politically proud. 
However, this may reflect the fact that the racism variable, which is part of a three- 
factor solution in Ireland (see table 5.4,), is not an especially good determinant of 
anything. On the other hand, this also might be due to the extremely low levels of 
racism measured in Ireland (see figure 5.6.). Interestingly, racism is significant and 
negative in the identity model, implying that people associate the EU with increased 
levels o f immigration. So, if  mean levels of racism in Ireland were low at the time of 
the ISSP survey (1995), those respondents that were racist held particularly strong 
views. Speculatively, the explanation for this phenomenon might be that as the 
absolute number of racists in Ireland is comparatively low, the mean level of racism 
amongst those racists left in the sample is correspondingly higher than in other 
countries as only ‘hard core’ racists remain. •
• In Great Britain cultural pride is an isolated factor, not explicable by any other o f  the 
main variables but identity. At the same time, only cultural pride is significant in the 
modelling o f  identity (although the model as a whole is not significant). So,
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European identity and cultural pride are closely bound together in Great Britain as in 
no other country in the survey. In section 6.4.2. the suggestion is made in more detail 
that cultural pride is a substitute for nationalism in Great Britain.
5.4.3. A ggregate Level Control V ariables
Here I analyse the impact of the control variables in tables 5.6b.-5.10b. by variable, although 
as in the sections above I also aim to point out the similarities and differences between 
variables. The results are compared against published findings in the literature. The 
principal findings from this section are that older, less educated voters tend to be more likely 
to hold racist and nationalist attitudes, where right wing political beliefs also play a role in 
determining racist attitudes. Right wing respondents (as well as far left respondents) are also 
more likely than leftists to be culturally proud, and this contrasts markedly with the tendency 
for religious, wealthier, better-employed, male respondents to be politically proud. Finally, 
the macroeconomic variables tested have little explanatory power.
As a caveat, I note that the significance o f certain variables depends on which subsets of 
countries are analysed (models A-C), pointing to the influence of single countries on the 
aggregate results. For instance, model C only includes Germany, Austria, Ireland, Sweden 
and Spain. The division between the aggregate and country level analysis is weakened 
appropriately, and one must exercise caution in imputing country subset findings to the 
aggregate level. I would argue that the most robust aggregate level conclusions come from 
model A  in which all countries are included, or those models in which a control variable is 
included for the first time. O f course, the distinction between country and aggregate results is 
already weakened by weighting the data by country population, so that results for, say, 
Germany are accorded greater significance than those for Ireland.
The most consistent findings from table 5.6b. are that increased levels o f political pride are 
significantly related to wealthier, male respondents who profess a religious denomination, 
while respondents who consider themselves upper or upper middle class are more likely to be 
politically proud than the middle classes. So, ‘better-off male members o f society seem to
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be more political proud. On the other hand, far left and fringe party supporters are less likely 
to be politically proud than people to the left o f the political spectrum.
Although the determinants of cultural pride are rather less clear than those for political pride, 
it would seem that the two concepts are rather differently constructed (see table 5.7b.). For 
models B-C we can see than right and far right respondents are more likely to be culturally 
proud than leftists. Interestingly, model C also shows that far left-wingers are more likely to 
be culturally proud. In models B and C for political pride, far left-wingers are associated 
with being less political proud with respect to leftists. So, as well as being distinct from 
political pride, cultural pride shares with racism the impact of right wing support. However, 
cultural pride also shares with the identity model the fact that the controls offer more insight 
into dependent variable variation than the main independent variables.
Because other findings typically do not acknowledge more than one dimension to national 
pride it is difficult to directly compare results. Even by examining closely what dimension of 
pride other authors are measuring, the main commonality that arises is the focus on a 
common set o f control variables: sex, education, religion, extremism and age. Smith and 
Jerkko find no statistically significant gender difference in national pride for any country in 
the ISSP survey, although they only consider one dimension to pride (1998). Topf, Mohler 
and Heath seem to tap cultural pride by showing that women in Britain are more likely to be 
proud of the monarchy (1989, p. 128). However, the country level results for the UK in the 
ISSP data show that men are more likely than women to be culturally proud. Rose (1985) 
and Almond and Verba (1989) all point to rising education levels as related to increased 
pride. For aggregate level political pride, this claim can be directly refuted. Only at the 
country level is there some evidence that education leads to higher political pride (the 
Netherlands and Sweden), while evidence from other countries points to the opposite 
phenomenon (Germany). However, there is support at the country level for Topf, Mohler and 
Heath’s result that the less educated are more likely to take pride in the UK monarchy (1989, 
p. 128). The importance of religion is generally recognised in the literature. For all o f the 
fifteen countries in the European Values Survey surveyed by Rose, those who said they were 
not religious were less likely to be proud of their country (1985, p. 89). Religious 
respondents were seen as more likely to display both ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ pride in Great
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Britain and Germany (Topf, Mohler and Heath, 1989, p. 128). Finally, Smith and Jarkko 
argue that for most countries in the ISSP survey, national pride has generally been declining 
across cohorts bom  before 1965, whereupon this decline has levelled o ff and even reversed, 
especially in some of the ex-communist Eastern European countries included in the survey. 
The drop in national pride is sharpest between 1931-1950, and is often explained by war guilt 
and other reactions to World War II (see also Rose, 1985). It is an open question whether 
this decline in national pride is generational or life-cycle driven, or both. However, it is 
unreasonable to expect these age effects to show up in the single period ISSP data.
Interpreting the determinants of identity presents some difficulties. The only variable 
consistently significant over the three models is the Protestant dummy, so that Protestants 
(but not Catholics) are less likely to feel relatively European than non-believers. The 
interpretation o f  this result is unclear: although some fringe national politicians have painted 
the European project as a ‘Papist conspiracy*29 it seems hard to believe that these ideas have 
currency throughout the Union or Germany, the largest country in the weighted regression 
model (see also section 5.4.4. below). From model B and C, far left and far right respondents 
are less likely to feel relatively European than leftists. This conveys the more standard idea 
that political extremists feel threatened by Europe. The only similar research in the literature 
is carried out by Duchesne and Frognier, who measure straight European identity in the 
Eurobarometer data rather than relative European identity, and show that education, income, 
age and gender are all significant socio-demographic correlates with European identity (in 
Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 209).
We see from table 5.9b. that nationalism is clearly linked with older, less educated 
respondents. Interestingly though, neither political affiliation nor subjective social class is 
significant in explaining nationalism, which is more a function of the ‘objective’ social 
characteristics o f  age and education. As we see in section 5.4.4., however, political 
affiliation does determine nationalism in some instances at the country level. Turning to 
other empirical work in this field, Heath, Taylor, Brook and Park rightly note that the main
29 See, for example, ‘The conspiracy behind the European Union: what every Christian should know’ by Arthur Noble, 
contained and endorsed by Dr. Ian Paisley, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) politician on his website 
(www.ianpaislev.orgY On this view, the EU is a resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire, an attempt to construct a Catholic 
superstate that threatens the interests of all Protestants.
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political theories o f  nationalism do not give us any especially clear or detailed leads in 
identifying the sociological bases of nationalist sentiment (1999, p. 165). These authors 
suggest a distinction between ethnic forms of nationalism, where ethnic markers such as 
language or religion would be strongly associated with nationalist sentiment, and more civic 
forms of nationalism based on a shared culture rather than common descent. Heath et al. 
assume that they are investigating this latter form of nationalism in Britain, also finding that 
age and education have the strongest associations with British national sentiment (1999, p. 
166).
We can readily see from table 5.10b. that racism is a function both of the ‘objective1 
characteristics of age, education, occupation as well as political affiliation. In common with 
nationalism, older, less educated respondents are more likely to be racist. Moreover, 
respondents with a lower socio-economic occupational status tend to be slightly more racist. 
In common with cultural pride, however, it is clear that right and far right supporters are 
considerably more likely to hold the attitude in question (i.e. racism) than leftists. The 
politically charged nature of racism can hardly come as a surprise; there is a fairly clear 
right/left wing split in the European political arena between parties on issues o f  immigration, 
asylum and so forth. While Quillian uses Eurobarometer data to provide confirmation o f the 
importance of gender, education and social class in explaining racism (1995), it is clear that a 
series of other factors is at work that cannot be captured using the ISSP survey. The 
European Commission report ‘Racism and Xenophobia in Europe1 (1997) highlights job 
insecurity as a contributory factor while Quillian points to a range o f individual and group- 
level theories (discussed briefly in section 4.6).
5.4.4. Country Level Control Variables
Once again, the aggregate level results are broadly represented at the country level. It is the 
aim of this section to cover the main exceptions to the aggregate level findings with reference 
to tables 5.6b.-5.10b. in section A.3. of the appendix. I proceed on a control and dependent 
variable basis. The chief findings are as follows:
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• The aggregate levels findings are not able to adequately capture inter-state differences 
in the impact of religion on the dependent variables. At the aggregate level, 
Protestant respondents are seen to be more likely than atheists to be politically proud, 
and less likely to feel relatively European. Catholics too are more likely than atheists 
to feel politically proud. This suggests that religious respondents tend to see the 
nation-state as a political focus point. Although in Germany Protestant respondents 
tend to be less likely to feel European, in Italy Catholic respondents are a force of 
political and social conservatism, being less likely to feel European, and more likely 
to feel culturally proud, racist and nationalist. Similarly, in Spain Catholics are more 
likely than atheists to be racist. The role o f Protestant respondents in Spain at first 
appears counter-intuitive; such respondents are pro-European, with a strong sense of 
cultural pride but weak political pride. However, further analysis reveals that, despite 
the significant coefficient results, there are only three respondents coded as 
Protestants in the Spanish data sample. In Italy, there are not even enough Protestant 
respondents to draw a comparison. So, one is tempted to conclude that Catholicism 
remains a powerful conservative force in Spanish and Italian society.
• Aggregate level findings concerning political affiliation are broadly repeated at the 
country level, although there are some interesting permutations that reveal national 
political debate on the issues analysed here. At the aggregate level, we know that for 
political pride, extremists at either end of the political spectrum tend to be anti-pride, 
while for cultural pride right-wingers tend to be more likely to be pro-cultural pride 
than those on the left. Similarly, there is some tendency for those who are relatively 
anti-European, nationalist and racist to be right wing. For Germany, we can add to 
this picture by noting that while extremists tend to be less politically proud than 
centrists and right-wingers, far right supporters are more likely to be racist, and 
relatively anti-European only. This suggests that a preoccupation with immigrants is 
behind far right opposition to Europe in Germany.
For Great Britain, although far left rather than far right respondents are consistently 
less politically and culturally proud and nationalistic, this segment o f the political 
spectrum is represented by just six respondents who, we are informed by the ISSP
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codebook, consider themselves supporters of the Green party. Rather disappointingly, 
the ISSP survey fails to include class in, of all cases, Britain.
For Sweden, left wing supporters tend to be pro-political pride, while right-wingers 
are more culturally proud and racist. Extremist left-wingers are anti-European, the 
only example from the eight countries taken here. Finally, in Spain, nationalism has a 
more polarised, political dimension than in many other countries. Every shade of 
political opinion apart from the control, leftist respondents, is strongly anti-nationalist. 
The pro-nationalist behaviour o f farmers points to an urban/rural division on this 
issue.
Turning now to examine issues by dependent variable, we have:
• Age and education are significant at the country level for political pride, although 
directionally different by country. Younger people are more politically proud in 
Germany, while the opposite tends to be true in Ireland. Similarly, while the less 
educated tend to be more politically proud in Germany, the opposite is the case in the 
Netherlands and Sweden.
• The country level findings for cultural pride are sparse; only in the Netherlands are 
more than two control variables significant. In common with identity, the central 
concepts give us more o f an insight into this variable’s makeup. For Great Britain, 
both males and the less educated are more likely to be culturally proud, suggesting 
that here the concept fits a similar profile to nationalism. Gender and education are 
not significant for Great Britain in the nationalism country model (table 5.9b.), and 
this provides some evidence for the suggestion made in section 6.4.2. that nationalism 
in Great Britain could well be best captured by cultural pride variables. •
•  In Austria, farmers are significantly less likely to be culturally proud than non­
farmers.
175
5. An Empirical Examination o f National Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism
using ISSP data
* The aggregate level impact o f  income seems to largely explain nationalist attitudes in 
the Netherlands and Sweden. On the other hand, nationalism in Italy is less utilitarian 
in nature, being associated w ith older, less educated Catholic respondents. In Spain, 
fanners and the less educated tend to be more nationalist.
• Turning to racism, education is the most common explanatory control variable, and is 
only not significant in Ireland and Austria. In the case of these two countries, the 
control variables do not explain a lot o f variation in the dependent variable. For 
Ireland, the RA2 of the model is rather low, again pointing to problems with the three- 
factor racism solution highlighted in section 5.2.5.
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I began by attempting to operationalise national pride, identity, nationalism, 
xenophobia and racism in the ISSP data. This lead to the creation of five core variables after 
it was found through factor analysis that national pride contains a political and cultural 
element, while none o f  the questions surveyed were deemed to tap xenophobic attitudes. I 
include with the nationalism variable a series of controls to account for minority nationalism, 
especially pertinent for respondents from the Basque country, Catalonia, Scotland and Wales.
The principal findings from this chapter relate to how the five concepts interact with each 
other. That is, all the variables predict each other positively, with some exceptions. Racism 
and political pride are negatively related in both directions, the relationship between identity 
and cultural pride, nationalism and racism is similarly negative, while identity and political 
pride are not significantly related in  either direction. Using factor analysis one can 
distinguish two underlying factors in the data; the first I label a ‘cultural’ measure of 
attachment, comprising all the factors to a degree, but above all tapping into the 
interrelationships between pride and nationalism. This closer than expected linkage between 
national pride and the other factors leads me to the conclusion that Adorno’s concept of 
ethnocentrism is not visible in the ISSP data, and that national pride may well not to 
unrelated to support for European integration. The second factor seems a clear measure of
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racism, leaving European identity, which loads negatively onto both factors, as something 
entirely separate.
The minority nationalism results are rather more clear-cut. The Catalans and Scots, and to a 
certain extent the Basques are fairly pro-European, while this is less obvious in the case o f 
Wales. This may reflect the attachment o f  many Welsh respondents to the UK, and brings a 
certain degree o f balance to the oft-heard argument that UK opposition to the Europe is 
English opposition to the Europe. The identity o f Basque respondents is more defined by 
their anti-Spanish outlook than any overwhelming warmth towards Europe, and in this 
respect there is a strong contrast to be made with the Catalans. Other minority nationalism 
results are less clear, although there is some evidence to suggest that the aspirations of 
citizens in sub-state territories, possibly including Padania and Scania, are towards Europe.
An analysis o f  the control variables reveals that nationalists and racists tend to be older, less 
educated respondents, with racism also containing a more political element. While cultural 
pride clearly differs from political pride in its make-up, it cannot be clearly linked to 
nationalism or racism. Indeed for cultural pride and identity, the main independent variables 
offered far more insight into dependent variable variation than the controls.
At the country level there are a number o f variations to the aggregate level models that are 
worth conveying. The role of the Catholic Church in Italy and Spain can be seen as a force 
o f social conservatism being, in particular, an explanatory factor o f  racist attitudes, whereas 
in other countries political affiliation plays a notable role. It seems likely that German far 
right-wingers appear to base their opposition to Europe on fears o f  immigration, while for 
Great Britain and Spain cultural pride, or rather loss o f cultural identity, seem to be the 
dominant concerns. The suggestion is made that cultural pride in Great Britain is a substitute 
for nationalism, both because of the sociological make-up of cultural pride and the apparent 
dearth o f nationalism as measured in the ISSP survey. One might also point out the greater 
preponderance o f low-income earners to display nationalist sentiments in Sweden and the 
Netherlands.
177
6. EXPLAINING  SUPPORT FO R  EUR O PEAN INTEG RATIO N USING  
ISSP DATA
6.1. C hapter A im  and Summary
In this chapter I examine differences in support for integration among eight European Union 
member states using International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey 
data. Specifically, I test the series o f  hypotheses constructed in chapter four that predict the 
attitudes towards European integration taken by nationalists, racists and those exhibiting 
national pride or a sense of national or European identity.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In each o f the various subsections o f section
6.2. I recapitulate a different hypothesis from chapter four and the operationalisation o f the 
accompanying concept as laid out in chapter five, along with any existent empirical evidence 
that may have a bearing on the hypothesis. I contend that while the existing evidence does 
not act to fundamentally oppose the hypotheses put forward here, the paucity and the lack of 
methodological robustness to this previous research makes further evidence all the more 
desirable. In the discussion o f the dependent variable in section 6.2.6. the decision is taken to 
predict favourable over negative attitudes towards integration, and at a later stage attitudes 
themselves versus non-attitudes, both at the aggregate and individual level. This decision 
lends itself to a two-way classification of models, giving a total o f four models to be 
analysed. In this chapter I predict favourable over negative attitudes towards integration at 
the aggregate and national level, while only in the next chapter addressing non-attitudes do 
we consider the two further models - attitudes versus non-attitudes at the aggregate and 
nation-state level.
The pair of dichotomous dependent variables that are constructed as part o f this two-way set 
of models favours the use o f logit regression techniques in the results section 6.3. By way of
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summary of the principal aggregate logit regression results in section 6.4.1., I find that higher 
levels of nationalism, racism and a relatively national sense o f identity are all associated with 
decreased support, as predicted. However, there is also a positive link between political and 
cultural pride and support for integration, so that we can reject hypothesis 2. This may be a 
manifestation o f Risse et a l *s (1999) expectation that national identities, and hence pride in 
these identities, adapt in the face o f changing perceptions of Europe. The remainder o f  the 
country level key independent and control variable findings are summarised in sections 6.4.2. 
to 6.4.4.
6.2. Constructing the Model
In this section I very briefly justify the choice of the ISSP National Identity survey data. I 
then recap the hypotheses constructed in chapter four that purport to explain how European 
identity, national pride, nationalism and racism interact with support for European 
integration. I also review the operationalisation of these concepts from chapter five, before 
assessing any empirical explanations of support in the scholarly literature. We shall see that 
overall this body o f empirical evidence, while broadly in keeping with the hypotheses, is 
unsatisfactory both in its paucity and its methodological robustness. Finally, the dependent 
and control variables are considered. Again, the controls are identical to those taken in 
chapter five, while on this occasion the dependent variable is split into two components: 
favourable over negative attitudes towards integration, and then attitudes themselves versus 
non-attitudes. In this chapter I look at only favourable versus negative attitudes towards 
integration.
6.2.1. The ISSP Survey
The reasons for selecting the ISSP survey to carry out this analysis of attitudes towards 
integration are entirely the same as those expounded at length in section 5.2.1. Essentially, 
the superior choice o f independent variables over the Eurobarometer data series better allow 
us to test the hypotheses listed in chapter four.
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6.2.2. European and National Identity
The identity hypothesis from section 4.3. is reproduced below. Identity is operationalised in 
section 5.2.2. by taking two questions asking respondents how close they felt to their country 
and the Europe.
HI: the more European a respondent feels, ceteris paribus, the more likely he or she is to 
support the European Union. Similarly, the more national a respondent feels, the less likely 
he or she is to support the Union.
I note that the measure taken in section 5.2.2. tests relative Europeanness; whether or not 
respondents feel more European than national, or vice versa. The disadvantages o f this 
measure are that it cannot tell us either about different dimensions to identity (see section 4.4. 
and 5.2.2.) or the strength or direction o f  the relationship between absolute levels o f  European 
identity and support. One might bear in mind, however, that national pride is a reasonable 
indicator o f absolute levels o f national identity, with the caveat that not all people who 
consider themselves as belonging to a  country are proud o f  it.
In general, then, one might expect a close relationship between respondents with a strong 
sense o f European identity and support for integration. From section 2.2.1., European 
identity can be viewed in this context as a more demanding form of loyalty to the European 
Union than support for further integration. Notwithstanding the low RA2 o f  the European 
identity models in section 5.3., it will be interesting to observe the similarities and differences 
in the make-up o f support and European identity. Although a critic might claim that 
relationship between relative Europeanness and support for integration is so likely to be 
positive as to be almost tautological, any negative or weakly positive relationship would point 
to a serious juncture between what one might term ‘underlying* support for European unity 
and the reality o f the European Union. Moreover, this strong relationship is likely only to be 
one-way; from section 2.2.1. I note that there is no reason to expect that supporters of 
integration necessarily feel European (although support may be a necessary condition for 
this). From the ISSP data we can see that around 5800 o f  11000 respondents see themselves 
as ‘benefiting’ from EU membership while only around 1400 feel ‘very close’ to Europe.
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Even if a further 3800 feel ‘close* to Europe, from figure 5.1. we can see that extremely few 
respondents are relatively European on the tougher measure taken here. So, a distinction 
between (relative) European identity and support for integration can be made in the data and 
so would seem apparent to respondents.
O f the little research into European identity and support for European integration that exists, 
Miiller-Peters shows that while European patriots tend to be pro-single currency, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between national patriots and support for the EURO 
(1998). Here the author surveys a total o f  15,088 persons from all fifteen EU member states 
in a specially commissioned study in 1997. Factor analysis is used to distinguish between 
putative nationalist, national and European patriotism variables arising from questions put1. 
The results from regression analysis show that for most o f the EU15, national patriotism is 
weakly associated with lower support for the EURO (-0.048, p=0.001), while European 
patriotism is strongly associated with EURO support (0.418, p=0.001). For Austria, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg, however, national patriotism is associated with increased EURO 
support (0.252, p=0.001). O f course, we must remember that the EURO is one policy issue 
amongst many (see section 2.3.3.), and attitudes towards the EURO are not concomitant with 
attitudes towards integration in general.
6.2.3. National Pride
The national pride hypothesis from section 4.4. is reproduced below. National pride is 
operationalised in section 5.2.3. by taking eight ISSP questions which after factor analysis 
reveal two underlying ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ dimensions.
H2: pride in a particular nation is not linked, ceteris paribus, with levels o f support fo r  the 
European Union amongst its citizens.
1 The questions “If I had the chance to set up home in another country I would leave (COUNTRY) straightaway” and “I feel 
attached to (COUNTRY) and its people" load negatively and positively respectively onto the ‘national patriotism* variable, 
which seems similar to the definition of national identity adopted herein. European patriotism is measured by the question “I 
feel attached to Europe and its people". See footnote 3 for a description of the dependent variable.
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The original rationale for supposing that national pride does not interfere with support for 
integration was the observation from the socio-psychology literature that identity, or pride, in 
one group does not preclude membership of another. In this way, not only are multiple 
identities possible, but also it should not matter to our hypothesis how many dimensions there 
are to national pride. Reality, however, may be complicated by the knowledge from chapter 
five that national and European identities may overlap; for instance, the outgroup for 
respondents holding one dimension to pride might be persons with a European identity. In 
particular, the closeness o f cultural pride to nationalism and racism demonstrated in table 
5.13. suggests that those with a European identity may well be an outgroup for respondents 
with high levels o f  cultural pride. O n the other hand, the two dimensions to political pride 
revealed in the same factor analysis means that it is hard to predict how this variable might 
relate to support. One might see the cultural dimension to political pride dominating or, 
alternatively, the civic republican dimension might be shown to be strongest, where this 
might well be more compatible with European Union membership. Routh and Burgoyne 
suggest that one feature of affective, cultural attachment is a backward-looking and regressive 
desire to avoid change in one’s national identity. On the other hand, instrumental attachment 
is more open to changes on the basis o f  the perceived benefits. (Routh and Burgoyne, 1998, 
p. 4).
Unfortunately, because the ISSP survey only takes place over one time period, we are unable 
to judge definitively whether any relation between pride and support is inherent, or part o f a 
more dynamic process o f  identity construction. From section 4.3., writers in the 
constructivist tradition such as Risse et aL (1999) presume that national identity and pride can 
be ‘reprogrammed’ to incorporate various degrees o f European identity. For instance, one 
might point to the increased propensity for European flags to be displayed alongside national 
flags in Italy or, conversely, the rise o f an English nationalist form o f national identity. 
Moreover, constructivist analysis often focuses in depth on the content of national identity, 
something that is beyond the scope o f  this thesis. Nevertheless, any relation between national 
pride and support, especially at the country level, may well offer support or insight into 
constructivist theses and I return to this point in section 6.4.1.
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between national pride and support for 
integration seems to confirm some link between pride and support. However, this evidence
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can be criticised for lack o f thoroughness, and uses distinctly different dependent and 
independent variables to those analysed herein. Routh and Burgoyne examine the negative 
effects of cultural-historical pride on support for the EURO in the United Kingdom (1998). 
The authors focus on what they term ‘sentimental attachment reflecting cultural symbols’; 
pride expressed in the Queen, history, the Pound and cultural traditions and customs. This is 
placed alongside an ‘instrumental’ measure of attachment, which asks respondents how well- 
functioning is the legal system, health care system, economic system, income level and 
distribution o f wealth and the education system2. The results from a causal path model based 
on approximately 1,100 responses from a 3,000 strong mail survey conducted by the authors 
in 1997 suggest that cultural attachment is directly linked with anti-EURO sentiment. 
Instrumental attachment does not directly impact anti-EURO sentiment, but only acts through 
the medium o f  a ‘EURO benefits’ variable, in which respondents were asked to indicate how 
much they agreed or disagreed with a number of opinions about the introduction of a single 
currency3.
In the work o f Müller-Peters, both the economic-political and cultural-historic strains o f 
national pride that she identifies are hypothesised to have no impact on EURO support, 
although ordinary least squares regression results show that for most countries the two 
national prides have a weakly positive impact on support for the EURO, with economic- 
political pride having a slightly stronger impact (1998, p. 715). However, country level 
correlations between cultural pride and EURO support show that in six of fifteen countries 
the relationship between the two variables is negative.
As we have already noted support for the EURO is not concomitant with attitudes towards 
integration in general. However both articles show that pride has some effect on support for 
the EURO. Can we reconcile the opposite findings concerning cultural pride in the two
* This focus on how well certain social institutions function is distinctly different from asking a respondent whether he or she 
is proud of such institutions, as questions on political pride seem to do. Rather, the emphasis on the functioning of 
institutions suggests that the survey questions elicit evaluations not solely of pride but rather of procedural and distributive 
justice, which could perhaps be summarised as measures of system legitimacy (see section 5.2.3.; Routh and Burgoyne, 
1999, p.3; Manstead and Hewstone, 1995, p. 574).
3 Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with a number of opinions about the introduction 
of a single European currency using the following response categories: strongly disagree, disagree, neither, agree, and 
strongly agree and don’t know. The three opinions were as follows: the introduction o f a single European currency will 
make trade between European countries easier; the goal o f a strong European economy will encourage greater cooperation 
across Europe; a single European currency will be better able to compete with the Dollar and the Yen and will therefore gain 
more influence in the world. The overall impact of the ‘Euro benefits' variable is pro-EURO. Unlike instrumental
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works? In the former analysis, the authors include pride in national currency as part of their 
cultural pride variable. In the factor analysis performed by Müller-Peters pride in one’s 
currency loads equally onto both political and cultural factors, and consequently is treated as 
a variable in its own right. Indeed, pride in one’s currency is shown by Müller-Peters to  
correlate more strongly with nationalism than either political or cultural pride (1998, p. 716). 
Could it be that Routh and Burgoyne are closer to measuring nationalism in their survey than 
cultural pride? Although the authors perform factor analysis on their variables, I note that 
there is no confirmatory factor analysis testing cultural pride items with those more likely to 
fall under an economic-political pride or nationalism latent variable. I also note that Routh 
and Burgoyne focus in their work on the UK where, as Müller-Peters shows, respondents 
generally have an extremely hostile attitude towards the EU (1998, p. 713). In any event, the 
confusion present in the work o f these two sets o f authors certainly leaves one with the 
impression that further research in this area would be desirable.
6.2.4. N ationalism
After a  survey o f the theoretical literature, the nationalist hypothesis was defined in section 
4.5. thus: "
H3: nationalist sentiment in a particular state is linkedceteris paribus, with lower levels o f  
support fo r  the European Union amongst its citizens.
Nationalist sentiment was operationalised in section 5.2.4. through the creation o f a variable 
splitting into quartiles a Likert scale comprising three ISSP survey questions and I do not 
dwell on this point here. In section 5.2.4. a minority nationalism variable was also created, 
where the missing cases for Ireland were replaced with the average score (1.07 for a little 
over 6%  o f respondents) o f  the two other countries in the ISSP survey, Austria and the 
Netherlands, with no separatist movements to speak of. Also created from the minority 
nationalism variable were interaction terms for respondents from Scotland, Wales, Catalonia 
and the Basque Country. I do include specific hypotheses as to how nationalist respondents
attachment, cultural pride is linked negatively with the ‘Euro benefits’ variable, so that respondents with high levels of 
cultural pride see few EURO benefits.
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from these regions might view the European Union. However, it is clear both on the basis of 
the analyses made in section 4.5. and results from the relative European identity model (table
5.8.) that one might expect Catalan and Scottish nationalists to be pro-integration, with 
perhaps a less enthusiastic welcome to the EU coming from Basque nationalists. For Welsh 
nationalists, I note that there is some ambiguity as to their likely relationship with the EU.
Although one might criticise the nationalist hypothesis as uncontroversial, even obvious, the 
strength o f the nationalist coefficient still remains o f interest. Moreover, as the evidence 
below demonstrates, there have been surprisingly few successful efforts to link nationalism 
and support for integration. Müller-Peters demonstrates that respondents holding nationalist 
attitudes are less likely to be in favour o f the EURO (1998). As noted above, the author uses 
factor analysis to distinguish between putative nationalist, national and European patriotism 
variables arising from questions put in a specially commissioned study in 1997, surveying a 
total of 15,088 persons from all fifteen EU member states. The results o f  ordinary least 
squares regression analysis strongly suggest that in all member states nationalist attitudes are 
associated with weaker support for the EURO. However, this survey is not ideal supporting 
evidence for our nationalism hypothesis primarily because the dependent and independent 
variables are too different to those taken here. While two o f  the three questions that load 
most heavily onto the nationalism latent variable are in much the same spirit as questions 
(26)-(28) from section 5.2.4., a third question invites the respondent to agree or disagree as to 
whether “a country which does not have its own currency is a true country” (1998, p.8)4. 
Again, the EURO is one policy issue amongst many and, without the benefit o f going back to 
this privately held data series, I propose that the nationalism regression coefficient might well 
be less negative if an alternative, less acutely political form o f  the independent variable had 
been taken.
Charillon and Ivaldi attempt test the link between nationalism and support for integration 
using the Eurobarometer survey series (1996). In a first approach, the authors investigate 
Europeans’ desires to preserve national sovereignty in several key areas. For three countries, 
France, Germany and the UK, a list o f eleven issue areas is displayed from EB 42 
(November-December 1994), along with the percentage o f the population in each country
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who believe that national governments should retain control in each one5. The authors 
construct an index with one point for each Euro-sceptic response. This index is then 
crosstabulated with a measure o f support for integration. There is a neat negative correlation, 
those very much in favour have an average score o f  1.87, those only to some extent in favour 
score 2.98, those only to some extent against score 5.05 while citizens very much against 
score 6.94. Breaking down the index by country, average scores are highest in the UK (4.46), 
then Germany (3.22) and then France (2.88). Impressive as these results are, Charillon and 
Ivaldi seem to be engaged in the methodologically dubious activity o f explaining support for 
the EU using support for EU policy areas.
Charillon and Ivaldi go on to another test o f  the nationalist hypothesis. An index o f  
nationalism from four EB questions is constructed from EB 42, with a point given for each 
answer highlighted in bold.
(15) “In the near future do you see yourself as...(nationality) only, (nationality) and 
European, European and (nationality), European only?” (see section 5.2.2. for Citrin and  
Sides* (2001) use o f this question)
(38) “Would you say that you are very  proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud 
to be (nationality).*’
(39) “On this list are some opinions about national pride. Please tell me which one of these 
opinions comes closest to your own.” National pride is a  duty for every citizen; national 
pride is natural; national pride does not make sense, because nationality is a matter o f chance; 
national pride does not make sense, because everyone is different; national pride is arrogant, 
because it is directed against persons of other nationalities; national pride is dangerous, 
because it often leads to extreme nationalism and even to wars; none o f  these opinions 
(spontaneous); I don’t care about national pride (spontaneous); Don’t know.
5 Although the authors do not mention which EB 42 question they use, it would appear to be Qu, 30, which asks respondents 
whether they believe a list of policy proposals should be decided by national governments or jointly within the EU- The 
policy areas taken seem most likely to be Defence, Protection o f the Environment, Relations with Developing Countries, 
Monetary Policy, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Drugs, a Single Currency, Europe.
186
6. Explaining Support for European Integration using ISSP Data
(40) “You said that you feel fearful about the Single European Market. Amongst the 
following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your fears about the Single 
Market?” Show cards, one of which reads ‘The loss of national identity9.
Table 6.1. shows the distribution o f scores on national lines. The order is different from the 
eleven-question index, where now Germany now has the least number of nationalists (those 
respondents scoring between 2-4 points), although the UK still heads the list.
Table 6.1.Nationalism score by country (EB 4 2 :1994)
Score 0 Score 1 Score 2-4
France 50.1% 30.0% 20.0%
Germany 59.7% 26.0% 14.3%
UK 32.1% 29.0% 38.9%
There is a neat correlation between the national sovereignty and nationalism indices, the 
implication being that nationalists are anti-European. Respondents with a score o f zero on 
table 6.1. are characterised by an average score of 2.44 on the sovereignty index, and this 
increases to 3.81, 4.94 and 6.05 for the scores 1, 2 and 3 respectively (1996, p. 68). The 
propensity to be anti-European ties in very well with nationalist respondents scoring between 
2 and 4. Taken against the question “In general, are you for or against efforts being made to 
unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, 
are you only to some extent against or very much against?” (Question (1) from section
2.2.4.), 87% o f people with a score o f  zero on the nationalism scale are in favour of 
integration. This percentage declines as the score increases to 44% for those in the ‘2-4’ 
category. Euro-scepticism, as measured by all anti-European responses in question (1), unites 
69% of the ‘ultras’ (with a score of 3 or more) on the nationalist scale, as against only 18% of 
those individuals in the *0’ category.
Interpreting the significance o f this evidence involves recognising the severe limitations of 
Charillon and Ivaldi’s paper. Their hypothesis that forms o f nationalistic sentiment reduce 
support for integration is weakened by the presence o f only three European Union countries,
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and the authors fail to take advantage o f one o f the strengths of the Eurobarometer survey 
series by not including data from more than one time-period. There is little in the way o f  
rigorous statistical analysis, while the choice o f questions is not ideal for the authors* 
purposes. Questions (37) and (40) seem a better measure o f identity than nationalism, w hile  
questions (38) and (39) would seem to capture attitudes o f national pride. While responses to  
the four questions taken together might tap an underlying nationalism factor, there is no  
supporting analysis for this claim. Doubtless part o f  the reason for this, as I suggest in  
chapter four, is that in common with many other empirical studies the authors fail to define 
theoretically their concepts before proceeding to empirical analysis. It is clear that th e  
available empirical evidence on the link between support for integration and nationalism, 
while not discouraging, is hardly satisfactory and there appears a need for more rigorous 
research in this area.
6.2.5. Racism
As ever, the racism hypothesis below is derived from an analysis o f the theoretical literature 
in section 4.6. and this hypothesis is operationalised as outlined in chapter 5.2.5., so tha t 
xenophobia is not tested:
H5: racist sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels o f  
support fo r  the European Union amongst its citizens.
There is very little evidence either supportive or hostile to the above hypothesis. The 
European Commission report ‘Racism and Xenophobia in Europe’ is o f some aid. Overall, a 
very high percentage of respondents (approximately 33%) openly declared themselves to be 
‘racist* or ‘very racist’ (1997, p. 1). This report also presents data showing the percentage o f  
people declaring themselves quite or very racist throughout the EU who are for, against and 
neutral concerning question (2) - “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) 
membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” 
(1997, p. 4). 45% of this racist category declared themselves against integration, while 26% 
were in favour. It seems that there is a clear need for further research on the link between 
support for integration and our hypotheses concerning racism and xenophobia.
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6.2.6. Dependent Variable Selection
The hypotheses recounted in section 6.2. above can be tested at different levels of analysis. I 
analyse ISSP 1995 National Identity data at the aggregate and country level. In this way one 
can both collate the ISSP data, to maximise the number of included control variables and the 
chances o f  obtaining statistically significant results, and break it down, to better analyse the 
country level picture. To give a second dimension o f analysis, I recode the dependent 
variable below to make the distinction between positive and negative attitudes towards the 
European Union, and between attitudes themselves (comprising both positive and negative 
responses) as opposed to non-attitudes. Non-attitudes are defined here as the ‘Don’t Know’ 
or 'Have never heard o f  survey response, where a fuller discussion of what exactly are non­
attitudes is left to chapter seven.
(41) “Generally speaking, would you say that (R’s country) benefits or does not benefit from 
being a member o f the European Union?” (Benefits, Does not benefit, Have never heard of 
the EU, Don’t Know/Can’t choose)6
The result is a two-way classification o f  analytical models pictured in table 6.2. below.
Table 6.2. Two-way Classification of Support for European Integration
Aggregate Level Country Level
Pro vs. Anti Model 1 Model 2
Integration (chapter six) (chapter six)
Attitudes vs. Non-attitudes (chapter seven) (chapter seven)
6 In fact the ISSP codebook question text includes the phrase ‘appropriate association’ rather than ‘R’s country*. However, 
an analysis of the individual country codebooks confirms that in all cases the appropriate association taken is the state in 
which the survey was carried out (as opposed to, say, nations within that state).
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"1
As the above table makes clear, in this chapter I only analyse models 1 and 2 that deal w ith  
pro and anti integration sentiments. In the following chapter, I specifically focus on attitudes 
versus non-attitudes towards integration. I make this distinction because, as is argued at 
greater length in chapter seven, non-attitudes comprise an important and poorly understood 
segment o f responses towards integration. In any case, one would discard the ‘don’t know ’ 
and ‘never heard of responses’ in a standard ordinary least squares or binomial logit 
regression analysis of attitudes towards integration. That is, unless one argues that ‘don’t 
know* responses constitute not a non-attitude but rather a  balanced, middle-way response b y  
those respondents who have carefully weighed up both sides o f the integration argument and  
cannot come down on either side. Most likely, however, this response category is a mix o f  
both types o f responses (see section 7.3.). Indeed, the ambiguous nature o f this middle 
response for question (4) is one reason why the attitudes vs. non-attitudes model used in 
chapter seven uses Eurobarometer not ISSP data (see section 7.5.1.).
The choice o f dependent variable is conditioned by the decision to use the ISSP survey. 
There is only one other question in the survey that asks respondents to evaluate the European 
integrative project.
(42) “Which o f the following statements comes closer to your own view?
1. (R ’s country) should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union.
2. (R’s country) should do all it can to protect its independence from the European
Union. “
Because respondents might be generally for membership o f  the European Union, but not in 
favour of the closer form o f  Union implied by question above, a clear difference can be noted 
between questions (41) and (42). In section 2.2.1. I make the case for measuring general 
support for European integration rather than any more specific proposal. That, and the fact 
that question (42) does not include data for Germany and Sweden means that use question 
(41), although in section 6 .4 .1 .1 use the above question to verify the aggregate results. The 
wording of question (41) is reasonably close to question (4), where both question the benefits 
to EU integration, so that the ISSP question also appears a utilitarian measure of support. 
Testing for the impact of affective factors on integration using a utilitarian dependent variable
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can only increase our confidence in the importance of any statistically significant affective 
results.
Of course, it makes little sense to study support if this variable does not vary, so that in figure
6.1. below I plot both aggregate (weighted) and country mean support levels.
Figure 6.1. 1995 ISSP Mean Support for European Integration by Country (‘DK’ and 
‘Never Heard o f EU’ Responses Excluded)
Overall, mean levels o f support are high and, for Ireland and Italy, are so positive towards the 
EU that they come close to not varying. It must be borne in mind, however, that support is 
increased by removing ‘DK* and ‘Never Heard of EIT responses from consideration in this 
chart, just as they will be removed from the regression analyses in this chapter. I note that 
this summary of attitudes towards integration also serve to place into context the probability 
charts 6.3.-6.7. later in the chapter, which display how the main independent variables affect 
the likelihood of a respondent being pro-integration.
6.3. Model Methodology and Results
The model methodology is largely imported from chapter five. That is, I use the same set of 
control variables presented in section A.2. of the appendix. Concomitantly, the aggregate
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level data taken in model 1 is split into three subsets (A, B and C) to account for the control 
variables missing in certain countries (see section 5.3.)* I apply the same weighting to the 
data in order to render the sample sizes equal by country. However, the bivariate response 
category o f  the dependent variable favours the use o f  logit regression techniques.
So, I estimate a logit model at both aggregate and individual level. Aldrich and N elson 
(1984) show that a reliance on a linear regression model such as Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous, and interpretable in terms o f  
probability, imposes constraints on the marginal effects o f  exogenous variables that are no t 
taken into account by the model. The logit model surmounts this obstacle by imposing a non­
linear transformation on the underlying linear relationship between y  and x, so that the 0-1 
probability constraint is satisfied without also constraining the right-hand side o f  the 
regression equation. The logit is a non-linear model o f  the probability o f being in one 
category o f  the dependent variable rather than the other. However, the model is linear in the 
logarithm o f the odds of being in one category rather than the other. Thus the coefficient for 
an explanatory variable, x, tell us the expected change in the log odds o f being at one, rather 
than the other, category o f y , for a one unit change in the value o f x. In addition, the logit 
model, while preserving many o f the features o f  the OLS model, makes less onerous model 
assumptions (Demaris, 1992, p. 42).
In the remainder of this section I present the abridged results o f the logit models showing ju s t 
the effect o f the main independent variables on aggregate level support in table 6.3. Because 
the regression models spawn a large amount o f  data, information on control variables and 
country level data, which is not included in the model summary below, is presented in tables
6.3. and 6.3b. in section A.4. o f the appendix.
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Table 6.3.1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Support o f the Independent Variables
(abridged)
M odel l a l b 1c
b O dds ra tio b O dds ratio b Odds ratio
Political Pride 0.49 ** 1.64 0.60 •  * 1.83 0.60 * • 1.81
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Cultural Pride 0.21 •  • 1.24 0.21 ♦ + 1.24 0.26
** 1.30
( 0 .05 ) ( 0 .06 ) (  0.07 )
Identity 0.46 •* 1.58 0.53 1.70 0.46
** 1.59
( 0-04 ) (  0.05 ) (  0.06 )
N ationalist A ttitudes -0.12 •  « 0 .89 -0.13 0.88 -0.06 0.94
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) (  0.06 )
M inority N ationalism -0.40 •* 0 .67 -0.30 • 0 .74 -0.45 ** 0 6 4
(  0-10 ) (  0.13 ) ( 0 .17 )
B asque C ountry -0.50 • 0.61 -0.51 0.60 -0.46 0.63
( 0.21 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0.32 )
C atalonia 0.48 ** 1.61 0.35 * 1.42 0.43 * 1.54
( 0.14 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.18 )
Scotland 0.46 1.59 0 .50 1.65 -
( 0.26 ) ( 0.32 )
W ales 0.29 1.34 0.10 1.11 -
( 0.26 ) ( 0 .30 )
Racist A ttitudes -0.64 •  * 0 .53 *0.67 ** 0.51 -0.66 * • 0.52
( 0.05 ) (  0 .06 ) ( 0.08 )
C onstant -7.53 ** 0 .0 0 -3.90 + * 0.02 -2.05 • 0.13
( 1.03 ) ( 1.08 ) ( 0.97 )
Num ber o f  Cases 4990 3354 2318
Pseudo RA2 0.21 0.19 0.20
L R C h iA2 (d.f.) 1235,65 (25) 795.68 (30) 568.62 (32)
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) 
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
6.4. Interpretation of Results
I interpret the findings from section 6.3. by independent variable type and at both aggregate 
and country level. I first look at the effect o f the main independent variables, pride, European 
identity, nationalism and racism on support at aggregate and country level. I then analyse the
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effect o f the remainder o f the control variables at aggregate and country level, and w ith  
reference to other empirical studies. The full regression models are placed in tables 6.3. and  
6.3b. in section A.4. of the appendix.
6.4.1. The Im pact of Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism on S u p p o rt a t  
the Aggregate Level
At the aggregate level the impact o f the main independent variables tends to be consistent and  
in contrast, as we shall see below, to the more variable country level picture. Essentially, 
racism, nationalism and European identity act as predicted on the dependent variable w hile  
the national pride hypothesis can be rejected. After a summary of these raw findings, in  the 
remainder o f  the section I go on to interpret and explore the results using CLARIFY and  a 
variety o f other statistical approaches.
The raw aggregate level findings are that the main independent variables behave in a fa irly  
consistent way in models la - lc  in table 6.3. Hypothesis 1 and 5 concerning Europeaness and 
racism respectively are confirmed, while hypothesis 3 treating nationalism is confirmed for 
models la -lb . Both cultural and political pride are positively related to support fo r 
integration, so that we can reject hypothesis 27. The models themselves fit the data  
reasonably well, each one correctly predicting at least 75% of cases in the samples, while the 
X 2 statistic is strongly significant in each instance. As a simple check on the validity o f  the 
dependent variable I repeat the aggregate level analysis taking as dependent variable question 
(42) measuring respondents’ desires to either unite fully or preserve one’s country’s 
independence from the EU. Despite the different question wording and absence of date from 
Germany and Sweden the results are fairly similar; increasing levels of political pride are 
associated with a greater likelihood to support greater unity with the EU, while the opposite is 
true for higher levels o f  racism. The cultural pride and nationalism variables are not 
statistically significant.
7 In chapter seven I construct a model to measure non-attitudes using EB 42. Replacing the non-attitudes dependent variable 
with a modified version of question (3) to exclude all but pro and anti-integration sentiments but otherwise changing nothing 
from the model outlined in detail in section 7.5., the variable measuring national pride is positive, and significantly related to 
support for integration. The variable measuring European identity is also positively related to support, while the racism 
variable is strongly negatively related to support for integration. So, to the extent that the EB 42 survey measures the central 
concepts of pride, identity and racism (see section 7.5.3.) the results in this section are all confirmed.
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Reflecting on the rejection o f hypothesis 2, it appears that pride in one’s country and support 
for Europe are linked positively. How might one reconcile these findings with those in table 
5.12. that treat political and cultural pride and nationalism as part of the same factor, where 
nationalism is clearly linked with lower EU support? Moreover, from section 5.4.1. and
5.4.2. we see that cultural pride and nationalism can be explained by similar socio­
demographic factors. The explanation may lie in the fact that nationalism loads most heavily 
onto the ‘nation* factor extracted in table 5.12. Political and cultural pride are surely 
necessary yet not sufficient conditions for nationalist attitudes, and it may be that this 
relationship is reflected in the factor loadings.
Unlike for nationalism, it may be that political and cultural pride are based on a flexible sense 
o f national identity. Returning to some of the arguments raised in section 4.4., the link 
between pride and support for integration has an interesting parallel in the work of Risse et al. 
(1999). These authors argue that pro-European changes in citizens* identities often find their 
outlet in attitudes towards national or regional symbols and institutions. That is, since 
individuals hold multiple identities, one does not expect to find the emergence of a common 
European identity overcoming national identities, but rather the evolution o f collective 
European identities in addition to and strongly related with nation-state and regional 
identities. Thus for pro-European citizens one would expect to see a realignment of their 
existing national or regional identities towards Europe. Perhaps the clearest example of this 
phenomenon might be the increased propensity in some countries for European Union flags 
to appear alongside their national counterparts on public building and so forth. This implies a 
more dynamic, two-way causality than that shown here. However, one might well suppose 
that these identity changes might take place over a long period. The single time period data 
used here cannot tell us if the link between pride and integration is recent or longstanding, 
and hence whether it reflects the changes in nation-state identities so meticulously tracked by 
Risse et al.
If we assume that national pride and nationalism share a fixed conception o f national identity, 
the positive link between pride and support might be explained by the system legitimacy 
dimension to pride (see section 4.4. and 5.4.1.) Anderson (1998; see also section 3.4.) 
demonstrates a link between satisfaction with democracy and support for integration,
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although this is contested by Sânchez-Cuenca (2000). Moreover, table 5.12. offers ev id en ce  
of a system legitimacy dimension only to political pride and not to cultural pride. In  
summary, then, the finding that pride and support are linked resonates with the work o f  so m e  
theorists, although there is not the conclusive empirical evidence available to give a  f irm  
explanation to the phenomenon.
Continuing with the model analysis, one can attempt to gauge the overall explanatory p o w e r  
o f the key independent variables by noting the effect o f  their inclusion on the logit model. In  
table 6.4. below I present three logit models, the first with only the country d u m m ies  
included, followed by a second model with the main independent variables added. F inally , I 
run the standard logit model la , so that I can successively judge the impact o f the c o u n try  
dummies, the main independent variables and the controls on the explanatory power o f  th e  
model. To allow one to compare the log likelihood results between models, I keep th e  
number o f cases constant between models by excluding those cases not included in m odel l a ,  
which would ‘naturally’ include the fewest cases. Using this approach, one can also a tte m p t 
to see how successfully the main independent variables explain away inter-country 
differences in support. After all, the findings in the literature that did most to s tim u la te  
interest in the variables studied here were those in section 3.5. concerning national trad itions, 
where several authors found that, after controlling for a number of utilitarian explanations o f  
support, sizeable country differences in support remained. This technique is especially  
pertinent given that the ISSP data do not allow us to directly test European identity, p ride e t  
al. using the same variable list taken by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2000), and G a b e l 
(1995; 1998) in section 3.5. So, the only variable coefficients reported along with the m o d e l 
summary statistics are the country dummies.
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Table 6.4.1995 ISSP Independent variable impact on country dummies
Country dummies Conntry dummies + 
main variables
Model la.
b O dds ratio B Odds ra tio B O dds ratio
* *
Germany 0.90 * 2.46 1.02 * 2.78 1.05 ** 2.85
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 )
*
( 0.15 )
Great Britain 0.14 1.15 0.42 * 1.52 0.33 * 1.39
( 0.10 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.16 )
Austria -0.18 0.84 -0.32 0.73 -0.29 0.75
( 0.18 ) ( 0.20 )
*
( 0.21 )
Italy 2.15 * 8.61 3.12 * 22.69 2.99 00 19.82
( 0.11 )
0
( 0.14 )
*
( 0.15 )
Ireland 2.28 • 9.77 2.09 * 8.09 2.30 *• 10.00
( 0.40 ) ( 0.41 )
0
( 0.42 )
Netherlands 1.36 * 3.91 1.24 • 3.47 1.20 •* 3.30
( 0.18 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.22 )
Sweden -0.09 0.91 0.12 1.13 0.02 1.02
( 0.20 ) ( 0.22 ) ( 0.25 )
Number of Cases 4990 4990 4990
Log Likelihood -2593.22 -2297.10 -2284.57
LR ChiA2 (d.f.) 618.34(7) 1210.58(17) 1236.65(25)
Pseudo RA2 0.11 0.21 0.21
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below. 
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) 
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
It is clear the five dependent variables are good predictors o f support compared to the other 
variables included in the model: the increase in log likelihood between the country dummy 
only and country dummy + main variables models is much larger than between the country 
dummy + main variables model and model la, so that a chi-squared test of the log likelihood 
ratio between model la  and the main variables model is only just significant at the 0.05 level.
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Switching focus to inter-country differences in support, the inclusion o f  the explanatory 
variables in the second model seem i f  anything to have increased the coefficients for the fo u r  
statistically significant country dummies in the first model. However, given that the inclusion 
of the key independent variables improves the overall model, I suggest that the perseverance 
o f these significant coefficients can be explained by the more or less equal effect o f  
nationalism et a l  on each country, so that the relative differences in support still remain. In  
the case o f  Great Britain, controlling for the key independent variables even serves to reveal a  
significant country dummy coefficient that was not apparent before8.
Given that the inclusion o f  the main independent variable improves the explanatory power o f  
the model, I shift my attention to presenting in a clear fashion the strength o f  effect of th e se  
main logit coefficients. In figure 6.2. below I present a clear, crude overview o f  th e  
coefficients derived by modelling weighted individual independent variables one at a t im e  
against the dependent variable at the aggregate level, and with no control variables included. 
All things considered, it would appear that the European identity variable has the strongest 
impact on support, followed by racism  and then nationalism, while the impact o f political a n d  
cultural pride is the slightest o f the variables.
8 The dummy variable coefficients are calculated with reference to the omitted variable, in this case Spain. However, 
altering the omitted country variable does not substantially change the findings.
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Figure 6.2. 1995 ISSP Individual Impact of Independent Variables on Support for 
Integration at the Aggregate Level
To provide a more intuitive measure o f independent variable impact, one can translate logit 
regression coefficients into probabilities by adopting the simulation methodology o f King et 
al. (1998) outlined in section 5.4.1. As previously noted, this method of simulating the 
expected values or probabilities of the dependent variable makes for a more intuitive measure 
o f the real world impact o f the coefficients than, say, the expected log odds of a nationalist 
being in favour o f integration calculable from figure 6.2. above.
I proceed by setting the characteristics of an average respondent and varying one-by-one 
those independent variables of interest to us here. I begin by selecting model la  on the 
grounds o f its relative simplicity and because it includes all eight countries. The categorical 
nature o f the countries considered as a whole makes selecting a modal value meaningless and 
I remove all country dummies from model la. I then set age, sex, education, religion and the 
ISEI occupation variables to their modal values, giving a 40-49 year old female, Roman 
Catholic respondent, with an incomplete secondary school education9. As more or less 
continuous variables, I set political and cultural pride, European identity, nationalism,
9 For the principal ISEI occupation variable, the mean and the mode is 4J.5 (see section 5.2.6.). The occupation coding is 
such that several jobs are numbered either 43 or 44, such as Firefighters, Bookkeepers, Foremen and Airline stewardesses 
(Ganzeboom, Treiman and Lceuw, 1992). So, in this instance, there is no single, ‘average’ job that can be imputed to the 
imaginary respondent in the reference model. As a secondary, related point, 1 assume that the farmer and ISEI dummies are 
set to 0.
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minority nationalism and racism to their means, while I assume that the average respondent is 
not Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh. Whereas in the previous chapter I made do with 
increasing the main independent variables by one standard deviation and tabulating the 
results, here I vary by small increments each of the variables individually, and plot 
probability and 95% confidence intervals against the variable score. In addition, I m ark with 
a circle those data points that represent a one standard deviation shift either side o f the mean 
independent variable score. Where the mean is not more or less 0 (-0.65 for figure 6.5. and 
2.55 for figure 6.6.), this data point too is marked on the x-axis. Above the circle and 
confidence intervals marking the standard deviation shift in either direction from the mean, I 
add the accompanying percentage change in support between the two data points. This 
allows one to swiftly see the effect of a change in the independent variable on support. We 
can see the results in figures 6.3.-6.7. below. All the data points are statistically significant, 
and make use o f aggregate weighted data.
Figure 6.3. Probability of Support Integration by Political Pride Score (1995 ISSP)
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1
Figure 6.4. Probability of Supporting Integration by Cultural Pride Score (1995 ISSP)
Figure 6.5, Probability of Supporting Integration by European Identity Score (1 9 9 5  
ISSP)
Identity  Score
2 0 1
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Figure 6.6. Probability of Supporting Integration by Nationalism Score (1995 ISSP)
Figure 6.7. Probability of Supporting Integration by Racism Score (1995 ISSP)
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The five charts show unequivocally that national pride and relative Europeanness are linked 
with higher support for European integration, while nationalism and racism lower support. 
We can see from the graph slope and the percentage change in support resulting from  a 
standard deviation change in pride that the effect o f political and cultural pride on support is 
rather similar. Relative Europeanness has the strongest effect on support o f all the variables. 
As expected, relative Europeanness and support for integration are extremely closely related: 
there is no discrepancy between feeling European and supporting the European U nion, 
brought on by, say, frustration w ith the actual institutional working of the EU. Turning to 
nationalism and racism, the percentage change in support from a standard deviation change in 
the independent variable is similar in each case, as well as being roughly the same as the 
equivalent figures for political and cultural pride.
As well as discussing the standard deviation changes in the independent variables, one can  
see clearly that the linearity o f the variable slopes differs (compare, for instance, figure 6.6. 
with figure 6.7.). Of course, the log linear regression model will lead to a non-linear pattern  
in the x  variable when plotted against the y  variable. Nevertheless, we can see that n o n ­
linearity is most marked for European identity and racism, and less marked for national p ride  
and nationalism. For European identity, the effect on support of extremists o f both pro and 
anti European persuasions is relatively stronger than respondents with opinions closer to  the 
mean. For racism, only extreme racists have a stronger effect on support than respondents 
closer to the mean.
Another interpretation o f  the figures above concerns the variation in responses for a one 
standard deviation change in support either side o f the mean. That is, in figure 6.6. a one 
standard deviation shift in nationalism covers almost the entire response spectrum, so that 
there is far less consensus amongst respondents than, say, concerning racism. So, it appears 
that there is considerable variation in nationalist attitudes relative to the other concepts. 
Certainly, this fits with the notion that nationalism is a quite contested concept; by contrast, 
even if there are a small number o f  extreme racists in many societies, most people do not 
share their views.
Turning to the minority nationalism variable, the results are a reversal to those reported in 
chapter five. That is, while minority nationalists were shown to be more likely to feel
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relatively European than ordinary respondents, they are less likely to support European 
integration. For minority nationalists, there would appear to be some discrepancy between 
feeling European and supporting the European Union. Catalan respondents are the only 
exception to this rule, where overall they are very slightly more likely to support integration 
than normal respondents in two o f the three models (model la  -0.40 (Min. Nat. coef.) + 0.48 
(Catalan coef.) = 0.08; combined coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level).
In the previous chapter, the sociological foundations and the interrelationships between the 
five concepts on test were examined. In this chapter, measures o f  affective support are shown 
to be good predictors o f attitudes towards the European Union. The hypotheses regarding 
nationalism, European identity and racism were confirmed, while increasing levels of 
political and cultural pride were both linked with rising support for the EU, so invalidating 
hypothesis 2. Racist attitudes and relative pro or anti-Europeanness seem to have the 
strongest impact on support, while the nationalism variable is notable for the high amount of 
variance. O f the minority states, the post-sovereignty discourse seems to inform the feelings 
of many Catalans towards Europe, while Basques seem more old-fashioned believers in the 
nation-state.
The only other successful investigation o f  overall ‘affective* attitudes on support is conducted 
by Hewstone (1986). Here, the author demonstrates a positive relationship between affective 
support and European integration in aggregate level data from approximately 500 students 
sampled in the early 1980s from West Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. However, what 
Hewstone labels affective support is something of a misnomer in our context. The battery of 
eight questions used to construct this measure generally asks respondents about their 
willingness to make personal sacrifices for other European countries and confidence/trust in 
other countries and the EEC institutions (Hewstone, 1986, p. 165). This seems to measure 
only a rather mild form of attachment to Europe, and is perhaps closer to measures o f system 
legitimacy (see section 4.4.). Certainly, Hewstone’s measure o f  affective support is incapable 
of capturing strong identitative feelings such as nationalism. It would seem, then, that the 
findings presented herein are somewhat unique.
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6.4.2. The Impact of Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism on Support at 
the Country Level
We are able to view the country-specific permutations to the aggregate level results in table 
6.3b. of the appendix. All the main independent variable coefficients, where significant, act 
in the same direction as the aggregate level and to this extent do not alter any of the findings 
from the preceding section (see also table 6.5.). However, while political pride, European 
identity and racism are significant for most o f the eight countries, nationalism only achieves 
significance for Great Britain, and cultural pride is only significant in the Netherlands and 
Austria. In the remainder o f  this section, I shall try to shed light on any variations in variable 
performance on a country-by-country basis. However, I do this without attempting to  
exhaustively test any hypotheses that might exist in the scholarly literature concerning a 
particular country’s relationship w ith Europe. Rather the country summaries provide a quick 
overview o f  the findings and aim to raise some ideas that may in themselves be a boost to 
further research.
We can see the extent to which the country level findings support the aggregate results b y  
considering table 6.5. Here, the coefficients for each independent variable at the country and 
at the aggregate level are reported (as taken from table 6.3. and 6.3b.).
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Table 6.5. 1995 ISSP Aggregate and C ountry Level Findings in Comparison
Variables Identity Political Pride Cultural Pride Nationalism Racism
Aggregate
(Model la)
0.46 0.49 0.21 -0.12 -0.64
Germany 0.40 0.43 0.20 0.02 -0.87
GB 0.60 0.89 -0.37 -0.52 -0.98
Austria 0.67 1.06 0.56 -0.03 -0.71
Italy 0.19 -0.01 0.21 -0.05 -0.69
Ireland -0.28 0.88 0.49 -0.36 -1.42
Netherlands 0.64 0.50 0 3 7 0.02 -0.26
Spain 0.42 1.14 0.29 -0.12 -0.35
Sweden 0.83 0.48 0.27 -0.21 -0.25
Significant coefficients at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) or better are highlighted in bold
From table 6.4. we already know that the main independent variables are good predictors of 
support compared to the other variables included in the model. This table makes clear that 
for most o f the variables there is remarkable consistency between countries: identity, political 
and cultural pride have a positive coefficient for seven o f  eight countries, the racism 
coefficient is always negative and the nationalism coefficient is negative in six o f eight cases. 
Given this impressive consistency between country coefficients, I am curious to see whether 
insignificant coefficients that are not too close to zero are generally paired with small sample 
sizes. In fact, the number o f respondents who are very culturally proud or racist is often 
rather low10. However, it is hard to draw any conclusions from these figures, as they are 
scarcely different from those for the political pride and European identity, for which most 
coefficients are statistically significant. For nationalism the variable is split into quartiles, so
101 identify respondents with high levels o f cultural pride and racism by referring not to the variable generated from factor 
analysis but rather an attitude scale constructed from questions (21)-(24) and (32)-(37) respectively. Respondents who score 
13+/] 6 for cultural pride and 24+/30 are deemed to be very cultural proud or racist (see footnote 28 from chapter 5 for more 
detailed information on this method).
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we know in advance that low sample size will not be a problem for more nationalist 
respondents.
Interpreting the findings from table 6.5. we see that for all countries except Italy political 
pride is positively and significantly related to support for integration, this is only true for 
cultural pride in Austria and the Netherlands. While it is not immediately apparent why 
cultural pride is only significant for these two countries, I note that for the remainder of the 
countries save Great Britain the cultural pride coefficient is at least positive, if  insignificant. 
This negative, insignificant cultural pride coefficient for Great Britain is not anomalous if  one 
considers that Britain is the only country in which nationalist attitudes are significant. Could 
it be that pride in sport, history, the armed forces and so forth may have acquired nationalist 
connotations in Britain, just as has pride in one’s currency (see section 6.2.3.)? Moreover, 
the finding that nationalism is only significant in Great Britain shows that, for Austria and 
Sweden, both relatively new entrants to the European Union in 1995 and with extremely low 
levels o f support for membership, nationalism would not seem like the decisive factor in 
explaining support. At least for Sweden, the decisive factor is surely the debate over welfare 
state reform (see section 6.4.4.).
Italy is the only country in which neither political nor cultural pride is significant. For what it 
is worth, the political pride coefficient is even slightly negative. We have seen in section
5.2.3. that for Italy mean levels o f political pride are far below the average, while mean levels 
of cultural pride are above average. It is tempting, if  a little presumptuous, to suggest that 
cultural pride acts as a substitute in some way for political pride, with Italians defining 
themselves more in terms o f their cultural and sporting achievements that in their political 
institutions. Secondly, being strongly pro-integration, as many Italians indubitably are, does 
not seem to rule out some respondents linking racism and integration (for further evidence 
see Hewstone, 1986, p. 154). Indeed, one might even suppose that European integration, 
perhaps through a resultant increase in the freedom o f  movement o f  persons, has increased 
racist attitudes. From section 5.4.4., both racist and nationalist attitudes in Italy were at least 
partially linked to Catholicism. However, in both Germany and Ireland high support for 
integration is also juxtaposed with a role for racist attitudes, where Catholicism was not 
shown to be a factor. In the case o f Ireland, it would seem that even if  average levels o f
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racism are extremely low (see figure 5.6.), those respondents who are racist are extremely 
virulent in their opinions.
Sweden and Italy are the only countries in the survey where minority nationalism is 
significant. The coefficient is strongly negative in both cases: for Italy the anti-integration 
minority nationalists in question might be Lega Nord or perhaps the rather less numerous real 
national minorities in Italy, in Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d’Aosta and Fruili-Venezia-Giulia. 
In the case of Sweden, the only minority nationalist voter block would seem to be the 
Scanians (see section 5.4.2.). These findings are somewhat surprising, given that from table 
5.8b we can see that Italian, Swedish (and German) minority nationalists tend to be pro- 
European. One possible explanation for a pro-European, but anti-integration point o f view is 
dissatisfaction with the current institutional arrangements or direction o f the EU. This points 
to a possible question-wording effect, as minority nationalists, who are pro-European 
generally, feel unable to see integration as benefiting their country whilst their minority 
nations have still not achieved statehood. However, without a further in-depth analysis of 
minority nationalism in the ISSP survey it is hard to come to firm conclusions on this point. 
Secondly, it is perhaps surprising that minority nationalism is not significant in Great Britain 
or Spain, where the distinct national minorities in the two countries originally lead to the 
inclusion o f the minority nationalism variable in the first place. However, the dummy 
variables for Catalonia and the Basque country do achieve significance in the aggregate level 
model, suggesting that while the difference in support derived from residing in either o f these 
regions is not significant within Spain, where support for the EU is fairly lukewarm (see 
figure 6.1.), at the EU level this difference does become significant. Because support in 
Spain is relatively low at around 55% (see figure 6.1.), the significance of the country 
dummies at the aggregate level might come from the lower level of variance at the aggregate 
level, where support is around 71%.
So, at the country level there is a remarkable degree o f  directional consistency between all the 
coefficients. On the other hand, racism, European identity and political pride tend to be 
significant far more frequently than cultural pride and nationalism, suggesting an ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ core of variables. Certainly at the aggregate level, racism and European identity 
seemed to have the strongest effect on support. We have also seen that minority nationalism 
has a negative effect on support in Italy and Sweden, quite the opposite to its impact on
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European identity in section 5.4.2, Again for Italy, as well as Ireland and Germany, a pro­
integration stance is not incompatible with often quite strong racist attitudes amongst 
segments the population. Great Britain appears the most nationalist country in the sample, 
where these attitudes might even have spilt over into cultural pride.
6.4.3. Aggregate Level Control Variables
At the aggregate level those control variables that are most use in explaining support for 
integration seem to be age, sex, occupation, and some strands o f political affiliation. In 
addition, it is interesting to note those hypotheses disproved by the ISSP data, notably 
sections o f Inglehart’s post-modernism enterprise and the impact o f farmers on support
Occupation (ISEI score) is the most consistently significant control variable in the aggregate 
dataset. From the ISEI occupational index described in section 5.2.6., support increases with 
job status, so that a rise on the scale from the mean (43.5) to the top category (90 - Judges) 
results in a hefty rise in the likelihood o f  supporting integration (an increase o f approximately 
90% at around 2% for each unit). Excepting model la, the dummy variable is insignificant, 
suggesting that there is no difference in support between those who declare an occupation and 
those respondents who do not declare an occupation, possibly because there are not 
participating in the labour force. One should remember, however, in interpreting this variable 
that data is available only for Germany, Austria, Spain and Ireland: for other countries the 
missing data is coded as the mean score.
Age and sex both hold positive, significant coefficients in models lb  and lc. Older, male 
voters tend to be more pro-integration. We can use this information to reject Inglehart’s two 
hypotheses recounted in section 3.4.; that younger generations will be more pro-European 
both because o f  the link between affluence and education, which leads to higher levels o f 
political skills, and because of post-war socialisation against nationalism. However, because 
the ISSP survey is conducted over only one time period, it is not possible to distinguish 
between cohort or life cycle differences in support for integration. Another hypothesis that 
can be rejected on the basis o f the ISSP data is the hostility o f farmers to integration, where 
the variable in question is insignificant in models la -lc .
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Political affiliation has a fairly marked impact on support for integration, with respondents 
categorised as far left or ‘other’ being significantly more anti-European in model lb  with 
respect to leftists, who comprise the omitted category. Indeed, in model lc  all coefficients 
except right-wing support are significant and negative. However, it should be bom in mind 
that by switching the omitted variable we can show that left-wing respondents are the most 
pro-European category of respondents, hence the tendency for other political affiliation 
categories to show negative coefficients11. Given the pro-European tendency of left-wing 
respondents, these findings can be taken as cautious support for a difference between left and 
right wing respondents towards European integration. At least in 1995, then, the left-right 
wing divide is not obsolete in understanding support for integration (for a different view see 
Hix (1994) in section 3.4.). Moreover, the findings also tend to support research based on 
Eurobarometer surveys from 1975-1992 by Gabel, who demonstrates a negative link between 
support for integration and electoral support for anti-system political parties (see section 3.3.). 
It may also be the case that support for far right parties can be seen as a proxy for racism, so 
that the findings could be used in support o f hypotheses 4. Certainly, table 5.10 in section 
A.3. of the appendix shows that right-wing respondents are more likely to be racist. So, these 
results can be imputed to the aggregate level with the proviso that data for Italy is missing. 
Briefly turning to subjective social class, working class respondents are less supportive of 
integration with respect to the omitted category, middle-class respondents. There is no 
similar relationship between lower class respondents and support.
6.4.4, Country Level Control Variables
Section 6.4.3. has already afforded us a glimpse into the country effects o f control variables 
on support. Here I interpret the results from table 6.3b. in section A.4. o f the appendix 
displaying support for integration models by country. Again, this is not an exercise in testing 
existent hypotheses but rather a summary and reflection on the available information. *
n The rationale behind choosing left-wing respondents to comprise the omitted variable is the high number of respondents in 
this category, where for some categories there are often just a few or even no respondents.
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For Germany the only significant control variables are age, sex and occupation. As noted in 
the section above, although it is clear that older people are more pro-EU, it is not clear 
whether this is a life cycle or cohort effect.
In Italy females are more likely to be pro-European than males, while the lower one’s 
education, the more likely one is to support integration. It is hard to speculate as to the 
psychological processes at work behind these results, although one might speculate that the 
European Union is associated with increased employment for the low skilled or unemployed. 
Unfortunately, occupation data is not available for Italy to control for this effect and shed 
further light upon this notion.
Swedish data throw into doubt whether or not some aggregate level findings are not in fact 
country level findings. In certainly seems possible that the extremely strong impact of the far 
left and conservatives in Sweden could have influenced the reduced sample (models lb-lc). 
The strong coefficients seem likely to have arisen from the debate over Union membership 
and the implications for welfare state reform in Sweden (Goldmann and Gilland, 2001). The 
coding o f the ISSP survey means that the far left respondents who are so strongly anti- 
European are in fact Green party supporters. Supporters o f the Conservative party are 
exceptionally pro-European, with a 139% increase in the likelihood of support for integration 
over respondents professing left party attachment. However, the opinions on integration for 
supporters o f the Social Democratic party, categorised in the data as left-wing, which 33% of 
Swedish respondents felt closest to, as compared to 18% for the Conservatives and 4% for the 
Greens, was not significantly different to centrists or those with no professed party 
attachment. This may well reflect the internal dissent at the time within the ruling Social 
Democratic Party,
Spain is the only country in which farmers have a significant impact on support for 
integration. Farmers are far less likely to support integration than non-farmers. The two 
immediate questions that spring to mind are, why are fanners less likely to support 
integration, and why is this result only significant in Spain? One possible explanation, which 
would account for the fanner variable not being significant in the other countries surveyed, is 
the relative impact o f the CAP in Mediterranean and northern European countries. Spain is 
the biggest olive oil producer in the world and, although recent reform to the olive oil sector
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outside the framework of Agenda 2000 seems to have firmly linked subsidies to production, 
we know from section 3.3. that the CAP heavily prioritises northern European foodstuffs such 
as cereals over crops typically produced in the south of Europe. For instance, recent 
expenditure by the EAGGF on olive oil constitutes only 6.6% o f total spending, while 43% is 
spent on arable crop support (Official Journal of the European Communities C 349, 1999, p. 
xii).
In summary, although the overall impact o f the country level models is positive, as witnessed 
by the goodness-of-fit tests, the controls themselves do not an enormous amount to our 
understanding of support. Indeed, for Ireland, no control variables are significant. Looking 
at table 6.3b., one o f  the most striking factors is how many categories, especially for the 
categorical variables such as political affiliation and subjective social class are not available 
or highly insignificant. Aside from the high number o f  missing variables, it seems that for 
many categories there are simply not enough cases available. This is particularly evident for 
the extreme right and left political categories, as well as for upper class respondents. In these 
cases, the log-odds ratios are often very high, while the number o f cases under consideration 
for each category often is in single figures. Of course, it may be that some controls that 
cannot be included here, especially testing utilitarian explanations o f support, may have 
proved to be significant.
6.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have shown in this chapter how the existing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between pride, European identity, nationalism, racism and support is 
characterised neither by its depth nor by its robustness. Spurred on by this academic lacuna, I 
show that racism and nationalism are indeed negatively related to support for integration, 
whereas relative Europeanness and political and cultural pride are positively related to 
support. Except for national pride, these findings confirm the hypotheses constructed in 
chapter four. Aside from falsifying hypothesis 2, the political and cultural pride finding are 
in keeping with the work of Müller-Peters reviewed above. Moreover, the behaviour of pride 
could well be a manifestation o f Risse et aV  s (1999) expectation that national identities adapt 
themselves in the face of changing perceptions of Europe.
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Especially at the country level, the impact of European identity, political pride and racism 
tends to be more consistent and stronger than that o f nationalism and cultural pride. Given 
the high percentage o f Europeans who openly declare themselves to be racist (see section
6.2.5.) as compared to the fairly mild absolute levels of xenophobia in the ISSP survey (see 
figure 5.5.) perhaps it is the strength o f racist rather than nationalist attitudes that are the main 
affective obstacle towards support for further integration between EU member states.
Although the control variables as a whole are shown not to add a great deal of explanatory 
power to our model, age, sex, political affiliation and occupation are the most relatively 
powerful controls explaining support. However, as with the key independent variables, there 
are often a number o f country level alternations to this picture. Although I did not set out to 
test other explanations of support for integration, it is nevertheless easily notable that some 
popular theories o f  support are not confirmed by the analysis. Farmers are not seen to hold 
different views o f  integration compared to other respondents, while the fact that support tends 
to increase with age tends to act against Inglehart’s notion that younger generations will be 
more pro-integration.
Caveats to these results include the lack o f (especially economic) control variables, and to 
this we can add the lack of comparison over different time periods that is a particular strength 
of the Eurobarometer surveys. We might also add the opinions may well have changed since 
1995, the date o f  the execution of the survey. It is to be regretted that the ISSP survey does 
not include other European countries renowned to be jealous o f sharing their sovereignty with 
Europe such as Denmark, or even such countries that have not joined the Union as yet where 
concerns over sovereignty might readily be seen as a reason why. On the other hand, for 
Austria and Sweden, both relatively new entrants to the European Union in 1995 and with 
extremely low levels of support for membership, nationalism would not seem like the 
decisive factor in explaining support.
7. NON-ATTITUDES TOW ARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
7.1. Chapter Aim and Summary
In this chapter I complete the analysis o f public opinion towards European integration by 
focusing on non-attitudes.
I begin in section 7.2. with a summary o f  over fifty years o f debate on public attitude­
holding, largely concerning matters o f foreign policy. The crux o f this debate revolves 
around understanding whether much public opinion can be interpreted as stable, 
consistent and relevant to policy-makers. Although it is eminently useful in the light o f 
earlier thesis chapters to examine theories that view public opinion as not entirely random 
and inconsistent, in this chapter the key point is to highlight those factors that explain so- 
called non-attitudes, where they can be shown to exist in public opinion data. I identify 
in the literature political knowledge, interest in politics, education and income as key 
explanatory factors. In sections 7.4. to 7.6. respectively I move on to formally 
hypothesise, model and then test the key explanatory factors for non-attitudes on 
aggregate and country-level data from Eurobarometer 42 (2nd half 1994). I select 
Eurobarometer data above ISSP data for the simple reason that the latter survey does not 
allow one to directly test a definition o f non-attitudes towards European integration. I 
also present an empirical exposé o f the level o f non-attitudes towards integration in 
Eurobarometer data in section 7.3. After all, if  non-attitudes are not particularly 
pervasive our interest in them diminishes.
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In summary, logit regression analysis shows non-attitudes to be negatively related to 
higher levels o f the socio-demographic variables interest, knowledge and education. At 
least at the aggregate level, there is also a clear gender and age difference amongst 
respondents, with older males being more likely to hold an attitude than younger females. 
Interestingly, higher levels of national pride and European identity are also linked with a 
lower propensity to hold non-attitudes. Because higher levels o f  these variables are also 
associated with support for European integration, it seems that pride and identity may 
have a strong enough effect on respondents to ‘convert’ non-attitudes into positive 
support for integration.
7.2. A Theory o f Non-Attitudes
Understanding the debate about the stability, structure and relevance o f  mass attitudes 
means first addressing two more-or-less polarised viewpoints: the so-called Almond- 
Lippmann consensus views public opinion as at best superficial, while the revisionist 
critique grants public attitudes more depth and structure. Between these two positions, 
authors such as Zaller (1992) and Delli Carpini et al. (1996) posit ‘spur o f the moment’ 
mass attitude generation. Following Sinnott (2000), I make sense of these stances by 
viewing attitudes and non-attitudes not as a brutal dichotomy but rather as being located 
at either end o f a real-to-random continuum. Although this conclusion helps to validate 
the public opinion findings from earlier chapters, I am more interested here in drawing 
out from the diverse approaches surveyed those factors responsible for encouraging mass 
attitude formation and, conversely, promoting non-attitudes. These factors include 
question-wording effects and levels o f  education, information and interest in politics 
amongst respondents.
The Almond-Lippmann consensus, for a long time the conventional wisdom concerning 
public foreign policy attitudes, broadly makes the case that public attitudes are so ill- 
informed, unstructured, unstable and irrelevant to policy-makers that they may as well be
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described as ‘non-attitudes’. As Holsti (1992) so well describes, the origin o f this 
viewpoint lies in the conflict between the realist school o f international relations and a 
more liberal-democratic tradition. According to a stream of thought that can be traced 
back to Bentham and Kant, and which was first embodied at a high political level by 
President Wilson, the foreign policies o f democracies tend to be peaceful, at least in part 
because the public can play a constructive role in constraining leaders who might 
otherwise be tempted to yield to their war-making proclivities (Holsti, 1992, p. 440). 
Most memorably railing against this, first Lippmann and then Almond drew attention to 
the risks of trusting the public with such a role, especially in a nuclear age. Lippmann, 
writing as a journalist and political commentator, portrays the common man as neither 
sufficiently informed by the media nor, due to the daily requirements o f earning a living, 
sufficiently interested to properly participate in foreign policy-making (1922). 
Supplementing this approach, on Almond’s ‘mood theory’ public opinion is invariably 
indifferent to foreign policy issues and only responds to immediate threats (1950). With 
the pressure removed opinion tends to snap back and this ‘moody’ volatility in opinion 
was not interpreted as constructive to foreign policy formulation (Shapiro and Page, 
1988, p. 212). The clear implication o f  this volatility is that policy-makers can and 
should ignore mass opinion.
For a long time, the definitive empirical contribution to the study of mass beliefs was 
provided by Converse, where on the basis o f American Panel Study data from the 1950s 
the author showed that as many as 80% o f Americans were without attitudes on important 
issues o f the day. Specifically, Converse hypothesised that as one moves down from elite 
sources o f belief systems the quality and range o f information held by people decreases. 
As a consequence, the character o f the objects in a belief system shifts from the more 
abstract to the increasingly simple, the range of belief systems become narrower and 
‘constraint’ declines1. Coupled with the psychological predisposition o f respondents to
1 Constraint is taken to mean the interdependence that exists between different attitudes. For instance, there is a logical 
constraint on attitudes concerning public spending and taxation. Other constraints might be loosely ideological or 
social, and require internal consistency. Dynamic constraints refer to the probability that a change in belief about an 
object would require some compensating change in attitudes elsewhere in an actor’s belief system. Lack o f information 
fuels lack o f constraint, so that amongst the mass public one finds a narrow cluster o f ideas amongst which little, even
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attempt to conceal their ignorance rather than admit they do not understand an issue (see 
also Rossi, Wright and Anderson, 1983, p. 212), the result is that people tend to offer 
meaningless opinions that vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time 
(Converse in Apter, 1964, p. 245). These opinions are characterised by Converse as 
‘non-attitudes’ as opposed to true attitudes. So, the conventional viewpoint brings out the 
insight that random ‘non-attitudes’ or moody, volatile responses arise because the 
average citizen is simply not interested or informed enough to possess well thought-out 
attitudes towards foreign policy. In addition, Converse recognises that information is 
perhaps only an intermediate variable in explaining non-attitudes. Prior to this factors 
such as education, implicit in his ordering o f belief systems from elite to mass levels, as 
well as specialised interests and tastes are seen as important (Converse in Apter, 1964, p. 
212-3).
Converse’s work has provoked many responses both from a methodological and more 
theoretical standpoint. Underpinning Converse’s empirical results is the Black-White 
model, which makes the rather strong assumption that the population can be divided into 
two sharply contrasting subsets: a minority proportion o f the population giving exactly 
the same response over time (in practise a period o f many years), and a majority 
submitting random responses. A number o f other methodological criticisms have been 
attached to this model, including the measurement of stability over time and concerns 
over the effect o f question wording (see, for example, Achen, 1975 and Brooks, 1994). 
Some authors, while accepting as legitimate Converse’s focus on whether citizens have 
attitudes towards a subject in the first place, attempt to shift the debate towards a more 
realistic understanding of public involvement in politics than that afforded by the Black- 
White model. As Converse acknowledges, the Black-White model leaves no room for 
the ‘grey’ area o f meaningful change o f  position or ‘conversion* (Converse in Apter, 
1964, p. 243). Brooks floats the idea o f a ‘selectively* political citizen, where non­
attitudes are less a function o f issue complexity and lack o f information than the current 
interests and concerns of an individual. As an adjunct to this argument, some theorists
logical, constraint is felt. Opinions may be inconsistent, subject to change and less responsive to objectively relevant 
information.
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have labelled the 1950s a particularly quiet historical period, marking the ‘end o f 
ideology* (Holsti, 1992, p. 458). Compared then with the turbulent 1960s, the prevalence 
of non-attitudes is unsurprising.
Another more nuanced effort to understanding attitude formation is set out by Hurwitz 
and Peffley (1987; 1992; see also Wittkopf in Munton and Rattinger, 1991). With a nod 
to the social psychological approaches covered in section 4.3. respondents are viewed as 
cognitive misers who rely on information shortcutting strategies or cognitive heuristics in 
an attempt to improve on their limited capacities (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, p. 1103)2. 
Paucity o f information held by the public on matters o f foreign policy, which the authors 
at no point challenge, is less an illustration o f non-attitudes but rather o f simplification to 
aid understanding. In common with stereotyping, then, lack o f  knowledge assumes a 
certain rationality. The result is that while constraint might not be found at the level o f 
specific and immediate issues, US foreign policy opinions are often stable where they can 
be related to an underlying, abstract value. There is a further parallel here with Easton’s 
understanding of diffuse and specific support outlined in section 2.2.2., where survey 
questions that tap into diffuse support are seen as less likely to give volatile responses. 
Indeed, we can see from figure 2.1. that question (1), which asks respondents if they 
support European integration in the most general terms, registers a far higher and more 
stable level o f support than question (4), which focuses on a more specific measure o f 
support (see figure 2.6.). So, the lesson here is that the less a question requires a 
predefined level o f knowledge and the more it taps into a respondent’s value-system, the 
more stable responses we can expect.
An alternative tack is a focus on the reasonableness o f aggregate rather than individual 
level public opinion. Shapiro and Page use data from over 6000 survey questions posed 
over the period 1935-1982 by five major survey organisations to argue that aggregate 
measures o f  US foreign and domestic policy opinion have been remarkably stable over
2 A similar approach is advanced by Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991). These authors also accept in a head-on 
way the information-deficiencies o f the public, but argue the public can still arrive at reasoned opinions . According to 
their education and levels o f information and awareness, members of the public reason with the aid o f a variety of more 
or less sophisticated heuristical, or shortcutting, techniques.
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time, so that o f  the 20% o f questions that were asked more than once well over half 
showed less than a modest 6% shift in responses from one period to another (1988). 
Where public opinion does change more sharply, or even reverses over a short period of 
time, Shapiro and Page place the data in a historical context to suggest that these changes 
have generally has been the result o f the incorporation of new information. For instance, 
the sharp decrease in public support for the Vietnam War in 1968 is placed in the context 
o f the increasingly successful progress o f  the Tet offensive (1988, p.234). Certainly, the 
Eurobarometer findings in section 2.3. would seem to bear out the point that, at the 
aggregate level, opinions can be rather stable. However, Shapiro and Page’s argument 
rests on the assumption that much individual-level instability cancels itself out at the 
aggregate level, the corollary o f this being that at the individual level, on which this 
chapter is focused, instability remains. So, this approach cannot be used to address the 
all-important question o f why and how individuals change their minds on an issue . The 
revisionist approach, then, although it challenges the Almond-Lippmann consensus, 
builds on its insights into the causes o f non-attitudes. There is, for instance, no 
opposition to the idea that the public is poorly informed about foreign affairs, nor that 
ceteris paribus a better informed public would make for more stable opinion (Holsti, 
1992, p. 447). In common with the conventional approach, political knowledge and 
education levels are seen as promoting attitude holding, while the work of Hurwitz and 
Peffley focuses our attention on whether the question posed is more abstract or specific.
The most recent wave of theorising has painted the distinction between attitudes and non­
attitudes as a somewhat false dichotomy by arguing that the notion o f attitude stability is 
a fuzzy one. That is, the search for some underlying ‘true attitude’ is mistaken; people 
rather possess a “series o f partially independent and often inconsistent ones” (Zaller, 
1992, p. 93; see also Delli Carpini et al.t 1996, p. 229). This is based on a revised 
understanding o f individuals as ‘ideologically inconsistent’, where there is no reason to 3
3 A further caveat to Shapiro and Page’s work is that the public seems to react just as readily to biased as unbiased 
information. The authors declare themselves agnostic over whether public opinion changes are a response to false or 
correct information. Moreover, many opinion changes were seemingly taken on cues from political leaders, implying 
that the public can be manipulated. Evidently this leads to a picture of the public as only so sophisticated.
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suppose that just because a person might feel, say, pro-abortion the same individual need 
not feel comfortable with killing foetuses (Zaller, 1992, p. 93). Even if  one feels that this 
is rather an example o f two different aspects to the same policy issue where views need 
not coincide, the implications are the same; individuals are very sensitive to survey 
question wording and context, which might explain response variability even for 
identically worded questions4. In the same vein, Zaller argues that opinions can be 
constructed on the spot during an interview, and that such a construction need not 
necessarily be random (Zaller, 1992, p. 33). Delli Carpini et a l  concur with this position, 
and go on to argue that knowledge is the key explanatory factor in determining the 
quality o f opinions. The authors posit that the link between opinions, attitudes and values 
is facilitated by knowledge, or accurate beliefs, so that the opinions of better-informed 
citizens should be more consistent (Delli Carpini et al., 1996, p. 236). Moreover, more 
knowledgeable citizens will be able to parse new information more consistently with their 
values and possess opinions on a wider range of subjects. The authors provide a wide 
range o f evidence from the US to show that a higher level o f  knowledge is a strong 
predictor o f opinion structure, stability, responsiveness to new information and 
opinionation - that is, the number o f issues on which the respondent provides an opinion 
rather than a ‘Don’t Know* response (Delli Carpini et a l 1996, p. 230-7).
The first conclusion from these successive waves o f theorising is that, with the 
appropriate caveats, opinions can be held to be representative o f underlying attitudes. 
However, rather than make an ‘either/or’ declaration for each opinion, the issue of ‘true 
attitudes* versus ‘non-attitudes* can be seen as a matter o f degree (Sinnott, 2000, p. 116). 
One might imagine a continuum with ‘non-attitudes’ at one extreme and ‘true attitudes’ at 
the other. Secondly, those factors which appear in the literature to have most hold over 
individual attitude-holding include the level o f an individual’s knowledge, an individual’s
4 Zaller and others have also focused in more detail on survey design by criticising the non-attitudes thesis as arising 
specifically out of measurement error. Indeed, as Zaller points out, where measurement ‘error’ typically constitutes 
one-half to three-quarters of the variance o f opinion items in empirical studies, one wonders if this is not rather a 
euphemism for ‘unexplained variance’ (1992, p. 32). Chief amongst the potential causes o f this variance are question- 
wording effects and response effects such as the race of the interviewer that distort respondents’ essentially stable 
attitudes (see also Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991). However, these effects may be offset in surveys measuring 
levels of knowledge by guessing, which acts to overstate individuals’ levels of knowledge (Delli Carpini et al.. 1996, p. 
66).
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interest in politics, an individual’s level o f education, question-wording and the 
abstractness o f the question. I follow up on these findings by hypothesising on individual 
non-attitude formation in section 7.4. Finally, the discussion o f  non-attitudes throws new 
light on the permissive consensus discussed in section 1.3.2. and 2.4. To the extent that 
the public holds non-attitudes towards integration, the notion o f European publics 
consciously abiding by a permissive consensus towards European integration becomes 
more and more untenable.
7.3. Non-Attitudes Amongst the European Publics
Because much o f the theory and evidence concerning non-attitudes comes from 
discussions surrounding US foreign policy, often centred on the Cold War, one might 
legitimately ask whether all this is applicable to the European Union. Despite the 
methodological problems associated with measuring non-attitudes in the Eurobarometer 
and ISSP data, the evidence suggests that non-attitudes towards European integration are 
a widespread phenomenon.
From a theoretical perspective, one might argue that non-attitudes towards European 
integration are o f  more relevance than non-attitudes towards US foreign policy. Even if 
as, say, a liberal democrat one believes that the public should play an important role in 
foreign policy, and many people do not hold this view, the reality has often been that the 
public has been marginalized in such matters (Holsti, 1992, p. 454). On the other hand, 
the steady expansion of the European Union has meant that, over the decades, the 
importance o f public opinion has assumed a degree o f centrality in the integration 
process. One need only think o f the frequency o f domestic referenda on EU treaties and 
the increased role played by a directly elected European Parliament (see section 1.4.). 
Indeed, on the understanding o f some authors, the EU is best conceived as a domestic- 
politics system, with a concomitant promotion in the importance o f the role played by 
public opinion (Hix, 1994).
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While non-attitudes might be thought of as especially relevant to the study o f European 
integration, their measurement is not particularly straightforward. There is little 
controversy over exactly what a non-attitude is; essentially an opinion, or lack of opinion, 
which indicates the absence of an underlying attitude in a respondent. However, we have 
seen how in practise attitudes and non-attitudes are best viewed as a continuum. The 
implications are that making a judgement on non-attitudes involves considering all the 
factors that might affect attitude holding, and accepting a loss o f  certainty in the final 
result. Having said this, the aggregate level empirical data would seem to bear out 
Shapiro and Page’s point that opinions can be rather stable (1988). To illustrate this, I 
reproduce below Eurobarometer question (1).
Figure 7.1. Question (1) -  Support (EU 10) (EB 1978-1997)
Unfortunately, as already noted in the previous section, aggregate findings cannot shed 
light on the individual level picture and are ultimately not useful in this context. The two 
principal survey series used in this thesis, the Eurobarometer and ISSP National Identity 
studies, obviously provide individual level data. However, identifying non-attitudes is far 
from straightforward as for many survey questions regarding attitudes towards integration
222
7. Non-Attitudes Towards European Integration
it is unclear whether non-attitudes or simple indecision is being measured. For instance, 
question (4), which is used in the ISSP National Identity and Eurobarometer survey 
contains no response category that one could definitely point to as capturing non­
attitudes.
(4) “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on 
balance benefited or not from being a member o f  the European Community (Common 
Market)?”
Respondents who do not wish to state that their country ‘Benefits’ or ‘Does Not Benefit’ 
from being a member of the EU can respond that they have ‘Never Heard of the EU’ or 
that they ‘Don’t Know’. While only very small percentages o f  respondents, typically less 
than 2% in each EU country, confess to having never heard o f  the EU, for Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands ‘Don’t Know’ is the second highest response category (see figure
7.2. below). The uncertainty over whether the ‘Don’t Know’ category measures 
indecision or non-attitudes means that I categorise these responses ‘non-committed’ 
rather than non-attitudes, and is the reason why I do not use ISSP data in the statistical 
analysis o f non-attitudes that follows in sections 7.5. to 7.6.
Figure 7.2. Non-Committed Attitudes in the 1995 ISSP Data
I IDFC
KSflD o es no t benefit
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As regards the Eurobarometer survey series, from section 2.2.4. we can see that questions
(1) and (5) do not even include a ‘neutral* response category, leaving just questions (2) 
and (3) amongst the frequently posed questions on respondents’ attitudes towards 
European integration. For question (2), respondents can evaluate their country’s 
membership o f the EU as a ‘good thing’, a ‘bad thing’ or as ‘neither good nor bad’.
(2) “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European 
Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?”
Because the wording o f this final category asks respondents to evaluate the good and bad 
points to integration, this would imply a more reasoned sort of indifference to integration, 
so that the ‘No Reply’ category for this question might well capture non-attitudes. On the 
other hand, for question (3) respondents are asked whether they would be ‘very sorry’, 
‘relieved’ or ‘indifferent’ were the EU scrapped.
(3) “If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you 
be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?” I
I argue that in this case the indifferent category is not a reasoned form of ‘non- 
committed’ attitude, this form o f  evaluation can be largely attributed to the ‘don’t know’ 
category, but instead captures the feeling o f not caring about the EU. Because I am only 
able to make the theoretical and not empirical case that indifference measures non­
attitudes rather than non-committed attitudes, this risk must remain an as important 
caveat to the results. Figures 7.3. and 7.4. display non-attitudes as identified in questions 
(2) and (3) respectively.
224
7. Non-Attitudes Towards European Integration
Figure 7.3. Question (2) -  EU 10 (EB 1973-1993) (Formerly Figure 2.2.)
.............G ood Bad —  N either
■ » ' N o  Reply m m -N et Support
Figure 7.4. Question (3) -  EU 12 (EB 1985-1995)
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Figure 7.3. suggests that non-attitudes have been running at a modest 5-10% over the 
lifetime o f the question. However, in figure 7.4. indifferent responses typically form the 
second highest response category over time or a stable 40% of responses. Indeed,
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indifference was the most common response for the whole of 1984, and has been only a 
few percentage points behind positive support over the lifetime o f the question. One 
might explain the difference between the two questions by noting that question (3) is a 
more explicit measure o f non-attitudes, with the indifference response category being 
included in the main question wording. Moreover, the rather emotionally charged 
wording o f the ‘sorry’ and ‘relieved’ response categories might have channelled 
respondents towards an ‘indifferent’ response. It is, after all, very possible to be in 
favour of the EU without being emotionally attached to it. With regard to question (2), 
the wording is a little more abstract than question (3), where we expect questions that tap 
into core values to have lower levels o f  non-attitudes (see section 7.2.). Overall, 
however, these two questions provide evidence of significant levels of non-attitudes since 
the 1970s. A further, incidental, observation again regards the permissive consensus 
introduced in sections 1.3.2. and 2.4. On the graphical evidence presented in this section, 
non-attitudes towards European integration extend back several decades, throwing into 
even further doubt the existence o f any permissive consensus.
The equation of indifference with non-attitudes as outlined above is a clear departure 
from Converse’s approach to non-attitudes, which measures those respondents that hold 
(unstable) opinions on a particular topic but no underlying attitude. This is a result of the 
methodological approach taken here: the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys do not contain 
panel data. I argue that in this particular instance this alternative, indifference approach 
to measuring non-attitudes does not have major implications for the interpretation of the 
results o f the analysis below. Underlying the indifference approach is the assumption 
that respondents with no expressed opinion on a given subject hold no underlying 
attitude. Although this might not be an appropriate assumption in opinion polls 
concerning voting behaviour for extremist parties (see, for instance, Breen, 2000) I do not 
believe that there are any reasons for respondent insincerity on the issue at hand here. On 
the other hand, treating only indifferent responses as non-attitudes means discarding 
those positive or negative opinions that in fact do not correspond to an underlying 
attitude. I would argue that including the indifference category in the main question (3) 
ensures that a high proportion o f non-attitudes are captured in this response category:
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tables 7.3. and 7.4. make plain the contrastingly small number o f  indifferent responses to 
question (2). As a second point, while it may be the case that the indifference approach 
fails to capture some Converse-style non-attitudes, it is equally true that Converse’s 
approach cannot account for non-attitude holders with no corresponding opinion. So, 
both approaches have their weaknesses but the key point is both tap non-attitude holders. 
Whether it is better to do this through a focus on opinion holders or non-opinion holders 
does not seem clear a priori and this is not a question I attempt to answer here.
In fact, Sinnott makes an original attempt to demonstrate Converse-style non-attitudes in 
EB 49 (1998). Responding to the rather involved question “The European Union should 
have a common defence and security policy” Sinnott observes a suspiciously low 6% 
average rate o f  ‘Don’t Know’ responses amongst the 15 EU member states (see also 
Sinnott, 1999, p. 11). Sinnott also identifies some inconsistency between responses. 
From Table 2.3. in section 2.3.3. we can see that there is a clear support for helping out 
regions in difficulty, yet only moderate support for a Europeanised approach to 
unemployment policy. It is hard to believe that this disparity is accounted for by the 
publics’ preference for regional aid over individual level welfare payments. This latter 
instance o f ‘non-attitudes’ might be rebuffed with recourse to Zaller’s characterisation of 
individuals as ‘ideologically inconsistent’. That is to say, while it is inconsistent and 
arguably irrational to wish for, say, higher state spending and lower taxes this has no 
necessary repercussions on attitude stability. Nevertheless, the impression remains that 
estimates o f non-attitudes based on ‘indifferent’ or ‘Don’t Know’ responses could well be 
underestimates as they fail to capture those respondents who express an opinion but who 
are without an underlying attitude.
Taking a different tack, further evidence o f non-attitudes might be gleaned from proxies 
for attitude holding, such as respondents* levels o f knowledge towards European 
integration. As I have yet to demonstrate the link between knowledge and attitude 
holding, however, this is perhaps a little premature. So, I move on to hypothesising non­
attitudes towards European integration.
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7.4. Hypothesising Non-Attitudes Towards European Integration
In this section I take the explanatory factors first identified in section 7.2. and turn them 
into hypotheses. I also present any empirical evidence concerning the European Union 
that supports these hypotheses. I particularly focus on levels o f  knowledge, interest in 
politics or issue salience and the socio-economic variables education and income in 
explaining non-attitudes.
The factor most widely deemed to affect non-attitudes is a respondent’s level of political 
knowledge. We have seen in the section 7.2. how Converse, Hurwitz and Peffley, 
Shapiro and Page, Zaller and Delli Carpini et a l  all specifically cite lack o f information 
as a barrier to attitude-holding, where better informed respondents are viewed as more 
likely to hold stable opinions. Following Delli Carpini et al. I define political knowledge 
as a range of factual information about politics stored in the long-term memory (1996, p. 
10). I assume that measures o f political knowledge address a range of general political 
matters, rather than domain-specific fields o f knowledge such as knowledge about the 
make-up o f a particular national government (Delli Carpini et al> 1995, p. 15).
Empirical research conducted by Sinnott suggests that higher levels o f knowledge are 
indeed associated with a more coherent attitude structure amongst respondents (2000). In 
this work, Sinnott first divides respondents into five discrete categories based on their 
general levels o f knowledge and understanding o f the EU displayed in EB 39. On this 
scale, 10% of respondents are well informed, a further 24% are moderately well 
informed, while approximately two-thirds o f respondents are coded as possessing ‘some 
but not much knowledge’ or less (Sinnott, 2000, p. 121). Sinnott then takes two further 
questions from the same EB survey that together offer a long list o f policy proposals in 
four main areas: economic policy, immigration and asylum policy, drugs and crime and
■
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common foreign and security policy5. The idea is to use factor analysis to show that 
respondents from higher knowledge groups are more likely to be able to recognise 
constraints or linkages between question items. For instance, one might expect 
respondents who support joint decision-making with regard to a common currency to also 
support some degree of joint economic policy-making. Sinnott reports that attitude 
structure does indeed decline with knowledge, especially concerning attitudes towards 
foreign policy (2000, p. 119).
Sinnott also cross-tabulates an index o f knowledge amongst respondents with 
Eurobarometer question (3) (in Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, p.102). The table is 
reproduced below (table 7.1.) and is especially interesting as I use EB question (3) as the 
dependent variable in the statistical analysis that follows (see section 7.5.1.).
Table 7.1. EB 41.1 (1994) Knowledge and Non-Attitudes
Attitude to Knowledge o f the
hypothetical EU EU
dissolution
Very well Moderately well Some but not Very little No
informed informed much
knowledge
knowledge knowledge
Very sorry 59 55 44 40 29
IndifTerent/DK 30 35 44 48 59
Very relieved 11 10 12 12 12
N(%  of total) 2,486 (20%) 2,008(16%) 2,597(21%) 2,293 (18%) 3,082 (25%)
Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott (1998, p. 102). Figures in percentages except N.
The knowledge index is constructed by Sinnott from a battery of questions included in 
Eurobarometer 41.1. (1994) asking respondents to name key Commission personnel and
s For the full question texts, the reader is invited to consult Appendix 1 in Sinnott (2000).
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i;
the correct members o f the Union6. The absolute levels o f knowledge are also visible in 
the table above, so that we can see that a quarter o f all respondents fall into the ‘no ;
knowledge’ category. This seems broadly in line with other research that suggests citizen j
general knowledge on the structure o f  the EU and politics in general is limited. In an "
earlier study on attitudes towards the EU amongst students in four member states, j
Hewstone borrows from Kriesberg the term ‘dark areas o f  ignorance’ to describe the j
chronic lack of knowledge o f Community affairs displayed: a miserable 12.3% o f  all j
respondents could name exactly all member states (1986, p. 158). So, table 7.1. shows a 
clear association between increased levels o f knowledge and positive attitude holding. ¡i
As knowledge increases amongst respondents, the drop in the indifference category is the
gain of the pro-integration ‘very sorry’ category. The ‘relieved’ category is barely altered i
i;
by changing levels o f knowledge amongst respondents. |.
[
The fairly simple form o f the findings in Table 7.1. means that they are challengeable on |
several grounds, as Sinnott is quick to acknowledge. Could it not be that lack of j[
knowledge is simply the function of an omitted variable, nam ely interest in politics? If j-
so, the two factors might well be collinear in any regression model constructed. Table f
7.2. shows another cross-tabulation, this time between levels o f  knowledge and interest in j
politics. !■
6 Respondents’ knowledge is classified as being between 0-4 points, so that those scoring 0 are deemed to possess ‘no 
knowledge’ and those with 4 are characterised as being ‘very well informed’. One point is available for, respectively, 
naming the then President of the Commission (in 1994 this was Jacques Delors), a then Commissioner from their own 
country, naming 9 or 10 countries of the then EU12, and naming the 11th and 12th country earns a fourth point.
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Table 7.2. EB 41.1 (1994) Knowledge and  In terest in Politics
Interest in 
Politics
EU Knowledge 
the EU
of
Very
informed
well Moderately 
well informed
Some but not
much
knowledge
Very
knowledge
little No
knowledge
N
A great deal 31 25 20 14 10 1,175
To some extent 19 21 24 19 17 4,025
Not much 10 15 22 24 - '' 29 4,313
Not at all/DK 4 8 18 22 48 2,841
Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott (1998, p. 99). Figures in percentages except N
While table 7.2. does appear to reveal a relationship between knowledge and interest, 
there are respondents who, despite their interest in EU politics, do not possess much 
knowledge7. For instance, one quarter o f those who claim to be very interested in 
European politics score one or less oruthe knowledge scale. There is, then, a failure on 
the part o f at least some o f the public to translate interest into knowledge (Sinnott, 1998, 
p. 99). Next, one might point to a relationship between positive attitude holding or 
support for integration and knowledge, so that support for the Union might well 
incentivise respondents to increase their levels o f knowledge on the subject. Even if it 
seems unlikely that all the impact o f increased knowledge is explained by positive 
support and interest in politics, as a first stage to testing the relationship between 
knowledge and attitude-holding I take the hypothesis
H6: Ceteris paribus, the higher a respondent s level o f  knowledge on the EU, the more 
likely they are to hold an attitude concerning European integration.
7 The full text o f  the interest in politics question is as follows: “To what extent would you say you are interested in 
European politics, that is to say matters related to the European Union: a great deal, to some extent, not much or not al 
all?” This question (43) is discussed at greater length in section 7.5.2.
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The next hypothesis attempts to formalise a position raised by Brooks (1994), namely 
that there is a link between attitude holding and higher levels o f interest in (European) 
politics. Eurobarometer surveys have repeatedly enquired into respondents’ interest both 
in politics and specifically in European politics, so that one can show a link between 
interest and attitude holding by again taking a cross-tabulation between interest in EU 
politics and attitudes towards the dissolution o f the EU (see Table 7.3. below).
Table 7.3. EB 41.1 (1994) Interest in EU Politics and Non-Attitudes
Attitude
hypothetical
dissolution
to Interest in 
EU politics
EU
A great deal To some extent Not much Not at all
Very sorry 78 61 35 16
Indifferent/DK 13 31 53 68
Very relieved 9 8 12 16
N (% of total) 1,177 4,030 4,321 2,841
Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott ( 1998, p. 101). Figures in percentages except N.
Table 7.3. shows us that there is a strong association in the Eurobarometer data between 
interest in politics and support. Drawing on Eurobarometers No. 30, 31 and 31A (1988- 
9) and the EU 12, Niedermayer also present empirical evidence to demonstrate that as 
levels o f  interest in EU politics rise so does ‘attitude-consistency’ or attitude holding 
towards questions (l)-(4) concerning support for integration (1990, p. 26). Of course, 
this is far from being able to say that higher levels of interest lead to decreased non­
attitudes and higher levels o f support for integration; the relationship may well be 
reciprocal. One must also bear in mind the argument that in measuring interest one is 
really measuring affect, making the relationship between support for integration and 
interest in EU politics circular. However, the Pearson’s correlation between support for 
integration and interest in politics questions in table 7.3. is a not unreasonably high 0.283 
(significant to at least the 0.01 level on the 2-tailed test). Indeed, Zaller claims that 
measures of cognitive engagement such as knowledge outperform measures of affective
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engagement or political interest in explaining stability (Zaller, 1992, p. 43; Zaller, 1990). 
So we have /v -
H7: Ceteris paribus, the higher a respondent s level o f  interest in the EU, the more likely 
they are to hold an attitude concerning European integration.
A different sort o f caveat is that, as Niedermayer argues, ‘interest in politics’ may only be 
an intermediary variable linking citizens’ socio-structural location with their political 
attitudes and behaviour. Typically, higher levels o f interest in politics are more likely to 
be pronounced among high-earning, well-educated males (Niedermayer, 1990, p. 2). 
This approach relates somewhat with Inglehart’s supposition that levels of political skills 
determine how able a person is to cope with and interpret the abstract content o f  political 
messages. Skills are, he postulates, related to education and values result from levels of 
affluence, where both these variables are supposed to have increased over time. From 
section 4.4. Janssen uses pooled EB data from 1973-88 for Britain, France, Germany and 
Italy to show that not attitude-holding but support for integration is related to levels of 
political skills. So, it would be reasonable to control for education and income levels in 
the statistical analysis o f non-attitudes8. Not only this, but the anticipated close 
relationships between education, income, knowledge and interest reminds one that in the 
sections that follow one must be careful to ensure that the independent variables included 
in any regression model are just that (see section 7.5.2. for further discussion of this 
issue).
Aside from the factors discussed, there are a number o f other potential explanatory 
factors which I mention for completeness but for which I do not construct a hypothesis 
either because they are already covered by existing hypotheses or because they are simply 
too difficult to operationalised in the EB data. To begin, Hurwitz and Peffley’s core 
values approach to non-attitudes stresses that the closer a question to an individual’s core
8 In a similar vein, Delli Carpini et al. show that levels of political knowledge amongst US citizens is predicted to be 
higher for older, non-minority males, and those respondents possessing factors such as intelligence that cannot be 
accurately measured here (1996, p. 201),
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values, the greater likelihood that he or she will hold a stable attitude. We have already 
seen in sections 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. how Eurobarometer questions comprising diffuse, 
affective measures o f support for integration attract more support for integration than 
those asking respondents about more utilitarian aspects o f integration. Amongst the 
diffuse measures o f support, question (1) asking respondents whether they are in favour 
o f unifying Western Europe seems closer to many core political values concerning 
integration and attracts higher levels o f net support than question (2), which asks 
respondents if their country’s membership of the Union is a good or bad thing9. So, we 
could try to gauge how close a question is to respondents’ core values simply by asking 
ourselves how abstract a particular question is, or how little recourse is needed to outside 
information, presumably political knowledge, in order to make a rational judgement on 
the issue in question. This o f course implies subjective interpretation o f  the dependent 
variable. However, it is unclear how this ‘abstractness’ could be included in any 
regression equation as presumably there would be no variation in a variable that captured 
this. So, this possible explanation for non-attitudes is dropped from our analysis.
Shapiro and Page mention that quality o f information is a crucial factor in determining 
public opinion output (1988, p. 244). Evidently, if  the public rely on biased sources of 
information coming, for example, from political organisations or the news media then 
one might expect rationality, a particular focus o f Shapiro and Page, to be compromised, 
but not necessarily the stability of responses. However, a more realistic example might 
be where members o f the public are exposed to multiple sources o f ‘competing’ bias, for 
example, for more than one political party. One might plausibly expect greater response 
instability as respondents lurch from one position to another, depending on the source o f 
the analysis and information they receive. I argue that this argument fails to take into 
account the ability o f respondents to assimilate or reject incoming information in keeping 
with their political beliefs according to their levels o f political knowledge. Zaller shows 
as the Vietnam war progressed the opinions of better informed citizens became more
9 An alternative explanation of the high net support levels for question (1) is the lack of a neutral category. Evidence 
from Sinnott (1999) presented in section 7.3. shows that lack of an appropriate neutral category may well contribute to 
artificially high positive or negative (non) attitudes.
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polarised, whilst amongst the less well informed there was little difference between 
hawks and doves in terms o f support for the war (1992, p. 200). So, other factors already 
discussed arguably already account for Shapiro and Page’s concern with the quality of 
information.
[.
So, we have seen that there is a reasonable amount o f evidence pointing to the impact of 
knowledge and interest in EU politics in attitude holding. The major caveat to this 
evidence turns out to be risk that both factors are really intermediate variables for other, 
underlying socio-economic phenomena. Certainly, this will have to be controlled for 
carefully in the final regression model. In addition, much o f  the evidence presented here 
refers to Eurobarometer survey data, which if  not exactly out o f date, could well benefit 
from being updated. However, the strategy taken here is to provide a completely new 
type o f evidence in the explanation of non-attitudes, rather than revisit existing 
approaches that are in any case not entirely adequate for our purposes.
7.5. A Model of Non-Attitudes
In this section I consider in turn the choice o f survey data, the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable, the relevant control variables and the appropriate model methodology 
to better understand non-attitude holding. . . .
7.5.1. The Choice of E urobarom eter Survey D ata
I choose to test a model explaining non-attitudes towards European integration using 
Eurobarometer not ISSP data, breaking the pattern o f  earlier chapters. As ever, the 
criterion on which this decision is based lies in the suitability of the questions available 
for use as dependent and independent variables. As discussed in section 7.3. using single
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time period survey data involves taking non-opinions not volatile opinions as indicators
;
of non-attitudes, a different method to Converse’s. !;
!
j
From the point o f  view of maintaining continuity, it would surely have been beneficial to
i
use the ISSP survey to explain non-attitudes, to include national pride, identity, j
nationalism and racism as control variables and to place these results alongside those
from chapters five and six. Unfortunately, we have seen in section 7.3. that question (4)
from the ISSP survey, which we have been using up until now to measure support for
European integration, does not include a response category that clearly captures non- !
attitudes. Even i f  it did, the ISSP survey is not equipped to operationalised even one of
the hypotheses from section 7.4. There are no questions that can be construed as directly
testing a respondent’s level of political knowledge, and likewise no questions that enquire
about a respondent’s interest in politics10 1. Indeed, the only variable available which taps |
reasonably closely knowledge, interest and political skills is the education level o f  the |
respondent. The problem here is that we have one variable to measure three hypotheses, l
and that in any case education is not an ideal proxy for all o f these three hypotheses11.
Instead, I choose to measure non-attitudes from Eurobarometer survey 42 (2nd half 1994). |
As well as being the most recent Eurobarometer survey containing question (3) that 
measures non-attitudes, and questions on knowledge and interest in the EU, the survey is 
also conducted at a similar time to the ISSP National Identity 1995 survey.
Unfortunately, while the Eurobarometer survey series fulfils the necessary condition for
: !measuring non-attitudes, this means compromising slightly on variables that capture 
national pride, nationalism, identity and racism. However, it should be remembered that
10 Question (19) in the ISSP survey asks respondents “How much have you heard or read about the EU? A lot, quite a 
bit, not much, nothing at all.” At a push, this could be construed as a test of respondents’ subjective knowledge on the 
EU. However, the question also seems to be getting at how successfully the EU has been promoted through media
outlets. |
11 From section 4.4. it can be seen that education, along with levels o f affluence, has acted as a proxy for political skills. [
On the other hand, this is less true for knowledge and interest in politics, where education might be seen as a |
particularly strong causal factor amongst many, True, Delli Carpini et ai. take education as a proxy for knowledge |
when dealing in evaluating some of the evidence to do with non-attitudes (1996, p. 231). The same book, however, t
provides detailed information on the stability of knowledge levels amongst the American public since the 1940s, !j
whereas overall levels of education have risen. From 1947-89, the median increase in levels o f public knowledge over [
fifteen factual questions mainly regarding US political institutions was 4.5% (Delli Carpini et a/., 1996, p. 116). j
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none o f  the Eurobarometer surveys contained a variable list as complete as the ISSP 
survey for measuring these factors.
As a reminder from section 2.2.3., Eurobarometer surveys are carried out by selected 
national institutes posing identical sets of closed questions to multi-stage, random 
samples o f  1000 people per country aged fifteen and over12. Since 1975 (EB 3), a sample 
of 300 for Northern Ireland has been added to Great Britain to constitute the United 
Kingdom. Given the unification o f Germany in 1990, an additional sample o f 1000 
persons have been interviewed since EB 34, so that there are a total o f  2000 interviews 
for this country. Since 1991 (EB 35) 500 interviews were conducted in Luxembourg, 
where before this date the number was only 300. Where results are displayed here for the 
Community as a whole, these are weighted on the basis o f the adult population in each 
country13. Results are open to replication, and the data files are stored at the Cologne 
University Central Archive14. As a final point, question (3) appears far less frequently in 
Eurobarometer surveys after EB 42, with the possible implication that maintaining up-to- 
date research on non-attitude holding will become more difficult in this particular survey 
series.
7.5.2. The D ependent and Independent Variables
In this section I operationalised the dependent and independent variables. I show that the 
variables measuring interest in EU politics, subjective and factual knowledge all appear 
to form part o f  the same underlying dimension in the Eurobarometer data.
1: In multi-stage clustering a number of sampling points based on ‘administrative regional units’ are drawn with a 
probability proportional to population size and density. From this a starting address was drawn randomly, using w'hich 
other addresses were randomly selected.
11 It is not mentioned in the Eurobarometer surveys what age group this refers to, and whether it is concomitant with the 
15+ age group used for surveys.
14 The data files are, however, available from several sources. The data used in this thesis have all been downloaded 
from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research website 
(http://www.icpsr.urmch.edu/index.htrnri.
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To begin by operationalising the dependent variable, I argue in section 7.3. that the use of 
the word ‘indifferent’ in Eurobarometer question (3) makes it a more adequate measure 
of non-attitudes than question (2). The caveats to bear in mind are that given the earlier 
discourse on a continuum from real to non-attitudes, the adequacy o f this ‘indifferent’ 
response in question (3) is relative, and that there is a risk that indifference measures non- 
committed attitudes rather than non-attitudes. Nevertheless, the full question text o f the 
dependent variable is:
(3) “ If  you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you 
be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?”
I code responses into two categories, where indifferent responses are coded 1 and all 
other responses coded 0, except for the handful of N/A responses that are discarded. I 
code DK responses along with other attitudes on the basis that they represent balanced 
attitudinal responses. So, this coding schema allows the use of logit regression 
techniques in the final model. I also note that figure 7.4. gives a description of the level 
of aggregate non-attitudes for the EU 12 from 1985 to 1995.
To operationalise interest in politics I use the following question from EB 42:
(43) “To what extent would you say that you are interested in European politics, that is to 
say matters related to the European Union (European Community): a great deal, to some 
extent, not much or not at all?”
f
I
it
t
The variable is coded from 1-4, where 1 represents higher levels of interest in EU 
politics. The mean level o f interest in EU politics is 2.8, while the respective country 
means are not significantly different from this figure.
To test the hypothesis concerning respondents’ knowledge o f the EU the following 
question presents itself:
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(44) “All things considered, how well informed do you feel you are about the European 
Union, its policies, its institutions? Very well, quite well, not very well, not at all well.”
This question clearly invites a respondent to subjectively appraise his or her levels of 
knowledge concerning the EU. Hayo goes as far to argue that subjective knowledge is 
more an attempt to communicate perceived interest in politics (1999, p. 646), The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for subjective knowledge and interest in EU politics is a 
notable 0.433 (significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)). It would surely be preferable 
to measure a respondent’s level o f objective, factual knowledge, and there are a number 
of factual questions relating to the European Commission in the Eurobarometer survey
(45) “Do you happen to know when the European Commission, that has been in office for 
the last few years, will end its mandate and a new Commission will take office?” (Yes, in 
1994; Yes, in 1995 [CORRECT ANSWER]; Yes, in 1996; Yes, later; No/DK).
(46) “Do you happen to know the name of the person who has been President of the
European Commission over the past few years, and whose mandate will come to an end 
in January 1995?” (Yes, Jacques Delors [CORRECT]; Yes, a Frenchman; Yes, Jacques 
Santer; Yes, Jean-Luc Dehaene; Yes, other name; No/DK) . ■ ..r
(47) “A successor o f Jacques Delors has been chosen as the new President of the 
European Commission. Do you happen to know who? I f  yes, could you give me his/her 
name?” (Yes, Jacques Santer [CORRECT]; Yes, a Luxembourger; Yes, Jean-Luc 
Dehaene; Yes, other name; No/DK). I
I construct a measurement scale from these three questions, so that one point is given for 
each correct answer. The result is a variable measuring a respondent’s level o f factual 
knowledge and coded from 0-3, where 48% of respondents score 0, 27% score 1, 17% 
score 2 and just 6% score 3. The correlation between subjective and factual knowledge is 
not particularly high, at just 0.30 (significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)). Is it 
reasonable to impute knowledge o f the EU in general from these questions concerning the
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Commission? Although a little more issue-specific than, say, asking respondents to name 
all the EU member states, the Commission is a (relatively) high-profile EU institution, 
with its President possibly the most visible specifically-European political figure.
To explore further the relationship between factual and subjective knowledge, and 
interest in EU politics I use factor analysis. The results are visible in table 7.4. below.
Table 7.4. EB 42 (1994) Rotated Factor Matrix for Education, Interest in EU 
Politics, Subjective and Factual Knowledge
Factor 1
In terest in EU Politics 0 .69
Subjective K now ledge 0.63
Factual K now ledge 0.48
Eigenvalue 1.71
% age Explained V ariance 56.97
C ronbach’s A lpha 0.62
Chi-squared (df) - (0 )
Only one factor with an eigenvalue o f  greater than one is extracted, so that all three 
variables tap the same underlying factor. Interest in EU politics and knowledge seem to 
go together, so that the scale would appear to distinguish between respondents with either 
higher or lower levels of interest and knowledge15. I include all three variables in the 
logit regression model below.
Finally, there is no measure for income in this particular Eurobarometer survey, while a 
standard demographic measure is available for education. The coding for these variables, 
along with all other dependent, independent and control variables is posted in table 7.5. 
below.
15 The same factor analysis performed on a country-by-country basis reveals very similar patterns. In no country is 
more than one factor extracted. The relative factor loading is also identical, except in France and Belgium where 
factual and subjective knowledge load almost equally onto the underlying factor, and in Netherlands, Greece and 
Portugal, where subjective knowledge loads more heavily than interest in EU politics onto the underlying factor.
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7.5.3. The Control Variables
Although there is no suggestion in the literature that any o f the hypotheses from chapter 
four play a role in determining non-attitudes, for completeness I include measures of 
national pride, nationalism, European identity and racism in the regression model. The 
adoption o f  Eurobarometer data also necessitates redefining several other control 
variables, such as occupation. A  summary o f  the control variables and coding 
arrangements is presented in table 7.5.
European identity is best measured using a question also taken by Citrin and Sides (2001) 
in their study o f European identity (see section 5.2.2.). Charillon and Ivaldi also 
misguidedly make use of this question in their flawed measure o f  nationalism (see section 
6.2.1.). . ,
' ’ ■ A \ "
(15) “In the near future do you see yourself as...(nationality) only, (nationality) and 
European, European and (nationality), European only?”
Some theorists view identity as a multi-dimensional concept (see section 5.2.2.), making 
this measure o f identity perhaps more simplistic than one would desire. Similarly, one is 
not able to differentiate between the political and cultural dimensions to national pride 
identified in section 5.2.3. using question (48) below. Nevertheless, the absence of 
alternatives means that national pride is measured by the question:
(48) “Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all 
proud to be (NATIONALITY)?”
Nationalism is not directly tackled by any o f the questions in Eurobarometer 42. One 
might attempt to tap nationalist sentiment from a battery of other questions posed and
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indeed this is attempted by Charillon and Ivaldi using the same Eurobarometer survey 
(1996). However, the authors make use o f  questions (48) and (15) below, along with two 
further questions investigating national identity and national pride. As the discussion in 
section 6.2.1. also makes clear, these questions are closer to other political phenomena 
than nationalism. So, I do not attempt to control for nationalism or minority nationalism.
I use the following question to capture racist attitudes:
(49) “You said that you felt rather fearful about the Single European Market. Among the 
following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your fears about the Single 
Market? Too much immigration into (OUR COUNTRY)”.
As the wording implies, this question is posed only to those respondents who responded :i
in a previous question in the same survey that the Single European Market (SEM) left j j
them fearful. The question is a little crude, as respondents either mention immigration as j 1
a factor or they do not, there is no possibility for respondents to express the degree o f fear i ,
felt by the prospect o f increasing immigration. Moreover, the structure o f this question i
series, where respondents are only asked more about their fears concerning the SEM if  on ;
balance this is the dominant emotion means that some respondents with racist attitudes 
might be missed because on balance they view the SEM positively. Following the same 
logic displayed in section 5.2.5., I assume that question (49) tests attitudes on racism 
because the largest component o f non-nationals in member states tends to be extra­
communitarian16.
Turning to the socio-demographic control variables, in the ISSP data I constructed an 
International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) of occupational status from competing 
national occupation scales. In the Eurobarometer data one can simply adopt the
16 A rough and ready gauge of the pride, identity and racism control variables can be gained by running a logit 
regression model explaining support for integration. That is, ‘very sorry’ is coded 1 and ‘relieved’ 0, with other 
responses being excluded. The results show that pride and identity coefficients are positive and significant, while the 
racism coefficient is negative and significant. Thus the aggregate level findings from chapter six are confirmed.
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proprietary measure of occupation. It follows from the categorical nature o f this variable 
that unlike in previous chapters no special arrangements are necessary to measure the 
impact o f the farming profession on attitude holding. I also add a host o f familiar 
controls such as sex, age, subjective social class, religion and political affiliation. As for 
the ISSP data, the Eurobarometer data in this instance unfortunately contains no 
macroeconomic control variables. A summary o f the control variables and coding 
arrangements is visible below in table 7.5.
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Table 7.5. EB 42 (1994) Variable Coding
V A R IA B L E D E SC R IPTIO N
D ependen t/Independen t variables
N on-attitude ho ld ing l= N on-a ttitude  (indifferent), 0=A ttitude (includ ing  D /K). N /A  d iscarded
Interest in  E U  po litics C oded from  1-4 (1 - N ot a t all, 2  -  N ot m uch, 3 -  T o  som e extent, 4  -  A great deal)- DK /N A  
discarded.
Subjective K now ledge Coded from  1-4 (1 - N ot a t all w ell, 2  -  Not very  w ell, 3 -  Q uite w ell, 4  -  V ery  w ell) . DK /N A  
discarded.
Factual K now ledge Coded from  0 -3  (0 -  N o questions answered co rrec tly , 1 -  O ne correct response, 2  -  tw o correct 
responses, 3 -  all three questions answ ered co rrec tly )
E ducation 
C ontrol V ariables
Coded from  0 -9 . Response indicates age re sp o n d en t finished education  +13 (l® 14  years o f  
education ...9= 22+ , 0=never studied, respondents s till studying are  discarded).
E uropean /N ational iden tity Coded from  1-4 (1 -  N at only, 2  -  N at +  E u ro ., 3 -  E uro + N a t, 4 -  Euro on ly ). DK/NA
N ational P ride discarded.
Coded from  1-4 (1 -  N o t a t all p roud , 2 -  N o t v e ry  p roud, 3 -  F airly  proud, 4  -  V ery  proud). 
Refusals, D K  &  N A  discarded.
R acism 1=SEM fear, (^Im m ig ra tio n  not m ention as a  S E M  fear
O ccupation Coded from  1-18 (1-housew ife, 2-student, 3-unem ployed , 4-re tired , 5-fam ier, 6-fisherm an , 7- 
se lf-em ployed professional, 8-self-em ployed, 9 -business ow ner, 10-professional, 11-general 
m anagem ent, 12-m iddle m anagem ent, 13-white co lla r w orker, 14-w hite collar w orker, travelling, 
15-service jo b ,  16-supervisor, 17-skillcd m an u a l, 18-unskilled m anual). ). T h is  variable is 
categorical, w ith  retirees as the b a se  category.
Sex l= M ale, 0= F em ale
A ge From  15 to  5 5 +  years. Coded as cohorts (1 -  1 5 -2 4 ,2  -  2 5 -3 9 ,3  -  4 0 -5 4 ,4  - 55+)
S ubjective S ocia l C lass Coded fro m  1-6 (1 -  W orking c la ss , 2 -  L ow er M idd le  class, 3 - M idd le  class, 4  -  U pper M iddle 
class, 5 -  U p p er class, 6 -  R efuses to  be  c lassified ). This v ariab le  is  treated as categorical. 
M idd le  c la s s  is  the base category.
Political A ffilia tion Coded from  1-6 (1 -  Far left, 2  -  Left, 3 -  C e n tre , 4  -  R ight, 5  -  F a r  right, 6  -  R efusal, D on’t 
Know). T h is  variable is treated a s  categorical; Le ft being  the  o m itted  category.
C ountry du m m ies W ith S p a in  a s th e  om itted country.
Religion Coded fro m  1-4 (1 -  Rom an C atholic, 2 - P ro testan t, 3 -  O ther re lig ion , 4 -  N o  re lig ion). Taken 
as  categorical variable, w ith no  re lig ion  as the base  category.
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7.5.4. Model Methodology
Y .  ■ ■ Y :  y .
In the sections above I outline the dependent, independent and control variables used to 
investigate the causes of non-attitude holding in the Eurobarometer 42 data. Here, I 
adumbrate the regression models that perform this analysis.
I analyse non-attitudes both at the aggregate and country level. The data in EB 42 
pertains almost exclusively to the EU 12, and so I do not include in the analysis Sweden, 
Austria or Finland. I weight each national sample in proportion to population size within 
the EU 12 countries. I use the predefined Eurobarometer EU 12 weighting, where this 
means excluding data for East Germany. I also note that, in contrast to the ISSP data, 
Northern Ireland is included within the UK data. The binary nature o f attitude holding 
means that I employ logit regression.
7.6. Results
In table 7.6. below I include an abridged version o f the results from the aggregate model 
investigating non-attitudes. The full results, including the country-level charts, are 
visible in section A.5. of the appendix. I
I note that because the of the number o f response categories contained in the categorical 
variables, I only display those categories that are statistically significant in the table 
below and the results contained in the appendix.
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Table 7.6. EB 42 (1994) Aggregate Level Impact on Non-Attitude Holding of the 
Independent Variables (abridged)
b Odds ratio
Interest -0.41 ** 0.66
( 0.03 )
Subjective Knowledge *0.24 *« 0.78
( 0.03 )
Factual Knowledge -0.25 + * 0.78
( 0.03 )
Education -0.03 ** 0.97
( 0.01 )
Identity -0.30 ** 0.74
( 0.03 )
Pride -0.15 0.86
( 0.03 )
Racism 0.00 1.00
( 0.08 )
Constant 2.88 ** 17.84
( 0.22 )
Number of Cases 
LR ChiA2 (d.f.) 
Pseudo R*2
10038
1424.56 (50) 
0.11
Note: Entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below. 
Calculations correct to 2 decimal places
** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) 
* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
7.7. Interpretation of the Results
In the subsections below I interpret the findings from section 7.6. at both aggregate and 
country level, and with reference to other empirical studies. The full regression models 
are placed in tables 7.5. and 7.5b. in section A.5. of the appendix.
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7.7.1. Analysis of the Independent Variables at the Aggregate Level
From the aggregate level results one can confirm the hypotheses concerning the impact of 
knowledge, interest and education on non-attitudes, so helping to resolve the matter of 
causality between non-attitudes and these variables. As well as offering more 
information on the relationship between these three concepts, the results also allow one to 
identify an age and gender difference in attitude holding. In conjunction with the results 
from chapter six, one can see that the variables distinguishing between attitude holding 
also discriminate between positive and negative attitudes, so that higher variable scores 
tend to result in more positive attitudes (but not non-attitudes) and decreasing scores lead 
to a growth in both non-attitudes and negative attitudes.
The clearest finding from table 7.6. is that the relationships between attitude holding and 
interest in EU politics, subjective and factual knowledge and education are all negative 
and statistically significant at the aggregate level. Hence, one can confirm all the 
hypotheses from section 7.4. The results also confirm Zaller’s findings, reported in 
section 7.4., that measures of political interest tend to outperform knowledge in 
explaining response stability.
With particular reference to the relationship between the independent variables, from the 
log odds ratios we can see that the likely impact on attitude holding is greatest for a unit 
change in the interest variable, more or less identical for subjective and factual 
knowledge and weakest for education. It is evident that education would remain that 
variable with the weakest likely effect on attitudes even were we to reduce its ten 
response categories to four, in harmony with the other variables. From the odds ratios, 
then, the regression results tend to support the factor analysis findings in table 7.5. That 
is, interest and knowledge seem to form part o f one underlying variable, where interest 
better captures this variable than knowledge.
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Secondly, the results go some way towards resolving the issue o f causality between 
knowledge, interest and support for the EU. We have seen in tables 7.1. and 7.3. above 
how more knowledgeable and interested respondents tend to be more pro-EU. In section
7.4. I noted the concerns regarding causality for the findings presented in these tables, 
and the regression results in table 7.6. demonstrate the existence of a link from 
knowledge and interest to non-attitudes and, by implication, support17. This is not to 
imply that there is no link from support to, say, knowledge as well.
The third finding clear from table 7.6. is that higher levels o f  pride and identity are 
associated with an increased likelihood to hold an attitude towards European integration. 
Remembering from section 6.4.1. that both national pride and European identity are 
strongly linked to support for integration, it would seem that the findings from this 
chapter and the last are interconnected: support for integration tends to increase for 
respondents with a higher than average sense o f European identity or national pride, and 
this is typically at the expense o f  both anti-integration sentiment and non-attitudes. The 
same phenomenon is visible elsewhere in the non-attitudes model for those variables that 
have a reasonably direct comparison in the ISSP support model, and held a pro-support, 
significant coefficient. So, older, male citizens are both more likely to support 
integration, and less likely to hold non-attitudes than younger females.
To better describe this phenomenon I note that a priori an increase in support requires the 
decrease in some other response category or categories by the same amount. The 
decrease might be spread amongst non-attitudes and negative opinion or, for instance, 
non-attitudes might stay level or increase while negative opinion decreases by a larger 
amount. The experience o f the regression analysis here is that increases in support are 
accompanied by decreases in non-attitudes and negative opinions. The logical 
counterpart to this is that falling support redistributes opinions back amongst negative 
and non-attitudes. For example, in table 7.6. o f section A.5. o f  the appendix Centrists are 
more likely to hold non-attitudes than Leftist respondents, as well as being more likely to
17 In fact, an analysis o f  support for integration using EB 42 shows that interest and knowledge are both positively 
related to support.
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be anti-integration than Leftists (from model lc  in table 63.)- However, this pattern does 
not hold for Upper Middle Class respondents who, while being more likely to hold non­
attitudes than the middle-classes, are not noticeably more anti-integration. Nevertheless, 
this tendency o f  responses to be ‘redistributed’ in a certain fashion is also visible at the 
aggregate level in figure 7 3 . which charts question (3) over time. To demonstrate this 
relationship a little more rigorously, correlations o f EU 10 responses from EB 15-40 
(1981-1993) show negative associations between ‘sorry’ and ‘indifferent’ responses (- 
0.55**) and ‘sorry’ and ‘relieved’ responses (-0.65**). However, there is only a weakly 
positive and statistically insignificant association between ‘relieved’ and ‘indifferent’ 
responses (0.06). So, it seems that there is an asymmetric relationship between positive, 
negative and non-attitudes towards integration. Variables linked with an increase in 
support do so at the expense o f negative and indifferent responses, while variables 
causing increases in non-attitudes are associated with a decrease in support but tend to 
have little impact on negative responses (see figure 7.5. below).
Figure 7.5. The Relationship between Pro, Anti and Non-Attitudes Towards 
European Integration Caused by Explanatory Variables
Pro-EU
ftI
It appears, at least for the variables considered here, that there is not much crossover 
between negative and indifferent opinion. This arrangement seems reasonable, in that it 
seems respondents do not move from negative to indifferent, and then on to positive
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attitudes. Indeed, if  this were the case one could simply code non-attitudes as a ‘middle­
way’ variable between positive and negative opinions and analyse all these attitudes 
together in one model. This ‘middle way’ pattern of responses seems more appropriate to 
Don’t Know’s rather than non-attitudes. I instead interpret non-attitudes as a variant o f  
non-support for integration, where the other alternative would be anti-EU sentiment. 
Moreover, the pattern of responses should remind us that splitting the dependent variable 
into two different models is rather artificial and independent variables act consistently 
across the non-attitudes and positive and negative attitude models, so that the 
interpretation o f coefficients should ideally be informed by the results from both sections.
The information revealed by the other control variables included in table 7.6. in section 
A.5. of the appendix is interesting, if  a little scanty. Religion does not appear to be a 
relevant explanatory factor at the aggregate level, and none o f the response categories are 
significant. There is a clear gender and age difference in attitude holding: it appears that 
older, male respondents are more likely to turn in an attitude than younger females. For 
age, there is a parallel with some recent research into political participation, especially 
voting. For instance, extensive comparative research into electoral turnout by Blais and 
Dobrzynska suggests that older citizens are more likely to vote (1998). Although there is 
no firm scholarly consensus on why this might be so, the suggestions of some authors in 
the context of welfare state reform might be applicable to attitude-holding and 
participation in general: namely, a decline in intergenerational solidarity amongst the 
young (a generational shift) is accompanied by a more acute awareness amongst older 
citizens o f possible losses in entitlements (a cohort effect) (Kersbergen in Kuhnle, 2000).
The findings for political affiliation, subjective social class and occupation are rather 
more ambiguous. It seems reasonable that respondents who are unclear o f  their political 
affiliation (‘DK’ response category) are more likely not to hold an attitude than Leftist 
respondents. It is not immediately apparent why Centrists should be more likely to hold 
non-attitudes than Leftists. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer variable asks respondents 
to subjectively place themselves on a scale o f 1-10, where 1 represents an extreme left 
viewpoint. This means that it is not possible to tie a respondent to particular political
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parties. Similarly, the interpretation o f relative increase in likelihood o f Upper Middle 
Class, but not Upper Class, respondents not holding attitudes is rather hard to fathom. 
For the significant occupation categories I do not offer any specific interpretation, except 
to caution that the number o f cases for fisherman is just seven.
In summary, many respondents display non-attitudes towards the European Union, where 
for this model the main explanatory factors are age, sex, national pride, European 
identity, knowledge, interest and education. This points to non-attitude holding as to a 
large extent a socio-demographic phenomenon. Although not possible here, it would 
have been especially interesting to test explanations o f non-attitudes that dwelt more 
overtly on the psychological dimension, such as whether non-attitudes represent a 
specific disillusionment with the EU. Such an approach might be able to answer such 
questions as to what degree the EU institutional and policy framework itself is 
responsible for non-attitudes, or whether such attitudes are simply functions of wider 
socio-demographic trends. •1
7.7.2. Analysis of the Independent Variables at the C ountry  Level
In this section I analyse the country results by sets o f independent variables: interest, 
knowledge and education; pride, identity and racism; age, sex and religion and then the 
rest o f the control variables. For key independent variables o f concern, the country level 
findings tend to closely follow the aggregate level findings. However, the results for the 
remaining controls are fragmented, and particularly difficult to interpret.
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Table 7.7. EB 42 (1994) Aggregate and Country Level Findings in Comparison
Variables Interest Subjective
Knowledge
Factual
Knowledge
Education Identity Pride Racism
Aggregate - 0.44 - 0.24 - 0.25 - 0.04 -0 3 0 - 0.14 0.00
France - 0.58 -0.18 -0.18 -0.04 - 0.20 -0.06 0.15
Belgium - 0.64 -0.19 -0.16 0.02 -0.18 - 0.48 1.09
Netherlands - 0.57 - 0.26 -0.17 -0.01 -0 3 5 -0.14 0.39
West Germany - 0.58 - 0.46 -0.47 -0.07 -0 3 5 -0.17 -0.20
Italy - 0.56 - 0.26 -0.18 -0.05 - 0.48 - 0.25 0.87
Luxembourg - 0.81 -0.31 -0.16 -0.16 -0.59 -0.18 0.83
Denmark - 0.50 - 0.43 -0.14 0.00 - 0.27 -0.18 0.03
Ireland - 0.45 -0.03 -0.19 0.01 0.05 - 0.29 -0.89
UK -0.15 - 0.22 -0.24 -0.05 -0.14 0.05 - 0.66
Greece - 0.55 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.21 -030 0.63
Spain -0 3 9 -0.35 0.10 0.03 -0.47 -038 -0.10
Portugal -030 -0 3 5 0.10 0.03 - 0.47 -0 3 8 -0.10
Significant coefficients at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) or better are highlighted in bold
I >
i :
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!
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1
Following the example set with table 6.5 we can get a clearer idea o f how closely the 
aggregate and country findings mirror each other with the aid o f a table comparing the 
key independent variables (see table 7.7 above). For interest and knowledge there is a 
remarkable degree o f confluence with the aggregate level findings; the directional effects 
of interest and knowledge are negative in all the countries. Moreover, the coefficients for 
subjective and factual knowledge are very similar in size. For West Germany and the 
UK, where both coefficients are significant, the values are almost identical.
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Similarly, the country level identity and pride results mirror the aggregate level negative 
coefficient in all but two cases. On the other hand, education, negative at the aggregate 
level, is positive for five countries. However, with the education coefficients generally so 
small and not significant in any country this is not especially remarkable. Racism seems 
to be the variable with the most country-level variation, with a positive coefficient in only 
seven countries. The UK is the only country in which neither one o f  the identity and 
pride variables is significant. On the other hand, the UK is one o f the three countries in 
which racism is statistically significant. For Belgium and Italy, the racism coefficient is 
positive, so that (overwhelmingly anti-EU) racists are more likely to hold non-attitudes 
than (overwhelmingly pro-EU) respondents who are particularly nationally proud or feel 
European. For the UK, however, the racism coefficient is negative, implying that anti- 
EU racists are more likely to hold an attitude. Although difficult to interpret, this might 
suggest that British racists see a particularly clear link between the EU and, say, 
increased racial diversity in society.
For the remainder of the variables included in the model the picture is rather fragmented. 
In common with section 6.4.4. there is a fair amount o f  variation in coefficient direction 
at the country level for age, sex and religion. The age coefficient is only significant (and 
negative) in the Netherlands and the UK. The sex coefficient is not significant in any 
state, while for religion, the only two significant results are that UK Protestants seem 
more likely to hold non-attitudes while in France respondents professing attachment to 
other religions are more likely to hold an attitude.
Turning to political affiliation, one might reasonably expect respondents who answer 
‘Don’t Know’ to be more likely to hold non-attitudes. While this is the case at the 
aggregate level and for some countries, Portuguese ‘Don’t Know’ respondents are in fact 
more likely to hold an attitude. Combined with a coefficient for subjective knowledge 
that is higher than for interest in EU politics, this could be taken to mean that Portuguese 
respondents are relatively self-confident. For Greece, all Centre and Right respondents 
are more likely to hold an attitude than Leftists, while WC and LMC respondents are less 
likely to have an attitude towards integration than MC subjects. Other subjective social
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class, occupation and political affiliation results appear too garbled to be constructively 
interpreted.
7.8. Conclusion
In this chapter I began by endorsing a conception o f attitudes that falls between the 
Almond-Lippmann consensus and a revisionist position, thus allowing for the possibility 
both for non-attitudes and meaningful attitudes towards political objects. I go on to argue 
that non-attitudes can be measured in single time period data by taking non-opinions as 
an indicator, and that ‘indifference* is a reasonable measure o f  non-opinions rather than 
simply non-committed opinions. On this approach, which differs to that o f Converse, it 
is readily apparent that non-attitude levels are running at a high level and merit 
investigation. After having made the decision to select the Eurobarometer data for the 
logit regression analysis, a clear negative link is visible between higher levels o f interest, 
knowledge, education and non-attitudes. Moreover, national pride and European identity 
are also negatively linked to the dependent variable, implying that increases in support 
for integration are drawn not just from anti-integration attitudes, but also non-attitudes. 
At the same time, a decrease in support would not appear to be fuelled by non-attitudes, 
serving to differentiate non-attitudes from ‘Don’t Know’ responses. So, the variables that 
distinguish between attitude holding also discriminate between positive and negative 
attitudes.
This later finding emphasises the need, notwithstanding the difficulties derived from 
taking a different survey in this last data chapter, to place results from chapter six and 
seven along side each other. Aside from age and sex, the remainder o f the control 
variables performed poorly and were notably difficult to interpret. In summary, it 
appears that interest and knowledge are at the forefront o f  explaining non-attitudes 
towards integration. Undoubtedly, this impression partially derives from the variables at 
our disposal. It would have been particularly interesting to include some measure of
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intelligence or a  range o f variables that could capture respondents* emotional responses 
to the EU. A potential relationship between, say, ‘disillusionment’ and non-attitudes 
might shed light on whether the responsibility (and hence solution) for non-attitudes lies 
with socio-demographic factors or more directly with the political masters of the EU.
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8. THESIS SUM M ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1. C hapter Aim
The first aim o f this chapter in section 8.2. is to collate and summarise the thesis results. All 
these results are cross-referenced to the section in which they were originally presented. In 
section 8.3. I then enter into a little speculation as to the wider significance of the results 
presented in the thesis, so that I end the chapter with some pointers for future research in this 
area.
8.2. Sum m ary of Results
(1) Theories o f regional integration differ in their emphasis on the role of the public in 
European integration, although there is enough evidence to satisfy the premise that the public 
is of some relevance.
• Realist, early neofunctionalist and the permissive consensus theories tend to 
exclude the public (1.3.2.; 1.3.4.).
o  The permissive consensus is criticised on empirical (2.4.) and 
theoretical grounds (1.3.2.).
• Revised neofunctionalist (including postmaterialism) and neorealist 
(interdependence) theories and their successors (two-level game theory, liberal 
intergovemmentalism) and multilevel governance stumble towards 
acknowledging a role for the public, often via the domestic sphere (1.3.2.-
1.3.5.) Recent evidence from referenda in particular suggests that even this 
role is understated.
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None of these theories really get to grips with the actual ways in which public opinion can 
shape integration. Only Sinnott makes a tentative attempt to explain this transmission 
mechanism (1.3.5.).
(2) Theories of integration are also silent on what function the public performs by exercising 
sway over integrative developments. I argue that public opinion is an important legitimising 
force behind the EU, and that attachment to the Union (‘support1 for integration) rather than 
European identity is all that is necessary for the public to fulfil this role (2.2.1.).
• Support itself can be thought of as a particular mode of orientation (an attitude) 
towards a political object (the EU), that can be either affective or utilitarian in nature 
(2 .2 .2.).
o  The affective/utilitarian split reappears when reviewing theories explaining 
support (chapter three) and operationalising national pride and explaining the 
interrelationships between pride, nationalism, European identity and racism 
(chapter five).
* There are several trends in support for integration over time.
o A downswing in the 1970s fits in with the ‘Eurosclerosis’ thesis, while the 
1980s was a time o f booming support. Since the early 1990s support has been 
trending downwards, with a mild upwards bounce coming after 1997 (2.3.). 
o  The support ‘boom’ of the 1980s meant that the relatively large difference in 
support between the psychological ‘core’ o f early entrants and the ‘periphery* 
o f later entrants dwindled to almost nothing by the early 1990s. 
o  Questions asking respondents more value-laden and general questions about 
the EU tend to record higher and more stable support levels than more specific 
(often utilitarian) questions (2.3.).
(3) Amongst those writers who do see public opinion as explaining support for integration, 
one can make a rough division between affective/utilitarian and public/private explanations.
• In the public, utilitarian category macroeconomic variables and intra-EU trade perform 
better than theories based on EU budget figures (3.2.).
• The evidence concerning farmers (private, utilitarian) is not conclusive (3.3.).
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• Amongst private, affective explanations socio-demographic indicators sex, class, income 
and education outperform postmaterialism. The left-right cleavage also appears 
significant, although it is difficult to generalise outside the country level o f  analysis (3.4.).
I argue forcefully that these existent explanations are not sufficient to explain the role o f the 
public in determining support for integration (3.5.).
• The national differences in support that remain in many (utilitarian) analyses spark 
interest in a micro-level explanatory role for affective factors; namely European identity, 
pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism.
• To maintain, as many authors do, that the principal basis o f  EU support is utilitarian 
implies, consciously or otherwise, a model of the EU that does not require identitative, 
legitimacy-inducing attachment. The advanced state o f  integration that exists in the 
European Union can be used to show that this argument runs counter to reality.
(4) I hypothesise about the concepts under consideration -  European identity, national pride, 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism. Emphasis is placed on a theoretical review o f  these 
concepts as a detailed definition is often neglected in empirical social science.
• Social identity and self categorisation theory act as building blocks for appraising the 
effect of the concepts on support and justifies their consideration all together here (4.2.)
o Where Europe is the ‘outgroup* for respondents we can expect their attitudes 
towards it to be hostile e.g. nationalism, xenophobia and racism (4.S.-4.6.).
■ For minority nations attitudes are more difficult to predict - the EU 
may be seen as a facilitator o f statehood or in a more traditional way as 
a barrier (4.5.).
o Acknowledging that respondents may possess multiple identities, I couch the 
identity hypothesise in relative terms, so that respondents with a relatively 
strong sense o f European identity are likely to support the EU (Europe is the 
‘ingroup* in this case) (4.3.).
o Again, multiple identities mean that national pride may coexist with European 
pride, so that I do not hypothesise any relationship between pride and support 
(4.4.).
• Although I do not form hypotheses concerning the relationships between concepts, one 
can look to explain these interactions using the psychological approach o f Adorno et a l
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8. Thesis Summary and Conclusions
(1950). In this work, nationalism, xenophobia and racism are all linked by the underlying 
concept o f  ethnocentrism, an attitude usually held by authoritarian personality types. 
Hence at the minimum one can expect these attitudes all to be linked to each other. This 
is contrasted with patriotism, or love of country, which is roughly equivalent to national 
pride. Hence pride is not expected to be related to the ethnocentric variables.
o  In contrast to the work o f Adorno, self-categorisation theorists argue that all 
group members, not just ethnocentric respondents, engage in stereotyping, 
which is in turn shown not to be an inherently irrational process, so that the 
distinction between pride and the ethnocentric variables should not be pushed 
too far (4.2.).
Finally, one should remember that even if some of these hypotheses appear rather self- 
evident, there has been little research to demonstrate this (3.5.). Not only this, but the 
strength o f  the relationships is also o f  interest both in its own right and as compared to the 
impact o f  utilitarian explanations o f  support.
(5) I proceed to operationalise national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism in 
the ISSP data, which offers a better range o f survey questions than the Eurobarometer survey 
series, even i f  only eight EU countries are included, against the fifteen available in the EB 
data (5.2.1.).
• Factor analysis reveals that there are two underlying ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ dimensions 
to national pride (5.2.3.).
• A minority nationalism variable is added to the model to account for the potentially 
divergent nationalist attitudes o f  the Basques, Catalans, Scots and Welsh (5.2,4.).
• It is not possible to operationalise xenophobia in the ISSP data, and this variable is 
dropped from all future analysis (5.2.5.).
•  A number o f relevant control variables are included in the OLS regression, including a 
socio-economic indicator o f occupation (ISEI scale) (5.2.6.). Unfortunately, neither the 
ISSP data nor the Eurobarometer data used in chapter seven contain any macroeconomic 
control variables, a disappointing omission from the thesis as a whole.
The aggregate level results for the five OLS regression models (weighted by country 
population and with robust estimators) investigating political pride, cultural pride, European 
identity, nationalism and racism show that the variables all positively predict one other.
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Exceptions are the relationships between political pride and racism, which is negative in both 
directions, and between European identity and political pride, where the relationship is not 
significant in either direction (5.3.).
I perform an aggregate level factor analysis on the key independent variables to test the idea 
that they are related to each other by some underlying concept. Once again, two underlying 
‘cultural’ and ‘political’ factors are extracted.
•  Political and cultural pride and nationalism load onto the first factor. The minor role for 
racism, and the link between pride and support shown in chapter six means that I do not 
see this factor as representing Adorno’s concept of ethnocentrism. Moreover, it seems 
likely that one cannot expect national pride holders, forming part of the same underlying 
factor as nationalists, to be indifferent with respect to European integration as earlier 
hypothesised (5.4.1.).
• The second factor appears a straight measure of racism, leaving relative European identity 
as something entirely separate (5.4.1.).
(6) Using the same concepts, control variables and ISSP National Identity survey used above 
I construct a model to test the hypotheses from chapter four concerning the effect o f pride et 
ah on support for European integration.
•  The dependent variable asks respondents to consider whether they benefit or not from 
their country being a member of the European Union. I recode the dependent variable to 
make the distinction between positive and negative attitudes towards the European Union, 
and between attitudes themselves (comprising both positive and negative responses) as 
opposed to non-attitudes (defined temporarily here as ‘Don’t Know’ or ‘Have never heard 
o f  responses) which are dropped. This recoded, dichotomous variable favours the use of 
the logit regression technique (6.2.6.)
• The supporting evidence for the hypotheses concerning pride, European identity, 
nationalism and racism is very limited and often methodologically flawed. There would 
appear to be a clear need for research in this area (6.2.2.-6.2.5.).
The aggregate level logit regression results on the eight EU countries retained in the ISSP 
National Identity survey (weighted by country population) confirms the negative effect of 
rising levels o f nationalism and racism on support, as well as the positive effect o f relative
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European identity on support. The hypothesis o f no relationship between national pride and 
support can be rejected, as rising levels of both political and cultural pride are associated with 
higher levels o f support for European integration.
• A possible explanation for the positive relationship between political and cultural pride 
and support can be furnished by Risse et a l  (2000) who see identity (and hence pride in 
that identity) altering over time in a ‘constructivist’ fashion: as citizen’s national identities 
become more European in content, a link between pride and support appears (6.4.1.)
o  The positive relationship between pride and support, contrasts with the 
negative relationship between nationalism and support. In section 5,4.1. 
pride and nationalism are shown to load onto the same factor. I suggest 
that this can be explained by  the fact that nationalism loads more heavily 
onto this common factor, so that pride is a necessary condition for 
nationalism.
•  As well as being the most consistently significant variables at the country level of 
analysis, one standard deviation changes in European identity and racism have the 
strongest effect on support at the aggregate level (6.4.1.-6.4.2.).
•  In a change from chapter five where minority nationalists were shown to be more likely to 
feel relatively European than ordinary respondents, in the chapter six results they are less 
likely to support European integration. There would appear to be some discrepancy 
between feeling European and supporting the European Union for such respondents. 
Catalan respondents are the only exception to this rule, where overall they are very 
slightly more likely to support integration than normal respondents (6,4.1.).
• At the aggregate level those control variables that are most use in explaining support for 
integration seem to be age, sex, occupation, and some strands o f political affiliation. In 
addition, it is interesting to note those hypotheses disproved by the ISSP data, notably 
sections o f Inglehart’s post-modernism enterprise and the impact of farmers on support 
(6.4.3.).
(7) I complete the analysis o f  public opinion towards European integration by focusing on 
non-attitudes.
• I begin with a summary o f  over fifty years o f debate on public attitude-holding, largely 
concerning matters of foreign policy. The crux of this debate revolves around 
understanding whether much public opinion can be interpreted as stable, consistent and
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relevant to policy-makers (where we can think o f unstable, inconsistent and irrelevant 
attitudes as non-attitudes). In the light of earlier thesis chapters it is certainly useful to 
examine theories that view public opinion as not entirely random and inconsistent (7.2.).
• The main point o f the literature review is to identify key explanatory factors o f non­
attitudes, where I focus on and hypothesise around political knowledge, interest in politics 
and education (7.2Z7.4.).
• Using mainly EB data, I am able to show that non-attitudes are reasonably prevalent in 
the European Union, and so merit further study here. Indeed, the level o f  non-attitudes is 
another reason to place into doubt the existence o f any permissive consensus (7.3.).
• Rather than continue to use the ISSP survey data, I switch to EB 42 (1994) survey data. 
The reason for this is that question (3) is a better measure of non-attitudes than the 
dependent variable used in chapter six, where there is a risk that this simply captures 
‘non-committed’ attitudes (‘don’t knows’ rather than ‘don’t cares’) (7.5.1). Using the EB 
data I argue that indifferent category responses to the chosen dependent variable equate 
with non-attitudes. This different measure is made necessary because in this chapter only 
single time period data is used.
The aggregate level logit results confirm that higher levels o f  political interest, knowledge
and education all increase the likelihood o f  attitude-holding (7.6.). Additionally
• Interest in politics appears to explain more variation in the dependent variable that 
knowledge or education (7.7.1.)
• Increased levels of control variables for national pride and European identity are 
associated with a greater likelihood to hold an attitude towards integration. It appears that 
there is a tendency for these variables to increase support at the expense of negative and 
indifferent responses. However, increases in non-attitudes are associated with a decrease 
in support but not negative responses. There is not much crossover, then, between 
negative and indifferent opinion. It seems respondents do not move from negative to 
indifferent, and then on to positive attitudes (7.7.1.).
262
8. Thesis Summary and Conclusions j
8.3. Avenues for Future Research
Although a somewhat forced comparison, in that I do not set out to entirely refute the 
explanatory power of utilitarian explanations o f support for integration, there is some sense in 
which the sub-title to this thesis could be ‘the other half o f the book that Gabel should have 
written*. The work of many researchers, with Gabel (1998) as perhaps the leading exponent, 
has done much to raise the profile o f utilitarian explanatory factors in explaining support for 
integration. Part of the aim of this thesis has been to redress that balance.
We have seen that there is a clear, important role for national pride, European identity, 
nationalism and racism in public evaluations o f the European Union. This is how things 
should be; although the refrain that the EU is an economic giant but a political pygmy is a 
common one, it seems ridiculous that a political system with the clout o f  the EU is judged 
according only to economic criteria. However, this and other findings in the thesis lead to a 
wider set o f avenues for future research beyond merely ‘setting the record straight*.
From the opening demonstration o f  the impact o f affective (and utilitarian) factors on support 
for integration, and the impact o f  public support on the integration process itself, means that 
there is ample room to update existing theories of integration to take account of these facts. 
Most theories only mention the public in passing, while only Sinnott (1994) makes an attempt 
to document the transmission mechanism for public opinion on European Union policy­
making.
In section 2 .2 .1 .1 argue strongly for an attachment with the European Union based on support 
rather than on identity. It can be seen that while European identity is relatively uncommon, 
most respondents support the EU. Thus support legitimises a loose form o f  attachment to the 
EU, possibly based on civic republicanism, that could supplant the need for a full-blooded 
European identity or demos. Broadly, the implications for the ‘Future o f  Europe’ debate are 
for institutional arrangements that allows citizens to retain their national or regional 
attachments rather than a futile attempt to replace these with an overarching European 
identity: a ‘Europe o f  nations’ rather than a federal vision. In the light of this, the
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‘democratic deficit’ argument looses some of its force: once one ceases to demand that 
European publics identify with the EU but merely support it, the actions o f institutions such 
as the European Parliament gain in legitimacy1.
In section 3 .5 .1 am at pains to point out that the cross-national variation in support detected 
by some authors acts only as a spur to hypothesising at the micro-level. It would be an 
interesting exercise to adopt multi-level modelling techniques so as to gauge how far such 
differences could be accounted for by the social psychological variables proposed. The 
application of this type of model is certainly an avenue that could be taken to build on the 
findings o f the thesis.
In chapter four I flesh out the notion o f affective values impacting upon support for European 
integration. There are, however, plenty more factors that might come under this heading than 
just identity, pride, nationalism and racism. In particular, one might look to support for 
democratic values, trust in other countries and, say, respect for human rights. The 
relationship between these new affective factors and support might offer material for 
reflection on the idea ‘What is Europe?’ Approaching the question from a cross-national 
perspective also appears a fruitful line for research. On some accounts, for instance, Italy and 
other southern European member states hold a relatively positive opinion o f European Union 
politics. On the other hand, one might contend that the Scandinavian countries are 
disaffected with the Union precisely because they perceive general political values in their 
countries to be more advanced. This is different from the emphasis on superior national 
values, which seems a source o f disaffection in Switzerland and Britain. As well as focusing 
on the European Union, this approach might encompass applicant and non-applicant 
countries of Europe from the crude perspective of investigating whether they are ‘fit’ to join 
theEU.
This thesis could also be extended in a more straightforward way to other regions o f Europe 
by using to Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer survey series to look at identity, pride, 
nationalism and racism. Especially interesting is how countries that under Soviet dominance
1 On the other hand, we have seen how constructivist authors explain the link between national pride and support as based on 
changing conceptions o f national identity (Risse et a/., 2000). If support itself is principally determined by identity, the 
above arguments loose their force.
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for many decades were expected to foreswear nationalism react to the prospect of burying 
their national identity in European Union membership. O r could it be that the EU is seen as a 
way to preserve national identities? For future applicant countries in South Eastern Europe 
which have suffered from violent conflict over the last decade the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and European integration is also particularly interesting.
From chapter six it would be interesting to check the robustness o f the findings that national 
pride is related to support for integration by replicating them on other datasets with 
alternative measures of national pride. It would also be worthwhile to develop and test 
further ideas about mechanisms that account for the positive association between national 
pride and support for the EU.
Although it proved not to have been possible here, it would be especially interesting to test 
explanations o f non-attitudes that dwelt more overtly on the psychological dimension, such as 
whether non-attitudes represent a specific disillusionment with the EU. Such an approach 
might be able to answer such questions as to what degree the EU institutional and policy 
framework itself is responsible for non-attitudes, or whether such attitudes are simply 
functions o f wider socio-demographic trends. The non-attitudes findings in general would 
benefit from being replicated with an alternate dependent variable or using a standard panel 
data approach so as to confirm that the ‘indifference’ approach adopted in this thesis is a 
valid measure o f non-attitudes.
Finally, I hazard that several aspects o f the thesis could be approached from a policy proposal 
perspective
• What policy recommendations might one make to increase public support for 
integration? One particular result from my thesis concerns national pride, where it 
appears that the prouder a respondent is o f his or her country, the more likely they are 
to support integration. Could a ‘constructivist’ approach to national identity be the 
best way to ensure the acceptance o f the European Union?
• Many respondents display ‘non-attitudes* towards the European Union, choosing 
simply not to express a particular opinion on the subject. Is this simply a socio­
demographic phenomenon (i.e. non-attitude holders tend to be less well educated or
265
8. Thesis Summary and Conclusions
wealthy) or can the EU be held responsible to a degree, perhaps through the failure to 
include teaching on the European Union in school curricula, public disillusionment 
with the EU or unnecessary institutional and policy-making complexity.
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Section A .l.
This section contains the country-level graphs for questions (1), (2), (3) and (4) from section
2.3.1. and 2.3.2.
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Section A.2.
This table displays the coding o f the variables used in chapters five and six.
V A RIA BLE D E SC R IPT IO N
D ependen t/Independen t variables  
E uropean/N ational iden tity Scored from  - 3  to  3. N egative  score in d ica tes m ore national a ttachm en t [M ean =  -0,65; variance 
=  0.80]
National Pride Factor an a ly s is  scale [m ean =  0 .00 ; variance =  0 .78  (political p ride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range 
4.77 (PP), 4 .88  (CP)]. L evels o f  pride  in c rea se  positive ly  w ith  variable sco re
N ationalism V ariable sp lit in to  quartiles d e riv ed  from  L ik e rt scale (scored  from  3-15). Levels o f  nationalism 
increase positiv e ly  w ith va riab le  score [m ean  =  2 .55; variance =  1.14]
M inority N ationa lism 1 ^ F av o u rs un ita ry  position  2= H olds sep a ra tis t attitudes. D ata on Ireland in itia lly  missing; coded 
to  1.07. In terac tion  variab les are c reated  for S co tlan d , W a le s , C a ta lo n ia  and the B asque 
C o u n try  b y  com bin ing  m in o rity  n a tio n a lism  response w ith  reg ional o rig in  o f  respondent as 
appropria te
Racism Factor an a ly s is  scale  [m ean =  0 .00; variance  =  0 .75 , range =  5.48], L evels o f  racism  increase 
positively  w ith  variable score
Support for E uropean Integration B ivariate sco rin g  - e ither p ro /an ti-in teg ra tio n  o r  a ttitude/non-a ttitude ho ld ing . l=Pro-European 
o r  a ttitude  h o ld e r respec tively
Control variables
Sex l= M ale , 0= F em ale
Age From  14 to  9 6  years. C oded  a s  cohorts (1 - ¿J9 ;2  - 30-39; 3 - 40-49; 4 - 50-59 ; 5 - 60+)
Education Coded fro m  1-7 (1 -  no  education ; 2  -  incom plete p rim ary ; 3 -  p rim ary  completed; 4 -  
incom plete  secondary; 5 - secondary  co m p le ted ; 6 -  incom plete  university/sem i-higher; 7 - 
un iversity  com pleted). S om e national v a ria tio n s  app ly1.
Subjective Social C lass C oded  fro m  1-7 (1 -  L ow er c la ss ; 2 -  W o rk in g  c lass; 3 -  L o w er M idd le  c la ss ; 4  -  D on’t know ; 5 
-  U pper m id d le  c lass; 6  -  U p p e r  c lass; 7  -  M idd le  class). T h is  variab le  is  treated  as categorical. 
M id d le  c la s s  is  the base  ca teg o ry . No d a ta  fo r  G B  o r the N etherlands.
Political A ffilia tion C oded  fro m  1-6 (1 -  F ar le f t;  2  -  L eft, c en tre  left; 3 - R ig h t, conserva tive ; 4  -  Far right; 5  -  
O ther, D o n ’t  K now ; 6 -  C e n tre , liberal). W e code this v ariab le  so th a t ’N /A ’ (previously coded  
‘0 ’) a n d  ‘an sw er-refused ’ (p rev iously  co d ed  ‘9 ’) are coded  system -m issing . ‘N o  party’ (‘7 ’) and 
‘D on’t  know * ( ‘8’) are co d ed  along w ith  ‘n o  specific p a rty ’ ( ‘6 ’). T h is  variable is treated as 
ca tego rica l; Left being  the o m itted  category . N o  data foT Italy .
Incom e Coded fro m  1*5 as quin tiles in  each coun try . H ence, th is is a m easure o f  the  relative income o f  a 
re sp o n d e n t H igher value equals  greater w ea lth . Italy data m issing .
Country  dum m ies 
Religion
W ith S p a in  as the  om itted coun try .
C oded from  1*3 (I - P ro testan t and L u the ran  respondents, 2 - R om an C a tho lic , 3 - No relig ion  
p rofessed). T aken as catego rica l variable, w ith  no re lig io n  as the base  category. ISEI co d in g
O ccupation from  16 to  90 . O ccupational sta tu s increases w ith  score. D a ta  m issing  fo r  G B , Italy, Sweden and  
the N e th e rlan d s  (coded to  th e  m ean  o f  4 3 .5 ).
O ccupation  D um m y 
Farm ers
l= n o  occu p a tio n  data  ava ilab le , O =occupation data  available 
1= A gricu ltu ra l w orker; 0 = non-ag ricu ltu ra l w orker
1 The co d ing  for S w ed en , G erm any, A ustria , the N eth erlan d s and G reat B rita in  departs f ro m  th is general m odel to take  accoun t o f  different 
national educa tiona l qua lifica tions. T hese ca tego ries a re  b road ly , ho w ev er, the n a tio n a l equivalents o f  the qualifications se t out in the 
general co d in g  an d  are hen ce  com parable.
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Section A.3.
In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 5.3.
For the following models:
• All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
• Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
• ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
•  * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
277
UlIililLLfrj
Appendix
Table 5.6. Aggregate Level Im pact on Political Pride o f the Independent Variables
Mode] A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Cultural Pride 0.21 4 4 0.18 4 4 0.20 4 4
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Identity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Nationalism 0.20 ** 0.19 ** 0.18 **
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism -0.11 4 4 -0.11 4 -0.14 4
( 0.04 ) C 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country 0.05 0.10 0.15
( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 )
Catalonia 0.17 4 4 0.10 0.10
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Scotland -0.04 -0.01 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.11 )
Wales 0.09 0.04 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 )
Racism -0.22 ** -0.20 4 4 -0.19 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Germany 0.89 ** 0.78 4 4 0.86 4 4
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Great Britain 0.37 4 4 0.22 4 4 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Austria 0.66 4 4 0.63 ** 0.65 4 4
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Italy -0.50 4 4 - -
( 0.05 )
Ireland 0.32 4 4 0.42 4 4 0.47 *+
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
Netherlands 1.03 4 4 0.92 4 4 -
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Sweden 0.32 4 4 0.22 4 4 0.30 4 4
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 )
Age 0.01 0.00 -0.01
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
Sex 0.07 4 4 0.07 4 0.08 4
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Education -0.02 -0.03 4 -0.06 4 4
| ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
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A Ctd. B Ctd. C C td.
Religion (Protestant) 0.21 ** 0.15 ** 0.17 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04) ( 0.05 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.24 ** 0.19 ** 0.25 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04) ( 0.06 )
ISEI score 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.02 0.10 * 0.11 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Farmers -0.01 -0.10 -0.07
( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
Income - 0.04 ** 0.03 *
c 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
Political Affiliation (Far Left) - -0.35 ** -0.40 **
( 0.06) ( 0.07 )
Political Affiliation (Left) - 0.01 -0.06
( 0.05) ( 0.06 )
Political Affiliation (Right) - 0.08 * -0.02
( 0.04) C 0.04 )
Political Affiliation (Far Right) - -0.20 -0.19
( 0.16) ( 0.18 )
Political Affiliation (Other) - -0.17 ** -0.23 **
( 0.05) ( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Lower) - - 0.01
( 0.11 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - 0.09
( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) - - -0.04
( 0.05 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - -0.05
( 0.14 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) - - 0.13 *
( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Upper) - - 0.38 *
( 0.19 )
Constant -4.15 ** -4.17 ** -3.18 **
( 0.32 ) ( 0.38) ( 0.32 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.39 0.26 0.29
F stat. (DF) 127.54(24) 38.10(29) 28.20(31)
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Table 5.6b. C ountry Level Im pact on Political Pride of the Independent Variables
Germany GB Austria Italy
¿(s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Cultural Pride 0.18 ** 0.13 0.19 ** 0.21 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 )
Identity -0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.05
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 )
Nationalism 0.16 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.21
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism -0.15 -0.01 -0.36 ** 0.02
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.08 )
Basque Country - - - -
Catalonia - - - - >
Scotland - -0.02 _ -
( 0.12 )
Wales - 0.08 - -
( 0.12 )
Racism -0.14 ** -0.21 ** -0.22 ** -0.26 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 )
Age -0.04 * 0.03 0.03 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.01
( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.06 )
Education -0.05 ** 0.02 -0.05 0.00
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.02 )
Religion (Protestant) 0.19 ** 0.05 -0.05 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.13 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.25 ** 0.02 0.09 0.23
( 0.07 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.14 )
ISEI score 0.00 - 0.00 -
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.06 - 0.06 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 )
Farmers -0.13 - -0.12 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.12 )
Income 0.06 ♦ 0.02 0.00 -
( 0.02 ) (
0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
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Germany GB Austria Italy
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) '0.50 ** -0.34 * - -
( 0.13 ) 0.17
Political Affiliation
(Centre) -0.05 -0.23 0.21 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.16 )
Political Affiliation
(Right) 0.17 * 0.21 0.05 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.16 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) -0.21 - - -
( 0.20 )
Political Affiliation
(Other) -0.28 -0.14 -0.50 -
( 0.16 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.57 )
Sub. Class (Lower) -0.20 - -0.28 -
C 0.19 ) ( 0.28 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - * “
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.06 -0.16 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 )
Sub. Class (Don’t Know) - - - -
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.08 _ 0.11 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0 . 1 1  )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.40 - 0.36 * -
( 0.24 ) ( 0.15 )
Constant -0.04 -0.93 ** 0.24 -1.64 **
( 0.19 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.21 )
Number of Cases 741 270 322 841
RA2 0.31 0.22 0.29 0.15
F stat. (DF) 14.41 (23) 4.01 (16) 6.62(21) 19.71 (9)
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Cultural Pride 0.21 ** 0.18 ** 0.06 0.27 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Identity 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.09 *
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Nationalism 0.06 0.11 •* 0.17 ** 0.18 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Minority Nationalism -0.11 -0.12 0.03
( 0.08 ) ( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.12 )
Basque Country - - - 0.07
( 0.10 )
Catalonia - - - -0.06
( 0.07 )
Scotland - - - -
Wales - - - -
Racism -0.06 -0.14 ** -0.26 ** -0.23 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 )
Age 0.09 ** -0.03 0.00 0.05
( 0.02 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Sex -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02
( 0.07 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
Education 0.01 0.05 ** 0.07 ** -0.04
( 0.02 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Religion (Protestant) 0.37 0.04 0.03 -0.95 **
( 0.28 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.25 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09
( 0.23 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.26 ) ( 0.15 )
IS El score 0.00 - - 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.13 - - 0.16
( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 )
Fanners -0.09 - - 0.06
( 0.11 ) ( 0.24 )
Income 0.02 0 .01 0.01 -0.03
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
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noNg& tt
Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) - -0.14 0.09 0.07
( 0.09 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.20 )
Political Affiliation
(Centre) -0.17 -0.06 0.26 ** 0.48 *
( 0.19 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.20 )
Political Affiliation (Right) -0.07 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04
( 0.36 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0 . 1 9  )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) - -0.10 - -
( 0.16 )
Political Affiliation (Other) -0.05 -0.16 ** -0.31 ** 0.13
( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.20 )
Sub. Class (Lower) 0.14 - 0.21 0.26
( 0.21 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.16 )
Sub. Class (Working) -0.06 - 0.12 0.15
( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.10 - - 0.14
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 )
Sub, Class (Don't Know) -0.14 - -0.03 -
( 0 . 1 9  ) ( 0.17 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.19 - 0.03 0.20
( 0 . 1 3  ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.19 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.09 - -0.03 0.24
( 0.32 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.41 )
Constant -0.14 0.15 -0.87 ** -1.19 **
( 0.33 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.42 )
Number o f Cases 617 909 564 428
RA2 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.35
F stat. (DF) 3.53 (22) 8.41 (16) 8.25 (20) 8.80 (24)
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Table 5.7. A ggregate Level Im pact on C ultural Pride of the Independent Variables
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) * ( « . ) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.18 ** 0.18 ** 0.20 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.03 )
Identity -0.05 ** -0.07 ** -0.05 *
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.02 )
Nationalism 0.12 ** 0.13 ** 0.17 **
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism -0.16 ** -0.19 ** -0.18 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country -0.39 ** -0.26 * -0.27 *
( 0.07 ) ( 0.12) ( 0.12 )
Catalonia
*ooOÖi -0.04 -0.05
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Scotland -0.16 -0.10 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.15)
Wales 0.02 0.09 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.10)
Racism 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.13 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.03 )
Germany -0.71 ** -0.70 ** -0.76 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06) ( 0.07 )
Great Britain 0.09 0.19 * -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07)
Austria -0.21 ** -0.17 ** -0.24 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06) ( 0.06 )
Italy 0.24 ** - -
( 0.04 )
Ireland 0.50 ** 0.53 ** 0.52 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07) ( 0.08 )
Netherlands -0.58 ** -0.57 ** -
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Sweden -0.36 ** -0.32 ** -0.40 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07) ( 0.08 )
0.00 0.02 0.02
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
-0.02 0.00 -0.04
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
0.00 -0.02 0.01
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
284
Appendix
ACtd. B Ctd. CCtd.
Religion (Protestant) -0.02 -0.08 -0.06
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04) ( 0.06 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05) ( 0.06 )
ISEI score 0.00 0.00 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.09 * 0.05 0.06
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Farmers 0.09 0.07 0.05
( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 )
Income - -0.02 -0.01
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
Political Affiliation (Far Left) - 0.11 0.19 **
( 0.07) ( 0.08 )
Political Affiliation (Centre) - 0.10 0.08
( 0.05) ( 0.07 )
Political Affiliation (Right) - 0.11 ** 0.16 **
( 0.04) ( 0.05 )
Political Affiliation (Far Right) - 0.36 * 0.39 *
( 0.16) ( 0.19 )
Political Affiliation (Other) - 0.05 0.03
( 0.05) ( 0.07 )
Sub. Class (Lower) - - 0.00
( 0.11 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - -0.04
( 0.05 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) - - 0.04
( 0.05 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - 0.00
( 0.13 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) - - -0.03
( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Upper) - - 0.02
( 0.10 )
Constant 1.11 ** 1.09 ** 0.81 **
( 0.29 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.31 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.33 0.35 0.36
F stat. (DF) 115.76 (24) 80.17(29) 60.56(31)
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fable 5.7b. C ountry  Level Im pact on C ultural Pride of the Independent Variables
Germany GB Austria Italy
b(  s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.23 ** 0.12 0.21 ** 0.12 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.03 )
Identity 0.00 -0.13 ** -0.09 * 0.00
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.02 )
Nationalism 0.21 ** 0.03 0.22 ** 0.08 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism -0.15 -0.17 -0.13 -0.06
( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.06 )
Basque Country - - - -
Catalonia - - - -
Scotland - -0.16 *
( 0.14 ) i
Wales - 0.04 - -
( 0.10 )
Racism 0.17 ** -0.01 0.08 0.07 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.03 )
Age 0.03 0.03 0.09 * -0.03
C 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex -0.07 0.20 * -0.20 * -0.03 ■
( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) C 0.04 )
Education -0.01 -0.11 ** 0.03 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.02 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.08 -0.07 0.16 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.15 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.15 0.09 0.02 0.21 *
( 0.08 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.10 )
ISEI score 0.00 - 0.00 -
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
IS El dummy 0.08 - 0.04 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10 )
Farmers 0.26 - -0.34 * -
( 0.16 ) ( 0.17 )
Income -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
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Germany GB Austria Italy
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) 0.19 -1.05 ** - -
( 0.15 ) 0.18
Political Affiliation
(Centre) -0.12 -0.09 0.03 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.16 )
Political Affiliation
(Right) 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.17 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) 0.24 - - -
( 0.22 )
Political Affiliation
(Other) 0.23 0.00 -0.04 -
( 0.19 ) ( 0.19 ) ( 0.49 )
Sub. Class (Lower) 0.12 - -0.15 -
( 0.18 ) ( 0.26 )
Sub. Class (Working) * - * “
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.01 * 0.09 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0 . 1 1  )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - - -
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) -0.05 • -0.03 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 )
Sub. Class (Upper) -0.01 - -0.28 -
( 0.12 ) ( 0.18 )
Constant -0.78 ** 1.03 ** -1.14 ** 0.19
( 0.24 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.17 )
Number of Cases 741 270 322 841
RA2 0.29 0.23 0.30 0.08
F stat. (DF) 12.61 (23) 4.52(16) 8.09 (21) 7.24 (9)
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.14 ** 0.24 0.05 0.24 a *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Identity -0.06 * 0.05 -0.06 -0.14 a *
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Nationalism 0.10 ** 0.05 0.12 ** 0.07 a
( 0.03 ) C 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Minority Nationalism -0.21 * -0.14 -0.18
( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
Basque Country - - - -0.30 a
( 0.12 )
Catalonia - - - -0.04
( 0.06 )
Scotland - - - -
Wales - * - -
Racism 0.03 0.08 * 0.04 0.04
( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Age 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Sex -0.11 * -0.10 * 0.01 0.08
( 0.06 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Education 0.02 -0.10 »a 0.00 0.02
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Religion (Protestant) 0.13 0.06 0.08 1.33 aa
( 0.26 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.22 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.27 0.16 aa 0.10 0.02
( 0.22 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.56 ) ( 0.13 )
ISEI score 0.00 - - 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy -0.09 - - -0.02
( 0.09 ) ( 0.08 )
Farmers 0.03 - - -0.22
( 0.09 ) ( 0.18 )
Income 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) - -0.35 ** 0.03 0.20
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.20 )
Political Affiliation
(Centre) 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.18
( 0.12 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.20 )
Political Affiliation (Right) -0.11 0.14 * 0.28
** 0.32
c 0.13 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 )
( 0.19 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) - -0.20 - *
( 0.16 )
Political Affiliation (Other) -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.08
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 )
( 0.22 )
Sub. Class (Lower) -0.18 - -0.35 0.02
( 0.25 ) ( 0.22 )
( 0.14 )
Sub. Class (Working) -0.13 * - -0.03 0.06
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
( 0.09 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.05 - -
0.21 *
( 0.07 )
( 0 . 1 1  )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) 0.02 - -0.09 -
( 0.16 ) ( 0.19 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.12 - 0.21
* 0.08
( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 )
( 0.15 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.04 - 0.04
0.14
( 0.32 ) ( 0.34 )
( 0.35 )
Constant 0.03 0.28 -0.29 -0.26
( 0.29 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.22 )
( 0.40 )
Number of Cases 617 909 564
428
RA2 0.13 0.20 0.12
0.21
F stat. (DF) 3.81 (22) 15.32(16) 4.38 (20)
4.36 (24)
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Table 5.8. Aggregate Level Im pact on European Identity
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Cultural Pride -0.08 ** -0.10 ** -0.07 *
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Nationalism -0.07 ** -0.06 ** -0.06 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.02 )
Minority Nationalism 0.22 ** 0.19 ** 0.16 *
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Basque Country 0.26 ** 0.09 0.10
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09) ( 0.09 )
Catalonia 0.36 ** 0.27 ** 0.28 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 )
Scotland 0.18 * 0.21 * -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.10)
Wales 0.12 0.15 -
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.15)
Racism -0.12 ** -0.14 ** -0.16 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03) ( 0.03 )
Germany 0.21 ** 0.17 * 0.07
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08) ( 0.09 )
Great Britain -0.36 ** -0.36 ** -
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10)
Austria 0.17 ** 0.07 -0.01
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07) ( 0.08 )
Italy 0.26 ** - -
( 0.05 )
Ireland -0.31 ** -0.37 ** -0.31 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
Netherlands 0.00 -0.02 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Sweden -0.17 * -0.19 * -0.24 **
( 0.07 ) ( 0.09) { 0.09 )
Age -0.01 0.01 0.00
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
( 0.03 ) ( 0.04) ( 0.05 )
Education 0.02 0.02 0.00
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
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A C td. BC td. CCtd.
Religion (Protestant) -0.14 ** -0.14 ** -0.18 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.05) ( 0.06 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.00 0.01 -0.10
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06) ( 0.07 )
ISEI score 0.00 0.00 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.09 * 0.06 0.05
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 )
Farmers 0.03 -0.06 -0.04
( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 )
Income - 0.00 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Political Affiliation (Far Left) - -0.20 ** -0.19 *
( 0.07) ( 0.08 )
Political Affiliation (Centre) - -0.05 -0.08
( 0.07) ( 0.09 )
Political Affiliation (Right) - -0.11 * -0.10
( 0.05) ( 0.05 )
Political Affiliation (Far Right) - -0.51 ** -0.49 *
( 0.18) ( 0.22 )
Political Affiliation (Other) - -0.06 -0.22 *
( 0.07) ( 0.09 )
Sub. Class (Lower) - - 0.03
( 0.12 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - -0.10
( 0.07 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) * - -0.06
( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) * - 0.11
( 0.16 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) - - -0.03
( 0.08 )
Sub. Class (Upper) - - 0.13
( 0.15 )
Constant -0.62 -0.03 0.04
( 0.38 ) ( 0.46) ( 0.39 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.14 0.14 0.12
F stat. (DF) 30.65 (24) 16.42(29) 13.15(31)
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Table 5.8b. C ountry  Level Im pact on European Identity
Germany GB Austria Italy
*< «•) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.08 -0.06 0.15 -0.05
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.04 )
Cultural Pride 0.00 -0.23 ** -0.14 * -0.01
( 0.04 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 )
Nationalism -0.05 -0.12 0.00 -0.09 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism 0.20 * 0.20 0.25 0.30 **
( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.19 ) ( 0.09 )
Basque Country - - - -
Catalonia - - - -
Scotland _ 0.04 - _
( 0.11 )
Wales - 0.16 - -
( 0.16 )
Racism -0.23 ** -0.08 -0.02 -0.07
( 0.04 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.04 )
Age -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.01
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex -0.07 -0.03 -0.19 0.12 *
( 0.07 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.06 )
Education -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.03 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.17 * -0.13 0.29 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.30 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.05 0.32 0.13 -0.43 *
( 0.09 ) ( 0 . 1 7  ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.20 )
ISEI score 0.00 - -0.01 -
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.09 - 0.15 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0 . 1 4  )
Farmers -0.13 - 0.06 -
( 0.16 ) ( 0.21 )
Income -0.02 0.00 0.12 ** -
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 )
292
Appendix
Germany GB Austria Italy
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) -0.20 0.06 - -
( 0.16 ) 0.25
Political Affiliation
(Centre) -0.03 0.02 -0.40 -
( 0.13 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.22 )
Political Affiliation
(Right) -0.13 -0.15 -0.48 * -
( 0.13 ) ( 0 . 1 9  ) ( 0.23 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) -0.54 * - - -
( 0.26 )
Political Affiliation
(Other) -0.61 0.28 -1.12 -
( 0.33 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.92 )
Sub. Class (Lower) 0.27 * - 0.21 -
( 0.14 ) ( 0.24 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - * “
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.06 0.09 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0.14 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - - -
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) -0.08 . -0.17 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.15 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.18 - -0.21 -
( 0.22 ) ( 0.33 )
Constant -0.29 -1.30 ** -1.02 * -0.21
( 0.25 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.29 )
Number o f  Cases 741 270 322 841
RA2 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.07
F stat. (DF) 4.95 (23) 3.94 (16) 1.34 (21) 5.61 (9)
N .B . T he F -s ta t ind ica tes th a t the m odels for G B an d  A ustria  are n o t significant.
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.16 *
( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 )
Cultural Pride -0.12 * 0.07 -0.09 -0.27 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 )
Nationalism -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 - *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Minority Nationalism 0.14 0.28 * -0.04
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.18 )
Basque Country - - - 0.02
( 0.12 )
Catalonia - - - 0.30 **
( 0 . 1 0  )
Scotland - - -
Wales - - - -
Racism -0.22 ** -0.10 ** -0.13 ** -0.02
( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Age -0.07 * 0.02 0.03 -0.02
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Sex 0.01 -0.10 * 0.03 0.12
( 0.08 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 )
Education 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.02
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.23 0.02 -0.12 1.68 **
( 0.36 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.29 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.28 0.03 1.11 ** -0.27
( 0.20 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.19 )
ISEI score 0.01 * - 0.01
( 0.00 ) ( 0.01 )
. ISEI dummy 0.02 - 0.01
( 0.14 ) ( 0.11 )
Farmers 0.17 - 0.13
( 0.14 ) ( 0.24 )
Income -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
294
w
Appendix
Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) - -0.08 -0.52 ** 0.92
( 0.12 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.62 )
Political Affiliation
(Centre) 0.10 0.08 0.01 1.12
( 0.25 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.62 )
Political Affiliation (Right) -0.55 ** 0.00 0.19 1.04
( 0.16 ) ( 0.08 ) C 0.12 ) ( 0.62 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) - -0.57 ** - -
( 0.19 )
Political Affiliation (Other) 0.08 0.03 -0.17 0.92
( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.63 )
Sub. Class (Lower) -0.06 - -0.39 -0.28
( 0.35 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.22 )
Sub. Class (Working) 0.00 - 0.01 -0.14
( 0.10 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.14 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.08 - - -0.08
( 0.10 ) ( 0.16 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) -0.12 - 0.24 -
( 0.20 ) ( 0.22 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.14 - 0.19 * 0.28
( 0.15 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.17 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.68 - 0.44 0.02
( 0.41 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.33 )
Constant -0.62 * -0.66 ** -1.22 ** -1.23
C 0.31 ) ( 0.19 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.79 )
Number of Cases 617 909 564 428
RA2 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.16
F stat. (DF) 4.60 (22) 2.2(16) 4.89 (20) 3.16(24)
N .B . T h e  F -s ta t ind ica tes tha t the m odels for the N e th e rlan d s  and  S p a in  are n o t s ign ifican t.
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Table 5.9. Aggregate Level Impact on Nationalism of the Independent Variables
Model A Model B Model C
b  (s.e.) b  (s.e.) * (« .)
Political Pride 0.30 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03) ( 0.03 )
Cultural Pride 0.21 ** 0.21 ** 0.26 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03) ( 0.03 )
Identity -0.08 ** -0.07 ** -0.07 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism -0.14 ** -0.11 -0.02
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06) ( 0.07 )
Basque Country -0.19 * -0.29 -0.29
( 0.09 ) ( 0.17) ( 0.17 )
Catalonia 0.04 0.06 0.03
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09) ( 0.09 )
Scotland 0.05 0.03 -
( 0.08 ) C 0.11)
Wales -0.21 -0.19 -
( 0.11 ) ( 0.16)
Racism 0.28 ** 0.35 ** 0.31 **
{ 0.02 ) ( 0.03) ( 0.03 )
Germany -0.57 ** -0.59 ** -0.56 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08) ( 0.09 )
Great Britain -0.02 -0.06 -
( 0.07 ) ( 0.10)
Austria 0.23 ** 0.29 ** 0.26 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 )
Italy -0.20 ** - -
( 0.06 )
Ireland 0.11 0.21 * 0.18
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
Netherlands -0.45 ** -0.44 ** -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09)
Sweden -0.10 -0.06 0.01
( 0.07 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
Age 0.08 ** 0.06 ** 0.07 **
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex 0.06 0.08 * 0.07
( 0.03 ) ( 0.04) ( 0.05 )
Education -0.10 ** -0.07 ** -0.08 **
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02) ( 0.02 )
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A Ctd. B Ctd. C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant) 0.02 -0.02 -0.09
( 0.05 ) ( 0.05) ( 0.07 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.07 0.04 0.03
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06) ( 0.07 )
ISEI score 0.00 0.00 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.04 0.01 -0.02
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 )
Farmers 0.16 0.18 0.21
( 0.10 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.12 )
Income - -0.02 -0.03
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Political Affiliation (Far Left) - 0.05 0.05
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
Political Affiliation (Cente) - -0.07 -0.13
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Political Affiliation (Right) - 0.05 0.04
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Political Affiliation (Far Right) - 0.11 0.22
( 0.18 ) ( 0.21 )
Political Affiliation (Other) - -0.04 -0.07
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Sub. Class (Lower) - - 0.11
( 0.12 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - -0.06
( 0.08 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) - - -0.07
( 0.07 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - 0.01
( 0 . 1 6  )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) - - 0.06
( 0.08 )
Sub. Class (Upper) - - 0.31
( 0.27 )
Constant 3.95 ** 3.53 ** 2.99 **
( 0.38 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.39 )
Number of Cases 5823 3892 2672
RA2 0.31 0.35 0.37
F stat. (DF) 118.27 (24) 70.48 (29) 55.71 (31)
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Table 5.9b. Country Level Impact on Nationalism of the Independent Variables
Germany GB Austria Italy
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.30 ** 0.26 ** 0.28 ** 0.29 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.04 )
Cultural Pride 0.30 ** 0.05 0.29 ** 0.20 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 )
Identity -0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.11
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 ) C 0.04 )
Minority Nationalism 0.07 -0.28 * -0.35 * -0.16
( 0.09 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.09 )
Basque Country - - - -
Catalonia - - - -
Scotland . 0.09 _ _
( 0.13 )
Wales - -0.18 - -
( 0.17 )
Racism 0.31 ** 0.41 ** 0.31 ** 0.18 **
( 0.05 ) C 0.06 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 )
Age 0.09 ** 0.04 0.04 0.08 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.07
( 0.07 ) C 0.12 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.07 )
Education -0.05 -0.08 -0.19 ♦ ♦ -0.13 **
{ 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.13 0.06 0.19 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.23 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.02 -0.12 0.17 0.49 * J*
( 0.09 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.14 )
ISEI score 0.00 - -0.01 -
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy -0.03 - -0.22 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.12 )
Farmers 0.12 - -0.09 -
( 0.18 ) ( 0.23 )
Income -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 )
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r Germany GB Austria Italy
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) -0.01 -0.70 ** - -
( 0.18 ) 0.21
Political Affiliation
(Centre) 0.17 0.08 0.21 -
( 0.12 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.25 )
Political Affiliation
(Right) 0.25 * 0.11 0.14 -
( 0.12 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.25 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) 0.36 - - -
( 0.24 )
Political Affiliation
(Other) -0.21 -0.02 0.89 ** -
( 0.16 ) ( 0.22 ) ( 0.26 )
Sub. Class (Lower) 0.22 - -0.05 -
( 0.20 ) ( 0.20 )
Sub. Class (Working) - ’ *
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.05 _ -0.01 -
( 0.09 ) ( 0.11 )
Sub, Class (Don't Know) - - - -
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.09 - 0.14 -
( 0.10 ) ( 0.14 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.34 - -0.04 -
( 0.34 ) c 0.34 )
Constant 1.96 ** 2.90 ** 4.11 44 2.53 **
( 0.28 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 0.24 )
Number of Cases 741 270 322 841
RA2 0.35 0.35 0.43 0.23
F stat. (DF) 20.01 (23) 8.06 (16) 151.9(21) 37.34 (9)
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride 0.09 0.28 ** 0.27 ** 0.31 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Cultural Pride 0.25 ** 0.09 0.21 #* 0.15 *
( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Identity -0,08 -0.05 0.00 -0.11 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) C 0.05 )
Minority Nationalism -0.20 -0.15 -0.16
( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.15 )
Basque Country - - - -0.26
- ( 0.17 )
Catalonia - - - 0.10
( 0.10 )
Scotland - - '■ -
\
Wales - -
-
- -
■ >
Racism 0.07 0.34 ** 0.51 ** 0.20 **
( 0.06 ) ( 0.05 ) C 0.04 ) ( 0.06 )
Age 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.07
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Sex 0.07 0.11 0.20 * -0.03
( 0.09 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 )
Education -0.06 -0.05 * -0.04 -0.15 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Religion (Protestant) 0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.3 S
( 0.29 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) C 0.30 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.24 0.01 0.18 0.09
( 0.22 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 0.18 )
ISEI score 0.00 - 0.00
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.06 - -0.02
(0 . 11 ) ( 0.13 )
Farmers 0.03 - 0.60 **
( 0.16 ) ( 0.18 )
Income -0.02 -0.09 ** -0.09 ** 0.00
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 )
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I r e la n d N e th e r la n d s S w eden S p a in
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) - -0.10 0.09 -1.08 **
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.19 ) ( 0.18 )
Political Affiliation
(Centre) -0.08 0.00 0.09 -1.41 **
( 0.21 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.18 )
Political Affiliation (Right) 0.32 -0.13 -0.06 -1.39 **
( 0.30 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.17 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) - -0.30 - -
( 0.21 )
Political Affiliation (Other) 0.05 0.03 0.05 -1.49 **
( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.18 )
Sub. Class (Lower) 0.34 - 0.40 -0.18
( 0.26 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.20 )
Sub. Class (Working) 0.03 - 0.00 -0.29 *
( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.12 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.01 - - -0.17
( 0.11 ) ( 0 . 1 4  )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) 0.04 - -0.01 -
( 0.21 ) ( 0.23 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.19 - 0.04 -0.31
( 0.15 ) ( 0 . 1 2  ) (  0 .2 5  )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.47 - -0.44 * 0.68
( 0.45 ) (  0 .18  ) ( 0.98 )
Constant 2.68 ** 2.83 ** 3.03 ** 4.65 **
( 0.33 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.42 )
Number o f  Cases 617 909 564 428
RA2 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.29
F stat. (DF) 4.28 (22) 12.66(16) 22.28 (20) 6.68 (24)
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Table 5.10. Aggregate Level Im pact on Racism of the Independent Variables
Model A Model B Model C
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.23 4 4 -0.21 -0.20 * *
(  0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) (  0.03 )
Cultural Pride 0.12 * * 0.11 4 4 0.13 4 4
(  0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) (  0.03 )
Identity -0.09 4 4 -0.10 ** -0.12 ♦ 4
oÖ
) ( 0.02 ) (  0.02 )
Nationalism 0.20 4 4 0.23 * * 0.20 * *
(  0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) (  0.02 )
Minority Nationalism 0.05 -0.07 -0.13 4
(  0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) {  0.06 )
Basque Country 0.11 0.20 0.19
(  0.07 ) ( 0.12 ) (  0.12 )
Catalonia 0.06 0.14 * 0.14 *
(  0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) (  0.07 )
Scotland -0.11 -0.12 -
(  0.09 ) ( 0.15 ) i
Wales 0.05 0.12 -
( 0.11 ( 0.14 )
Germany 0.67 4 4 0.58 ** 0.55 **
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Great Britain 0.35 4 4 0.20 ** -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
Austria 0.27 ** 0.13 4 0.12
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Italy 0.57 4 4 - - ■
( 0.04 )
Ireland -0.37 4 4 -0.48 4 4 -0.41 4 4
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Netherlands 0.47 ** 0.25 ** -
v>Oo'w' ) ( 0.06 )
Sweden 0.30 ** 0.15 4 0.16 4
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
Age 0.03 4 4 0.03 4 4 0.03 4
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
Sex 0.05 0.05 0.03
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 )
Education -0.11 4 4 -0.09 4 4 -0.07 4 4
( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
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A C td. B Ctd, C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant) 0.01 -0.08 -0.09
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Religion (Catholic) 0.04 -0.10 * -0.11
( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
ISEI score -0.003 * -0.005 ** -0.005 **
( 0-00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
IS EI dummy -0.01 0.03 0.05
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Farmers -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.12 )
Income - 0.00 0.02
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 )
Political Affiliation (Far Left) - -0.05 -0.08
( 0.06 ) ( 0.07 )
Political Affiliation (Centre) - 0.11 * 0.03
( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 )
Political Affiliation (Right) - 0.21 #* 0.17 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
Political Affiliation (Far Right) - 0.74 ** 0.73 **
( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 )
Political Affiliation (Other) - 0.19 ** 0.02
( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Lower) - - 0.22
( 0.11 )
Sub. Class (Working) - - 0.01
( 0.05 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) - - 0.12 *
( 0.05 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - -0.06
( 0.16 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) - - -0.08
( 0.06 )
Sub. Class (Upper) - - 0.02
( 0.26 )
Constant -2.71 ** 
( 0.29 )
-1.25 
( 0.36
**
)
-0.74 
( 0.31
*
)
Number of Cases 
RA2
F stat. (DF)
5823
0.26
79.31 (24)
3892
0.28
41.51 (29)
2672
0.33
32.61 (31)
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Table 5.10b. C ountry  Level Im pact on Racism of the Independent Variables
Germany GB Austria Italy
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.16 ** -0.25 ** -0.33 ** -0.27 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.04 )
Cultural Pride 0.15 ** -0.01 0.10 0.12 *
( 0.04 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 )
Identity -0.18 ** -0.05 -0.01 -0.06
( 0.03 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.04 )
Nationalism 0.20 ** 0.34 ** 0.31 ** 0.13 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism -0.16 0.05 0.06 0.38 **
( 0.08 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.08 )
Basque Country - - - -
Catalonia - - - -
Scotland . -0.19 . _
( 0.18 )
Wales - 0.10 - -
( 0.15 )
Age 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.02 )
Sex 0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.07
( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.06 )
Education -0.08 ** -0.14 ** -0.09 -0.14 **
( 0.02 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.02 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.16 * -0.05 -0.09 -
( 0.07 ) C 0.11 ) ( 0.23 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.21 ** -0.10 -0.08 0.50 *
( 0.07 ) C 0.15 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.20 )
ISEI score -0.01 * - 0.00 -
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy 0.07 - 0.02 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.11 )
Farmers -0.18 - 0.18 -
( 0.17 ) ( 0.18 )
Income 0.02 0.00 0.01 -
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
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Germany GB Austria Italy
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) -0.03 0.65 ** - -
( 0.15 ) 0.20
Political Affiliation
(Centre) 1 o o -0.25 -0.15 -
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.21 )
Political Affiliation
(Right) 0.10 0.04 0.11 -
( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.22 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) 0.65 ** - - -
( 0.15 )
Political Affiliation
(Other) 0.12 0.30 0.14 -
( 0.25 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.26 )
Sub, Class (Lower) 0.06 - 0.32 -
( 0.17 ) ( 0 . 1 7  )
Sub. Class (Working) - * *
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) 0.09 0.25 -
( 0.06 ) ( 0.13 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) - - - -
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) -0.06 -0.10 -
( 0.08 ) ( 0.13 )
Sub. Class (Upper) 0.10 - -0.12 -
( 0.34 ) ( 0.24 )
Constant 0.41 -0.30 -0.63 -0.49
( 0.24 ) ( 0.37 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.27 )
Number of Cases 741 270 322 841
RA2 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.23
F stat. (DF) 17.76 (23) 6.74(16) 10.32(21) 37.34 (9)
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Political Pride -0.06 -0.18 ** -0.30 ** -0.21 **
( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
Cultural Pride 0.04 0.08 * 0.05 0.04
( 0.05 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.06 )
Identity -0.13 ** -0.07 * -0.11 ** -0.01
( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 )
Nationalism 0.04 0.18 ** 0.37 ** 0.10 **
( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Minority Nationalism - -0.11 0.05 0.02
( 0.10 ) ( 0.10 ) C 0.10 )
Basque Country - - - 0.09
( 0.12 )
Catalonia - - - 0.02
( 0.07 )
Scotland - - - -
Wales - - - -
Age -0.04 0.07 + * 0.05 0.04
( -0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Sex -0.11 0.08 -0.10 -0.02
( -0.06 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 )
Education 0.01 -0.09 ** -0.08 * -0.06 *
( -0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
Religion (Protestant) -0.29 0.01 0.07 0.28
( -0.26 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.20 )
Religion (Catholic) -0.36 0.09 -0.40 ** 0.25 *
( -0.19 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.12 ) i
ISEI score 0.00 - - -0.01
( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
ISEI dummy -0.11 - - -0.03
( -0.09 ) ( 0.09 )
Fanners 0.14 - - 0.10
( -0.12 ) ( 0.32 )
Income 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
( -0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.03 )
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Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain
Political Affiliation (Far
Left) - -0.43 ** -0.31 -0.71 *
( 0.09 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.35 )
Political Affiliation
(Centre) 0.02 -0.14 * -0.02 -0.58
( -0.21 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.35 )
Political Affiliation (Right) -0.03 0.30 ** 0.32 ** -0.51
( -0.1S ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.34 )
Political Affiliation (Far
Right) - 0.26 - -
( 0.15 )
Political Affiliation (Other) 0.04 0.21 * 4 0.05 -0.69 4
( -0.06 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.34 )
Sub, Class (Lower) -0.25 - -0.01 0.40 *
( -0.32 ) ( 0.32 ) ( 0.18 )
Sub. Class (Working) -0.03 - 0.22 * 0.00
( -0.07 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 )
Sub. Class (Lower Middle) -0.14 - - 0.16
( -0.09 ) ( 0.11 )
Sub. Class (Don't Know) 0.15 - -0.02 -
( -0.13 ) ( 0.24 )
Sub. Class (Upper Middle) 0.13 - -0.12 -0.09
( -0.10 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.17 )
Sub. Class (Upper) -0.30 ** - -0.26 0.03
( -0.10 ) ( 0.23 ) ( 0.56 )
Constant 1.06 ** -0.18 -1.18 ** 0.30
( -0.26 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.45 )
Number o f Cases 617 909 564 428
RA2 0.12 0.18 0.38 0.20
F stat. (DF) 4.14(22) 12.66(16) 22.00 (20) 3.96 (24)
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Section A.4.
In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 6.3.
For the following models:
• All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
• Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
• ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
• * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
Bflflonnn”
Table 6.3. Aggregate Level Impact on Support of the Independent Variables
— ------------------------------
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M odel l a l b 1c
b O dds ratio b Odds ratio b O dds ratio
Political Pride 0 .4 9 4 4 1.64 0 .60 ** 1.83 0 .60 4 4 1.81
( 0 .05 ) ( 0 .0 6 ) ( 0 .08 )
C ultural Pride 0.21 4 4 1.24 0.21 4 4 1.24 0 .26 4 4 1.30
( 0 .05 ) ( 0 .06 ) ( 0 .07 )
Identity 0 .4 6 4 4 1.58 0 .53 4 4 1.70 0 .46 44 1.59
( 0 .04 ) ( 0 .05 ) (  0 .06 )
N ationalist A ttitudes -0 .12 4 4 0.89 -0 .13 4* 0 .88 -0 .06 0 .9 4
( 0 .04 ) ( 0 .05 ) ( 0 .06 )
M inority  N ationalism -0 .40 4 4 0.67 -0 .30 * 0 .74 -0.45 4 4 0 .64
( 0 .1 0 ) ( 0 .13 ) ( 0.17 )
Basque C ountry -0 .50 * 0.61 -0.51 0 .60 -0 .46 0 .63
( 0.21 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0 .32 )
Catalonia 0 .48 4 4 1.61 0.35 4 1.42 0.43 4 1.54
- (  0 .14 ) (  0 .17 ) ( 0 .18 )
Scotland 0 .4 6 1.59 0 .50 1.65 -
' ( 0 .26 ) ( 0 .32 )
W ales 0 .2 9 1.34 0 .1 0 1.11 -
( 0 .26 ) ( 0 .3 0 )
Racist A ttitudes -0 .64 4 4 0.53 -0 .67 4* 0.51 -0 .66 4 4 0.52
( 0 .05 ) ( 0 .06 ) ( 0 .08 )
G erm any 1.05 4 4 2.85 0 .72 *4 2.06 0.58 4 4 1.78
( 0 .15 ) (  0 .16 ) ( 0 .20 )
G reat B ritain 0.33 4 1,39 *" 0 .30 1.35 -
( 0 .16 ) ( 0 .20 )
A ustria -0 .29 0.75 -0 .48 ♦ 0.62 -0 .66 4 0 .52
( 0.21 ) ( 0 .24 ) (  0 .27 )
Italy 2 .99 4 4 19.82 - -
( 0 .15 )
Ireland 2 .30 4 4 10.00 2 .29 4 4 9.90 2 .48 4 4 11.99
( 0 .42 ) ( 0 .40 ) ( 0 .42 )
N etherlands 1.20 4 4 3.30 1.19 44 3.28 -
( 0.22 ) ( 0 .24 )
Sw eden . <! 0.02 1.02 -0 .04 0.96 0.01 1.01
( 0 .25 ) ( 0 .25 ) ( 0 .28 )
A ge 0.03 1.03 0 .10 4 * 1.11 0.11 4 l .U
( 0 .03 ) (  0 .04 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
Sex 0.08 1.08 0 .22 4 1.24 0 .37 4 4 1.45
( 0 .08 ) ( 0 .09 ) ( 0 .12 )
E ducation 0.02 1.02 0 .06 1.06 0 .0 0 1.00
( 0.03 ) (  0 .04 ) ( 0 .04 )
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U  C td . l b  C td . Ic  C td .
Religion (P ro tes tan t) 0.12 1.13 0.11 1.12 0.05 1.05
( 0.11 ) ( 0 .12 ) ( 0.15 )
Religion (C atholic) 0.13 1.14 0.04 1.04 -0.13 0 .88
( 0.12 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.16 )
ISEI score 0.02 ** 1.02 0.02 ** 1.02 0.02  ** 1.02
( 0.00 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
ISEI dum m y 0.22 * 1.25 -0.01 0 .99 -0.05 0.95
( 0.11 ) ( 0 .12 ) ( 0.13 )
Farm ers -0.32 0 .73 -0.46 0.63 -0.49 0.61
( 0.29 ) ( 0 .30 ) ( 0 .30  )
Incom e - -0.02 0 .98 -0.03 0.97
( 0 .04 ) ( 0.04 )
Political A ffiliation (F a r  L eft) - -0.72 ** 0.49 -0.69 ** 0.50
( 0 .18 ) ( 0.19 )
Political A ffiliation  (C en tre ) - -0.26 0.77 -0.63 ** 0.53
( 0 .16 ) ( 0.24 ) :
Political A ffiliation  (R ig h t) - 0 .06 1.06 0.10 1.11
( 0 .10 ) ( 0.13 )
Political A ffiliation (F a r
Right) - -0.52 0 .60 -1.25 ** 0 .29
( 0 .34 ) ( 0.42 )
Political A ffiliation  (O th e r) - -0.47 ** 0.62 -0.53 ** 0.59
( 0 .16 ) ( 0.20 )
Sub. C lass (L ow er) * * 0.19 ; 1.21
( 0 .29  )
Sub. C lass (W ork ing ) - - -0.48 ** 0.62
( 0.18 ) ,
Sub. C lass (L ow er M id d le ) - - 0.05 1.05
( 0.14 ) .
Sub. C lass (D on 't K n o w ) - - -0.97 0 .38
( 0.86 )
Sub. C lass (U pper M id d le ) - - -0.31 0.73
( 0.18 )
Sub. C lass (U pper) - - -0.08 . 0.93
0.54
C onstan t -7.53 ** 0 .0 0 -3 .90 ** 0 .02 -2.05 0.13
( 1.03 ) ( 1.08 ) ( 0 .97  )
N u m b er o f  C ases 4990 3354 2318
P seudo RA2 0.21 0 .19 0.20
L R  C hiA2 (d .f.) 1235.65 (25) 795.68 (30) 568.62 (32)
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Table 6.3b. Country Level Impact on Support of the Independent Variables
G erm an y G B A u s tr ia
b O dds ra tio b Odds ratio b O dds ratio
P o litica l P rid e 0.43 ** 1.54 0.89 mm 2.43 1.06 mm 2.89
( 0.16 ) ( 0 .29 ) ( 0 .26 )
C u ltu ra l P rid e 0.20 1.23 -0.37 0.69 0 .56 * 1.75
( 0.14 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0 .25 )
Iden tity 0.40 ** 1.49 0.60 *♦ 1.82 0.67 mm 1.96
( 0.13 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0 .20 )
N a tio n a lis t A ttitudes 0.02 1.03 -0.52 m 0.59 -0.03 0.97
( 0.12 ) ( 0.23 ) ( 0 2 0 )
M in o rity  N atio n a lism -0.53 0 .59 -0.19 0.83 0.58 1.78
(  0.31 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0 .59 )
B asq u e  C o u n try - - -
C a ta lo n ia - - -
S co tland * 0.11 1.12 -
(  0.59 )
W ales - 0.12 1.13 -
( 0.52 )
R a c is t A ttitudes -0.87 ** 0.42 -0.98 ** 0.37 -0.71 ** 0.49
( 0.15 ) ( 0 2 5 ) ( 0 .20 )
A ge 0.20 • 1.22 -0.01 0.99 0.08 1.08
( 0.09 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.15 )
S ex 0.55 * 1.74 0.69 1.99 -0.03 0.97
( 0.24 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0 .36 )
E ducation 0.03 1.03 0.24 1.27 0.42 1.52
( 0.10 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0 2 4 )
R elig ion  (P ro testan t) -0.03 0 .97 0.94 m 2.57 0.79 2 2 0
( 0.27 ) ( 0.45 ) ( 0.98 )
R elig ion  (C atho lic) -0.14 0 ,87 1.00 2 .72 0.05 1.05
( 0.30 ) ( 0.61 ) ( 0 .45 )
ISE I sco re 0.02 * 1.02 - -0.01 0.99
( 0.01 ) ( 0 .02  )
ISHI dum m y -0.23 0 .79 - 0.46 1.59
( 0.25 ) ( 0 .4 4 )
F arm ers 0.01 1.01 - -0.36 0.70
( 0 .60 ) ( 0 .7 3 )
Incom e -0.14 0.87 -0.23 0 .79 0 .40 m 1.49
( 0.09 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.17 )
311
Appendix
G e rm an y G B A u s tr ia
Political A ffiliation (F a r  Left) 0.27 1.31 - -
( 0 .56  )
Political A ffiliation (C en tre) 0.74 2 .0 9 -0.07 0 .93 -1 .04  0 .35
( 0.42 ) ( 0 .54  ) ( 0 .82  )
Political A ffiliation (R igh t) 0.91 * 2 .4 8 -0.38 0 .6 9 -0 .96  0 .38
( 0.43 ) ( 0 .54  ) ( 0 .84  )
Political A ffiliation (F a r  R ight) -0.29 0 .7 5 - -
( 0.71 )
Political A ffiliation (O ther) 0.53 1 .70 -0 .40  0 .6 7 -
( 0 .90  ) ( 0 .75  )
Sub. C lass (L ow er) -0.27 0 .7 6 - -0 .3 0  0 .7 4
( 0 .58  ) ( 0.91 )
Sub. C lass (W ork ing ) - - -
Sub. C lass (L ow er M id d le) -0.06 0 .94 -0.71 0 .49
( 0 .26  ) ( 0 .4 7  )
Sub. C lass (D on't K now ) - - -
Sub. C lass (U pper M idd le) -0.57 0 .56 _ -0 .1 2  0 .89
( 0.32 ) ( 0 .4 9  )
Sub. Class (U p p er) -0 .64  0 .53 - -
( 0 .92  )
Constant -0.01 0 .99 1.85 6 .33 -2 .22  0.11
( 0 .89  ) ( L 48  ) ( 1-72 )
N um ber o f  C ases 637 225 258
Pseudo RA2 0.16 0.29 0 .2 7
LR  C hiA2 (d .f.) 114.62 (24) 8 7 .4 9 (1 7 ) 94 .29  (20)
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Ita ly Ire la n d N e th e r la n d s
b Odds ratio b Odds ratio b Odds ratio
Political Pride -0.01 0 .99 0.88 ** 2 .42 0 .5 0 ♦ * 1.64
C 0 .17  ) ( 0 .26 ) (  0 .1 8 )
C ultu ral Pride 0.21 1.24 0 .49 1.63 0 .37 * 1.45
( 0 .22  ) ( 0 .27 ) ( 0 .1 5 )
Identity 0 .19 1.21 -0.28 0 .7 6 0 .6 4 * + 1 .90
(  0 .15  ) ( 0 .20 ) ( 0 .1 4 )
N a tio n a lis t A ttitudes -0 .05 0.95 -0 .36 0 .7 0 0 .02 1.02
( 0 .14  ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.11 )
M in o rity  N ationalism -0.91 *• 0 .40 - -0.41 0 .6 6
(  0.31 ) (  0 .3 9 )
B asque C ountry - - -
C atalonia - - -
Scotland - - -
W ales - - -
R acist A ttitudes -0 .69  • • 0.50 -1.42 • •  0 .24 -0 .26 0 .77
( 0 .18  ) ( 0 .25 ) ( 0 .15 )
Age -0.13 0.87 -0.13 0.87 0 .0 0 1.00
( 0 .10  ) ( 0.15 ) (  0 .0 8 )
Sex -0 .75  * 0 .47 0.01 1.01 -0 .3 9 0 .68
( 0 .30  ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0 .2 2 )
Education -0 .29  ** 0.75 0.03 1.03 0 .1 8 * 1 3 0
( 0.11 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0 .0 8 )
R elig ion  (Protestant) - -7.04 0.00 -0 .16 0 .85
( 24 .12 ) ( 0.31 )
R elig ion  (C atholic) 0 .57 1.77 -6.85 0 .00 -0.54 0.58
( 0 .69  ) ( 24 .09 ) ( 0 .2 8 )
ISE1 score - 0.02 1.02 -
( 0 .02 )
ISEI dum m y - -0,24 0 .79 -
( 0 .56 )
Farm ers - 0.29 1 3 3 -
( 0 .76 )
Incom e - O .ll 1.11 0 .18 • 1.20
-
( 0 .16 ) ( 0 .08 )
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I ta ly I r e la n d N e th e rlan d s
Political A ffiliation (F a r  Left) - - -0.99 * 0.37
( 0.42 )
Political A ffiliation (C en tre) - -0.34 0.71 -0.04 0.96
( 0.91 ) ( 0.33 )
Political A ffiliation (R igh t) - 6.55 0.28 1.33
( 39.72 ) ( 0 .34 )
Political A ffiliation  (F a r  R ight) - - -0.18 0.83
( 0 .64 )
Political A ffiliation  (O ther) • -0.15 0 .8 6 -0.48 0.62
( 0 .37  ) ( 0.29 )
Sub. C lass (L ow er) - 0.73 2 .07 -
( 1-26 )
Sub. C lass (W ork ing) - 0,19 1.21 -
( 0 .45  )
Sub. C lass (L ow er M idd le) 0.48 -0.92 0 .40 -
0 .56 ( 0 .47  )
Sub. C lass (D on 't K n o w ) - -0 .02 0 .98 -
( M 3  )
Sub. C lass (U pper M idd le) 0.42 -0.52 0 .6 0 -
0.42 ( 0 .86  )
Sub. C lass (U p p er) 1,41 5.85 -
1.10 44.93
C onstant 5.46 ** 2 35 .52  
( 1-15 )
8.63
( 24.12 )
5600 .47 1.45 
( 0.78 )
4.25
N um ber o f  C a ses 
P seudo RA2 
L R C h iA2 (d .f.)
731
0.11
46.75  (1 3 )
584
0.22
74.01 (21)
592
0.12
75.40  (23)
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S p a in Sw eden
b  O dds ratio b O dds ratio
P o litica l Pride 1.14 ** 3.12 0 .48  • • 1.62
( 0 .2 0  ) ( 0 .18  )
C u ltu ral Pride 0 .2 9 1.34 0.27 1.31
( 0 .2 0  ) ( 0 .18  )
Identity 0 .42  ** 1.52 0.83  ** 2 .30
( 0 .14  ) C 0 .15  )
N a tio n a lis t A ttitudes -0 .12 0.89 -0.21 0.81
( 0 .13  ) ( 0 .14  )
M in o r ity  N atio n a lism -0 .26 0.77 -1 .24  •* 0.29
( 0 .44  ) ( 0 .45  )
B asq u e  C ountry -0 .57 0.56 -
( 0 .44  )
C ata lon ia 0.41 1.51 -
( 0 .28  )
Scotland - -
W ales - -
R acist A ttitudes -0 .35 0.71 -0.25 0.78
( 0 .2 0  ) (  0 .15  )
A ge -0 .02 0.98 0.06 1.07
( 0 .1 0  ) ( 0 .09  )
Sex 0 .28 1.33 0.31 1.36
( 0 .2 6  ) ( 0 2 6  )
Education -0 .08 0.93 0.04 1.04
( 0 .1 0  ) ( 0 . 1 1  )
R elig ion  (P ro testan t) 5 .8 9 0.32 1.38
22 .25 ( 0 .29  )
R elig ion  (C atho lic) 0 .07 1.07 -0 .49 0.61
( 0 .45  ) ( 1-47 )
1SEI score 0 .03  * 1.03 -
( 0.01 )
ISEI dum m y 0.11 1.12 -
( 0 .32  )
Fanners -2 .50  * 0.08 -
( 1-21 )
Incom e 0 .1 9 1.21 0.06 1.06
( 0 .12  ) ( 0 .09  )
I
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Spain Sweden
Political A ffiliation (F a r Left) 4 .18 65 .60 -1.60 * 0 .2 0
( 14.96 ) ( 0,74 )
Political A ffiliation (C en tre) 5.10 163.92 0.53 1.70
( 14.96 ) ( 0 .39 )
Political A ffiliation (R igh t) 5.22 185.00 1.40 ** 4 .0 7
( 14.96 ) ( 0.43 )
Political A ffiliation (Far R igh t) - -
P o litical A ffiliation (O ther) 4,41 82 .64 0.29 1.34
( 14.96 ) ( 0.42 )
Sub. C lass (L ow er) 0.77 2 .15 0.50 1.65
( 0.66 ) ( 0 .89 )
Sub. C lass (W orking) -0.24 0 .79 -0.68 * 0.51
( 0.33 ) ( 0.31 )
Sub. C lass (Low er M idd le) 0.35 1.42 -
( 0.41 )
Sub. C lass (D on 't K now ) - -1.38 * 0 .25
( 0.67 )
Sub. C lass (U pper M idd le) -0.40 0 .6 7 0.91 * 2 .48
( 0.65 ) ( 0.41 )
Sub. Class (U pper) 5.63 -0.67 0.51
14.98 ( 0.95 )
Constant -5.53 0 .0 0 1.44 4.21
( 15.00 ) ( 1.00 )
N um ber o f  C ases 397 426
Pseudo RA2 0 .27 0.25
L R C h iA2 (d .f.) 125.95 (26) 149.85 (21)
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Section A.5.
In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 7.6.
For the following models:
•  All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
• Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
•  ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
•  * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
For the categorical variables, only statistically significant findings are reported.
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Table 7.5. Aggregate Level Im pact on Non-Attitude H olding of the Independent 
Variables
b Odds ratio
Interest -0.44 ** 0.64
( 0.03 )
Subjective Knowledge -0.24 ** 0.78
( 0.03 )
Factual Knowledge -0.25 ** 0.78
( 0.03 )
Education -0.04 • * 0.96
( 0.01 )
Identity -0.30 ** 0.74
( 0.03 )
Pride -0.14 ** 0.87
( 0.03 )
Racism 0.00 1.00
( 0.08 )
France -0.09 0.91
( 0.09 )
Belgium 0.46 ** 1.59
( 0.14 )
Netherlands -0.03 0.97
( 0.13 )
West Germany -0.65 0.52
( 0.10 )
Italy -0.48 0.62
( 0.09 )
Luxembourg -0.80 0.45
( 0.70 )
Denmark -0.17 0.85
( 0.19 )
Ireland -0.60 * 0.55
( 0.24 )
UK 0.19 ♦ 1.21
( 0.10 )
Greece -0.03 0.97
( 0.19 )
Portugal 0.21 1.23
( 0.14 )
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C td .
A ge -0.26 ** 0.77
( 0.03 )
Sex -0.15 *# 0 .86
( 0.05 )
R e lig io n  (C atho lic) 0.02 1.02
( 0.07 )
R e lig io n  (P ro testant) -0.05 0 .95
( 0.08 )
R elig ion  (O ther) -0.20 0.82
( 0.13 )
P o litic a l A ffiliation  (F a r Left) 0.08 1.09
( 0 .09 )
P o litic a l A ffiliation  (C entre) 0.28 ** 1.32
( 0.06 )
P o litic a l A ffiliation (R ight) 0.15 1.16
( 0.08 )
P o litic a l A ffiliation  (F a r  R ight) 0.22 1.24
( 0.12 )
P o litic a l A ffiliation  (D K ) 0.47 ** 1.60
( 0.08 )
S u b . C lass (W orking) 0.04 1.04
( 0 .06 )
Sub. C lass (L M C ) 0.09 1.10
( 0.07 )
Sub. C lass (U M C ) 0.20 * 1.22
( 0.09 )
Sub. C lass (U C ) 0.15 1.16
( 0 .16 )
Sub. C lass (R efusal) -0.02 0 .98
( 0.13 )
Fisherm an -3.20 * 0 .04
( 1.47 )
Self-em ployed -0.28 * 0 .75
( 0.12 )
G eneral M anagem ent -0.51 * 0 .6 0
( 0 .24 )
M iddle m anagem ent -0.48 0 .62
( 0.12 )
C onstant 2,99
( 0.21
ft*
)
19.83
N um ber o f  C ases 
Pseudo R A2 
LR ChiA2 (d .f.)
10053
0.10
1366.62 (49)
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Table 7.5b C ountry Level Im pact on Non-A ttitude H olding of the Independent 
Variables
F ra n c e B e lg ium N e th e r la n d s
b O d d s ra tio b O d d s ra tio b O dds ratio
In terest -0.58 ** 0 .5 6 -0 .64 4 4 0 .53 -0 .57 4 4 0.56
( 0 .10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0 .13 )
Subjective K now ledge -0.18 0 .8 4 -0 .19 0.83 -0 .26 4 0.77
( 0 .10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0 .13 )
Factual K now ledge -0.18 0 .83 -0 .16 0 .85 -0 .17 0.84
( 0 .10 ) ( 0 .1 0 ) ( 0.11 )
E ducation -0.04 0 .9 6 0 .02 1.02 -0.01 0.99
( 0 .04 ) ( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .04 )
Iden tity -0.20 4 0 .82 -0 .18 0 .8 4 -0 .35 4 4 0.70
( 0 .10 ) ( 0 .1 0 ) ( 0.11 )
Pride -0.06 0 .9 4 - 0 4 8 4 * 0 .62 -0 .14 0.87
( 0 .10 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0 .1 0 )
R acism 0.15 1.16 1.09 * 4 2 .97 0 .3 9 1.48
( 0 .24 ) ( 0 .35 ) ( 0 .33 )
A ge -0.19 0 .83 -0 .13 0 .88 -0.23 4 0.79
( 0 .12 ) ( 0 .13 ) ( 0 .12 )
Sex -0.25 0 .78 -0 .0 9 0.91 0.13 1.14
( 0 .18 ) ( 0 .1 8 ) ( 0 .19 )
R eligion (C atholic) -0.18 0 .84 0 .3 0 1.34 0 .09 1.10
( 0 .19 ) ( 0 .1 9 ) ( 0 .1 9 )
R eligion (P ro testan t) -1 .99 0 .14 1.08 2.93 0 .0 6 1.06
( 1.11 ) ( 1.41 ) ( 0 .25 )
R elig ion  (O ther) -0.92 * 0 .40 0 .84 2.32 0.23 1.26
( 0 .43 ) ( 0 .5 9 ) ( 0 .24 )
Political A ffilia tion  (F a r  Left) 0 .56 * 1.75 0 .63 * 1.88 -0 .79 4 0.45
( 0 .28 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0 .38 )
Political A ffilia tion  (C en tre) 0 .46 * 1.58 0 .4 4 1.56 -0 .08 0.92
(  0 .22 ) (  0 .2 4 ) ( 0 .19 )
Political A ffilia tion  (R igh t) 0.41 1.51 0 .4 9 1.64 -0 .26 0.77
( 0 .28 ) ( 0 .2 7 ) ( 0 .23 )
Political A ffilia tion  (F a r  R ight) 0 .47 1.59 -0 .6 5 0 .52 0 .14 1.15
( 0.41 ) ( 0 .4 6 ) ( 0 .46 )
Political A ffilia tion  (D K ) 0.43 1.54 0 .8 7 4 4 2 .39 -0.37 0,69
( 0 .33 ) ( 0,31 ) ( 0 .34 )
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F r . C td . B e l C td . N e th .
C td .
S u b .  C lass (W ork ing ) 0.08 1.09 0.25 1.28 -0 .14
0.87
( 0 .20  ) ( 0 .20  ) (  0 .21 )
S u b . C lass (L M C ) . 0 .00 1.00 0.32 1.37 -0 .08
0.92
(  0 .34  ) (  0 .29  ) (  0 .2 5  )
S u b . C lass (U M C ) 0 .84 ** 2.31 0.26 1.30 0 .18
1.20
( 0 .27  ) (  0 .34  ) (  0 .23  )
S u b . C a s s  (U C ) -0 .16 0.85 -1 .34  * 0 .26 -0 .04
0.97
(  0 .52  ) ( 0 .68  ) ( 0 .75  )
S u b .  C lass (R efu sa l) -0.10 0.91 -0.08 0.93 0 .0 0
1.00
( 0 .37  ) ( 0 .48  ) (  0 .5 3  )
S e lf -e m p . P ro fessional - -1 .64  * 0 . t9 *
1 ( 0 .78  )
Self-em ployed - -0.72 • 0.49 -
( 0 .35  )
C onstan t 2.53 * + 12.54 3.55 * •
34.90 3.02 +* 20.46
( 0 .74  ) ( 0.78 ) (  0.71 )
N u m b e r  o f  C ases 841 778
874
P seudo  R A2 0.12 0.15
0.12
L R  C h iA2 (d .f.) 131.88 (37) 160.88 (37)
139.95 (38)
f
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W est G e rm a n y I ta ly L u x e m b o u rg
b O dds ra tio b O dds ra tio b O dds ratio
In terest -0.58 ** 0 .56 -0.56 ** 0 .5 7 -0.81 ** 0.45
( 0.15 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.22 )
Sub jective  K now ledge -0.46 ** 0.63 -0.26 * 0 .77 -0.31 0.73
( 0.16 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.25 )
Factual K now ledge -0.47 ** 0.63 -0.18 0 .83 -0.16 0.85
( 0 .12 ) (  0.14 ) (  0.17 )
E ducation -0.07 0 .93 -0.05 0 .95 -0.16 0.86
( 0.05 ) ( 0 .04 ) ( 0 .08  )
Iden tity -0.35 ** 0 .7 0 -0.48 •  * 0 .6 2 -0.59 ** 0 .55
( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0 ,20  )
P ride -0.17 0 .8 4 -0.25 * 0 .78 -0.18 0 .8 4
( 0.12 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0 .20  )
R acism -0.20 0 .82 0.87 * 2 .3 9 0.83 2 .30
( 0.32 ) ( 0 .39 ) ( 0.91 )
A ge 0.04 1.05 -0.01 0 .9 9 0.27 1.31
( 0.14 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0 .23  )
Sex -0.06 0.95 0.18 1.20 -0.04 0 .9 6
( 0.23 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0 .37  )
R eligion (C atholic) -0.25 0 .78 -0.43 0 .6 5 -0.88 0.42
( 0.32 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0 .55  )
R eligion (P rotestant) -0.32 0 .72 0.41 1.51 -
(  0.32 ) (  1.11 )
R elig ion  (O ther) -0.15 0 .86 0.54 1.72 -
( 0.71 ) ( 0.82 )
Political A ffilia tion  (F a r Left) -0.89 0.41 0.26 1.29 -0 .30 0 .74
( 0.58 ) ( 0.32 ) ( 0.82 )
Political A ffilia tion  (C en tre) 0.07 1.08 0.49 * 1.64 0.04 1.04
( 0.26 ) ( 0 .24 ) ( 0 .46  )
Political A ffilia tion  (R igh t) 0.06 1.07 0.39 1.47 -0.18 0 .84
( 0.33 ) ( 0.30 ) ( 0 .56  )
Political A ffilia tion  (F a r R igh t) 0.43 1.54 1.04 ** 2 .8 2 -0 .54 0 .58
( 0.61 ) ( 0.39 ) ( 1.23 )
Political A ffilia tion  (D K ) 0.48 1.61 1.06 «* 2 .88 0.02 1.02
( 0.35 ) 1 ( 0.26 ) ( 0 .58  )
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WG. CttL Italy Ctd. Lux. Ctd.
Sub. Class (Working) -0.29 0.75 -0.08 0.93 -0.05 0.95
( 0.29 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.41 )
Sub. Class (LMC) 0.54 1.71 0.10 1.11 -0.35 0.70
( 0.30 ) ( 0.26 ) ( 0.75 )
Sub. Class (UMC) 0.29 1.34 0.19 121 -022 0.80
( 0.34 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.59 )
Sub. Cass (UC) 0.45 1.58 0.25 128 -
( 0.50 ) ( 0.49 )
Sub. Class (Refusal) 0.97 2.65 -2.30 * 0.10 -0.38 0.69
( 0.65 ) ( 1.13 ) ( 0.54 )
Housewife - -0.73 * 0.48 -
0.31
Professional 1.61 * 5.03 - -
0.79
Constant 2.93 ** 18.67 2.91 ** 1.00 421
4
* 67-13
( 0.89 ) ( 0.80 ) ( 1-45 )
Number of Cases 693 884 352
j Pseudo RA2 0.18 0.14 0.20
LR ChiA2 (d.f.) 146.38 (37) 149.90 (37) 75.15(32)
Appendix
Denmark Ireland UK
b O dds ra tio b O dds r a tio b O dds ra tio
Interest -0.50 ♦ * 0.61 -0.45 ** 0.64 -0.15 0.86
( 0.11 ) ( 0 . 11  ) ( 0.08 )
Subjective K now ledge -0.43 ** 0.65 -0.03 0.97 -0.22 m 0.81
( 0.14 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.09 )
Factual Knowledge -0.14 0.87 -0.19 0.82 -0.24 * 0.79
< 0.10 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.11 )
E ducation 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.01 -0.05 0.95
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.04 )
Identity -0.27 * 0.76 0.05 1.05 -0.14 0.87
( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.08 )
P ride -0.18 0.84 -0.29 * 0.75 0.05 1.06
c 0.12 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.09 )
R acism 0.03 1.03 -0.89 0.41 -0.66 * 0.52
( 0.26 ) ( 0.86 ) ( 0.27 )
A ge -0.08 0.92 -0.17 0.84 -0.58 ** 0.56
( 0.12 ) ( 0 . 11  ) ( 0.09 )
Sex 0.14 1.15 -0.06 0.95 -0,02 0.98
( 0.17 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.15 )
Religion (C atholic) -0.38 0.69 -0.49 0.61 -0.15 0.86
( 0.61 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.20 )
Religion (P ro testant) 0.19 UO 0.14 1.15 0.32 * 1.38
( 0.20 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.16 )
R eligion (O ther) 0.10 1.10 -1.10 0.33 -0.12 0.89
( 0.60 ) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.33 )
Political A ffiliation  (F a r L eft) -0.53 0.59 -0.14 0.87 -0.01 0.99
( 0.44 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.35 )
Political A ffiliation (C en tre) 0.01 1.01 -0.49 * 0.61 0.42 * 1.53
( 0.21 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.18 )
Political A ffiliation (R igh t) -0.26 0.77 -0.36 0.70 0.25 1.29
( 0.24 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0.23 )
Political A ffiliation  (Far R igh t) 0.18 1.19 -0.42 0.66 -0.43 0.65
{ 0.49 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.41 )
Political A ffiliation (D K ) -0.47 0.63 -0.30 0.74 0.15 1.16
( 0.49 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0.26 )
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Den. a d . Ire. Ctd. UK. a d -
Sub. Class (Working) 0.15 1.17 0.31 U 7 -0.04
0.96
( 0.20 ) (
o*1o ( 0.16 )
Sub. Class (LMC) -0.56 0.57 0.21 1.23 -0.43
• 0-65
( 0.36 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.22 )
Sub. Class (UMC) 0.03 1.03 -0.29 0.75 -0.10
0.90
1 ( 0.28 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.47 )
i
. Sub. Class (UC) 0.39 1.48 -0.03 0.97 0.47
1.59
( 0.65 ) ( 0.64 ) ( 1.18 )
Sub. Class (Refusal) -0.63 0.53 0.72 * 2.04 0.35
1.42
( 0.91 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.32 )
Constant 2.77 ** 16.04 2.72 •• 15.11
2.22 ** 9 .1 9
( 0.74 ) ( 0.87 ) ( 0.60 )
J  Number of Cases 922 845 1179
j Pseudo RA2 0.10 0.09 I
0-12
I LR ChiA2 (d.f.) 111.79(38) 93.11 (37) L 193.87(38)
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G re e c e S p a in P o rtu g a l
b O d d s ra tio b O dds ra tio b O dds ratio
In terest -0.55 ** 0.58 -0.39 0.67 -0.30 0.74
( 0.10 ) ( 0 .10  ) ( 0 .10 )
Subjective K now ledge -0.08 0.92 -0.02 0.98 -0.35 ** 0.71
( 0.12 ) ( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0.12 )
Factual K now ledge -0.02 0.98 -0 .20 0.82 0.10 1.11
( 0 .10 ) ( 0 .12  ) ( 0 .09 )
E ducation -0.01 0.99 0 .00 1.00 0.03 1.03
( 0 .04 ) ( 0 .04  ) ( 0 .04 )
Iden tity -0.21 0.81 -0 .19 0.83 -0.47 * + 0.63
( 0.12 ) ( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0 .12 )
Pride -0.30 ** 0.74 -0 .28  * 0.75 -0.38 ** 0.68
( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0 .12 )
R acism 0.63 1.87 0 .44 1.55 -0.10 0.91
( 0 .38 ) ( 0 .39  ) ( 0 .49 )
A ge -0.09 0.91 0.10 1.11 -0.17 0.85
( 0 .10 ) ( 0 . 1 1  ) ( 0 .10 )
Sex -0.10 0.90 -0.35 0 .70 -0.26 0.77
( 0.18 ) ( 0 .18  ) ( 0.18 )
Religion (C atholic) - -0 .16 0 .86 0.19 1.21
( 0 .22  ) ( 0.31 )
Religion (P ro testant) - - 0 .47 1.59
( 1.00 )
R eligion (O ther) -0.48 0.62 -0.65 0.52 -0.34 0.71
( 0.72 ) ( 0 .74  ) ( 0.68 )
P o litical A ffiliation  (Far L eft) -0.64 0.53 0.25 1.29 0.23 1.25
( 0.37 ) ( 0 .30  ) ( 0.40 )
Political A ffilia tion  (C en tre) -0.59 ** 0.55 0 .44  * 1.55 -0.14 0.87
( 0.23 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.21 )
Political A ffiliation  (R ig h t) -0.86 ** 0.42 0.44 1.56 -0.06 0.94
( 0 .29 ) ( 0 .26  ) ( 0.28 )
Political A ffilia tion  (Far R ig h t) -1.12 ** 0.33 0.36 1.43 -0.82 * 0.44
( 0.31 ) ( 0 .34  ) ( 0.39 )
Political A ffiliation (D K ) -0.34 0.71 0.28 1.33 -0.51 ♦ 0.60
( 0 .28 ) ( 0 .24  ) ( 0.23 )
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Gr. Ctd. Sp. Ctd- Port. c td *
Sub. Class (Working) 0.43 * 1.54 0.02 1.02 0.32
( 0.18 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.19 )
Sub. Class (LMC) 0.52 • 1.69 -0.22 0.80 0.03
1.03
( 0.27 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.22 )
Sub. Class (UMC) -0.68 0.51 0.22 1.25 -0.55
0.57
( 0.50 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.50 )
-0.65 0.52Sub. Class (UC) - *
( 0.67 )
Sub. Class (Refusal) 0.38 1.46 -0.57 0.57 1.59
4.91
( 0.47 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.95 )
1 Constant 3.47 ** 32.02 1.85 *»* 6.34
3.87
j ( 1.00 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.77 )
, Number of Cases 924 837
845
| Pseudo RA2 0.11 0.07
0.09
j LR ChiA2 (d.f.) 137.00 (34) 83.92 (35)
109.32 (35)
\
I
i
i
\
!
I
327
1
i
UlilLLUg
BIBLIO G R A PH Y
Abrams, Dominic and Michael A. Hogg. 1990. Social identity theory constructive and 
critical advances. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Achen, Christopher, “Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response,” American Political 
Science Review  69 (4): 1218-1232 (1975).
Adomo, Theodor W  et a l  1950. The Authoritarian personality. 1st ed. New York: Harper.
Aldrich, John Herbert and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. Linear probability, logit, and probit 
models. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham. 1950. The American people and foreign policy. 1st ed. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham. 1960. The American people and foreign policy. New York: 
Praeger.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1963. The civic culture political attitudes and 
democracy in five  nations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1989. The Civic culture revisited. Newbury 
Park, Calif: Sage Publications.
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1983. Imagined communities reflections on the origin and 
spread o f  nationalism. London: Verso.
Anderson, Christopher, “When in doubt, use proxies,” Comparative Political Studies 31 (5): 
569-601 (1998).
328
Bibliography
Anderson, Christopher and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Dynamics o f Public Opinion toward 
European Integration, 1973-1993,” European Journal o f  International Relations 2 
(2): 175-199(1996).
A nderson, Christopher and Shawn Reichert, “Economic Benefits and Support for 
Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis,” Journal o f  Public Policy Vol. 
15 (3): 231-249 (1996).
Anderson, Jeffrey, “The State of the (European) Union,” World Politics Vol. 47 (April) 
(1995).
A pter, David Ernest. 1964. Ideology and discontent London: Free Press o f  Glencoe.
Aquinas, Thomas. 1978. The Summa Theologica (Volume II). University o f  Chicago.
Ardy, Brian. “The National Incidence o f the European Community Budget,” Journal o f  
Common Market Studies 26(4): 401-29 (1988).
Aron, Raymond. 1954. The century o f  total war. 1st ed. Garden City, N.Y : Doubleday.
Barry, Brian M. 1989. Theories o f justice. Berkeley: University o f California Press.
!
Bednar, Jenna, John Ferejohn and Geoffrey Garrett. “The Politics o f  European Federalism,”
International Review o f Law and Economics 16:279-294 (1996).
! Beiner, Ronald. 1999. Theorizing nationalism. Albany, NY: State University o f New York 
Press.
Benz, Arthur and Burkard Eberlein, “Regions in European Governance: The Logic o f Multi- 
Level Interaction,” RSC Working Paper No. 98/31 (1998).
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal nationalism. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage.
Blais, André and Agnieszka Dobrzynska, “Turnout in electoral democracies,” European 
Journal o f  Political Research 33 (2): 239-61 (1998).
329
Bibliography
Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott, and Pâlie Svensson. 1998. People and Parliament in the 
European Union participation, democracy, and legitimacy. Oxford, England, New 
York: Clarendon Press. Oxford University Press.
Breakwell, Glynis M. and Evanthia Lyons. 1996. Changing European identities social 
psychological analyses o f  social change. Oxford, Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Breen, Richard. “Why is Support for Extreme Parties Underestimated by Surveys? A Latent 
Class Analysis,” British Journal o f  Political Science 30(2): 375-382 (2000).
Breuilly, John. 1993. Nationalism and the state. 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
Brika, Ben, Gerard Lemaine and James Jackson. 1997. Report on Racism and Xenophobia in 
Europe (Eurobarometer No. 47.1). Brussels.
Brooks, Clem, “The Selectively Political Citizen? Modeling Attitudes, Nonattitudes, and 
Change in 1950s Public Opinion,” Sociological Methods and Research Vol. 22 (4): 
419-459(1994).
Bruter, Michel, “Civic and Cultural Components o f  a European Identity: A Pilot Model of 
Measurement o f Citizens Levels o f  European Identity,” paper presented at IDNET 
workshop, 18 and 19th June 2001.
Canovan, Margaret, “Patriotism is not enough,” British Journal o f  Political Science 30 (3)
(2000).
Carey, Sean, “The Impact o f Political Parties on Public Support for European Integration,” 
Paper presented at the 27th Joint Sessions o f  the European Consortium fo r  Political 
Research (ECPR) (1999).
Cecchini, Paolo, Alex Jacquemin, and Michael Catinat. 1988. The European challenge, 1992 
the benefits o f  a single market. English ed. Aldershot, Brookfield, Vt., USA: Gower.
Cederman, Lars-Eric, “Nationalism and Integration,” Unpublished Paper (1996).
Charillon, F. and G. Ivaldi, “Les opinions publiques allemande, britannique et française face 
à FUnion Européenne,” La Lettre de la Maison Française (1996).
330
B ibliography
C heckel, Jeffrey, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist- 
Constructivist Divide,” European Journal o f International Relations Vol. 3 (4) 
(1997).
A
C heckel, Jeffrey, “Social Construction and Integration,” Paper presented at the workshop on 
"Social Constructivism in European Studies”, University o f Aarhus (1998).
C itrin , Jack and John Sides, “Europeanization: Institutions and the Evolution o f  Social 
Identities,” presented at IDNET workshop, Florence, 18th and 19th June 200L
C lark e , Harold and Nitish Dutt, “Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized 
Societies: The Impact of Unemployment,” American Political Science Review 85 (3): 
902-20 (1991).
C laude, Inis L. 1971. Swords into plowshares the problems and progress o f  international 
organization. 4th ed. New York: Random House.
C orbey , Dorette, “Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster o f European 
integration,” International Organization Vol. 49 (2) (1995).
C oren , Michael. 1993. The invisible man: the life and liberties o f  H.G, Wells. Toronto: 
Random House o f Canada.
D e V aus, D. A. 1995. Surveys in social research. 4th ed. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin.
D eflem , Mathieu and Fred Pampel, “The Myth o f Postnational Identity: Popular Support for 
European Unification,” Social Forces 75 (1): 119-143 (1996).
D elli Carpini, Michael X and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans know about politics and 
why it matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
DeM aris, Alfred. 1992. Logit modeling practical applications. Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications.
Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1957. Political community and the North Atlantic area 
international organization in the light o f  historical experience. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.
331
Bibliography
Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1967. France, Germany, and the Western alliance a study o f  elite 
attitudes on European integration and world politics. New York: Scribner.
Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang, 1969. Nationalism and its alternatives. New York: Knopf, 
distributed by  Random House.
Dogan, Mattei, “The Decline o f Nationalisms within Western Europe,” Comparative Politics 
27 (3): 281-305 (1994).
Duchêne, François and Jean Moimet. 1994. Jean Monnet the first statesman o f  
interdependence. 1st ed. New York: Norton.
Easton, David. 1965. A systems analysis o f  political life. New York: Wiley.
The Economist, “Visigothenburgers,” , 23 June 2001,40.
The Economist, “Farm Subsidies,” 24 June 2000, p. 145.
The Economist, “Poland’s angry second nation,” 12 October 2000.
Eichenberg, Richard, “Integration as Redistribution: Economic Conditions, Political 
Stability, and the Post-Maastricht Decline in Support for European Integration,” 
Paper prepared fo r  delivery to the Annual Meeting o f  the American Political Science 
Association (2000). 0 ,
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell Dalton, “Europeans and the European Community: the 
dynamics o f public support for European integration,” International Organization 
V ol.47  (4): 507-534(1993).
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell Dalton, “Convergence and Divergence in Citizen Support 
for European Integration, 1973-1996,” Paper prepared fo r  delivery to the Annual 
Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association (1997).
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell Dalton, “Post-Maastricht Blues: The Political Economy, 
Redistribution, and Citizen Support for European Integration 1973-1999,” Draft 
(2000).
r
Bibliography
Eichengreen, Bany, “Measurement Matters: Cumulation in the Study o f  Citizen Support for 
European Integration,” Unpublished Research Note (1999).
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The three worlds o f  welfare capitalism. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press.
European Voice, “Study suggests religions plays key role in women's attitude to the EU,” 3 
(33) (1997).
European Voice, “Parliament Calculations Tum Budget Losers into Winners,” 4 (11): 
Article 20(1998).
Eurostat. 2000 edition. European Social Statistics -  Migration. Luxembourg.
Featherstone, Kevin, “Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union,” 
Journal o f  Common Market Studies Vol. 32 (2) (1994).
Feld, Werner J and John K Wildgen. 1976. Domestic political realities and European 
unification a study o f  mass publics and elites in the European Community countries. 
Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
Fischer, Joschka et al. 2000. What kind o f  constitution fo r  what kind ofpolity? responses to 
Joschka Fischer. San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, Cambridge, MA: European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Jean Monnet 
Chair, Harvard Law School.
Fishbein, Martin and leek Ajzen. 1975. B elief attitude, intention, and behaviour an 
introduction to theory and research, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
Forbes, H. D. 1985. Nationalism, ethnocentrism, and personality social science and critical 
theory. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren, “Uncorking the bottle: Popular 
Opposition to European Unification in the Wake o f Maastricht,” Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies Vol. 32 (4) (1994).
333
L
r n w n i
Bibliography
Franklin, Mark and Christopher Wlezien, “The Responsive Public. Issue salience, policy 
change and preferences for European unification,” Journal o f  Theoretical Politics 
Vol. 9 (3): 347-363 (1997).
Gabel, M. and G. Whitten, “Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public 
Support for European Integration,” Political Behaviour 19: 81-96 (1997).
Gabel, Matthew and Harvey Palmer, “Understanding Variation in Public Support for 
European Integration,” European Journal o f  Political Research Vol. 27 (1995).
Gabel, Matthew J. 1998. Interests and integration: market liberalization, public opinion, and 
European Union. Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press.
Gabel, Matthew J, “Public Support for Integration: An Empirical Test o f Five Theories,” 
Journal o f  Politics 60: 333-54 (1998b).
Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Donald J. Treiman and Paul M. De Graaf. “A Standard 
International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status,” Social Science 
Research 21(1), 1-57(1992).
Garton Ash, Timothy. “Is Britain European?,” Prospect, February 2001.
Gellner, Ernest. 1964. Thought and change. London: Weidenfeld andNicolson.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1994. Conditions o f  liberty civil society and its rivals. 1st American ed. New 
York, N.Y: Allen Lane/Penguin Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1997. Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
George, Stephen. 1996. Politics and policy in the European Union. 3rd ed. Oxford, UK, 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldmann, Kjell and Karin Gilland. 2001. Nationality versus Europeanisation: the national 
view o f  the nation in fo u r  EU  countries. Stockholm University, Department of 
Political Science.
334
Bibliography
Goldstein, H. 1995. Multilevel statistical models. London, New York, E. Arnold. Halsted 
Press,
Gowan, Peter and Perry Anderson. 1997. The question o f  Europe. London, New York: 
Verso.
Graubard, Stephen Richards. 1964. A new Europe? Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Greene, William H. 1990. Econometric analysis. New York, London: Macmillan. Collier 
Macmillan.
Greenstein, Fred I and Nelson W Polsby. 1975. Handbook o f  political science vol 5. 
Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The uniting o f  Europe political, social, and economic forces, 1950- 
1957. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the nation-state functionalism and international organization. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
Haas, Ernst, “The Study o f Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre­
theorizing,“ International Organization Vol. 24 (4) (1970).
Haas, Ernst B. 1975. The obsolescence o f regional integration theory. Berkeley: Institute o f  
International Studies, University of California.
Haas, Ernst B. 1997. Nationalism, liberalism, and progress. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press.
Haas, Ernst and Philippe Schmitter, “Economics and Differential Patterns o f Political 
Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,*’ International Organization 
Vol. 18: 705-37 (1964).
Habermas, Jürgen and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. 1989. The new conservatism cultural 
criticism and the historians' debate. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Hallstein, Walter. 1972. Europe in the making. London: Allen and Unwin.
335
Bibliography
Handley, David, “Public Opinion and European Integration: The Crisis o f the 1970s,” 
European Journal o f  Political Research Vol. 9: 335-364 (1981).
Hayo, Bemd, “Knowledge and Attitude Towards European M onetary Union,” Journal o f  
Policy Modeling 21 (5): 641 -651 (1999).
Heath, Anthony et al., “British National Sentiment,” British Journal o f  Political Science 29: 
155-175 (1999).
Hewstone, Miles. 1986. Understanding attitudes to the European community a social- 
psychological study in four member states. Cambridge Cambridgeshire, New York, 
Paris: Cambridge University Press. Editions de la Maison des sciences de lTiomme.
Hix, Simon, “The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative 
Politics,” West European Politics V ol. 17 (10): 1-30(1994).
Hodder-Williams, Richard. 1970. Public opinion polls and British politics. London: 
Routledge & K. Paul.
Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation-State and the Case of 
Western Europe,” Daedalus 95 (3): 862-915 (1966).
Hoffmann, Stanley, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” Journal o f  
Common Market Studies Vol. 21:21-37 (1982).
Hofrichter, Juergen, “The EUROBAROMETER Programme o f the EC Commission,” 
Mannheim Centre fo r  European Social Research Working Papers EUROD ATA/Nr. 
4(1993).
Holland, Martin. 1993. European Community integration. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Holsti, Ole, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (4): 439-466 (1992).
Hooghe, Liesbet. 1996. Cohesion policy and European integration building multi-level 
governance. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
336
Bibliography
Howe, Paul, “A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings/’ Journal o f  
Common Market Studies 33 (1): 27-46 (195).
Hurwitz, Jon and Mark Peffley, “How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A 
Hierarchical M odel./’ American Political Science Review Vol. 81: 1099-1020 (1987).
Hutchinson, John and Anthony D Smith. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,” International Organization 
Vol. 24 (4) (1970).
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The silent revolution changing values and political styles among 
Western publics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald, “Long-Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification,” 
Government and Opposition Vol. 12: 150-77 (1977b).
Inglehart, Ronald and Jacques-Rene Rabier, “Economic Uncertainty and European 
Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends,” Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Social and 
Political Science 440: 66-97 (1978).
International Social Science Program (ISSP). 1998. National Identity (1995). Edited by 
.Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
International Stratification and Mobility File: Conversion Tools, Utrecht: Department o f 
Sociology.
Janssen, Joseph, “Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public Support for European 
Integration,” British Journal o f  Political Science Vol. 21 (1991).
Kant, Immanuel and Hans Siegbert Reiss. 1991. Kant political writings. 2nd ed. Cambridge 
England, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Keating, Michael, “What do the Nations Want? Nationalist Aspirations and Transnational 
Integration in the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and Canada,” Paper presented at 
the ECPR Joint Session, Grenoble, April 2001.
337
i
Bibliography
Keohane, Robert O and Stanley Hoffmann. 1991. The N ew  European community 
decisionmaking and institutional change. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
Key, V. 0 . 1961. Public opinion and American democracy. 1st ed. ed. New York: Knopf.
King, Gary, Robert 0  Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing social inquiry scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg, “Making the M ost of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” Paper prepared fo r  presentation at the 
Annual Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA (1998).
King, Gary Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000). CLARIFY Version 1.2.1. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Kosterman, Rick and Seymour Feshbach, “Toward a Measure o f Patriotic and Nationalistic 
Attitudes,” Political Psychology 10 (2): 257-274 (1989).
Kriesi, Hanspeter et a l  1999. Nation and National Identity. Zurich: Verlag Ruegger.
Kuhnle, Stein. 2000. Survival o f  the European welfare state. London, New York: Routledge.
Laffan, Brigid, “The Politics o f Identity and Political Order in Europe,” Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies 34(1):81-102(1996).
Laffan, Brigid, “The European Union and Its Institutions as 'Identity Builders’,” paper 
presented at IDNET workshop, Florence, 18th and 19th June 2001.
Le Corbusier and Frederick Etchells. 1952. Towards a new architecture. London: 
Architectural Press.
Leibfried, Stephan and Paul Pierson. 1995. European social policy between fragmentation 
and integration. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Levison, Sanford, “Is Liberal Nationalism an Oxymoron? An Essay for Judith Shklar.,” 
Ethics 105 (3): 626-45 (1995).
338
Bibliography
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Economics and elections the major western democracies. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Liebert, Ulrike, “The Gendering of Euro-skepticism: Public Discourses and Support to the 
EU in a Cross-national Comparison,” Institute for European Studies Working Paper, 
Cornell University (1997).
Lilli, Waldemar and Michael Diehl, “Measuring National Identity,” Arbeitspapiere - 
Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europäische Sozialforschung (10) (1999).
Lindberg, Leon N. 1963. The political dynamics o f European economic integration. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
Lindberg, Leon N  and Stuart A Scheingold. 1970. Europe's would-be polity: patterns o f  
change in the European community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
Lindberg, Leon N and Stuart A Scheingold. 1971. Regional integration theory and research. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Lippmann, Walter. 1922. Public opinion. New York: Macmillan.
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: cross­
national perspectives Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others. New York: Free 
Press.
Loth, Wilfred, “Identity and Statehood in the Process o f European Integration,” Journal o f  
European Integration History 6 (1): 19-31 (2000).
Ludlow, Peter. 1982. The making o f  the European Monetary System a case study o f  the 
politics o f  the European Community. London, Boston: Butterworth Scientific.
Lynch, Peter. 1996. Minority nationalism and European integration. Cardiff: University o f 
Wales Press.
MacCormick, Neil, “Beyond the Sovereign State,” Modem Law Review  56 (1): 1-18 (1993).
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1992. Macroeconomics. New York: Worth Publishers.
339
Bibliography
Manstead, A. S. R  and Miles Hewstone. 1995. The Blackwell encyclopedia o f  social 
psychology. Oxford, UK, Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Manza, Jeff and Fay Lomax Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion: The State of 
the Debate,” Institute fo r  Policy Research, Northwestern University WP-01-06 
(2001).
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, “European Integration from the 1980s: 
State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance,” Journal o f  Common Market Studies Vol. 
36 (3) (1996).
Mathew D.D., “Europeanism: a study o f  public opinion and attitudinal integration in the 
European Community”. M.A. thesis: Norman Patterson School o f International 
Affairs, Carleton University. (1980).
McCrone, David and Paula Surridge, “National identity and national pride,” British Social 
Attitudes 15th Report: 1-17 (1998).
Melich, Anna, “Public Opinion Towards Non-EC Immigrants in the European Community,” 
Paper delivered at the Scientific Conference on International Perspectives on Race 
and Ethnic Relations, September 13-15,1991, University o f  Michigan.
Melich, Anna, “Comparative European trend survey data on attitudes towards immigrants,” 
Paper prepared fo r  ECPR Joint Sessions 27/4/1995 (1995).
Michalski, Anna and Jonas Tallberg, “Project on European Integration Indicators: People's 
Europe,” Working Paper, European Commission Forward Studies Unit (1999).
Michelmann, H., “Multinational staffing and organizational functioning in the Commission 
of the EC,” International Organisation 32 (2) (1978).
Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Considerations on representative government. 2nd ed. London: 
Parker, son, and Bourn.
Millner, Helen, “International Theories o f  Cooperation among N a t i o n s World Politics Vol. 
44: 466-96(1992).
340
Bibliography
Mil w ard, Alan S, George Brennan, and Federico Romero. 1992. The European rescue o f  the 
nation-state. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mitrany, David. 1943. A working peace system an argument fo r  the functional development 
o f  international organization. London, New York, Toronto etc.: The Royal Institute 
o f  International Affairs. Oxford University Press.
Mitrany, David. 1975. The functional theory o f  politics. London: Published on behalf o f 
London School o f  Economics & Political Science by M. Robertson.
Mitrany, David and William McKean Brown Memorial publication fund. 1933. The 
progress o f  international government. New Haven: Yale university press.
Moodie, Graeme C. and Gerald Studdert-Kennedy. 1970. Opinions, publics and pressure 
groups an essay on 'Vox PopulV and representative government. London: Allen & 
Unwin.
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the EC f  International Organization Vol. 26 (1) (1987).
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach,” Journal o f  Common Market Studies Vol. 31 (4) 
(1993).
Moravcsik, Andrew, “W hy the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic 
Politics and International Cooperation,” Harvard University Center fo r  European 
Studies (1994).
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Review of Alan Milward’s ’The Rescue o f  the European Nation- 
State*,” Journal o f  Modem History Vol. 67 (1995).
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51 (4) (1997).
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The choice fo r  Europe social purpose and state power from  
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
341
Bibliography
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998b. Centralization or fragmentation? Europe facing the challenges 
o f deepening, diversity, and democracy. New York, Washington, D.C.: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press. Distributed by Brookings Institution Press.
Müller-Peters, Anke, “The significance of national pride and national identity to the attitude 
toward the single European currency: A Europe-wide comparison,” Journal o f  
Economic Psychology Vol. 19: 701-719(1998).
Müller-Peters, Anke et al., “Explaining attitudes towards the euro: design o f a cross-national 
study,*'Journal o f  Economic Psychology 19: 663-680 (1998b).
Mutimer, David, “ 1992 and the Political Integration o f Europe: Neofunctionalism 
Reconsidered,” Journal o f  European Integration Vol. 31 (1) (1989).
Nelsen, Brent and James Guth, “Exploring the Gender Gap: Women, Men and Public 
Attitudes toward European Integration,” European Union Politics 1 (3): 267-291 
(2000).
Nelsen, Brent F and Alexander C-G Stubb. 1994. The European Union readings on the 
theory and practice o f  European integration. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner.
Neumann, Iver and Jennifer Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: an Addendem 
to the Literature on International Society,” Review o f  International Studies 17: 327- 
348 (1991).
Niedermayer, Oskar, ‘T h e  European Citizens' Interest in Politics and their Attitudes and 
Behaviour concerning the EC and the European Integration,” ZEUS Report fo r  DGX, 
Commission o f  the European Communities (1990).
Niedermayer, Oskar and R Sinnott. 1995. Public opinion and internationalized governance. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook, ““Less Filling, Tastes Great” The Realist-Neoliberal 
Debate,” World Politics Vol. 46 (1994).
342
Bibliography
Northern Ireland, Dept, of Finance and Personnel, and Policy Planning and Research Unit. 
1998. Northern Ireland annual abstract o f statistics. Belfast, Nonhem  Ireland: 
HMSO.
Nye, Joseph, Harvard University, and Center for International Affairs. 1971. Peace in parts 
integration and conflict in regional organization. Boston: Little, Brown.
Nye, Joesph, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics Vol. 40 (1988).
O'Neill, Michael. 1996. The politics o f  European integration a reader. London, New York: 
Routledge.
Oakes, Penelope J, S. Alexander Haslam, and John C Turner. 1994. Stereotyping and social 
reality. Oxford, UK, Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 1997. Treaty on European 
Union: European Union consolidated versions o f the Treaty on European Union and  
the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Luxembourg.
Official Journal o f the European Communities (C349), 42 (1999).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Economic Outlook 61 
(1997).
Peffley, Mark and Jon Hurwitz, “International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public 
Response to Changing Soviet-US Relations American Journal o f  Political Science 
36 (2): 431-61 (1992).
Pentland, Charles. 1973. International theory and European integration. London: Faber,
Pierson, Paul, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” 
Comparative Politics Studies Vol. 29 (2): 123-163 (1996).
Potter, Jonathan and Margaret Wetherell. 1987. Discourse and social psychology beyond 
attitudes and behaviour. London, Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications.
Puchala, Donald, “O f Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration,” Journal o f  
Common Market Studies Vol. 10 (1972).
343
Bibliography
Putnam, Robert D, Robert Leonardi, and RafFaella Nanetti. 1993. Making democracy work 
civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Quillian, Lincoln, “Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population 
composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe/’ American 
Sociological Review  61 (1995).
Rattinger, Hans and Don Munton. 1991. Debating national security the public dimension. 
Frankfurt am Main, New York: P. Lang.
Ray, Leonard, “Divergent policies, divergent interests: explaining cross-national variation in 
the social basis for support for EU integration.,” Paper presented at the American 
Political Science Association (1996).
Reif, K. and H. Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections,” European Journal o f  
Political Research 8 (1980).
Reinsch, Paul Samuel. 1911. Public international unions, their work and organization a 
study in international administrative law. Boston, London: Pub. for the World Peace 
Foundation, Ginn and company.
Rhodes, Carolyn and Sonia Mazey. 1995. Building a European polity? Boulder, Colo: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Risse, Thomas, “To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European 
Union,” ARENA Working Paper 98/1 (1998).
Risse, Thomas, Martin Marcussen, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf and 
Klaus Roscher. “Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German 
Nation-State Identities,” Journal o f  European Public Policy 6(4): 614-33 (1999).
Rose, Richard, “National pride in cross-national perspective,” International Social Science 
Journal Vol. 36: 85-96 (1985).
Rosecrance, Richard N. 1986. The rise o f  the trading state commerce and conquest in the 
modem world. New York: Basic Books.
344
Bibliography
Rosenau, James N. 1969. International politics and foreign policy a reader in research and  
theory. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press.
Rossi, Peter Henry, James D Wright, and Andy B Anderson. 1983. Handbook o f  survey 
research. San Diego: Academic Press.
Routh, David and Carole Burgoyne, “Being in two minds about a single currency: a UK 
perspective on the EURO,” Journal o f  Economic Psychology Vol. 19: 741-754 
(1998).
Ryan, Alan. 1988. Bertrand Russell a political life. 1st American ed ed. New York: Hill and 
Wang.
Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, “The Political Basis of Support for European Integration,” 
European Union Politics 1 (2): 147-171 (2000).
Sandholtz, Wayne and John Zysman, “ 1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World 
Politics Vol. 42(1989).
Sbragia, Alberta M. 1991. Euro-politics institutions and policymaking in the new European 
community. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Schmitt, Hermann and Inge Weller, “Behavioural Relevance o f  Attitudes and Opinions 
towards European Integration and the EC,” ZEUS Report fo r  DGXr Commission o f  
the European Communities (1991).
Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000. How to democratize the European Union— and why bother? 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Schmitter, Philippe C and Ernst B Haas. 1964. Mexico and Latin American economic 
integration. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University o f California.
Schneider, Gerald and Lars-Erik Cederman, “The change of tide in political cooperation: a 
limited information model o f European integration,” International Organization Vol. 
48 (4): 633-62 (1994).
Scruton, Roger. 1982. A dictionary o f  political thought. London: Macmillan.
345
Bibliography
Sewell, James Patrick. 1962. An evaluation o f  the functional approach to international 
organization with emphasis on United Nations programs financing economic 
development
Shapiro, Robert and Benjamin Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” Journal o f  
Conflict Resolution Vol. 32 (2): 211-247 (1988).
Shepherd, Robert James. 1975. Public opinion and European integration. Famborough, 
Lexington, Mass: Saxon House. Lexington Books.
Sherif, Muzafer. 1967. Group conflict and co-operation: their social psychology. London: 
Routledge & K. Paul.
Sinnott, Richard, “Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the Internationalisation of Issues: 
The Implication for Legitimacy,” RSC Working Paper No. 94/13 (1994).
Sinnott, Richard, “Europeanisation and Public Opinion: The Extent and Implications of 
'Non-Europe',” RSC Conference Paper EUR/21 (1999).
Sinnott, Richard, “Knowledge and the Position o f Attitudes to a European Foreign Policy on 
the Real-to-Random Continuum,” International Journal o f  Public Opinion Research 
12 (2) (2000).
Smith, Anthony D., “National Identity and the idea o f  European unity,” International Affairs
; . 68: 55-76 (1992).
Smith, D and J Wanke, “Completing the Single European Market - An Analysis o f  the 
: Impact on Member States,” American Journal o f  Political Science 37 (2): 529-554 
(1993).
Smith, Tom and Lars Jarkko, “National Pride: a Cross-national Analysis,” National Opinion 
Research Centre, University o f  Chicago GSS Report no. 19 (1998).
Sniderman, Paul M, Richard A Brody, and Philip Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and choice 
explorations in political psychology. Cambridge England, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
346
Pima*
Bibliography
W i l l  ■  '  f  ' '  -i* ‘ J  * *  "  ------------'-*■* -
Topf, Richard, Peter Mohler, and Anthony Heath, “Pride in one's country: Bntain and West 
Germany,” British Social Attitudes 6th Report: 121-142 (19S9).
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in 
the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC,” Millennium Vol. 20(1): 1-22 (1991 >
Tsoukalis, Loukas. 1983. The European Community past, present <£ future. Oxford: B.
Blackwell.
Turner, John C. 1987. Rediscovering the social group self-categorization theory . Oxford.
UK, New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell.
Viroli, Maurizio. 1995. For love o f country an essay on patriotism and nationalism Oxford.
New York: Clarendon Press. Oxford University Press.
Wallace, William and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1990. The Dynamics of ■
European integration. London, New York: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs. i
i
W ard, Conor and Andrew Greeley, ““Development” and Tolerance: the Case of Ireland,”
Eire-Ireland 25 (4): 7-17 (1990).
Wober, J. M., “British Attitudes towards Europe: an exploration of their inner structure,”
British Journal o f  Social Psychology* 20: 181-8(1981).
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and collaboration essays on international politics.
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
W ood, Adrian. 1994. North-South trade, employment, and inequality changing fortunes m a 
skill-driven world. Oxford England, New York: Clarendon Press. Oxford University 
Press.
Woolf, Leonard and Fabian Research Department. 1916. International government: ftto 
reports. London: Allen and Unwin.
World Bank. 1997. The state in a changing world. New York: Published for the World 
Bank, Oxford University Press.
347
Bibliography
Wright, Quincy. 1942. A study o f  war. Chicago, 111: The University o f  Chicago press.
Zaller, John. 1992. The nature and origins o f  mass opinion. Cambridge England, New York, 
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Zaller, John and Vincent Price, “A study in everyday memory: Learning and forgetting the 
news,” Paper given at the annual meeting o f  the Midwestern Political Science 
Association, Chicago (1990).
348
I
W I M
* ■
%Uàà


